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My interest in the phenomenon of nationalism as an intellectual subject has been long-
standing.  I came to the study of nationalism and radicalism in colonial West Africa in the 
late 70s and early 80s during my tenure as a lecturer in the Department of History, 
University of Ibadan, Nigeria where I designed and taught courses in Modern African 
Political Thought and in other select themes.  In the course of teaching this class, I 
became engaged with the subject of nationalism and posed the issue of rethinking the 
phenomenon in new ways to enrich prevailing scholarship on the subject in regard to 
Africa.  My rethinking of this subject led to my decision to explore it further and resulted 
in various unpublished papers in the 80s and 90s,1 culminating in an earlier draft of my 
doctoral dissertation.2  The insights in this present work and its methodological 
framework derive most importantly from this earlier draft of my doctoral dissertation and 
from my earlier works and papers since the 80s.  They are all based on my findings from 
archival research work I carried out in the British archives and from preliminary research 
in the Nigerian archives, from newspaper reports, Legislative Council Debates documents 
for the colonies, rare manuscripts, memoirs, etc., as well as select interviews carried out 
earlier in Nigeria with famed activists of the period under study: labor left leader Michael 
Imoudu, Islamic feminist, Alhaja Hajiyya Sawaba Gambo, and ex-Zikist, Nwafor Orizu.3  
These are supplemented with information from secondary materials. 4  Additional 
material is provided in this study from the British Documents on the End of Empire 
(BDEE) series.   
 This study confronts the nationalist problematic at a particular historical juncture 
in British West Africa from a reconstituted methodological and epistemological 
framework in the attempt to provide further understanding of the phenomenon of 
nationalism and of the process that ended empire in British West Africa.  It seeks to 
examine perspectives on community and citizenship and how people were re-imagining 
the boundaries of their world and the future and seeking to reorder their lives especially 
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in the period of rapid political decentralization in what turned out to be the last decades of 
British colonial rule.  The study examines the shifting political boundaries and how 
people were seeking to reposition themselves vis-à-vis the community, and the 
coordinates that determined individual formulations of rights and belongings.  In its 
attempt to fill a lacuna in the historiography of the nationalist phenomenon and of the end 
of empire in British West Africa, the study also explores the category of the “communist” 
which was being added to British imperialist discourse in the period under study.  It seeks 
to reveal the effects of British officialdom’s perceptions of communism in the West 
African colonies and their reaction to the perceived radicalism of the left among colonial 
social radicals on the contestations over community and citizenship among colonial 
social forces, and on the social, legal, and political contexts that defined the 
Independence Constitutions.   
In attempting to explore aspects of the cultural and political contestations in the 
public sphere over community and notions of citizenship especially among African 
ethnopolitical entrepreneurs and colonial social radicals in this period, the study examines 
how they and their organizations constructed their arguments and actions relative to each 
other and what they were doing with the categories of, i.e., “race,” “ethnicity,” “gender,” 
“class,” “religion,” in their discourses and social and political practice.  As Brubaker has 
commented, categories are for doing.5  The social radicals’ perspectives of citizenship are 
examined to involve an understanding of citizenship in inclusive terms and understood as 
the set of practices – juridical, political, economic, and cultural – which define a person 
and through which persons define themselves as competent members of society.  They 
attempted to make the categories of race, ethnicity, gender, class, religion, etc., into 
“nation” in mutually-inclusive terms.  The ethnopolitical entrepreneurs’ discourses and 
perspectives of the “nation” and of citizenship and their categories are examined to be 
predicated on narrower forms of cultural and political address.  Their discursive practices 
are examined to involve the making of categories of, i.e., race, ethnicity, gender, class, 
religion into “nation” in mutually-exclusive terms.  Their discourses are conceptualized 
as the master-discourse and the discourses of colonial radicals are conceptualized as the 
supplementary-discourse, following Homi Bhabha’s concept of the master-discourse and 
the supplementary-discourse.6  
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The analytical concepts and categories applied in this study, including the 
category of social radicalism, are problematized and the study seeks to reconceptualize 
them in processual and relational terms and to apply them as coordinates.  It is noted in 
this, for example, that the phenomenon of social radicalism, like that of the broader 
phenomenon of nationalism, was complex, contradictory, and shifting and that the 
radicals were not social radicals in all respects.  They are problematized as also sharing 
some relational characteristics with other colonial social forces, including the 
ethnopolitical entrepreneurs.  The radicals’ attitude to tradition, for example, could be 
problematic.  Thus, one finds the renowned feminist, Funlayo Ransome-Kuti (FRK) of 
Nigeria, whose life and energies were devoted to contesting received understanding of 
rights and duties and to reconstituting these, in particular, gender norms, in more 
equitable terms, advocating for the rights of the Ogboni male fraternity in the 
reconstituted Egba Central Council (ECC) in Abeokuta on the basis of their traditional 
rights, “rights” which conflicted with the rights of women in the same Council.7  In their 
suggested reforms of the Egba Native Administration, she and the women in the 
Abeokuta Women’s Union (AWU) advocated, among other things, that “the legitimate 
rights of the Ogboni Chiefs should be restored to them.”8  She failed to see that those 
traditional rights constrained against the rights of women in the newly reconstituted ECC 
and other governing Councils into which the colonial government was now for the first 
time allowing a few women, including FRK, to enter.  Ironically, the same Ogbonis were 
at the same time protesting against the representation of women in these Councils as 
“contrary to Egba customs and tradition” and requested that the colonial government 
remove the women from these Councils!9   Many of the colonial social radicals could be 
said to lack a proper appreciation of culture as a signifying system, “the signifying 
system through which necessarily (though among other means) a social order is 
communicated, reproduced, experienced and explored.”10  
Also, many of the radicals and their organizations had emerged from the womb of 
the more mainstream political organizations and/or parties whose leadership was 
composed of African politicians located more right of center and center on the 
ideological spectrum, although the social radicals’ intent was to radicalize these more 
mainstream political organizations and parties and leadership from within.  In Nigeria, for 
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example, the Zikist radicals had emerged from the National Council of Nigeria and the 
Cameroons (NCNC) party in 1948, and the Northern Elements Progressive Union 
(NEPU) radicals from the broader but cultural and conservative organization in the 
North, the Northern Peoples’ Congress (NPC) in 1950, and in the Gold Coast, the labor 
radicals from the Convention People’s Party (CPP), etc.  Even women radicals had gone 
into alliance with these more mainstream organizations at certain periods of their political 
movements and parties, though mostly short-lived.  FRK allied the AWU with the NCNC 
and later in the 50s, her Commoner Peoples’ Party with the NPC and Cummings-John of 
Sierra Leone allied her Sierra Leone Women’s Movement (SLWM) with the more 
centrist/right of center mainstream political organization in the Sierra Leone Protectorate, 
the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP).   The women had also believed in impacting 
these otherwise gendered mainstream political organizations from within.  But the social 
radicals could not long subsist in these organizations and most were either expelled, 
forced out, or disengaged from these parties out of frustration.  This is because their 
vision of community and notions of citizenship premised on the realization of equality 
before the law and to become an underlying principle for social, economic, and cultural 
action, conflicted with, as well as challenged the more mainstream notions of citizenship 
that sought to concentrate all lines of affiliation into a single, totalizing, unmediated, and 
exclusionary version of the national community.   
For example, the political organization of social radicals in the North of Nigeria, 
NEPU, founded with the objective of fundamentally changing the norms in this 
conservative Islamic-ruled society, had represented a direct attack on the status quo right 
from its founding.  With its motto Yama (freedom) symbolizing three freedoms – 
political, economic and social – it sought at its creation in 1950 within the NPC to fight 
for the grassroot against the constraints of the feudal social structure of the emirate 
system which the British Indirect Rule system had largely preserved and perpetuated in 
many ways there.  NEPU’s program for local government reforms involved a serious 
attempt at establishing grassroot democracy.  Powerful emirs and certain administrative 
officers regarded the NEPU within the NPC then, with its radicalizing initiatives, as a 
dangerously radical group and effected the elimination of the radical elements from the 
NPC at an early stage.  Their socially radical program and attempts to redefine the 
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political culture and norms in this Northern Nigerian society in more egalitarian ways 
directly challenged both the traditional rulers and the colonial authority who would 
together continue to seek to marginalize NEPU and the radicals.  The Zikists in the 
NCNC, labor radicals in the Convention People’s Party (CPP) in the Gold Coast, and 
other organizations and/or coalitions of social radicals in mainstream organizations, also 
experienced similar hostility and reactionary measures, including expulsion, by leaders of 
these parties.  In the case of women radicals, the narrow organizational structures and 
agendas of the more mainstream parties with which they went into alliance marginalized 
them and their organizations in those parties and they also failed to impact them from 
within.   
The social radicals stood outside these more mainstream organizations and 
parties, then, challenging the framings and narrative encodings of community and 
citizenship as constituted in the discursive practices of African ethnopolitical 
entrepreneurs who led those parties.  The radicals contested the differences among 
citizenry that were ordered by class, religion, gender, and other logics of centeredness 
and marginalization inscribed in mainstream construction of community and notions of 
citizenship.  They challenged the perceived exploitation and patterns of domination and 
exclusion concealed in the use of language of ethnicity, race, religion, class, etc., by the 
ethnopolitical entrepreneurs.11  The colonial social radicals stood in a somewhat 
dialectical relationship vis-à-vis the ethnopolitical entrepreneurs and their organizations, 
but without negating the reconstituted social contradictions of the past or present, or 
turning contradictions into a dialectical process.  They stood, rather, as the supplementary 
space of cultural signification, challenging the power of what became the dominant 
discourse, i.e., the master-discourse, and antagonizing its power to generalize and its 
tendencies to totalize the social in a “homogenous empty time.”12  Colonial social 
radicals imagined the nation more in inclusive terms as a new kind of community based 
on citizenship conceived of as a kind of “fraternity of equals” and a “deep horizontal 
comradeship.”  Their discourse and social and political practices are posited as falling 
largely outside the terms of the social, political, and cultural imaginings that 
ethnopolitical entrepreneurs’ idea of the nation and citizenship entailed.   
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This study seeks to examine the process of delegitimization and entitlement 
among citizenry and the language and mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion involved in 
this process, i.e., the native/stranger, autochtony/allochtony duality, etc., in the 
immediate pre-independence period.  It seeks to examine the creation of new boundaries 
of exclusion, as well as aspects of the complex process by which inclusion in the nation 
was competed for and claimed in this period. 
In my attempt to reconstitute the narrative of nationalism and to provide fresh 
perspectives on the phenomenon of nationalism and the end of empire in British West 
Africa, my work also explores the making of the category of the “communist” by British 
officialdom and to what effects.  It examines British officialdom’s imperialist anti-
communist framework, their distinction between the “respectable,” i.e., “moderate” 
African, and the “extremist” and “communist” African, and in particular, their application 
of the category of the communist to colonial social radicals and to anybody that they did 
not like.  It seeks to examine the effect of this categorization and of the imperial anti-
communist framework on the dynamics of the competing framings of community and 
notions of citizenship among colonial social forces, and on the process that ended empire. 
The colonial social radicals’ discourses and social and political practices are 
posited in this study to represent alternative space for the construction of community and 
framings of citizenship but were delegitimized by British officialdom who sought to close 
the space for the imagining of community and citizenship in the socially transforming 
terms in which the radicals were seeking to privilege them.  This study posits that by 
collapsing theirs and other forms of social intervention that officialdom did not like into 
the imperial anti-communist grid, British officialdom fairly succeeded in closing the 
space for other forms of social intervention that might have mapped out a different, 
perhaps more democratic terrain for the future independent African societies.   
I seek to examine the twin themes of social radicalism and communism in the 
narrative of nationalism and of the process that ended empire in the British West African 
colonies in ways that previous literature of nationalism and decolonization in British 
West Africa have not addressed or adequately focused on.13   A few works in the last 
couple of decades such as Stephen Howe’s (1993),14 and Hakim Adi’s (1998) 15 have 
provided important focus on anti-colonialism and the left in Britain.  Hakim’s Adi’s study 
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comes closest to a focus on nationalism and communism in British West Africa but his 
work is limited to an examination of the activities of West African students n Britain.     
Perhaps because of the social radicals’ failure to succeed and historians’ 
predilection to studying the movements that succeeded, the phenomenon of radicalism 
and of the associated phenomenon of communism with which they were associated in 
British officialdom’s mind have remained fairly neglected in the literature of nationalism 
and of the end of empire in British West Africa.  But the movements that failed are as 
significant, if not more significant than those that succeeded in that they help in the 
understanding of the process by which some succeeded while others failed as well as the 
nature of the outcome.  This study seeks to reveal aspects of the process by which the 
terms of the social, political, and cultural imaginings that the ethnopolitical 
entrepreneurs’ idea of the nation entailed became the dominant form – the master-
discourse – and the basis of the Independence Constitutions for the West African 
colonies.  It attempts to reveal how this process was furthered by British officialdom’s 
legitimization of ethnopolitical entrepreneurs’ discourse  – the discourse that they would 
rather have privileged – and their delegitimization of those which they would rather not 
have centered – those of colonial social radicals, etc. 
The conflicts and contestations between colonial social radicals and the 
ethnopolitical entrepreneurs over the “nation” and notions of citizenship also involved 
conflicts and contestations between the social radicals and British officialdom and their  
perspectives on community and forms of citizenship.  It involved contestations over how 
the makers of empire sought to remake or “order” these West African societies in what 
turned out to be the last decades of British rule there.  The imaginings of community and 
citizenship among the ethnopolitical entrepreneurs - the officially-constituted 
“moderates” – would find more common grounds with those of British officialdom’s.  
They were as gendered and as socially conservative as officialdom’s imaginings of these 
African societies and the way they hoped to reorder them.  Hence officialdom wished that 
the NEPU radicals would leave the status quo alone in the North and have unpolluted 
“the Hausa and Fulani of the North, Muslims and warriors, with the dignity, courtly 
manners, high bearing and conservative outlook which democracy and the Daily Mirror 
have not yet debased,” in the words of the Secretary of State, Mr. Lyttelton, in 1953.16  
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British officialdom would wish that radicalized students and intellectuals would not upset 
Colonial Office’s “calculations and … the even tenor of political developments among 
the slow moving masses,” etc.17   
The conflicts and contestations of the last decades of British colonial rule in these 
places were also largely disputes over the law and over the terms of the new 
constitutions, especially the very last constitution in these colonies – the Independence 
Constitution – that would form the legal basis of the new African states.  The radicals in 
NEPU regarded the 1956 Constitutional Conference as critical because it was the last of 
its kind before Nigeria’s independence which had already been agreed to by officialdom 
and the political incumbents.  NEPU was particularly adamant that the 1956 Conference 
should lay a more solid foundation on which a permanent Nigerian constitution would be 
established by the Constituent Assembly which would follow the British withdrawal from 
the country.  NEPU drew attention to the weaknesses in the previous constitutions on 
which the final Constitution was being built and suggested ways to amend them.18  
Critiquing the 1953/54 London and Lagos Constitutional Conferences, NEPU’s position 
paper stated that: 
The London and Lagos Conferences of 1953/4 did not 
reflect the views of the people of Nigeria as the conferences 
were organized by the Colonial Office to effect changes in 
the 1950 Constitution without consulting the people of 
Nigeria.19 
 
NEPU advocated full participation of all citizens in the making of the new constitution 
and was very insistent on the principle of consultation and representativeness.  It 
emphasized that: 
The Party wants an opportunity to be given to the people to 
have their say before those alterations are further 
entrenched in the political life of Nigeria.20 
Funlayo Ransome-Kuti and all the other social radicals also opposed the 
unrepresentativeness of the colonial administration and the limitations of the new 
constitutions being enacted   FRK, commenting on perceived officialdom’s heavy-
handedness, and remarking on the way the exiled Alake – the colonial chief – was re-
imposed on the people of Abeokuta, for example, lamented, referring to British 
officialdom, that “these people discussed and sealed a whole nation’s fate without 
 xii
consulting the affected people.”21  In her quest for democracy in the government of 
Egbaland, Abeokuta, and in her envisioning of community and citizenship in inclusionary 
terms, FRK stated that: 
When popular discontents have been very prevalent, it may 
well be affirmed that there has been generally something 
found amiss in the constitution or in the conduct of 
government … This is an age of liberty, an age of franchise 
and brotherhood, when rulers should give way to popular 
opinion.22 
 
This study inquires into the validity or otherwise of officialdom’s categorization 
of colonial social radicals as “communist” or communist-influenced and to what extent if 
so.  It inquires into what the social radicals were actually saying and doing in their 
political organizations.  It seeks to reveal, for example, how women like Funlayo 
Ransome-Kuti of Nigeria and Constance Cummings-John of Sierra Leone, otherwise 
middleclass feminists, labeled by British officialdom as “communist” were seeking rather 
democratic change and to reconfigure gender norms in more equitable terms.  The study 
seeks to reveal how more democratically-inclined political organizations like NEPU in 
Northern Nigeria, condemned by British officialdom as “extremist,”  were also rather 
fighting against the ills of the Native Authorities and agitating for the reform and 
democratization of the Native Authority System in the North, the emancipation and rights 
of women, etc.  Officialdom’s remark, in condemning the NEPU radicals, that their 
“expressed aims conflict with the existing system of Native Administration” was 
precisely what NEPU was about, i.e., challenging the existing system of Native 
Administration and its perceived unrepresentativeness and corruption, etc.23  The existing 
system’s governing philosophy conflicted with the more democratically inclined 
perspectives on community and citizenship of colonial radicals in NEPU.  And NEPU 
was beginning to win considerable followership and votes on that account and even 
British officialdom could not help but acknowledge that also.  The British Resident 
would acknowledge that NEPU’s “strength lies in its campaign against corruption and 
nepotism,” and that “it represents an organized body of political opinion in the North.”24  
In spite of that, British officialdom and the Native Authorities would seek to constrain the 
ability of NEPU to become a formidable force in the North of Nigeria and officialdom 
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would still insist on labeling it as an extremist organization and would seek, with the 
NPC, to neutralize NEPU as an opposing political force.  Some of the means by which 
this was achieved was through continued labeling of NEPU as “extremist” and 
“communist,” labels which served to officially delegitimize it, as well as through 
limitations inscribed in the 1951 and subsequent Constitutions in Nigeria which seriously 
undermined NEPU’s ability to thrive politically.   
In Abeokuta, Western Provinces of Nigeria, the British colonial authorities 
secretly returned Alake Ademola, the colonial chief, who had been forced to abdicate as a 
result of popular movements of protest against him and in which FRK and the Abeokuta 
Women’s Union (AWU) were central participants.  In spite of the Alake’s glaring abuses 
and the desire of the people of Egbaland to elect a new Alake, British officials, in 
connivance with the Yoruba Egbe composed of ethnopolitical entrepreneurs, returned 
him to the throne surreptitiously in December 1950 without the necessary mandate.  In 
spite of the Alake’s widespread abuses and mismanagement and intense popular 
disenchantment against him, British officialdom continued to favor him and to grant him 
capacity.  Grassroot opposition movements were constantly derided and reduced to the 
activities of a “misguided and mischievous few.”  The Chief Commissioner for Western 
Provinces, Hoskyns-Abrahall,  thanking the Alake and regretting recent demonstrations 
and “defiance of authority which had occurred in Abeokuta,” would publicly regret the 
“insulting of the Alake,” and other activities of “certain persons who had disturbed the 
peace and tranquility of Abeokuta.” 25  He patronizingly declared in his address in 
Council Hall, Abeokuta on 27 April, 1948 that “all true sons of Abeokuta must feel with 
[him] this sorrow at the misguided and mischievous activities of some of her children.”26  
He was referring to the demonstrations and sit-ins in the palace of the Alake by over  
10, 000 women demonstrators under the AWU led by Funlayo Ransome-Kuti (FRK).  
The women were discursively reduced by British officialdom to the status of children 
who did not know what they were doing!  The Alake’s position on his return was further 
entrenched by his alliance with the Egbe Omo Oduduwa (Egbe), later to be transformed 
into the Action Group (AG) political party – the political organization of ethnopolitical 
entrepreneurs – led by Obafemi Awolowo.  These were the colonial social forces for 
whom British officialdom was opening the boundaries of legitimate discourse at the end 
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of the 40s and at the turn of the 50s and in the new constitutions enacted from this period 
onwards.  At the same time, these boundaries were being closed to the social radicals and 
to their discourse of the “nation” and of citizenship in socially radical and inclusive terms 
– the discourse that officialdom would rather not have centered.   
The importance given to communism in the examination of the nationalist 
phenomenon in this study and in my earlier works27 is not because there was any 
considerable communist presence in British West African colonies as there was, for 
example, to some extent in South Africa and in the Sudan at the time.  It is not because 
communism significantly impacted the imaginings of community and notions of 
citizenship among colonial social radicals or any other colonial social forces in British 
West Africa because it did not, as this study attempts to reveal.  It is also recognized that 
the importance of communism itself is diminished in more contemporary times and that 
the fear of communism has indeed been overtaken by the fear of Islamic fundamentalism.  
Also, class and class-based movements predicated on the ideology of communism have 
since been overtaken by political movements based on “nationalism” especially since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989.28  However, this study posits that the theme of 
social radicalism and the associated theme of communism explored in this study remain 
important for the study of the nationalist phenomenon and of the end of empire in British 
West Africa.   
The importance of communism for this study is tied to British officialdom’s 
perceptions of its importance in their West African colonies from the era of the 
Communist International, and particularly in the post-World War II era of the Cold War, 
and the way this perception affected officialdom’s deliberations over their West African 
empire.  British officialdom’s perception of communism in their West African colonies 
and among certain colonial forces may be different from the reality, but perception is also 
an important ingredient of policy.  It affects important decisions such as to when a nation 
goes to war, and in the case of this study, when the makers of empire relinquished 
empire.  This study posits that British officialdom’s perception of communism and its 
influence in their West African colonies and among certain colonial social forces was an 
important part of the complex dynamics that led to the relinquishing of empire when it 
occurred and in what this study considers to be precipitous decolonization, as well as the 
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terms on which empire ended.  British perceptions of communism in their West African 
colonies became their reality.  
This study seeks to show how British officialdom’s perceived threat of 
communism and its influence in their colonies – real or imagined – ended in a hasty move 
to hand over power from the second half of the 1950s to the African “moderates,” those 
who they felt would secure their West African colonies within the sphere of Western 
influence for the future.  As A. B. Cohen, one of the main British policy-makers in the 
Colonial Office and a reluctant advocate of rapid political devolution in these colonies, 
wrote, it was necessary “to move more rapidly than ideally [we] should wish,”29 if they 
were “to keep on good terms with the more responsible political leaders such as Mr. 
Nkrumah and his immediate colleagues,” and “not to force the Gold Coast Government 
into the hands of extremists.”30  After the 1948 Gold Coast crises and following other 
crises in the colonies, the subsequent reforms and rapid grant of new constitutions that 
would enable the “moderates” to participate more fully in government was seen as the 
“best defense against communism in West Africa,”31 “the only chance of friendly co-
operation between [this country] and the West African territories,” and “the best chance 
when the time comes of securing a favorable decision by the Gold Coast and Nigeria to 
stay within the British Commonwealth,” Cohen further argued in 1951.32  The 
recommendations for more far-reaching constitutional changes made by the Watson’s 
Committee that investigated the 1948 crisis in the Gold Coast and by the Coussey 
Committee that followed the Watson’s Commission were accepted, subject to certain 
reservations, by the Colonial Office.  The Secretary of State, Arthur Creech Jones, in 
defending the decision to accept these recommendations, stated in 1949 that if they were 
not prepared to accept them broadly, “moderate opinion will be alienated and the 
extremists given an opportunity of gaining further and weightier support and of making 
more trouble.”33   In 1953, the Secretary of State, Mr. Lyttelton, in inviting his colleagues 
to approve in broad principles the latest proposals by him for new constitutional 
instrument for the Gold Coast34 and which would be submitted to the Privy Council early 
in 1954, advised that: 
The Gold Coast proposals, far reaching as they are, have 
been prepared with care by a moderate African 
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Government anxious to avoid any break in relations with 
the United Kingdom.35   
 
“Their rejection,” he further advised, “would bring to an end settled government by 
consent, and forfeit the goodwill towards the United Kingdom and the desire to retain the 
British connection.”36   The decision to grant self-government to these colonies, starting 
with the Gold Coast in 1956,37 was celebrated by British officialdom as having served to 
“cut the ground from under the feet of the Communists” and to have “robbed the 
Communists of the familiar imperialist argument.”38  Such was the weight of communism 
in their West African colonies on British officialdom’s mind. 
The study seeks to show how the British ended up being imprisoned in their own 
categories, seeing a coherent communist/leftist threat where there were diverse and 
complex interventions being made and therefore seeking a coherent alternative to it, in 
the form of moderately conservative “nationalists,” the Interlocuteurs Valables - the 
partners worth working with - and in whose hands they left the care of the nation and 
ended empire precipitously.  This study attempts to document the process by which this 
occurred, and the effect of British officialdom’s anti-communist grid on the social, legal,  




Chapter One establishes the conceptual framework of this study and provides a 
background exploration and discussion of the salient methodological issues and analytical 
categories applied in the study as well as the themes explored in the study in the attempt 
to provide further understanding of the phenomenon of nationalism in the last quarter of 
British rule in West Africa. 
Chapter Two begins to explore the subjectivities of the discourse and construction of 
community in the interwar period through some in-depth examination of some social 
movements as case-studies.  It explores the conflicts of interests on which the social 
movements in this period were predicated, involving legal disputations over rights and 
duties, etc.  It examines the disputations over law, i.e., disputation by men over divorce 
laws that eased the marriage restrictions on women and which women were taking full 
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advantage of, disputations over laws that restricted free access to village lands, and 
disputations over the unrepresentativeness of the Sole Native Authorities, etc.  It explores 
aspects of the contradictory developments in social structures and social relations and 
their effects on local politics and collective identification and individual subjectivities.  It 
focuses on the ethnopolitical entrepreneurs’ construction of community and the 
coordinate of class and community on which their formulation of rights and belongings 
were predicated.  This chapter also points to objective developments towards mutually-
inclusive categories and of community conceived in more embracing terms of full rights 
and belongings but which were being undermined by the subjectivities of the discourse 
and construction of community by African ethnopolitical entrepreneurs. 
Chapter Three explores the making of the British imperialist category of the communist 
from the interwar period.  It examines British officialdom’s fear of communism among 
West African students overseas and among colonial labor, focusing in particular on the 
West African Students Union (WASU) in Britain and on I. T. A. Wallace-Johnson of 
Sierra Leone as case studies.  It examines aspects of the interactions of West African 
overseas students and of Wallace-Johnson with the Colonial Office, as well as with 
leftwing organizations and individuals in Britain to reveal the nature of the influences on 
them and to what effects.  It seeks to begin to examine the actual as opposed to the 
imagined threat of communism in British West African colonies among labor and among 
colonial students overseas and as sources of communist infiltration into the colonies, if 
any.  The chapter also seeks to show how the British anti-communist grid was beginning 
to collapse into one the different socially relevant interventions of colonial social forces 
in the colonies and overseas.  
Chapter Four begins to explore the dynamic of change among colonials and among 
British officialdom in the post-World War II period.  It attempts to examine continuity in 
transition and points of conjuncture.  It examines some socially relevant interventions of 
colonial social forces in the post-World War II period, and focuses in particular on the 
conjunctures of the late 40s in the colonies, specifically, the 1948 Gold Coast crisis as a 
moment of transition, effecting certain shifts among British officialdom and among 
colonials as well.  The chapter also explores aspects of the contradictory developments 
towards mutually-inclusive categories and mutually-exclusive categories in this period, 
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using the AWU movement as a case study.  It explores the complex interplay of 
categories of gender, class, community, etc., as individuals and social forces sought to 
reposition themselves vis-à-vis the community and to reformulate rights and belongings 
in the post-World War II period. 
Chapter Five explores the shifts in the discourses and practices of British officialdom and  
some African politicians subsequent to the 1948 Gold Coast crisis.  It explores British 
officialdom’s reconstitution of the category of the “responsible African,” i.e., the 
“moderate,” and examines how some African politicians like Kwame Nkrumah and 
Nnamdi Azikiwe were effectively repositioning themselves to the center from this period 
onwards.  The chapter seeks to begin to show how the ideological shift among the 
African politicians who officialdom was now reconstituting into the category of the 
“moderates” also involved the imagining of community and of citizenship in rather 
socially conservative ways, i.e., gendered and closed to popular agendas.  It seeks to 
show how this framing of community and citizenship – the framing that is conceptualized 
in this study as the master-discourse - was beginning to be legitimized by officialdom 
with the new constitutions being enacted from this period onwards.  It examines, at some 
length, the contrasting notions of community and citizenship from somewhat left of 
center as put forward by Eyo Ita, a member of the 1949/50 Constitutional Review 
Committees, in his Minority Report which served as commentary from within on the 
master-discourse of the “nation” and of change in mainstream institutions and 
organizations.  The chapter begins to explore the dialectic of change and the discrepancy 
between change and change itself in the post-World War II period. 
Chapter Six examines the shifting political boundaries and aspects of how individuals 
were seeking to reposition themselves vis-à-vis the community, including the coordinates 
that determined individual formulations of rights and belongings in the era of rapid 
political devolution of the 50s.  It examines the contestations over inclusion and over 
rights and entitlements.   It explores in particular aspects of how ethnopolitical 
entrepreneurs were attempting to reconstitute community and citizenship and to reshape 
lines of identification, and the effects of their categorization on self-understanding and 
political claims of colonials.  It examines what they were doing with categories of i. e., 
ethnicity, religion, gender, class, in their political organizations in this period and to what 
 xix
effect.  It attempts to examine the gap between the “nationalist” organizations and the 
putative groups in whose names they claimed to speak.  This is facilitated by the 
exploration of aspects of the process of delegitimation and entitlement among citizenry 
and the language and mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion, i.e., the Native/Settler, 
Autochthon/Allochthon dichotomy, in the era when the resources of the state were being 
directed to the regions and local administrative units and controlled by the African 
regional political power and/or political incumbents in the “nationalist” organizations.  It 
examines languages of exclusion, couched in religious, ethnic, class, and gendered terms. 
Chapter Seven explores the construction of inclusion and the forms of citizenship 
premised on the realization of equality before the law and to become an underlying 
principle for social, economic, and cultural action.  It examines who the colonial social 
radicals were and what they were saying and doing, including their attempts to 
reformulate rights and entitlements in more egalitarian terms.  It explores how the social 
radicals and their organizations constructed their actions and arguments relative to those 
of ethnopolitical entrepreneurs, including their attempts to make the categories of , i.e., 
ethnicity, gender, class, religion, into groupness in mutually-inclusive terms.  It also 
attempts to examine the actual as opposed to the imagined impact of the international left 
and/or communism on them.  This chapter examines the limitations of colonial social 
radicals and constraints against them and social radicalism, and also offers a critique of 
colonial social radicals and social radicalism. 
Chapter Eight explores the process that ended empire and integrates the salient themes of 
this work to a conclusive and meaningful whole, leading to the grant of political 
independence first to the Gold Coast in 1956 and to the rest of British West Africa 
subsequently.  It explores aspects of the process by which this stage was reached and tied 
to British officialdom’s fear of communism in the colonies and their perception of 
colonial radicals as “communist.”  It examines the effects of these fears and perceptions 
among officialdom on the outcome of the cultural and political contestations of 
community and citizenship among colonial social forces and on how empire ended.  This 
is revealed to involve the terms of the social, political, and cultural imaginings that 
ethnopolitical entrepreneurs’ idea of the nation entails and which became the dominant 
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form – the master-discourse – on which the Independence Constitutions for the West 
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This study confronts the problem of nationalism at a particular historical juncture in 
British West Africa from a reconstituted methodological and epistemological framework 
in the attempt to provide further understanding of the phenomenon of nationalism and of 
the process that ended empire in British West Africa, including a historicized 
reflection on the terms in which empire ended and the relationship to the crises of 
democracy and citizenship in post-independent Africa.  It explores aspects of the 
colonialism/citizenship interface, and the legacies, continuities, and discontinuities.  It 
seeks to examine colonial discursive practices of community & citizenship, in particular, 
aspects of the political and cultural contestations in the public sphere over community 
and notions of citizenship between African ethnopolitical entrepreneurs and colonial 
social radicals, and their outcome.  It inquires into how they and their organizations 
constructed their arguments and actions relative to each other, and what they were doing 
with the categories of, i.e., “race,” “ethnicity,” “gender,” “class,” “religion,” and to what 
effects.  The discourse of ethnopolitical entrepreneurs and of colonial social radicals is 
conceptualized as the master-discourse and the supplementary-discourse, respectively, 
following Homi Bhabha’s conceptualization.  The categories and analytical concepts 
applied in this study, including the category of social radicalism, are problematized.  The 
study seeks to reconceptualize them in processual and relational terms and to apply them 
as coordinates.  This work is predicated on the organizing principle of conflict to capture 
points of conjuncture and of continuity in transition.   
In reconstituting the narrative of nationalism in this period, the study also 
explores the category of the “communist” which was added to British imperialist 
discourse and applied to colonial social radicals and anybody that British officialdom did 
not like.  It attempts to examine the effects of British imperial anti-communist framework 
on the dynamics of the social, political, and cultural imaginings and contestations of 
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community and citizenship and the process that ended in precipitous decolonization.  It 
seeks to reveal the effects of officialdom’s categorization and anti-communist grid on the 
social, legal, and political contexts that defined the Independence Constitutions and to fill 










 “Nation/Nationalism” in its various practices and/or connotations, be it as a category of 
everyday social experience or as a category of analysis, continues to metamorphise and to 
engage the interest of scholars as varied sets of analytical perspectives are brought to bear 
especially on concepts normally associated with the construct of the nation such as the 
construct of “ethnicity,”39 “gender,”40 “class,” etc.41  This study seeks to engage with the 
nationalist problematic at a particular historical juncture in British West Africa in its 
attempt to shed further light on the nationalist phenomenon and on the end of empire in 
British West Africa.  It seeks to examine aspects of the cultural and political contestations 
of community and citizenship42 in the public sphere among various colonial social forces, 
in particular among African ethnopolitical entrepreneurs and colonial social radicals,43 
and the political outcomes.  It seeks to examine how “community” was being constructed 
and how the notion of citizenship was being conceived among these social forces, and 
how they and their organizations constructed their actions and arguments relative to each 
other and relative to other colonial social forces.  By examining the antecedent history in 
the colonial period, in particular the pre-independence period, of the conflict and 
disconnect between forms of citizenship and national belonging, it attempts to throw 
some light on the related problems and conflicts in post-independent African societies.  It 
examines forms of citizenship premised on the realization of equality before the law and 
to become an underlying principle for social, economic, and cultural action, and forms of 
citizenship that sought to concentrate all lines of affiliation into a single, totalizing, 
unmediated, and exclusionary version of the national community.  The former vision and 
tendencies are located in this study among the social radicals and the latter are located 
among the ethnopolitcal entrepreneurs.  Also, by exploring British officialdom’s 
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distinction between the “respectable” African and the “extremist/communist,” the study 
seeks to reveal how this categorization affected the outcome of the contestations among 
colonial social forces and the nature of the Independence Constitutions.  It seeks to show 
how British officialdom fairly succeeded in this and other ways in closing the space for 
other forms of social intervention that might have mapped out a different, perhaps more 
democratic terrain for the future independent African societies than the ones privileged 
by officialdom. 
 This study seeks to examine aspects of what African ethnopolitical entrepreneurs 
and the social radicals were doing with the categories of, i.e., “ethnicity,” “race,” 
“religion,” “class,” “gender,” in their discourses and social and political practices and to 
what effect.44  It examines the construction of inclusion and boundaries of exclusion, i.e., 
the making of categories of “ethnicity,” “class,” “religion,” “gender,” in mutually-
inclusive and mutually-exclusive terms, as well as aspects of the complex process by 
which inclusion in the nation was competed for and claimed.  It posits that the social and 
political and cultural imaginings that the “nation” and notions of citizenship entailed 
among ethnopolitical entrepreneurs involved narrower forms of cultural and political 
address.  The social radicals’ imaginings of the “nation” in more inclusive terms and their 
notions of citizenship understood as full membership of the human community – 
pertaining to civic, political, and social rights – are posited to fall in important ways 
outside the terms that the idea of the nation and citizenship entailed among the 
ethnopolitical entrepreneurs.   
 The social forces examined in this study and the categories applied are 
problematized and attempt is made to reconceptualize them in processual and relational 
terms.  No social force is conceived to exist as a homogenous entity but is conceived to 
subsist in a complex, and sometimes dialectical relationship to each another.   Thus, 
while elements of the terms in which social radicals conceived of community and 
citizenship are identified as falling outside the terms in which ethnopolitical 
entrepreneurs sought to conceive them, social radicals’ discourses could also be located, 
paradoxically, within those terms even as the radicals attempted to change them.45  Also, 
some of the social radicals, perhaps unselfconsciously, still identified with certain 
cultures of more mainstream organizations. 
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The radical spectrum is also not free of contradictions.  The study notes that the 
social radicals in question were not social radicals in all respects.  People left on some 
questions, such as property questions, were conservative on other questions, i.e., gender 
questions and vice versa.  Also, anti-imperialism and social radicalism could be quite 
contradictory in that imperialism provided ideological tools against male patriarchy in 
certain respects, such as divorce laws.  For example, in Guinea, French West Africa, in 
the same period under study, while many men in Sekou Toure’s radical Rassemblement 
Democratique Africain (RDA) party may condone the very active and “revolutionary” 
public roles the women in the party were playing in the anti-colonial movement, they 
were resentful of the liberating effects women’s emancipatory roles in the public sphere 
were having on gender relations in the private/domestic sphere!46  Social radicals’ 
attitude towards tradition and culture also proved contradictory at times.  Thus, one finds 
the renowned feminist, Funlayo Ransome- Kuti (FRK), who headed the AWU in 
Abeokuta, Southern Nigeria in the late 40s and the Nigerian Women’s Union (NWU) to 
which the AWU was subsequently transformed, and whose life and energies were 
devoted to changing gender norms in more equitable terms, busy defending the 
traditional rights of the men in the newly reconstituted Egba Central Council (ECC) in 
ways that she failed to perceive potentially undermined the equal representation of the 
women. 47 She advocated for the rights of the Ogboni male fraternity in the ECC on the 
basis of tradition while, ironically, the same Ogboni male fraternity were publicly asking 
the government to remove her and the handful of women from the same ECC and other 
institutions to which the women were at last being nominated by colonial authorities as 
“contrary to Egba custom and tradition.”48  Furthermore, some of those with the closest 
connection with international left in their young days such as Kwame Nkrumah and Jomo 
Kenyatta ended up in the socially conservative group.  However, there are identifiable 
distinctions between the discursive practices of colonial social radicals and those of the 
ethnopolitical entrepreneurs examined in this study that are salient and of significance for 
this study.  
By examining what colonial social radicals were doing with the categories of 
ethnicity, gender, class, etc., the study attempts to reveal their endeavors to privilege the 
discourse of community and of citizenship in mutually-inclusive terms.  Colonial social 
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radicals sought to privilege the discourse of democracy and popular sovereignty and 
citizenship at the center of national discourse especially at a time of rapid new 
constitutional enactments and political devolution of the late 40s and early 50s when the 
possibilities for realizing such goals were perceived to be promising.  Their discourse of 
the “nation” and notions of citizenship are posited in this study to represent a metonymic 
interruption in the representation of the people in what became mainstream discourse of 
the nation – the master-discourse - in the period under study.  African ethnopolitical 
entrepreneurs’ practices of “ethnic,” “racial,” and “national” categorization are examined 
to involve the mystification of the past, predicated on appeals to a prior community of 
interests or cultures as if bounded and/or fixed and of the nation as a homogenous entity.  
Their use of vernaculars, such as omo ibile, i.e., “sons of the soil,” and of the 
native/settler, local/stranger (autochthony/allochthony) duality, are examined to serve as 
loose qualifiers and as binary operators, marking a distinction between “in” and “out” in 
ambiguous manner and thus permitting them to leave open multiple interpretations and to 
draw energy from their imprecise overlaps with other powerful pre-existing identity 
polarities at particular scales of identity and difference.49  This study seeks to examine 
aspects of the ambivalence of language in the narratives of the nation and notions of  
citizenship among the ethnopolitical entrepreneurs especially.  It seeks to examine the 
ambivalent temporalities of the nation-space,50 the janus-faced discourse of the nation, 
the bifurcations in the framing of the nation, the indeterminacies and contradictions, the 
dialectic of political innovation and actually existing cultures, and the in-between space 
of the nation in the “nation-talk” and practices of African ethnopolitical entrepreneurs in 
particular.   
 Colonial social radicals contended with the construction of community51 and 
citizenship in the terms in which African ethnopolitical entrepreneurs were privileging 
them.  They challenged their privileging of an idealized prior community and of the past 
and sought to reveal the actualities of social fragmentation, “class” divisions, “gender” 
and “ethnic” exclusions, and hierarchies, and relations of power.  Such “prior 
communities” were not bounded as they are themselves always in the process of 
historical formation and change and are usually much more divided and contested than 
may be apparent or believed to be.  This study seeks to examine the question of power 
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inequality and the silencing of voices within the common culture52 in what became 
mainstream discourse of the “nation” and of citizenship located among African 
ethnopolitical entrepreneurs.  The discourse of ethnopolitical entrepreneurs is 
conceptualized as the master-discourse and the discourse of colonial radicals is 
conceptualized as the supplementary-discourse or minority-discourse, following Homi 
Bhabha’s concept of the master-discourse and the supplementary/minority discourse. 53  
 The social radicals’ discourse is further represented in this study as the 
“supplementary space” of cultural signification.  Homi Bhabha has noted that the 
supplementary strategy is significant because it affects the narrative structure of modern 
political rationality.54  As Gasche suggested, “supplements … are pluses that compensate 
for a minus in the origin.”55  Homi Bhabha further elaborated that supplementary strategy 
suggests that adding “to” need not “add up” but may disturb the calculation,56 noting that: 
The supplementary strategy interrupts the successive 
seriality of the narrative of plurals and pluralism by 
radically changing their mode of articulation.  In the 
metaphor of the national community as the ‘many as one,’ 
the one is now both the tendency to totalize the social in a 
homogenous empty time, and the repetition of that minus in 
the origin, the less-than-one that intervenes with a 
metonymic, iterative temporality.57 
 
“The discourse of minority,” he further commented, “reveals the insurmountable 
ambivalence that structures the equivocal movement of historical time,”58 and summized 
that: 
Minority discourse acknowledges the status of national 
culture - and the people - as a contentious, performative 
space of the perplexity of the living in the midst of the 
pedagogical representations of the fullness of life.59  
 
 Although colonial social radicals did not turn contradictions into a dialectical 
process they remained significant as the supplementary space of cultural signification.   
They contested the differences among citizenry that were ordered by class, religion, 
gender, and other logics of centeredness and marginalization inscribed in mainstream 
construction of the nation and citizenship.  By insinuating themselves into the terms of 
reference of the dominant discourse and antagonizing its power to generalize, and by 
interrupting the “successive seriality of the narrative of plurals and pluralism, etc.,”60 
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colonial social radicals’ discourse and practices represented attempts to radically change 
the mode of articulation of the master-discourse.  As Homi Bhabha further noted in 
regard to the supplementary, “the power of supplementarity is not the negation of the 
reconstituted social contradictions of the past or present,” but “its force lies … in the 
renegotiation of those times, terms, and traditions through which we turn our uncertain, 
passing contemporaneity into the sign of history.”61  This study seeks to explore how 
colonial social radicals sought to renegotiate and reconfigure the terms of their individual 
and collective incorporation in society and their contestation of the terms in which 
ethnopolitical entrepreneurs were seeking to reconstitute community and citizenship in 
the era of rapid political decentralization. 
In its focus on colonial social radicals and the theme of radicalism in general, the 
study also seeks to explore the theme of communism and its significance in the dynamic 
of the process that ended empire in this region.  It seeks to explore the making of the 
category of the “communist” by British officialdom and its effect on the dynamics of the 
process of “nation-forming” in the last quarter of British colonial rule.  It explores British 
officialdom’s anti-communist framework and their tendencies to collapse colonial social 
radicals62 and their discourses and practices, as well as anyone they did not like, into one 
undivided category of the “communist.”63  It seeks to examine the effects of British 
perceptions of communism in the colonies and of their application of the category of the 
‘communist’ to colonial social radicals, and the impact of this categorization on the 
contesting discourse and construction of community and citizenship among colonial 
social forces.  It examines the effect on the construction of inclusions and exclusions and 
the process of legitimization and delegitimization.  It posits that British perceptions of 
communism in these West African colonies and their anti-communist grid was an 
important part of the dynamics of the process by which empire ended precipitously - and 
of the terms on which political independence was achieved in British West Africa.64  The 
theme of communism in British West Africa and in the process that ended empire there 
has been  largely a neglected theme in the literature of the events of this period and of 
decolonization.65  This is perhaps because of the actual lack of communist presence in 
these colonies.  But the perception of its presence by British officialdom in these colonies 
and among certain colonial social forces or individuals make it significant as perception 
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is also an important ingredient of policy, affecting important decisions as to when a 
nation goes to war, for example, and in the case of this study, when the makers of empire 
relinquished empire.  British officialdom’s perception of communist presence or 
influence in their West African colonies may be different from the reality but their 
perception was also their reality.  The study seeks to reveal how British officialdom’s 
perception of communism in their West African colonies also shaped in important ways 
the social, cultural, and political context that formed the basis of the Independence 
Constitutions of these colonies.  As such, it is believed to merit the attention given to it in 
this study.  
My work seeks to show how the British ended up being imprisoned in their own 
categories, seeing a coherent communist/leftist threat where there were diverse and 
complex interventions66 being made and therefore seeking a coherent alternative to it, in 
the form of moderately conservative ‘nationalists’- the Interlocuteurs Valables, i.e., the 
“moderates.”  The study argues that British officialdom’s perceived threat of communism 
and its influence in their colonies – real or imagined – contributed in part to what this 
study regards as precipitous decolonization in their West African colonies.  This involved 
a hasty move by British officialdom from the second half of the 50s to hand over power 
to the “moderates,” those that they felt would secure these West African colonies within 
the sphere of Western influence.  It represented a pre-emptive move against the chances 
of the perceived colonial radicals – the “communists” - from gaining power or control 
and hence of the colonies falling into the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union.67  As 
Andrew Cohen, one of the main British policy-makers in the Colonial Office and an 
otherwise reluctant advocate of rapid constitutional change, advised in 1951, the British 
government may not be able to adhere to an ideal time-table.68  He envisioned that they 
might be forced, if they were to keep on good terms with “the more responsible political 
leaders such as Mr. Nkrumah and his immediate colleagues and not to force the Gold 
Coast Government into the hands of extremists, to move more rapidly than ideally they 
should wish.”69  The grant of new constitutions that would enable the “moderates” to 
participate in government was seen as the “best defense against communism”70 and the 
decision to grant self-government to these colonies, starting with the Gold Coast in 1956, 
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was celebrated as having served to “cut the ground from under the feet of the 




This study seeks to distinguish between nation/nationalism as a category of practice and 
nation/nationalism as a category of analysis and to treat terms such as “nation,” 
“nationalism,” “ethnicity,” “identity,” etc., more as categories of social and political 
practice, i.e., categories of everyday social experience, as distinguished from experience-
distant categories.72  
As a category of practice and of everyday social experience, nation/nationalism 
has shifted from its association with the Enlightenment/French tradition, linked to notions 
of popular sovereignty and citizenship, to a more reactionary and virulent form in the 
nineteenth and twentieth century, linked in the twentieth century to Nazism and fascism 
and other movements of the radical right.  In the last decades of the twentieth century and 
beginning of the twenty first century, it has been associated, especially in post-Soviet 
societies and in the non-Western and post-colonial societies, for example, with 
degenerate practices such as “ethnic cleansing.”73  The wars and conflicts in the former 
Yugoslavia republic, the conflicts between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo, the war 
among Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda and Burundi in East Central Africa, and the crises in 
the Darfur region of Sudan in North Central Africa, etc., for example, have been framed 
and encoded in those terms.  
As a category of analysis, the narrative of nationalism has moved from the 
original idealist and organic conception of the nation, associated with Herder74 and the 
German romanticist nationalist school in the eighteenth century, to a political or 
voluntarist conception associated with the French revolution and the Enlightenment, and 
to the modernist and fairly recent dominant view of the nation as culturally constituted 
and the redefining of national community through culture rather than place of birth.75  In 
the literature of this phenomenon, nationalism has moved from structural and materialist 
analyses to an approach stressing the meanings and effects of a ‘sense of nationality’ and 
the intimate connections between personhood and belonging to a nation.76  In yet more 
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recent times, attempts at more complex analysis of the phenomenon have involved the 
application of different perspectives, including the perspective of citizenship, and of 
fields not normally associated with the study of the nation.  For example, Roger 
Brubaker, in his fairly recent study, Ethnicity without Groups, has advocated bringing to 
bear a set of analytical perspectives, such as cognitive perspectives, which he believes are 
not ordinarily associated with the study of, i.e., “ethnicity,” or “nation,” in his attempt to 
further the understanding of the categories of “ethnicity,” “nation,” “race,” and to 
problematize such categories in new ways.77  He advocates the analysis of such 
categories without invoking bounded groups78 and sought to reconceptualize these 
categories in a non-groupist manner. 79  He would dispense altogether with the ‘group’ as 
an entity as a basic analytical category and would apply groupness as a contextually 
fluctuating conceptual variable.80  The reality of race, nationhood, ethnicity, etc., he 
commented, does not depend on the existence of “races,” or of “ethnic groups” or 
“nations” as substantial groups or entities.  He advances groupness as variable and 
contingent rather than fixed and given, and as an event that happens or may not happen, 
despite the “group-making” efforts of ethnopolitical entrepreneurs.81   
The perspective of citizenship is also being advanced by some scholars as an 
important category through which the meanings of complex concepts like ethnicity, class, 
and gender, concepts associated with the study of nation/nationality, could be more 
successfully reconfigured.  Kathleen Canning has suggested, for example, that more 
complex understanding of both gender and citizenship could be derived by a focus on the 
subjectivities of contemporary discourses and constructions of inclusion and exclusion.82 
In their recent edited work, Citizenship and National Identity in Twentieth-Century 
Germany, Geoff Eley and Jan Palmowski have suggested that the perspective of 
citizenship could provide a new paradigm to understanding not only the history of 
Wilhelmine Germany in particular, but also other notions and constructs associated with 
the concept of nation/nationality in general.83   
This study seeks to reconceptualize the category of the nation and of other 
categories and analytical constructs such as class, gender, ethnicity, 84 religion, identity, 
etc., all of which, like the category of the nation, are also constructed.  As practice 
categories, i.e., of social and political practice, the study seeks to apply them in reference 
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to their use by ethnopolitical entrepreneurs, as well as by colonial radicals, to make sense 
of themselves or of their activities and of the world around them and as they sought to 
persuade people to understand themselves, their interests, and their predicaments in a 
certain way, etc.  As categories of analysis, the study attempts to apply categories such as 
“nations,” “ethnicity,” “class,” etc., in relational and processual terms. 85  Constructs such 
as “class” are also applied as time and place-specific construct, rather than as an 
unproblematic signifier of identity.86   
This study seeks to examine the problem of “nation-forming” in pre-independence 
British West Africa and their contingent, fluid, and “event-type” nature.  As already 
posited in earlier studies, the concept of “Nigeria,” “Sierra Leone,” or “Kenya,” for 
example, as “nations” or “nation-states” is indeed of recent origin and is artificial.  
Commenting on “nationalism” in Africa within the arbitrary frontiers created by 
colonialism, Mazrui had long noted that colonialism created the “Nigerians,” 
“Tanganyikas” (Tanzanians), etc., and so they could be argued not to have been 
“Nigerians,” “Tanganyikas,” etc.87  What made them so is how they had been constructed 
in those terms and predicated largely on colonial administrative cartography of identity.88  
And because of their “constructed” nature, this study posits that they are fluid and subject 
to reconstitution as evidenced in post-colonial African states’ crises of nationhood and 
contestations over citizenship in nearly all these ex-colonies.  The Biafran (Ibo) 
secessionist war in Nigeria in 1966, less than a decade after independence, more recent 
wars and crises in Rwanda and Burundi, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, Somalia, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, etc., represent in some different essential ways 
attempts to reconstitute the “nation” and redefine citizenship in new ways.  Such 
imaginative endeavors should be expected to continue as there is nothing sacrosanct 
about the inherited borders or the constituent members of many post-colonial African 
states.89  The fairly recent creation of Somaliland in 1991 from Somalia is an instance of 
such remaking/reconstitution of the nation and notions of citizenship. 
This study seeks to examine the emergence of “nationalism” in British West 
Africa as a specific ideological and cultural innovation90 in the pre-independence period.  
It seeks to inquire into aspects of the framings and narrative encodings of the “nation” in 
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the contrasting discourse and practices of African ethnopolitical entrepreneurs and social 
radicals.  For purposes of analytical clarity, this study, following my earlier works on the  
subject of nationalism, is predicated on the organizing principle of conflict and distinguishes  
in the Hrochian tradition between fundamental social antagonism, i.e., socially-relevant 
conflicts of interest, and the nationally-relevant conflicts of interest.91  It seeks to 
maintain an important focus on culture in its examination of how boundaries of 
exclusion, in relation to nationality and citizenship, were being constructed in this period.  
Culture helps to reveal how these boundaries were being facilitated in the indeterminate 
and fluid contexts where “meanings may be partial because they are in ‘medias re’; and 
history may be half-made because it is in the process of being made; and the image of 
cultural authority may be ambivalent because it is caught, uncertainly, in the act of 
composing its powerful image.”  Culture, i.e., the manner in which people communicated 
in the broadest sense in modern societies,92 and everyday “ethnicity,” also serve to reveal 
how ordinary people, the “crowded people,” were reordering their lives.93  Conflict, the 
organizing principle on which the study is predicated, helps to reflect the conflicts of 
interest among the various colonial social forces, including their daily struggles over the 
details of life in space and time, from the continuum of residential space to the workplace 
and to the market place.  The study seeks to reveal how conflicts generated, in part, from 
the changing socio-economic conditions and processes under colonialism in this period, 
i.e., socially-relevant conflicts of interest, intersected with “nationally-relevant” conflicts 
of interests.  It seeks to show how African ethnopolitical entrepreneurs went to the people 
and sought to discursively reconstitute local conflicts which originated in the sphere of, 
i.e., economic life, religion, kinship, relations between age and sex categories, etc, into 
conflicts carried on in the name of the  “community” or of the “nation.”94  Their 
endeavors involved combining materials that provided potential community, or 
groupness, such as language, religion, and culture, into a larger collectivity.  Eley and 
Suny have remarked that most successful nationalisms presume some prior community of 
territory, language, or culture (the objective basis) which provide the raw materials for 
the intellectual project of nationality (i.e., the subjective basis, linked to political 
intervention, new ideologies, and cultural change).95   
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This study seeks to examine contradictions and ambiguities, the coexistence of 
stasis and change, etc., in its examination of the nationalist phenomenon in British West 
African colonial social formations in its attempt to provide further understanding of this 
phenomenon.  It seeks to point to multiple pathways of mobilization, with their 
ambiguities and contradictions, and the pathways not taken.96  In the attempt to analyze 
contradictions, focus is also maintained on context and action, i.e., the context in which 
local actors had available to them more than one set of social interpretations and which 
they employed as appropriate, such as their use of tradition.97  This facilitates the analysis 
of contradictory attitudes, positions, and discourses, and the complex contexts in which 
African politicians, in particular the ethnopolitical entrepreneurs, went about the project 
of the “nation.”  The perspective of citizenship also affords some insights into the 
analysis of contradictions and of stasis and change.  As Geoff Eley and Jan Palmowski 
have commented, such a perspective could provide a new paradigm that encompasses 
notions that otherwise seem contradictory, such as the continued importance of the 
locality and the nation; the evolving relationship between the private and the public 
spheres; and the coexistence of stasis and change.98   
Hitherto mainstream studies of nationalism in colonial Africa have tended to 
simplify the otherwise complex phenomenon of nationalism and the idea of nationalism 
in these contradictory and ambiguous contexts.99  This had been due in part to their 
failure to problematize nationalism100 and to move its analysis from the realm of  
politics, 101 the ground on which the category of the nation was first proposed, to the 
terrain of culture where it was elaborated and in which it is best conceived as a complex, 
uneven, and unpredictable process.  A few of these earlier studies, such as Coleman’s 
(1958), were more sociologically based but suffered from certain teleology. 102  A few 
other earlier studies such as Richard Joseph’s work on the Cameroun (1977), Kanogo’s 
on East Africa (1987), and Richard Sklar’s on Nigeria (1963), deviated from the hitherto 
conventional paradigm.103 
In general, there had been two main schools of interpretation of the nationalist 
phenomenon in African studies with notable degrees of variations between them.  One 
tradition, associated with James Coleman,104 is that which interpreted nationalism to 
involve the movement among Western educated colonial Africans for the takeover of the 
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state.  In this interpretation, the development of “nationalism” is assumed rather than its 
being seen, for example, as a phenomenon formed in the complex political contestations 
for power and over identities and meanings.  The western educated Africans - the 
enterprising intellectuals105 - as well as wealthy commercial class, did play important 
roles in the project of  “nation-forming” in Africa but they are to be conceptualized as 
part of the social forces and the roles they played to be historicized and analyzed, as this 
study attempts to do.106  The other hitherto school of nationalism in Africa, the anti-
colonial school of which Thomas Hodgkin is representative and to which belonged 
African historians such as Adu Boahen, for example, interpreted and collapsed different 
forms of anti-colonialism into “nationalism.”107  While rightly observing that the 
definition of “African nationalism” presents great difficulties, Thomas Hodgkin offered 
what he called a broad definition of the term “nationalist” to describe:  
Any organization or group that explicitly asserts the rights, 
claims and aspirations of a given African society (from the 
level of the language group to that of  'Pan-Africa') in 
opposition to European authority, whatever its institutional 
form and objectives.108    
   
This study is premised on the view that the phenomenon of nationalism in colonial West 
Africa was rooted in complex social processes and related to other kinds of politics with 
which it was constantly articulating. 109 
 There is no doubt that defining nationalism is problematic.  It is long-agreed 
among scholars of nationalism that the term embraces so many dissimilar meanings and 
that the very concept is muddled.  Hutchinson and Smith had earlier remarked that 
“perhaps the central difficulty in the study of nations and nationalism has been the 
problem of finding adequate and agreed definitions of the key concepts, nation and 
nationalism.”110  Alter, another expert on nationalism, stated that “the plethora of 
phenomena which may be subsumed under the term ‘nationalism’ suggests that it is one 
of the most ambiguous concepts in the present-day vocabulary of political and analytical 
thought.”111  Hence Brubaker, for example, more recently advocated the need to dispense 
with the category of the “nation” altogether in collective “group” terms.112  More recent 
studies on the subject of nationalism in Africa have also attempted to move the 





The problem of understanding the phenomenon of nationalism in Africa had been tied in  
important ways to:  1) the problem of hitherto methodology and epistemology, what had 
also been the dominant analytical perspective in Africa’s nationalist studies and what 
Chatterjee had called the “problematic” and the problem of the “thematic”;114 it has also 
involved the problem of its analysis in the social sciences in general, and 2) the general 
problematic of political development, i.e., aspects of what Nairn referred to as the 
“nationalism-producing” dilemma.115   
 
The Methodological and Epistemological Problem 
 
As indicated above, hitherto mainstream studies of the nationalist phenomenon in 
pre-independence Africa have tended to treat the processes of the period mainly as 
intellectual rather than as part of a complex social, as well as cultural, phenomenon and 
had abstracted from the social base.  This is reminiscent also of the intellectual tradition 
in the historiography of nationalism in Western society, pioneered by Carlton Hayes and 
Hans Kohn.  Important as this tradition was in helping to move the subject of nationalism 
and thinking about nations and nationality beyond the “organic" conception of the nation, 
it did not facilitate a contextual analysis and social history of the subject.  
In the 60s, a few studies among Western scholars of nationalism provided certain 
critical entry into possible new theoretical framework within which studies of this 
phenomenon could be carried out more successfully.  The process of deconstructing 
nationalism and moving it from a primordialist, essentialist notion of the nation and tying 
it to the social base and to the more currently dominant view of the nation as invented 
began in Western European studies in the 60s with modernization theorists, i.e., Elie 
Kedourie (1960), Ernest Gellner (1964), and communication theorists, Karl Deutsch 
(1953), etc.  Kedourie116 contended that nation/nationalism was historically and 
sociologically contingent, Gellner117 that it was historically contingent, and Deutsch118 
drew attention to nationalism's rootedness in social processes which he characterized as 
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processes of industrializing societies.  However, Deutsch failed to integrate the subjective 
forces and elements such as the social, linguistic, and cultural experiences of individuals 
and groups within and without the social group that mediate and shape what he regarded 
to be the objective social processes in such ways that these otherwise objective social 
processes become in themselves problematic and unpredictable.119  
In the early 80s, Benedict Anderson's work, Imagined Communities, represented a 
significant intervention in scholarly works in the study of nationalism.  Anderson (1983; 
repr. 1991) contends that nationality was culturally constituted.120  As Eley and Suny 
commented, these new schools connected the emergence of nationalism (and by 
implication, of the nation) to the rise of the modern.  Culture replaced structure because 
of the necessity of complex communication in modern society.  Identity is conceived to 
derive more from culture, than from one’s place in a given relatively fixed structure.  
Works on the public sphere formation served to redescribe the processes of social 
communication postulated by Deutsch and concretized by Hroch and established the 
centrality of cultural publics to the project of nation-building.121  Marxists’ 
reconceptualization of nationalism also furthered the understanding of this subject and 
provided major breakthroughs in helping to materialize and historicize the narrative of 
nationalism.  Hobsbawm’s and Ranger’s “invention of tradition”122 and Anderson’s 
evocation of ‘imagined communities’ helped to move the discussion beyond material and 
structural determination into the realm of discourse and the generation of meaning.123  
The historiography of nationalism in non-Western societies, particularly in 
colonial and post-colonial societies, have benefited from the contributions of these newer 
schools while newer studies from non-Western societies have also afforded valuable 
perspectives from the “margins” to enrich the study of this subject.  The growing field of 
cultural studies in the last couple of decades have also been serving to fill two important 
missing dimensions in “modernist” approaches to the study of nationalism, viz., the 
lessons provided from the “margins” and the gendered dimension of the nation.   
Until more recent times, however, Africa’s nationalist historiography had suffered 
from the uncritical adoption of western paradigms, with its inherent challenges for the 
proper understanding of non-Western societies.  The problem of understanding the 
nationalist phenomenon in Africa has thus also been related to the problem of 
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epistemology.  Works in African and subaltern studies in recent times have sought to 
provide better analytical insights in these fields by attempting to redefine in the light of 
the realities of these societies certain concepts and methodological approaches.  For 
example, analytical concepts such as gender are being redefined in more robust terms as 
to what it means to be a woman or a man in certain African context.124  Some question 
whether it should be assumed that social relations in African societies and/or in all 
societies are organized around biological sex differences, or if the male body in African 
societies can be seen as normative and therefore a conduit for the exercise of power.  
Other works by scholars such as Mudimbe (1988), 125 Mazrui (2002),126 etc., are serving 
to explore and to come to a better understanding of the whole idea of Africanity or 
Africanness in general.  Mudimbe, long concerned with this dilemma in African studies, 
searched for an African “gnosis,” i.e., African knowledge system, to guide practices and 
understanding.
127   
The problem of the hitherto dominant analytical perspective in Africa's nationalist 
studies is indicative of what had also been a larger problem and inherent “crisis” in 
Africanist studies in general and in Africanist nationalist historiography in particular.128  
This has had to do, on the one hand, with the implicit and explicit influence of Western 
intellectual and political heritage on Africa and in African studies, as earlier stated.  In 
the post-World War II period, this took the form of revisionist theories of liberal 
democracy crafted by a generation of Western political scientist and codified in Political 
Development and Modernization theories.129  These were ideological in intent, providing 
scientific rationalization of the status quo or, rather, a particular vision of change.  As 
Gendzier pointed out, it was in this climate (also Cold War climate) that nationalism as a 
field of enquiry emerged in intimate symbiosis with the rise of independence movements 
in Africa.130  Remarkably, the intellectual hold of this tradition had been so strong in 
Africa that even when in the 60s and 70s African historians self-explicitly embarked on 
the project of writing “our” history, they were implicitly still saddled with the burden of 
the “other” history and tradition to which they had hitherto been socialized and schooled.  
Temu and Swai, remarking on this dilemma, have stated that “Africanist historiography 
was constituted as an ideological response to colonial historiography,” and that in this 
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encounter “it also remained trapped, thereby making it a negative mirror image of liberal 
historiography.”131   
Africa's nationalist studies had notably reflected this paradox.132  This is 
epitomized in the various schools of nationalist historiography that emerged, from the 
Dar Es Salaam school to the Nairobi, Ibadan, and Makerere school, for example.  
Notably, the interpretations of politics and society in the Political Development and 
Modernization theories which came to govern the understanding of colonial/Third World 
societies had implied at the onset a conservative response to the problems of democracy 
and mass societies in Western societies from which they originated.133  As Gendzier 
noted, the development of this school of thought, like those that followed it, was closely 
linked to prevailing forms of domination and cultural hegemony and to forms of 
resistance against it.134  Partha Chatterjee has also detailed out in his excellent work how 
the Western rationalist epistemological framework had involved a field of discourse in 
which power was inscribed.135                 
 A problem of deconstruction, “the unlearning” of “the inherent dominative 
mode”136 had thus been posed in my works and is also posed in this study, centered 
around the whole issue of knowledge and of power.  One is in relation to what became 
mainstream discourses of self determination and of the ‘nation’ among colonials, 
especially among ethnopolitical entrepreneurs, carried out also within a Western 
liberal/rationalist thought system with its given attributes of modernity.  In the colonial 
social formations under study in the immediate pre-independence period, this applied 
structure of thought set an a priori boundary to the discourses that ensued, giving space to 
some – the master-discourse of African ethnopolitical entrepreneurs - while closing off 
others – i.e., colonial social radicals’ supplementary-discourse.  In the late 40s and early 
50s era of constitutional changes in British West Africa, the space that was opening up 
allowed for the discourse of change and of the ‘nation’ as constituted within Western 
liberal paradigms, while closing off space to the discourse of change and of the nation 
and notions of citizenship in terms that were more autochthonous, more inclusive, and 
socially transforming.  It has raised the question in my works of the limits posed by this 
choice in pre-independence “nation-forming” and construction of community and 
citizenship and the terms in which independence was won in these African states.  In 
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regard to hitherto Africa’s nationalist studies, it had also affected the choice of analytical 
categories and paradigms. 
In the 90s, Partha Chatterjee addressed this problem of epistemology and made a 
significant contribution to the discourse of the nation/nationalism from a non-Western 
perspective.  His celebrated and classic work, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial 
World,137 provided quite an important theoretical intervention in the period in nationalist 
studies in general and in colonial nationalisms in particular.138  Chatterjee was able to 
move Anderson’s celebrated text on the discourse of nationalism further, especially for 
the study of nationalism in non-Western societies, by examining the impulses from the 
margins in his attempt to theorize on the authenticity or otherwise of the discourse of 
nationalism from the 'margins.’  Benedict Anderson's work, Imagined Communities, was 
salutary in the 80s in reconceptualizing the way in which people became able to 
reimagine the boundaries of their worlds.  It remains celebrated as the emblematic text in 
marking the moment of transition in the literature of nationalism from structural and 
materialist analyses of nationalism to an approach stressing the meanings and effects of a 
‘sense of nationality’ and the intimate connections between personhood and belonging to 
a nation.  However, although Anderson successfully posed the ideological creation of the 
nation as a central problem in the study of national movements, he did not quite succeed 
in the 80s in breaking with the old western liberal rationalist tradition and the unilinear 
conception of historical development that had been so central to bourgeois ideology. 139    
To Anderson's concept of “imagined communities,” Chatterjee posed a counter 
question and developing concept, “whose imagined communities?”140  Chatterjee 
criticized the liberal/rationalist position in failing to pose the issue of the lack of 
autonomy of nationalist discourse as a theoretical problem.  In fact, he said, the 
liberal/conservative bourgeois rationalist thought is unable to pose the theoretical 
problem differently.  In his critique of the lack of autonomy and of the inherent 
contradictoriness of nationalist discourse, Chatterjee aptly contended that this discourse 
puts forward certain proposition about society and politics whose meaning is fully 
governed by the rules of the language of post-Enlightenment rational thought within 
which they were couched.  He wrote that nationalist texts are meaningful only when read 
in terms of the rules of that larger framework of thought and he took issue with the idea 
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of development, modernization, and of progress in both rational-liberal and Marxist 
tradition.141 
Other works on nationalism, such as Miroslav Hroch’s work on Eastern European 
societies, have also served to advance the understanding of the phenomenon of 
nationalism from the “margins.”  Hroch’s comparative and materialist methodology 
established a socio-historical approach to nationalist movements and their uneven spread.  
It explicitly related the process of nation-forming to larger processes of social 
transformation, specifically those associated with the global, European wide penetration 
of the unevenly expanding capitalist mode of production.142  His basic distinction 
between the dominant or “large” nations, i.e., England, France, etc, and the “small” 
nations which he investigated in his book and whose independence could only be secured 
against the emerging domination of a foreign, metropolitan, bourgeois-aristocratic 
coalition have some resonance also for the study of the phenomenon of nationalism in 
colonial Africa.143  
 
The Problematic of Political Development 
 
The problem of “nationalism” in colonial Africa is also tied to the wider 
problematic of social change, to the way colonial capital and colonial bureaucracy 
penetrated these African societies in uneven, contradictory, and incomplete ways.  Tom 
Nairn, following Gellner, referring to the uneven diffusion of industrialization in Europe 
had termed it the “nationalism-producing dilemma”144  In this regard, Nairn named the 
nation the “modern janus,” i.e., that the uneven development of capitalism inscribes both 
progression and regression, political rationality and irrationality in the very genetic code 
of the nation, and that “in this sense, it is an exact (not a rhetorical) statement about  
nationalism to say that it is by nature ambivalent.”145  
 In Africa, colonial intervention – colonial capital and bureaucracy - impacted the 
process of historical formation and change146 as well as the divisions and contestations 
within and between communities in complex and contradictory ways.  Colonial capital 
and colonial administration both affected the status quo ante without transforming it. 147  
In local African societies, the ambivalence and contradictions were both predicated 
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largely on the forms in which capital sought to articulate with pre-capitalist African 
social structures and systems of production as well as the ways in which the colonial 
powers sought to reinvent African societies.148  
 The problem of “nationalism” posed in this study arose, in part, in these 
contradictory contexts149  hence the engagement in this study and in my earlier works 
with the theme of contradictions and ambiguities in relation to the nationalist 
phenomenon.  My study of colonial social conflicts and of the political and cultural 
contestations of community and notions of citizenship and over rights and entitlements in 
the last two decades of colonial rule has represented a beginning attempt to try to 
understand the nature of such conflicts and contestations in those conflictual and 
contradictory contexts.150   
 This study, as with my earlier my earlier works on the phenomenon of 
nationalism in British West Africa, seeks to map out a different terrain, not just 
conceptually, but also in terms of the texts or narrative.  The study does not seek to 
resolve all the issues it raised and some lines of enquiry are followed in greater detail 
than others.151  It is hoped, for example, to explore more fully in subsequent works the 
possibilities and limits of the concept of citizenship in relation to how individuals across 
the board sought to identify themselves in the period under study as well as in 
contemporary African societies.  My works, including this study, represent beginning 
attempts from early in the 80s and 90s to point to new ways of thinking about the 
phenomenon of nationalism and of the end of empire in this West African region.  
 
Radicalism and Communism   
 
In my attempt to reconstitute the narrative of nationalism in colonial British West Africa 
in this period, important focus is maintained also on the themes of radicalism and 
communism in this study and in my earlier works because of the valuable insights they 
provide.  The category of the radical, as with the other ideological categories applied in 
my examination of the subject of nationalism in the West African colonial social 
formations, is also posited to be problematic, as indicated earlier.  But the category of the 
radical remains enduring in my study, however, because of the fresh insights it provides 
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into how other people were imagining the future, as well as the insights it provides into 
the process that ended empire.  The association of radicalism and colonial radicals with 
communism in British official mind is regarded in this study as of importance in how and 
when empire ended in West Africa.  Thus, my engagement with the nationalist 
phenomenon had also involved at the very onset an engagement also with the idea of 
communism and radicalism in ways that have not been previously explored or adequately 
focused on in the literature of the events and processes of this period in these places.  
Strategic “native” intellectuals like the Islamic radicals, Mallam Ringim, Mallam 
Lawan Dambazair, and Muda Spikin in the North of Nigeria, labor socialist-oriented 
trade union leaders like Wallace Johnson of Sierra Leone, and Pobee Biney and Anthony 
Woode of the Gold Coast, and feminists like Hajiyya Sawaba and Funlayo Ransome-Kuti 
in Nigeria, for example, are examined in my earlier works and in this study as offering 
glimpses of possible alternative conception of the “nation” and of citizenship from a 
radical perspective.  British officialdom at different times would go as far as labeling 
them as “communist.”  Many of the colonial social radicals, though also a complex and 
shifting category, stood at the critical gateway between various social forces152 of whom 
they were a part.  They symbolized part of a larger process in colonial society in which 
the largely rural as well as urban social forces sought to renegotiate the terms of their 
incorporation in colonial society and to reorder their lives “in the course of an 
extraordinary rapid and confusing expansion of their lives.”153  This was especially the 
case in the era of rapid constitutional changes and openings of the late 40s and early 50s 
when it was perceived to be possible.  But the openings were for certain categories of 
colonials and certain kinds of discourses that British officialdom would have privileged.  
In the late 40s and 50s, British officialdom was also closing the boundaries of legitimate 
discourse – the discourse of the nation in mutually-inclusive terms as a new kind of 
community based on citizenship conceived of as a kind of “fraternity of equals” and a 
“deep horizontal comradeship”– the discourse of colonial social radicals that officialdom 




Ethnopolitical Entrepreneurs and the Making of Community 
 
 
Introduction   
 
This chapter seeks to examine the subjectivities of the discourse and practice of 
“community” in the interwar period and the local context in which this was occurring, 
including aspects of the contradictory developments in social structures and social 
relations.  It seeks to examine the shifting political boundaries and how people, in 
particular the ethnopolitical entrepreneurs, were positioning themselves vis-à-vis the 
community, and the coordinates that determined their formulation of rights and 
belongings.  It begins to explore the use that African ethnopolitical entrepreneurs were 
making of categories of, i.e., “community,” “class,” “gender,” “race,” “religion,” in their 
social and political practices.  It seeks to begin to contend with their practices and 
framings, such as their use of vernaculars in their duality that defined the in and out,154 
their framings of community aimed at increasing levels of groupness but which were 
predicated on more narrow forms of political and cultural address, their appeal to 
tradition, and their discourse of the past, i.e., “the ways of our forefathers,” or “the way 
things used to be,”155  etc., in static, idealized and ambiguous terms.  The study questions 
why and to what effects.  
 African ethnopolitical entrepreneurs would invent a common social identity that 
were defined by such polarities or binaries as “race,” “nationality,” “religion,” etc., but 
which conceals the differences among citizenry.  In this enterprise, old forms of social 
identities or collectivities based on prior idealized community were invested with new 
meanings and old instruments of social mobilization were applied in changing 
circumstances to realize new goals and new interests, and to formulate rights and 
belongings.  Tradition also became an important ideological substructure of “nation-
forming” and an instrument of social engineering.  Like the British reinvention of 
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tradition to foster legitimacy in their African colonies,156 African ethnopolitical 
entrepreneurs also got busy in their social and political practices modernizing tradition 
and subverting it in the process of its reinvention.157   The colonial chiefs who formed an 
important component of this social force were busy particularly in the interwar period, 
modernizing tradition in their own self interest, using the new leverage that the British 
had afforded them vis-à-vis their subjects to formulate new rights and duties, demanding 
from them obligations in the name of tradition and carrying on practices whose rules and 
forms had changed. 158   
 In exploring the subjectivities of the discourse and construction of community 
among African ethnopolitical entrepreneurs, this chapter seeks to begin to reveal the 
actualities of social fragmentation, class divisions, gender and ethnic exclusions, and 
hierarchies, and relations of power in their discourses and social and political practices.  
Some social movements in the interwar period are examined as case-studies in this 
chapter to reveal how community was being constructed among the ethnopolitical 
entrepreneurs and to what effect in these social movements.  This chapter also points to 
the objective developments towards mutually-inclusive categories and of community 
conceived in more embracing terms denoting full rights and belongings but which were 
being undermined in the subjectivities of the discourse and construction of community. 
 
Contradictions and Ambiguities 
 
The discourse and construction of community and citizenship in the terms in which 
African ethnopolitical entrepreneurs were constituting them were in part shaped by and 
further shaping the inherent contradictions in African social structures and in internal 
social relations.  These contradictions were related in part to the uneven penetration of 
colonial capital and colonial bureaucracy.  This chapter seeks to focus on certain aspects 
of these contradictory developments to reveal how African ethnopolitical entrepreneurs 
were maneuvering them and manipulating the complex sets of relationship in which 
people were involved in their own perceived interest as they went about the business of 
creating “community.”  
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 The contradictions in African colonial society had involved, in part, developments 
in those structures and systems on which social control had previously been effected in 
African societies such as the kinship and lineage systems, again also always in the 
process of becoming, as well as in the nature of emergent social forces.  For example, 
while on the one hand the kinship structure prevalent in most African societies and based 
on the authority of elders or on age factors came under assault especially under the 
Indirect Rule system,159 on the other hand, the structure was also being reasserted within 
and without structures of Indirect Rule.160  Also, while the lineage system which had been 
most important in sustaining social structures in many of these African societies both as a 
source of recruitment and as a cognitive element was beginning to come under assault, as 
Apter had noted,161 for example, it was also being strengthened in other instances as in 
areas of cocoa production.162  Colonial capital penetrated or incorporated a system of 
social relations and communal “identities” which, though not fixed as also always in the 
process of becoming, retained great vitality.  In many places, capital did not formally 
subsume labor.163  Bernstein’s work on the Hausas in Northern Nigeria, for example, 
revealed how individualized household production was incorporated in the circuit of 
capital and subjected to its domination without the direct organization of production by 
capital and without the socialization of production.164  Thus, in many places, especially 
where cash crop farming was introduced, a contradictory development was occurring in 
which new social relations of production and attitudes were occurring within prior social 
organization of production,165 with important implications for local politics and the 
formulation of rights and duties.  Earlier studies, such as the well-written account of 
David Apter,166 for example, had long noted the undermining of these erstwhile 
indigenous structures in the colonial period.  Thomas Hodgkin’s study167 also provided 
an early and valuable account of the growth of emergent social groups/ forces and 
organizations in the African colonies.  However, they did not adequately show or explore 
how these structures and emergent social forces were developing in complex and 
contradictory ways and the effects of these contradictions on the process of 
“community-making” or their relationship to collective identification and individual 
subjectivities.  This study seeks to explore aspects of these developments. 




It is noted in this study that while new social forces168 were developing in this period 
(alongside the newly created group of colonial chiefs) these were not crystallized on a 
particular social axis.  Certain economic categories, like the peasantry and the worker, for 
example, were emerging in this period but with peculiar characteristics of their own.  In 
the case of workers, for example, while they may be developing certain identities based 
on workplace experience, it is also noted that they continued to share relational 
characteristics with other incipient colonial social forces.  African “farmers,” “peasants,” 
“workers,” “capitalists” or “bourgeoisies,” and other such socio-economic categories 
have indeed been debated as problematic categories.169  Going by what had been the 
conventional definition of the terms, there were, for example, wage earners who looked 
like workers but were more than and less than workers, farmers who looked like peasants 
but were more than and less than peasants, and prosperous commercial Africans who 
looked like capitalists but were more than and less than capitalists.170  Because of this 
state of indeterminacy, scholars have long debated the appropriateness or otherwise of 
applying these terms which had been developed in the experience of other regions of the 
world to conditions and categories/social forces in the African societies or of other such 
societies in which capitalism took on certain peculiar forms and where it was also tied to 
the phenomenon of imperialism.171  What is important for this study is to be able to 
historicize these categories and to seek an understanding of the particular forms in which 
they manifested in particular societies and periods and to what effects, especially in 
regard to the architectures and/or reconstitution of community in the period under study.   
 Also important was the emergence among the incipient social forces of a new 
range of perceived criteria centering around newly created roles alongside older notions 
and values.  Traditional solidarity units based on kinship or age, for example, such as the 
age grading societies, were being undermined but not destroyed.172  New agencies of 
solidarity and new patterns of role definition based on education, i.e., literary societies, 
labor, cooperative associations,173 trade unions, burial societies and political youth 
movements, for example, were also developing, as Hodgkin had shown,.174  But they 
were arising from the womb of many older units of solidarity which, though changing, 
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still retained certain significance even while their institutional forms may be changing.175  
This incomplete socialization and crystallization into particular forms and the given state 
of indeterminacy facilitated, on the one hand, the subjective construction of community 
and citizenship while it simultaneously predisposed to objective development of National 
Societies on the other hand. 
 Given these conditions of fluidity and contradictoriness, the application of 
analytical categories such as class poses a problem.  For example, while there was 
considerable differentiation going on, especially in areas of agricultural production, no 
particular interest group was able to fully crystallize into a “class” or “group.”  On the 
other hand, one could at the same time detect the growth of a new social force or an 
incipient “class” formation, for example, with the growth of western-educated Africans, 
or with the rise of wealthy or successful farmers.  The latter were able to employ the 
labor of others who for various reasons were not so fortunate.  In the Gold Coast, for 
example, rich farmers/chiefs acted as money lenders to poor peasants who offered their 
labor and crops (for sale) to the lenders.176  But the process of stratification and 
differentiation here in the agricultural sector as elsewhere in these colonial social 
formations was being mediated by other and complex sets of relationship that people 
were involved in which undermined a more propitious development on “class” lines.  
Nevertheless, “class” element was involved in the exclusionary terms in which the 
discourse of community was being privileged among certain colonial social forces.  This 
is better exemplified and analyzed when the category of class is conceptualized in 
processual and relational terms and applied as coordinates of other analytical categories 
such as community, i.e., class and community, as this study attempts to do.  The social 
movements examined in this chapter in the interwar period, such as the Benin Water Rate 
Movement (1937-41) in Nigeria and the Gold Coast Cocoa Movements in 1930-31 and in 
1937-38,177 are explored as case studies of the ways in which “class” interest was being 
advanced in the resolution of conflicts of interest otherwise predicated on community 
interest.  The application of the analytical categories of community and class as 
coordinates serve to better facilitate this examination.  They serve to exemplify the 
diffused and subjective terms in which community and citizenship were being defined in 
the interwar period, to resonate in more salient ways in the post-World War II period.  
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The social movements examined reveal how more narrowly-based interests were being 
fought for in the name of “community,” involving, for example, the manipulation of other 
cross-cutting ties and the complex sets of relationship that people were involved in.178   
 There was, however, also objective development of community in mutually-
inclusive terms, as noted above.  The contradictions and diffused nature of colonial social 
structures and social relations also predisposed, objectively, towards the potential 
creation of National Societies.  The next section examines in brief the beginning 
developments towards mutually-inclusive categories, i.e., National Societies, as well as 
how these were being undermined in the ideological creation of “community” and/or the 
“nation” by ethnopolitical entrepreneurs. 
 
Developing National Societies  
 
One could detect from this period onwards, at another level of examination, objective 
developments towards the creation of mutually-inclusive categories, especially in the 
cities.  New communities of interest were being generated in the cities that cut across 
prior existing cultures or categories of religion, language, or ethnicity, etc.  Shared social 
and cultural space, the continuum of geographical space among the employed and 
unemployed, etc., provided certain elements of commonalities and potential new 
communities of interest among various social forces.  Happy hour gatherings in beer 
parlors, alcohol drinking in bars, new language of social discourse such as pidgin 
English,179 annual festivals, the streets, cinema houses, etc., provided new sites for the 
construction and dissemination of popular culture and discourse and new arenas of 
socialization that bonded people of different backgrounds in the cities.  This objective 
development towards the creation of community in mutually-inclusive terms in the cities 
is well exemplified in the case of workers and is examined a little further in the following 





The West African Colonial Worker and the Development of Mutually-inclusive 
Categories 
 
Workers’ shared social and geographical space with others such as the mass of the 
peasantries, the unemployed, and other colonial social forces was serving to create new 
communities of interest that went beyond the hidden abode of production from the  
interwar period onwards.180  One notes, for example, that when workers went on strike, it 
was not just workers who took to the street, but hordes of others, i.e., laborers, urban 
poor, unemployed, i.e., “verandah boys” in the Gold Coast, discharged veterans, and the 
whole community, many of whom were not directly tied to the abode of production.181  In 
one of the notable strikes among workers in the interwar period, i.e., the 1919 Freetown 
strikes and riots in Sierra Leone, the whole community became involved,182 as will be 
repeated in other instances and periods in this and other colonies as well.  When workers 
went on strike they also took with them not just the community but also causes that 
issued beyond the workplace.183  The strike in Freetown in 1919 by workers occurred 
mainly among daily wage workers against the felt hardship of the post-World War I 
inflationary trend.  But they were supported by others – artisans, laborers, the urban poor, 
the unemployed, etc., who all joined in the strike and went on rampage and for various 
other causes.184  Abdullah commented in his examination of these strikes that the strikes 
and subsequent riots were also very much the product of the interaction between workers 
and the unemployed, most of whom were discharged carrier corps members, migrants 
from the Freetown hinterland, as well as Sierra Leonean “Sea boys” who had been 
repatriated as a result of racial disturbances in Liverpool and Cardiff, England.185   
 Certain developments did seem to suggest some growth along worker 
consciousness,186 such as their attempts to advance their perceived interests in the 
workplace ranging from overt direct actions such as strikes to more subtle and hidden 
forms such as absenteeism and restricted output.  Also, wage earners had in many places 
taken early initiatives to organize on trade lines and in unions in defense of their 
perceived collective interests.187  There were also some attempts made to forge the 
colonial worker into a “class” to advance its interests in the workplace and later, in the 
40s, in the colonial state.  In the immediate post-World War II period, serious attempts 
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were made by labor socialist-oriented trade union leaders in Nigeria and in the Gold 
Coast to consolidate the workers in these places into a “class” by seeking to create 
workers’ political party to fight for workers’ interests.188  But the colonial worker 
continued to share relational features with the peasantries and other incipient colonial 
forces at the same time as they were developing some identity based on workplace 
experience, with significant political implications. 
 In spite of the many features and activities that typified developments towards 
some kind of groupness among workers the colonial worker in the West African colonial 
social formations under study did not form or become a crystallized social category nor 
always acted so.  In fact, the lines of fractionalization and differentiation continued to be 
evident among workers even when and where sustained attempts were made to unite 
them to fight in their own perceived interest.  Internally, they did not even form a 
monolithic group and were divided vertically and horizontally.189  Except perhaps for the 
radical fringe, the history of West African colonial workers was one of constant 
fractionalization.190  In my interview with Michael Imoudu,191  the radical labor activist 
and railway union leader who came into prominence in the famous Nigerian General 
Strike among railway workers in 1945, he lamented the divisions among workers which 
he said continued till date in Nigeria.192  In the colonial period, the closest to the 
development of the worker in British West Africa as a distinct category was with very 
select groups such as the Sekondi Takoradi cluster of railway workers in the Gold Coast.  
They also became politically significant, notably, in their militancy and in the resultant 
British colonial administration’s fear of this category of workers as sources of communist 
infiltration into the colonies.193  The Sekondi-Takoradi railway and harbor workers were 
also the only group of Gold Coast wage earners to have established union organization on 
a durable footing prior to the beginning of World War II in the Gold Coast and they were 
also the most prone to militant action.194  Their sustained militancy fed official fear of 
them as sources of communism in the colonies.195 
 In general, the multiple locations and connectedness of workers with others 
outside their workplace, among other factors, mediated in the development of worker 
consciousness196 and served, at another level of observation, to foster the development of 
community in inclusive terms among workers and other colonial social forces.  However, 
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such propitious developments became undermined,197 in part, in the construction of 
community by ethnopolitical entrepreneurs.  Such divisiveness was increasingly 
actualized in the last decades of British colonial rule in West Africa as African political 
entrepreneurs and cultural producers went about talking and acting on behalf of the 
“nation.” 
 In Nigeria, for example, the National Societies that were developing in the 
Azikiwe-led National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC)198 party in the 
1940s became undermined and “ethnicized” in the political competition between the 
NCNC and the Yoruba-based Egbe Omo Oduduwa (Egbe) which was later transformed 
into the Action Group (AG) political party and was headed by Obafemi Awolowo.  In 
this political competition, the NCNC became discursively framed in narrower terms as an 
“Ibo-dominated” party by Azikiwe’s political rivals – Awolowo and the Action Group 
party, and later, the party of the Mallams, the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) in the 
North.199  Subsequent Nigeria’s new Federalist Constitutions of 1951 and 1953 which 
legitimized the regions as the basis of Nigeria’s unity served to legitimize this discourse 
and political practice.  Based on these new constitutions, access to power at the national 
level was seen to be more readily attainable by control of the regional power base.  While 
regionalism itself could be functional, the use that ethnopolitical entrepreneurs made of it 
in Nigeria and Sierra Leone in which this was introduced was largely dysfunctional.  As 
the AG and the NPC quickly moved to gain control of their own regional base – the 
Yorubas in the West and the Hausa-Fulanis in the North – they discursively constituted 
other regional parties in exclusionary terms as the “outsiders,” out to subjugate the people 
in their own region of control.200  This was in their efforts to consolidate their power base 
and to keep rival political parties out of their region.  As Azikiwe and more mainstream 
members of the NCNC succumbed to focusing on gaining power in what had become 
NCNC’s regional base in the Ibo majority-composed Eastern Nigeria,201 the erstwhile 
developing unity of workers and of other social forces in the NCNC became increasingly 
undermined.  Workers’ affiliation with the NCNC party became largely determined by 
their region of origin and while Ibo workers remained in the NCNC, Yoruba workers left 
the NCNC en-masse to join the Yoruba-based AG party in response to Yoruba 
“nationality” patriotic appeals by the AG leadership.202  In the North of Nigeria, the NPC 
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political party also discursively constituted the Yoruba and Ibo workers in the North and 
who formed the bulk of the Northern administrative support system as oppressive and 
dispossessors and were associated with the rival Yoruba-based AG party and the Ibo-
based NCNC party.  They were discursively linked with Christianity, labeled by the NPC 
and their Northern followers as the religion of “infidels.”  In this way, the Northern rulers 
that composed the NPC party fairly succeeded in drawing a wedge, to their advantage, 
between Moslem Northern workers and populace and workers from the East and West of 
Nigeria residing in Northern Nigeria.  The 1966 pogrom in the North of Nigeria in which 
hundreds of Ibos residing in the North were massacred by Northerners was the most 
virulent manifestation of the use of categories of, i.e., “ethnicity,” “religion,” in such 
divisive and mutually-exclusive terms.  The resultant Nigerian Civil War of 1966-70 – 
the Biafran War - in which the Ibos tried to secede and to carve out a state of their own 
(Biafra) was a direct result of this pogrom, and in the long-term, of “nation-forming” 
premised on mutually-exclusive categories.203 
 
Community and the Socially-Relevant Conflicts of Interest  
 
This section begins to explore the socially relevant interventions of colonials through the 
examination of some select social movements to reveal the forms204 in which 
architectures of community and identities of interest were being created from the pre-
World War II period onwards.  It examines aspects of the contestations among certain 
colonial social forces over rights and duties, disputations over law, etc., and their 
relationship to collective identifications & individual subjectivities. 
 The inter-war period witnessed a variety of social activism and struggles in local 
African society.  The struggles were reflective of conflicts of interests among Africans as 
well as against colonial capital and the colonial bureaucracy, including against Africans 
with vested interest in the colonial state, such as the colonial chiefs.  Part of the root of 
conflicts in the local arena was structured specifically in the changes being effected in 
gender relations, in relationships between generations, in the colonialists' restructuring of 
communal and chiefly jurisdictional boundaries and status, and in the changing structure 
of power and production in these societies, etc.  The conflicts were also tied to 
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differences in access to sources of wealth and power.  In these conflicts and struggles, 
issues of power, class, democracy, gender, community, and others intersected and 
interconnected in varieties of ways to produce different dynamic.  Also, interests 
converged and diverged in such ways that some issues or interests became displaced in 
the perceived realization of others.  The sites of struggle also varied, occurring at the 
level of the community, at the level of production, etc.205  In many cases, a variety of 
issues were equally interwoven in a particular struggle that it may be difficult for the 
casual observer to gain any critical entry into the understanding of what was being fought 
over or prosecuted.   
 In these struggles, issues and coalition of forces were constituted and 
reconstituted many times for the realization of certain perceived goals and interests.  In 
this state of indeterminacy and fluidity, certain interests were realized while others 
became displaced.  More privileged Africans, such as the colonial chiefs, used their 
vantage location in both the colonial state and in colonial society to advance many of the 
movements in which they were involved in their perceived interest while discursively 
constituting the movements in terms of community interest.206  Also, men organized 
against the ease and frequency with which women were initiating and getting divorce 
from the courts and sought to make the colonial power curtail the burgeoning autonomy 
women were developing in marital relationships.207  In these conflicts and struggles, old 
and new aspirant power elites sought to reconstitute community by reaching for a 
historical and an idealized past, obscuring the inherent divisions and inequities between 
them and others. 
 
Class and Community 
 
A major discursive component of many local struggles that were waged in this period 
was community but more particular and narrower interests were involved.  Although 
“class” elements appeared subsumed in the collective context in which these struggles 
were waged, closer examination reveals that, though muted, “class” was an important 
determinant of action.  More adequate analysis of these “community” movements is 
facilitated when class and community are used as coordinates.  In these social 
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movements, vertical lines of division were discursively blurred and other interests 
marginalized as colonials with capacity and ability made internal shifts at different 
moments as consistent with their perceived interests while simultaneously constituting 
the discourse or conflicts ostensibly in terms of the realization of wider, community 
goals.  Some of the select social movements examined below also reveal how community 
was being discursively constituted in relation to differences vis-à-vis others, i.e., 
differences of race, i.e., “we,” the Benin Community, against the “aliens who were 
allowed an indefinite period of monopoly of Timber Areas,”208 i.e., the European 
merchants, or the foreign cocoa merchants in the Gold Coast who were causing 
“widespread alarm … throughout the agricultural districts’ by their monopoly 
practices.”209 
 In the Water Rate Controversy Movement in Benin City, Nigeria, 1936-40, and 
the Cocoa Hold-Up Movement in the Gold Coast in 1930-31 & 1937-38, the Benin 
community and the farmers in the Gold Coast, respectively, were discursively constituted 
as if homogenous and united in opposition to the foreign merchants in Benin, Nigeria, 
and in the Gold Coast.  But this homogeneity or consensus was more apparent than real.  
When examined in closer detail, one discerns narrower interests being advanced as much 
against the foreign merchants as against other members of the community within the 
coalitions though the movements might have been constituted in terms of community-
wide interest.  Inherent lines of differences and divisions reveal vested interests within 
the coalitions, such as those of the landlords in Benin City, or of the larger farmers in the 
Gold Coast, among whom were the colonial chiefs, that belied the appearance of 
community-wide interest or unity.210    
 In the Benin Movement, for example, while the colonial government was willing 
to ameliorate the cause of the grievances brought before them in the “community-wide” 
petition by seeking to reduce the amount of the proposed tax based on tenement and 
against which the Benin Movement initially arose, the Benin landlords who composed a 
vocal segment of the petitioners declined to take the offer.  They rather insisted on a flat 
rate which would reduce the cost to them by spreading the cost to all members of the 
community, including non-homeowners and those who may not be able to pay for it.  
They argued that the payment of Water Rate based upon “tenement” rendered their 
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houses insecure and that “the Flat rate system is fairer because it is more distributive.”211  
But home owners were the ones benefiting from the installation of the water system, 
either directly or indirectly by providing competitive rent price.212 
 The Gold Coast Cocoa Movements reveal similarly divergent interests.  They 
were also prosecuted in terms of community-wide interest although the occasion for it – 
the fall in cocoa export prices, especially in the mid-1930s - affected mostly large-scale 
farmers and other wealthy cocoa traders and brokers among whom were the colonial 
chiefs who were also the principal organizers of the movements.  Other cocoa farmers 
who were least affected by the fall in prices were forced into participation by the colonial 
chiefs under threats of reprisals if they failed to join in.  Chiefs through the Native 
Authorities system, i.e., the Native Tribunals and Native Police, enforced the traditional 
rights of oath-taking and gong-gong proclamations in order to secure compliance.  Chiefs 
in Native Authorities used their power to arrest and heavily fine cocoa brokers, laborers, 
and poor farmers who were seen to have violated the traditional oaths or gong-gong 
prohibitions against the sale of cocoa and purchase of imported goods.213  These actions 
were to ensure the success of their cause, whether or not the interest of the rest of the 
farmers or of the community was as much involved.  Once the interest of these large 
farmers and wealthy traders and brokers was realized, or failed to be realized, they 
abandoned the movement which then dissipated and brought no gains to the 
community.214  The 1937-38 Cocoa Movement not only failed but also brought reprisals 
against the community by the colonial administration.  These cases and other select social 
movements examined in this and subsequent chapters reveal the ways in which certain 
interests were being advanced and legitimized over others in the construction of 
community especially by African political entrepreneurs and cultural producers.  
 As these movements developed, relationships, ideas, interests and values were 
discursively constituted and reconstituted in the light of perceived interests. Language 
and action shaped and reshaped each other in quite unpredictable and dialectical ways.  In 
the case of the Benin Water Rate Controversy Movement in Nigeria which is examined in 
more detail here and below as a good case study, the language of discourse moved back 
and forth from “we,” i.e., the community, versus “them,” the colonial officials and/or the 
foreign companies, to “we,” the non-privileged Benin natives versus “them,” the 
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privileged colonial chiefs and their clientele, the wealthy landlords, and/or the Western-
educated members of the community.  It was typified by a more narrowly defined 
discourse and action based on the interest of the wealthy members of the Benin 
community, the western educated Africans, and the landlords, at different moments.215   
 The Benin Community Movement was based on a complex array of issues and 
was at the onset constituted ostensibly as a community movement centered on apparent 
community issues.  The water rate grievance provided an immediate and focal point for 
all disenchanted members of the Benin community to vent their grievances and it 
appeared to have brought the community together initially.  However, as the movement 
continued, more particular and divergent interests surfaced and the language of discourse 
and patterns of alliances became continually subject to reconstitution.  In this movement, 
sides changed quite often in line with perceived and redefined interests.  Disaffected 
chiefs who had joined forces with the western educated elements in the initial struggle 
against the colonial government and the colonial chief were abandoned by the 
westernized elements as the interest of the latter became redefined in the light of certain 
administrative changes being introduced in the course of the struggle and which were 
perceived to be favoring them.  These changes led the Western-educated members of the 
Benin Community to re-align themselves with the colonial chief, the Oba, against whom 
they had initially organized.  The westernized elements soon shifted their position again 
later on to organize against the colonial chief, this time with the support of the Nigerian 
Youth Movement (NYM) which had waded into the struggle at a later stage.216  The 
loyalist chiefs who had initially sided with the Oba of Benin, the colonial chief, at the 
beginning of the struggle also turned against him in the course of the struggle after they 
found themselves displaced in the 1940 administrative reorganization that was 
undertaken by the colonial administration in partial response to the on-going movement's 
demands.217  They would now accuse the Oba of not governing according to “custom and 
tradition,” some of the same accusation earlier levied against the Oba by the opposition 
movement and against which they had stood in support of the Oba at the time.218  
“Custom” and “tradition” became defined and redefined to serve particular interest at 
different moments in time!   
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 In these struggles, categories of class, gender, nationality, etc., were being made 
into “community” as conceived by different social forces at different times.  This would 
also be the case in other instances and places in this period and in the post-World War II 
period.  The cases examined briefly below, such as the Okeiho-Iseyin struggle in Western 
Nigeria, or the anti-tax movement in the Gold Coast in 1931, also reveal such practices in 
the interwar period.  In these cases, the struggle against the erosion of old privileges and 
power positions or the struggles of would-be male power holders, etc., were undertaken 
and discursively constituted also in terms of “community” struggle.  In many of these 
struggles and/or movements, elements of class, power, gender, and community 
intersected in quite complex and contradictory ways.  This study seeks to unmask the 
inherent divisions and inequities that underlay the “community” and/or the “nation” that 
ethnopolitical entrepreneurs in particular were constituting in otherwise homogenous and 
undivided terms in their discourses and practices. 
 Although many local struggles in the colonial period took on “community” and/or 
“group” forms, their real causes were indeed much more sectional and multifaceted, and 
the dynamics much more complex.  In the Iseyin/Okeiho risings of 1916 in Western 
Nigeria, issues of power and control were intertwined with other more popular issues, as 
would tend to be the case in many other instances in this period and in the post-World 
War II period.  The local chiefs who were major participants in this movement had their 
personal concerns, involving their resentment against the new reduction in their power 
and influence under colonial administration.  The Native Court System introduced in 
1914 had served to reduce the leverage which these chiefs formerly had over local affairs.  
Non-chiefs resented the new Western legal codes applied in the interpretation of cases.  
The rank and file expressed resentment against forced labor and changes in community 
health procedures, etc. 219  Western-educated Africans, who in their own case felt 
alienated from the structures of power, were struggling to gain control of some of the 
power positions and resources of the colonial state.  Colonial administrative restructuring 
in the interwar period had not only negatively affected the position of many of the old 
power elites, it also served to alienate large sections of the growing new Western 
educated Africans who it mostly left out of the institutions of  power.  The latter sought to 
advance their claims against both the colonial power and the colonial chiefs.  Their 
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struggle was facilitated in some cases through alliance with other alienated groups, 
principally disaffected chiefs (mainly sub-chiefs), in waging what were usually sectional 
struggles but carried on in the name of the community.   
 The Gold Coast also provides ample examples of these developments.  In the late 
interwar period in this colony, for example, chiefs whose status became diminished as a 
result of the then on-going native administration changes and sections of alienated 
Western-educated Africans joined together and mobilized community against colonial 
chiefs and other colonial officials alike, transforming their grievances into community 
grievances.  In this particular colony, local opposition to the colonial government and to 
pro-government chiefs was developed, partly under the auspices of the Aboriginal Rights 
Protection Society (ARPS), in three crucial areas of Native Administration policy there: 
the Provincial Councils, Stool Treasuries, and Native Tribunals.220  In his study of rural 
politics in South-Central Gold Coast (Ghana), Stone reveals how, in 1939, local 
opposition to the Native Treasuries Bill enacted that year was mobilized by a section of 
the Western-educated Africans led by Kobina Sekyi and the rump of the ARPS who were 
also nursing resentment against the new role of chiefs and the reduction of their own 
influence.221 They had encouraged in this movement the formation and activities of anti-
government parties within the states, providing legal and political advice to further local 
propaganda against instruments of interventionist Indirect Rule such as the Provincial 
Councils and the Stool Treasury System.  Nana Amanfi III, the Omanhene of Asebu and 
the president of the Central Provincial Council, complaining against the ARPS’ 
agitational activities and pamphleteering, observed that “they first touch the states in 
which they know discontent exists or where relations between the chiefs and a section of 
his people are strained.”222  Resentment of dispossessed chiefs, especially, provided 
fertile grounds for local actions against colonial chiefs and for alliances with other 
alienated groups against both the colonial chiefs and the colonial authority.  Nana Amanfi 
III in his complaint against the activities of Sekyi and the ARPS remarked that agitational 
leaflets are “taken to the chiefs who in the opinion of the society are at variance with the 
Paramount Chiefs.”223   
 Similar developments were occurring in other places and colonies.  The Benin 
Community Movement in Nigeria in the latter half of the 1930s exemplifies many of the 
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issues raised above in regard to the ways in which architectures of community or  
groupness were being created around more narrowly-based interests and is examined in 
further detail in the following section. 
 
The Benin Water Rate Agitation Movement, 1937-1941 
 
In Nigeria, disaffected western educated Africans and sub-chiefs in Benin - political 
entrepreneurs and cultural producers - mobilized the community for a struggle fought, 
ostensibly, over the Benin water rate levy in 1937 as a community struggle.  The struggle, 
however, incorporated other aims and interests some of which were mutually conflicting 
and competing.  In this struggle, interests and identities were constructed and 
reconstructed as the struggle developed and alliances remained shifting in the realization 
of certain perceived interests.224  The ostensible common cause or the immediate cause 
over which the struggle was waged was the government's proposed levy of 10% on 
annual value of tenements on the people.225  The petitioners had initially written to the 
Chief Commissioner, Southern Provinces, claiming to be speaking on behalf of the whole 
community, that:  
The community desires to invite Your Honor's special 
attention to the fact that in matters of public interest and 
concern the opinion of the community must be consulted 
before submission.226   
 
They subsequently organized through the auspices of the Western-educated members of 
the Benin community and chiefs into a powerful body, the “Benin Community,” to 
express their discontent against this law and to attempt to right their many felt grievances.   
 The movement indeed seemed all-encompassing and community-based as it 
involved a cross-section of the Benin City community and various interest groups, from 
the Iyase (Prime Minister)227 who took up leadership of the movement, to other 
traditional chiefs, and to the Western-educated members of the community, the 
commercial class, farmers, as well as artisans all of who formed the bulk of the tax 
paying adult population.228  The issue over which the struggle ensued ostensibly cut 
across groups but it only provided a focal point for fighting out other pent-up grievances 
and personal discontents, however.  Underlying it was the disenchantment of many of the 
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aggrieved parties with the Benin Native Administration system as then constituted by the 
colonial government which was also felt to undermine many old privileges.  The 
Western- educated elements who were also left out of power felt the new arrangement 
gave too much power to the colonial chief and they promoted a discourse constituted 
around the perceived unrepresentativeness of the Benin administration of which the Oba, 
the colonial chief, was a part.  
 The water rate issue thus provided an occasion for fighting out more fundamental 
grievances the nature of some of which mutually conflicted internally. While, at one 
level, community-related causes brought members of the Benin community together, at 
other levels, individual or “class” interest was undermining and fractionalizing the 
collective build-up.  For example, the petitioners had complained, in the interest of the 
“community,” that they perceived the formation of the new Forest Reserves by the 
government as serving only the interests of European merchants, particularly those of the 
United African Company (UAC) operative in that area.  In the petition to the Chief 
Commissioner, they had made it known to him that “it is not the desire of the community 
that the new Forest Reserves should be formed,”229 and claimed that “the community sees 
no vision in undertaking a profitless labor for the sole benefit of aliens who are allowed 
an indefinite period of monopoly of (their) Timber Areas.”230  The economic resources of 
the “community” were to be protected from the “outsiders” – the White merchants and 
the foreign monopolies.  However, sections of these same petitioners – wealthy members 
of the community, i.e., the landlords, etc., - who claimed to be speaking for the people 
would also seek to protect their interests over those of the people – other members of the 
Benin community.  They would ask that the government introduce the Flat Rate system 
in regard to payment of the water rate levy in Benin City instead of payment on tenement 
basis as approved by the government.  They wrote: “Your Petitioners' request is for 
payment of the Flat Rate system and its adoption, and not a reduction based on 
Tenements.”231  This was to take care of the interest of these landlords to whom the 
tenement rate would only have accrued.  The Flat Rate reduced the amount for them as it 
spreads the cost to everyone and not just to homeowners.  But homeowners were the ones 
benefiting from the installation of the water system, as earlier indicated, either directly or 
indirectly by providing competitive rent price.  Even when the government showed a 
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willingness to reduce the total due amount by 6%, still based on Tenement, these 
petitioners refused, insisting on the flat rate.  They wrote that:  
Although a reduction to 6% of the Tenement rates brings 
the required amount from 1,442 (pounds) to about 800 
(pounds)232 only, Your petitioners prefer to pay the full 
1,442 (pounds) by the Flat Rate system instead of … by 
Tenement.233 
 
 They insisted that 'the flat rate system is fairer as it is more distributive and 
impartial as well.'234  The government, however, rejected the flat rate proposal for many 
reasons.  Among these was the belief, rightly, that the collection of the flat rate would be 
difficult and political officers were also of the view that people outside Benin City should 
not be compelled to pay for amenities enjoyed by the city dwellers alone and that a flat 
rate tended to penalize the poor more than the rich.  The landlords engaged in the Benin 
Movement, on the other hand, did not feel compelled to consider the effects of the Flat 
Rate system that they were insistent on recommending on the ordinary and non-
privileged Benin community members. 
 In this movement, another interest group, the traditional chiefs, dispossessed of 
their erstwhile income and power as district heads in the on-going administrative 
reorganization of the provinces and of central administration,235 took action to redress 
their felt grievances.  To redress this in ways desired by these chiefs, i.e., go back to 
“traditional” arrangements, would of course constrain against the aims of the Western- 
educated elements who were seeking representation in the new administrative structures 
and could make more undemocratic a system the latter already criticized as 
unrepresentative and undemocratic.  The western educated elements had resented their 
exclusion from positions of authority and the large powers enjoyed by the Oba as Sole 
Native Authority, aided by a council selected on the basis of alleged traditional title-
holders.  They also sought in the Water Rate struggle a reform of the Sole Native 
Authority system along what they perceived to be more democratic and progressive lines.  
The wealthy Benin natives as well as the Benin chiefs also took action in the same 
movement to express their felt pent-up grievances against the Oba and the British Native 
Administration for the law enacted in November 1937 which restricted their free access 
to village land, contrary to the free practices in pre-colonial period.  Now, the permanent 
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crop rule enacted stipulated that permission had to be obtained first from the village 
councils which then sent this to the Oba for scrutiny.  This usually involved delays and 
some arbitrariness in the decision as to who eventually got what. 
 Interests were not, however, as clearly defined or positions fixed. As noted earlier, 
they were shaped and reshaped in the course of the struggle.  Even the colonial 
administration also reconstituted its discourse of what was representative and shifted its 
position to accommodate other groups by undertaking some administrative reorganization 
in the course of the movement, a step forced on them by the resoluteness of the 
participants of the struggle.  British colonial officials had thought at the beginning of the 
struggle, in their usual manner, that the crisis would simply disappear.  Even the colonial 
chief, who had similarly thought so, had to quickly change his strategy and went as far as 
employing a lawyer for his defense when he realized the seriousness and permanence of 
the movement. 236  
 At the early stage of the struggle, the Western-educated elements and sections of 
disaffected chiefs could be found in alliance against the Oba, the Sole Native Authority, 
on the one side and on the other side, those chiefs who remained loyal to the Oba in 
support of him.  But even in these alliances, there were already ideological lines of 
friction and the coalition would not be sustained.  The falling apart began in March 1938, 
subsequent to the public meeting at the Benin Native Court between the Assistant District 
Officer, H. F. Marshall, the Iyase, and other Benin chiefs and representative members of 
the Benin Community.  A committee of six had been elected at that time by the Benin 
Community to produce an Intelligence Report in regard to proposed lines of 
administrative reforms for Benin.  All the six elected members happened also to be 
Western-educated Benin natives who were engaged in different occupations.237  In their 
report, they had emphasized, among other things, that in due course literacy and 
intelligence should be the primary qualifications for membership of the Benin Native 
Administration.  Although they were correct in emphasizing, as they did in their report, 
the need for democratizing the base of government and in condemning the appointment 
of councilors mainly on the basis of title, they were wrong in unduly equating literacy 
and intelligence with Western education, thus eliminating other potentially capable 
individuals who may not be Western-educated.  Their report obviously had a partisan and 
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self-interested slant to it and caused reaction among the other members of the 
Community with whom they were in alliance, particularly the disaffected chiefs.  Many 
of the dispossessed chiefs with whom they had been in alliance became strongly opposed  
to the Benin Community Intelligence Report238 and subsequently reorganized themselves 
into a new constituent group, the “Ekhaekpen Chiefs of Benin.”  They went on to argue 
that in the reorganization of the Benin Native Administration, “titles should not be wiped 
out or discouraged nor looked upon with scorn.”239  They further emphasized, appealing 
to tradition, that, in accordance with the stated policy of reorganization “the good old 
principles and customs” should be maintained.240    
 The new reorganization that was carried out by the government, however,  
favored the young, more Western-educated elements than the chiefs altogether whose 
position became more precarious because of the selection criteria basis for getting any 
members of this group into the Benin Council.  It served to crystallize the latent 
antagonism between the old traditional ruling elites, including the “loyalist” chiefs who 
were now also becoming displaced in the new reorganization, on the one hand, and the 
younger, Western-educated elements, on the other hand, if only temporary.  
 The struggle in Benin was a long drawn-out process and continued even after the 
1938 reorganization and when the water rate controversy was no longer an important 
issue.  Barely a year after the reorganization, positions, interests and discourses began to 
change again.  The small but “loyal” and influential group of chiefs who had supported 
the Oba previously when the agitation had been centered on the water rate issue now 
turned against the Oba because of their own recent displacement from office as a result of 
the latest administrative reorganization.  These changes, however, still secured firmly the 
base of power of the Oba even while new elements were being given more adequate 
representation.  The newly displaced “loyalist” chiefs now accused the Oba of assuming 
privileges not conferred on him by “custom!”  In an outburst of anger, one of the leading 
chiefs asked the District Officer whether the British were in Benin solely for the benefit 
of the Oba or whether they were there for the chiefs and people as well!241   
 In alliance with the Oba at this time was the reconstituted members of the Benin 
Community, composed mostly of the western educated elements, who came out in 
defense of the Oba!  One of the younger elements, Uwaifo, called the displaced chiefs 
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“reform grumblers in Benin” and who were merely self-seekers.  Igbafe’s remark in 
regard to the movement's new configuration to the effect that “it looked like a reversal of 
alliance,”242 is an understatement of the changing dynamics of this movement and of the 
fortunes of its participants!  It was indeed a reversal of alliances!!  But even this reversal 
would be subject to further reversals and shifts a year later with the involvement of the 
Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM) which again introduced new dynamics into the 
movement.    
 The NYM, originating in Lagos among western-educated Southerners was geared, 
among other things, towards the reform or abolition of the Indirect Rule system.  Among 
its strongest members were also the group of young, vocal, Western-educated elements 
who formed part of the Benin Community.  The assistant secretary of the Benin 
Community, Mr. E. E. Omere, was, for instance, also the leader of the local branch of the 
NYM.243  With the active involvement of the NYM at this time, the support of the 
Western-educated members for the Oba changed again as these once more reconstituted 
themselves into an opposition against the Oba and joined forces with the alienated chiefs.  
The grievances against the Oba at this point mainly concerned the chiefs and titled 
classes exclusively, many of whose grievances had arisen directly or indirectly out of the 
reorganization of the Benin Division which had excluded them and for which the 
government and not the Oba was responsible.  But the grievance resolutions passed on 
December 28, 1940 and January 11, 1941 had the support not only of this group but also 
of the whole Benin City community, including the democratically-inclined elements who, 
as Igbafe also observed, “a short while previously were hot and strong as champions of 
the people against the titled chiefs.”244  He also recalled that in the earlier Intelligence 
Report on Benin City written during the water rate agitation, the Benin Community had 
been opposed to many members of the titled classes being ex-officio members of the 
Central Council.  He said representation of these titled chiefs at all had been due to the 
Oba and the political officers245 and concluded, despairingly, that “the alliance of these 
strange bed-fellows early in 1940 was the more baffling when the antagonism between 
the two groups in 1939 is borne in mind,” and again remarked that “it was a reversal of 
roles.”246   
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 It definitely does not seem rational that the Benin Community, especially the 
young western-educated elements, would find common cause with the chiefs again.  
However, their repositioning was strategic and was now tied into the politics of the NYM 
which was geared towards eroding the base of power of the colonial chiefs, the Obas, in 
the Indirect Rule System.  The alliance of the western-educated members of the Benin 
Community, who now controlled the Benin Community, with the disaffected chiefs was 
to strengthen their goal of eroding the power of the Oba of Benin.  At this point, sectional 
struggles at the community/local level were beginning to be tied into the politics 
predicated on goals and interests that transcended local issues even while these formed 
important elements of it.247   Socially-relevant conflicts of interest would begin to be 
discursively constituted into nationally-relevant conflicts of interest increasingly as these 
Western-educated Africans, including wealthy commercial class, etc, embarked on the 
project of the “nation-forming” especially in the post-World War II period.248 
 In the Benin Movement, the politics of the Western-educated elements ensured 
the resolution of the conflict and its contradictions more in their favor in the short-term 
during the interwar period.  They succeeded in forcing the hands of the administration to 
effect more changes along more democratic lines in the Benin administration in the early 
1940s.  An Executive Council was established on April 22, 1941 made up of all groups, 
chiefs as well as non-chiefs.  Its function was to advise the Oba on all measures before 
these became promulgated into law by the Native Administration.  It served to reduce to 
some extent the concentration of power in the Oba. 
 
The Gold Coast Cocoa Movements, 1930-31/1937-38 
 
The Gold Coast Cocoa Movements of 1930-31 and 1937-38 are also examined further 
below as important case studies of social struggles discursively constituted in terms of  
community interest but in which narrower “class” interests were being fostered.249  
Different aspects of these movements have been the subject of some previous and well-
written studies250 and it is not the intent of this study to go over the details of these cocoa 
Hold-Up Movements.  The Movements are examined in this chapter in the light of part of 
this study’s aim of revealing the forms in which “community” was being constituted 
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especially in the discourse and practices of ethnopolitical entrepreneurs from the interwar 
period onwards.  These involved ways that served some interests while other interests 
were marginalized.  
 The 1930-1931 and 1937-1938 Cocoa Movements in the Gold Coast were 
principally organized and advanced as community action by the colonial chiefs, along 
with other wealthy cocoa traders and cocoa brokers251 for whom the then fall in prices 
spelt economic doom, especially after 1937.252  The colonial chiefs, in their role as large 
farmers, had put their political weight behind the movements and were in fact the first to 
take action.  Before the first hold-up movement began, the Central Provincial Council of 
Chiefs had passed a resolution early in 1929 in which they drew the government's 
attention to: 
  The present widespread alarm that the action of cocoa  
  merchants in this country is causing throughout  
  the agricultural districts by the very low prices  
  paid for cocoa, contrary to the assurances that  
  from time to time have been held out to farmers  
  by the officers of the Agricultural Department.253  
 
 But the Hold-Up Movements were more complex and the interests involved more 
narrowly-based among Africans than simple community action based on the interest of 
cocoa farmers254 in general as self-interested participants tried to discursively constitute it 
and to prosecute it as such.  Although, as already noted in previous works, the Cocoa 
Hold-up Movements in the Gold Coast involved a wide cross-section of colonials, 
particularly those involved with the cocoa trade, not all members of the cocoa growing 
community stood to gain from, or willingly participated in it.  Contrary to how the large 
cocoa farmers, especially the colonial chiefs, would seek to constitute it, the cocoa-
growing community was not homogenous.  The interests and positions of the new 
economic groups that arose around the cocoa trade were highly differentiated in terms of 
their relative dependence on this trade.  Large scale farmers, some of whom were the 
chiefs and including many migrant cocoa farmers, wealthy urban-based traders, and 
cocoa brokers who participated in the movement had stronger ties with the market forces 
and with the international market relations and were thus more hard-hit by the cyclical 
change in producer prices than the smaller-scale farmers and cocoa brokers.  The latter 
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were partially still subsistence farmers with weak ties to the market and their livelihood 
was therefore less dependent on the cash-based economy.  Because of their relatively 
small dependence on the market place and on market forces therefore, they tended to stay 
relatively aloof from farmers’ political protests.  Some small farmers had indeed 
participated in the hold-up when it was perceived to be in their interest, as in the case of 
small farmers in the Central Province, as Twumasi reveals. 255  But there were many other 
places where there was substantial opposition to the hold-up largely among small cocoa 
brokers and small farmers.  Force had therefore to be applied on them to participate.   
 The chiefly and wealthy commercial class tried to use their vantage position and 
relative influence in colonial society to mobilize mass support and to prosecute the 
movement as a community movement, irrespective of the lack of community-wide 
consensus over it.  At the start of the Cocoa Hold-Up Movement, the colonial chiefs not 
only used their traditional and legislative and judicial powers to advance the cause of the 
movement but also used these powers to coerce small farmers and others not so badly 
affected by the slump to participate by force in the Hold-up in their attempt to ensure its 
success.  The Kyidomhene of Larteh, for example, swore the traditional oath of Akwapim 
that he would see to it that his subjects did not sell their cocoa until the price rose to 25/- 
shillings per load.  Wealthy traders and brokers also, under the prompting and with the 
active encouragement of colonial chiefs, intimidated dissidents.256  Chiefs through the 
Native Authorities system, i.e., the Native Tribunals and Native Police, enforced the 
traditional rights of oath-taking in order to secure compliance.257  Gong-gong 
proclamations, the pre-colonial forms of gathering the community together on urgent and 
crucial community matters, was beaten in towns and villages to enforce participation.  
They used their power to arrest and heavily fine cocoa brokers, laborers, and poor 
farmers who had violated traditional oaths or gong-gong prohibitions against the sale of 
cocoa and purchase of imported goods.  Failure to comply was threatened with all forms 
of punishment including one year’s imprisonment258 to anyone who bought European 
goods or sold cocoa.  There was counter-reaction to this enforcement, however, revealing 
the lack of consensus and differences in the cocoa community.  In rural areas like Kwahu, 
where the Asafo organization was strong, organized pressure was put on the chiefs to lift 
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the ban on the sale of cocoa and failure to do so resulted in the destoolment of some 
chiefs.259 
 The colonial chiefs who forced the community into compliance did not, however,  
take the community into considerations when they chose to abandon the movements.  Not 
surprisingly, they did not hesitate to abandon the movement and the cause as soon as they 
started to incur the displeasure of the colonial government and perceived that their other 
position of power in the state was at stake.  Their withdrawal subsequently created 
important splits in the leadership of the Hold-Up Movement and contributed to the failure 
of the Movement to achieve its objectives.  The 1930-31 hold-up movement, for example, 
lasted for less than two months, though intense and well-organized, and when it was over, 
the price of cocoa was lower than when the hold-up began.260  The Movements also 
brought reprisals against the community by the colonial government. 
 This pattern of political behavior, the potential to fight individual perceived 
interest in terms of a “collective” whole or on behalf of the “community” or “nation,” 
was to occur again and again throughout the colonies in the interwar period and in the 
post-World War II period.  This was especially the case among the chiefly and wealthy 
class as well as among the Western-educated and professional elements – the cultural 
producers and political entrepreneurs – as well as others all of whom at different times 
sought to enlist mass support.261  
 It is therefore helpful to inquire into the coincidence of class and community, 
class and ethnicity, i.e., “ethnoclass,” and class and nationality, etc., for example, in the  
discourses and practices of the ethnopolitical entrepreneurs and their construction of 
“community” and/or the “nation.”262  It is clear that “class” and “national” interests can 
and do coincide.263  As revealed in this study in the case of certain aspirant African 
political incumbents, it is also clear that “class” aspirations can and do in certain 
situations also take dominance over “nationalist” or “community” considerations even 
when the rhetoric is “nationalist” or “community.”  In his important study of national 
revival among the smaller European nations, Miroslav Hroch made the qualitative 
distinction of principle between the national movement as part of the process of the 
formation of the modern nation and the “national” activities of the Estates (in the case of 
this study, the “national” activities of African political entrepreneurs and cultural 
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producers, i.e., African ethnopolitical entrepreneurs).264  It is noted in this study and in 
my earlier works that in the “nation-forming” project of African ethnopolitical 
entrepreneurs, popular issues and/or socially relevant conflicts of interests were displaced 
as they sought to transform these into nationally-relevant conflicts of interest.265  There 
was no serious or sustained discussion among them of grassroot-oriented issues or issues 
of democracy and popular participation, including issues of grassroot entitlements, in 
their imagined new community or “nation.”  Those who sought to center these grassroot 
issues at the center of national agenda - such as certain colonial social radicals - were 
marginalized and delegitimized by both British officialdom and the ethnopolitical 
entrepreneurs.   
 Certain colonial social radicals attempted to resolve socially relevant conflicts of 
interests and nationally-relevant conflicts of interests in more popular terms and to make 
the categories of, i.e., “ethnicity,” “gender,” “religion,” “class,” “nationality,” etc.,  into 
National Societies in their social and political practices.266  A handful of them, influenced 
to some varying degrees by communist and leftwing revolutionary doctrines and 
movements, had begun to imagine the “nation” and citizenry in new and socially 
transforming ways in the interwar period.  They had begun to raise the issue of 
democratic change in the colonies as well as the issue of the end of empire as serious and 
immediate agenda in the interwar years, as seen in the career of Wallace-Johnson in this 
period, for example.  I. T A. Wallace-Johnson,267 a socialist-oriented labor leader in 
Sierra Leone, had established a West African colony-wide organization, the West African 
Youth League (WAYL), first in Sierra Leone in 1935 and in the Gold Coast in 1937, as 
the organizational instrument for the realization of these goals.  By 1942-43, various 
Marxists groups had also developed in West Africa and especially in Lagos, Nigeria, also 
in furtherance of similar goals.  Many of the leading members of these groups would 
eventually go to London as students though not all were committed Marxists and many 
would fall foul of the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) which tried to patronize 
them on arrival in Britain.268  Outside the colonies, discourses of democracy and of self-
determination in the interwar period were located in the discourses and activities of other 
African and Black organizations,269 as well as in the Pan African Movement270 which 
included a number of West Africans in Britain.  These individuals and organizations were 
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all certainly influenced to varying degrees by leftwing discourse of self-determination 
and of the nation in the interwar period.   
 The contrasting framings of the “nation” in socially radical terms would be 
opposed by British officialdom who were beginning to be fearful of such discourses and 
developments from the interwar period.  The resonance of communism in colonial social 
radicals’ discourses was perceived as counter-hegemonic and destabilizing of the status 
quo and of officialdom’s imagined community in their West African empire and they 
would seek to close the space for such discourses and practices.  One way by which 
officialdom did so was in the application of labels such as “extremist,” “communist,”  
“agitator,” etc., labels that served to delegitimize such “nation-talk” and their proponents, 
as well as notions of citizenship in socially transforming terms.   
 The next chapter examines the making of the category of the “communist” in 







British Officialdom and the Making of the Communist 
 
 
Introduction   
 
This chapter examines aspects of the making of the category of the communist in British 
imperial discourse and to what effect.  The study posits that by discursively constituting 
as “extremist” and “communist” those whose discourses and practices represented 
alternative space for the construction of community and discourse of citizenship in more 
socially inclusive and progressive terms, British officialdom was serving to delegitimize 
and to close the space for the privileging of community and notions of citizenship in 
socially transforming terms.  This also involved officialdom’s corresponding gradual 
legitimization of the discourses that they would rather have centered, located more 
among the ethnopolitical entrepreneurs, especially after the 1948 Gold Coast conjuncture.  
The latter development is examined in chapter four and subsequent chapters.  This 
chapter seeks to examine, in addition, the real threat of communism, if any, in British 
West African colonies and among colonial social radicals in the colonies, including 
among West African students in Britain.  “Communist” was indeed a label that British 
officialdom applied to those holding a wide range of political views.  It was applied in 
particular to colonial social radicals, critics of government, and anybody that they did not 
like.271  As Hakim Adi commented, in the light of British government’s post-World War 
II problems, perceived opposition to British plans to strengthen itself economically and 
politically in the colonies was also seen as part of the Soviet threat.272   
 As noted in chapter two, colonial social radicals were already being perceived by 
British officialdom as sources of communism in the colonies from the interwar years as 
early as the 1920s, in the heyday of the Communist International (Comintern) 
movement.273  Colonial social radicals comprising of labor socialist-oriented trade 
unionists and union leaders like I. T. A. Wallace Johnson of Sierra Leone, Pobee Biney 
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and Anthony Woode of the Gold Coast, Nduka Eze and Michael Imoudu of Nigeria, and 
others, were labeled as “strike agitators” and “communists;” 274 workers’ strikes like the 
1919 and 1926 workers’ strikes in Sierra Leone, the various mine workers’ strikes in the 
Gold Coast, the later 1945 workers’ strike in Lagos, and the Enugu coal miners’ strike in 
1949,  etc., were decried by officials as the rioting of “hooligans,” or of the “mob,”275 and 
believed by them to be influenced by “extremists” and “communists” and “agitators”276 
from outside;  the 1948 Gold Coast crisis was characterized by Governor Creasy as the 
work of “six evil men,” influenced by communists, referring to Nkrumah and others 
accused of complicity in the disturbances;277 otherwise middleclass women radicals that 
led grassroot movements for change in the colonies such as Funlayo Ransome 
(Anikulapo) Kuti and Constance Cummings-John were labeled as “communist”278 and 
their movements as “communist-inspired,” etc.;279 the organization of West African 
Students Union (WASU) in Britain were felt to be “under communist influence” and of  
“political extremists”;280 popular grassroot movements such as that of the Northern 
Elements Progressive Union (NEPU)281 in the North of Nigeria were ridiculed as 
“invented political society to fulfill desires of self-aggrandizement by its leaders”282 and 
its members as mere “extremist group,”283 etc.   
 This chapter seeks to examine the actual as opposed to the imagined threat of 
communism in British West African colonies and among colonial students overseas and 
to show how the British anti-communist grid was beginning to collapse into one the 
different socially relevant interventions in the colonies and among colonial students in 
Britain.  This is partly revealed through a closer examination of the discourses and 
activities of two major colonial social forces who, in official mind, were perceived as 
potential sources of communist infiltration into the colonies in the interwar period.  This 
includes an examination of officialdom’s interaction with, and reaction to them.  These 
were: colonial students overseas284 - those from West Africa represented in Britain in 
their main organization, WASU285 - and colonial labor and trade unionists286 with a kind 
of labor-socialist orientation, symbolized in the interwar years in the colonies in the 
activities of I. T. A. Wallace-Johnson of Sierra Leone.  The latter loomed larger than life 
in official mind as a source of communist infiltration into their West African colonies and 
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was regarded in various unfavorable terms, including that of an “unscrupulous 
professional agitator.”287  
 The exploration of these themes in this chapter is important because of what this 
study considers to be the significance of British officialdom’s fear of communism in their 
colonies in the process that ended empire in West Africa and of the terms in which 
empire ended in these colonies.  A central thesis of this study and of my earlier works on 
the theme of radical nationalism in colonial British West Africa is that British 
officialdom’s fear of communism in the colonies, real or imagined, was an important 
component of official mind and of the dynamic of the process that ended in what this 
study considers to be precipitous decolonization in British West Africa.  The many 
correspondence files of the Colonial Office and Foreign Office in the British national 
archive in London reveal officialdom’s intense pre-occupation with communism and their 
fear of its potential infiltration into the British colonies especially in the post-World War 
II Cold War period, not only in their possessions outside Africa such as in South-East 
Asia, but also in Africa, including West Africa.  These range from correspondence files 
on communist activities in the colonies to their prevention, etc. 
 There is no doubt that officialdom was fearful of colonial social forces like 
colonial students overseas, and in the colonies, trade union organizers with labor-socialist 
orientation, workers in strategic industries like the ports and railways, and returning 
servicemen and students.  They felt the latter would have had contact with prevalent 
communist and other leftwing ideas and leftwing individuals while serving or studying 
overseas.  In the course of the research work I undertook in the British archives, I found 
numerous listings in the Colonial Office and Foreign Office files on communism in 
regard to these groups in relation to British colonies, including extensive listing in 
relation to these groups in British West African colonies.  Many of them were marked as 
destroyed or detained by the Department of State.  These included files such as 
“Communism in the Colonies: Communist influence on students in the U.K, 1948-
1949,”288 “Colonial Students in UK: security problems caused by undesirable contacts, 
1951-1952,”289 and “Communist Activities in the Colonies, 1948.”290  A few marked as 
detained had been released and some are reflected in this study. 291  Although destroyed 
or unavailable at particular times, the extensive listing in itself is further indicative of the 
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great pre-occupation of British colonial power with communism in their African and 
other colonies as well as of its perceived influence among colonial students overseas.   
 In regard to West African students, Colonial Office reports contain numerous 
signs of alarm at “the addiction of so many of the young West African intelligentsia to 
form Communist associations in the UK and the printing of communist articles in the 
West African native press.”292  Discussions about solutions to the problem of perceived 
communist influence amongst the students took place at the highest level of the Attlee 
government involving the Colonial Office, the Commonwealth Relations Office and the 
Foreign Office, as well as amongst the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in the Cabinet itself.293 
 
The Development of the Imperial Anti-Communist Grid 
 
In the West African colonies, the fear of communism was already beginning to seriously 
engage colonial officials’ attention from the interwar period.  The perceptions and 
concerns of colonial officials in regard to communist influence in these colonies were 
also being conveyed dutifully to the Home Office through official dispatches, political 
intelligence summaries, etc., from the 1920s onwards.  They reveal colonial officials’ 
beginning  unease at any activism in the colonies that appeared radical or oppositional 
and their fear of communist involvement in these, as well as their fear of potential 
communist infiltration into these colonies.  They were also beginning to collapse all the 
different forms of social activism in the colonies that they did not like into one undivided 
category of, i.e., “rebellion,” “communist,”294 etc., and were seeking ways to combat 
them.  For example, early attempts by workers to establish unions295 in response to wage 
and working conditions were suspect among colonial officials right from the start.  They 
were prone to quickly label such incipient workers’ initiatives and activism as rebellious 
and their leaders as “agitators” or “communist,” etc.  Thus, the 1921 census reports for 
the Gold Coast noted the trade guilds in Takoradi to be “under the influence of 
agitators.”296  Damachi underscored the troubling nature and negative effect of such 
official perceptions and labeling of labor-oriented activism in his study of industrial 
relations in Africa.  He noted that, at the beginning, African trade union movements and 
organizations that arose mainly in response to work conditions and wages turned early as 
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much a reaction to imperial rule as a reaction to working conditions as a result of official 
labeling of these movements and strikes as “rebellious.”297  He further remarked that: 
As the demand for higher wages or better working 
conditions was being regarded as subversive by  
the colonial governments, Africans learned the  
lesson that a strike was not only an economic but  
also a political tool.298 
 
 Officialdom’s fear of communist influence in the colonies and the development of 
the imperial anti-communist grid dated back to developments in the international arena 
consequent to the Communist Revolution of 1917.  The period of further consolidation of 
empire, the interwar years - 1917-1939 - had also witnessed the birth and growth of the 
communist movement and communism’s attempt at proliferation worldwide through the 
organ of the Third International, i.e., the Comintern.  This also involved plans for 
aggressive pursuit of converts in the West’s colonies, regarded as its “weakest links.”299  
Plans were indeed made to infiltrate the West’s spheres of influence, specifically their 
colonies, in the Sixth Congress at Baku in 1924.  The theses adopted in the Fourth World 
Congress of the Comintern earlier in 1922, for example, described Blacks as a nationality 
oppressed by worldwide imperialist exploitation and who must be liberated through the 
extension of communism into these territories/colonies.300  Marxism-Leninism’s 
theorizing on capital, imperialism and the colonial question301 sought to provide critical 
consciousness and insights into the perceived multiple layers of domination and 
oppression to which the Black colonials in particular were believed exposed.302  In this 
twin system, the Black masses are seen to be experiencing alienation both as members of 
the dispossessed class and of an oppressed race.  Specialized bodies such as the League 
Against Imperialism (LAI) and the International of Seamen and Harbor Workers (ISHW) 
were created to carry out the task of winning the minds and souls of the West’s colonial 
subjects, particularly the workers.  The LAI was the Comintern’s front organization and 
an important and major conduit pipe for the dissemination of leftwing ideas to colonial 
subjects of varied ideological leanings.303  Through the LAI, colonials not having had 
direct exposure to communism were able to have indirect contact, however fleeting, with 
Marxism-Leninism and with leftwing organizations in the West and in the Soviet 
Union.304  The LAI also gave support to the West African Students Union (WASU),305 a 
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mainly liberal body in conception, and was in close touch with the Negro Welfare 
Association (NWA).306  Reginald Bridgeman and Fenner Brockway in England were 
major LAI members who gave considerable support to the WASU in London and also to 
select political organizations in the colonies, such as the party of the social radicals in 
Northern Nigeria, the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU).  The ISHW was 
another of the important front organizations of the Comintern established to serve as 
sources of revolutionary influence among Blacks and colonial subjects in the interwar 
period.307 
 Official fear of communist influence in the colonies and among African colonial 
subjects was also fed in the interwar period by the radicalization of the Pan-African 
movement, a transcontinental organization composed of colonial subjects and diasporic 
Blacks in Britain.308  Diasporic Africans like W. E. B. Dubois who became recognized as 
leader of the Pan-African movement and others like George Padmore309 who had been 
influenced by communist ideas and were card carrying Communist Party members at 
some stage of their political career facilitated the radicalization of Pan- 
Africanism from within.  Through them the movement became affected by the ferment of 
leftwing and communist revolutionary ideologies then prevalent and which served to 
introduce into it the discourse of immediate radical change and political independence in 
the colonies in the interwar period and was renewed in the post-World War II period.  
The transition to a decidedly radical political nationalist agenda within the Pan African 
movement was only made, however, with the historic Pan African Congress of 1945 in 
London.310     
 The impact of communism was, nevertheless, minimal in the West African 
colonies, if at all.  Leftwing-leaning Africans were fairly limited in number and were only 
strategically engaged with communism. 311  The discourse of the nation and of political 
self-determination in leftwing terms in the interwar period tended to resonate more 
among the diasporic Blacks and a handful of colonial subjects resident abroad in Britain, 
France, and in the United States.312  Diasporic Blacks were more seriously engaged with 
communism at certain stages of their career.  These included leftwing-oriented Blacks 
such as George Padmore, the West Indian who played very active role in the movement 
until he resigned from it, Paul Robeson, the African American singer and communist 
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activist, W. E. B. Dubois, an African-American literary figure who became a communist 
late in life, Claude MacKay, the revolutionary African American poet, Cheddi Jagan, C. 
L. R. James, and others all of who played more prominent roles in leftwing movements 
among people of color in the interwar years.   
 Although perhaps of limited presence and influence in the colonies and among 
West Africans, the communist movement and communism’s radical ideas and 
programmatic agendas were perceived to be threatening enough by colonial officials to 
raise among them the specter of communist infiltration into their colonies even in this 
early period and would continue to feed into official fear of communism in their colonies 
in the post-World War II period as well.  The onset of the Cold War in the post-World 
War II period would intensify official concern about communist influence in the colonies.  
In the interwar years, as early as the 1920s, the British colonial authorities were already 
speculating on the beginning hold of communist influence on their West African subjects 
and, fearful of the implication of such, were looking for ways to combat it and would not 
leave things to chance.  In the colonies, especially in the Gold Coast, local administration 
had already begun to get alarmed at the Comintern's perceived influence in these early 
years and had also started to take active steps to search for the infiltration of communist 
literature into their West African territories.  Their fears were further fed by the discovery 
of some communist literature already filtering into the colonies.  In the Gold Coast, the 
then governor, Guggisberg, expressed his fear of the infiltration of communism into the 
colonies when The Crusader, a Leninist anti-imperialist publication, was seized by 
officials.313  This was believed to have been brought in by colonial seamen.  Guggisberg 
regarded the publication as “dangerous,” “violently aggressive against the white race,” 
and “welcomes the spread of Bolshevism.”314   
 The next sections examine two major social forces conceived in official mind as 
sources of communist infiltration into the colonies in the interwar and immediate post-
World War II period: colonial students overseas and socialist-oriented labor in the 
colonies.   It seeks to examine the actual influence of communism on them as well as 




The Overseas Colonial Student 
 
Overseas African students, 315 particularly students in Britain where nearly all overseas  
West African students were located in this period,316 were perceived by colonial officials 
not only as potential sources of communist infiltration into the colonies but also as 
critical groups whose role could make the difference between stability and instability in 
the colonies because of their strategic position in relation to their home countries.  The 
link between African students overseas with events in the colonies was indeed real and 
significant, as will be revealed below in the examination of the West African Students 
Union (WASU) in London.  Also, Hakim Adi noted in his study that communism and 
especially Marxist ideology was playing an increasingly important role in the politics of 
many of the students in Britain, and that to some extent this influence was spreading to 
West Africa.317  But the extent of communist influence on them and its spread to the 
colonies through them may not be as officialdom imagined.  Lord Milverton, formerly Sir 
Arthur Richards, governor of Nigeria in the 40s, disliked WASU’s political activities and 
was fully convinced, for example,  that WASU was “a communist medium for the contact 
of communists with West Africans when they come to this country”318 and suggested an 
inquiry into the Union’s activities. 
 The Colonial Office report produced during 1947 captures officialdom’s long-
time concerns about the politics of students and intellectuals which it claimed had upset 
Colonial Office’s “calculations and disturbed the even tenor of political developments 
among the slow moving masses” in the colonies.319  The report details officialdom’s 
concerns and belief that “the whole tenor of political future of the African colonies is 
bound up with these few men,” referring to the students and intellectuals, and sought 
ways to “counter if possible the extremist political propaganda and atmosphere to which 
students are subjected in this country.”320  Committees were set up principally on colonial 
students in the United Kingdom to address officialdom’s concerns about potential and 
believed actual communist influence on colonial students in Britain.321  The Informal 
Group set up by the Colonial Office to investigate the “Political Significance of Colonial 
Students in the UK” and the Welfare and Information Departments of the Colonial Office 
would continue to discuss what could be done to combat believed communist influence 
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among the students.  These would also seek ways to encourage social relations between 
Africans students and the ruling class in Britain, as well as how to develop more fully the 
use of anti-communist propaganda.322  
 The potential socialization of colonial students into Western intellectual thought 
which could readily facilitate the transmission of leftwing ideas, as well as their 
proximity in Britain to communist-front organizations like the LAI and other leftwing 
organizations and leftwing socialists in Britain323 were indeed felt to be ominous for the 
colonies.  Among the sources of perceived communist influence with overseas African 
students was the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB).  Colonial officials 
regrettably identified the activities of the CPGB among Gold Coast students in Britain 
“who are contacted upon arrival and indoctrinated through social contacts.”324  The 
CPGB, with its headquarters in King Street, London, and its affiliates in Liverpool and 
other ports trading with West Africa, was also reported to carry its activities among 
disaffected seamen who “bring funds and literature to West Africa.”325   The WASU was 
able to be in touch with the CPGB through their links with Reginald Bridgeman and the 
LAI and with the Indian communist MP in Britain, Shapurji Saklatvala.  Through these 
contacts and WASU’s co-founder and General Secretary, Ladipo Solanke’s friendship 
with Jomo Kenyatta, a link was also established with the Profintern’s International Trade 
Union Committee of Negro Workers (ITUC-NW) which was presided over by the 
African-American communist, James Ford.  WASU’s cluster leftwing-oriented 
organization, the Circle, also functioned as a vehicle for the transmission of the ideas of 
the CPGB to WASU.326   
 To combat the threat of communism among colonial students and others, the 
British tried counter-propaganda devices through books and pamphlets, posters and films, 
occasional lectures (particularly among students), the setting up of libraries and pro-
establishment press,327 as well as attempted control of the main organization of West 
African Students in Britain, the West African Students Organization (WASU),328 for 
example.  Because of their fear of communist influence on WASU, the Colonial Office in 
Britain also became involved in encouraging the creation of a rival students’ hostel, 
Friends House, to that of WASU’s Aggrey House, as breaks to the dominance of 
WASU’s influence among West African students in Britain.329  Friends House was 
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managed by students who had split from WASU and who the British perceived to be 
more amenable to official influence and control, as opposed to the more independent-
minded WASU members and its leadership.330  WASU had all along been careful to 
maintain its independence from British official control and to retain its links with 
leftwing socialists in Britain. 
 Indeed, about all West African students in Britain from the period 1925-1950 
were exposed to socialist/communist ideas331  which to varying degrees became one of 
the important intellectual origins of the radical/militant ideas espoused by some of them 
on their return to their colonies.332  For example, Aminu Kano, a colonial social radical of 
upper class parentage from Northern Nigeria who had gone to study in London for one 
year at the Institute of Education, London University in 1946/47, gained considerable 
exposure to leftwing ideas and which influenced his radical discourse of community and 
citizenship in the Islamic-based Northern Nigeria333 on his return to Nigeria.  He is 
reported by his biographer to have used his time in London to attend a variety of socialist 
group meetings, joined all the socialist groups he could find, and befriended some of the 
left-leaning MPs.334 “Socialism was a concept that attracted him,” remarked Feinstein in 
his biographical study of Aminu Kano.335  Feinstein further remarked that “the 
ideological spectrum was completed when, as a colonial student, he was courted by 
another kind of socialist group, the communists, and even met some of the top 
leaders.”336   
 Aminu Kano was soaking up these new ideas while developing his own thoughts 
on how to effect change in his society, particularly in the very conservative Northern 
Nigeria, his region of birth, on his return to his colony Nigeria.  Alan Feinstein 
commented that “his head was spinning with all the ideological nuances and variations he 
was sopping up, and with his attempts to apply them to Nigeria and Africa,”337 and that: 
He … had a strong urge to go back and put into operation 
some of the exhilarating new and revolutionary ideas he 
had picked up in his year in the outer circle – ideas that 
might effect the changes necessary to bring his own land 
into the wider orbit of the modern world.338 
 
 The influences on Aminu’s thinking were of course wide-ranging, as with many 
other colonial radicals.  For Aminu Kano, the range included his early learnings from the 
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Koran and the writings of the historic nineteenth century Islamic reformer in the North of 
Nigeria, Usman Dan Fodio, and from his mentor in Northern Nigeria, Sa’adu Zungur,339 
whose radical but parochial thinking had influenced Aminu Kano long before he traveled 
abroad and continued upon his return as well, to the philosophy and political concepts of 
early French and American revolutionaries, to Shavian Fabian socialism, to Ghandi’s 
nonviolent (satyagraha) concept of struggle from colonial domination, and to socialist 
and communist ideas.    
 Another colonial student in London, Ladoke Akintola,340 who would also later 
become prominent in his colony’s political scene, as with many other such ex-overseas 
colonial students, was similarly exposed to the range of radical/revolutionary ideas during 
his years of study in London as a law student between 1946 to 1949.  He was involved in 
liberation politics, particularly in WASU, which was founded by a fellow Yoruba 
student, Ladipo Solanke in 1925.  Through Solanke, Akintola was introduced to George 
Padmore of Trinidad, once a card-carrying communist but still imbued with revolutionary 
ideas of a Pan Africanist nature,341 Jomo Kenyatta, and also to Kwame Nkrumah.  
Akinjide Osuntokun recorded in his valuable biography of Akintola that it was between 
1947 and 1949, through his friendship with George Padmore, that Akintola toyed openly 
with communism.342    
 However, in spite of evidence of exposure to, and flirtation with communist ideas 
by some colonial students overseas, communism did not become an important tenet or 
lasting philosophical underpinnings of their imagined new communities in West Africa.  
Aminu Kano, for example, might have become enthralled with his new-found concept of 
socialism, but he and the leaders of the militant circle within WASU, the West African 
National Secretariat (WANS) to which he was introduced under the aegis of Kwame 
Nkrumah, George Padmore, and others, were not thinking of mass movements in 
Marxian terms, as Feinstein also recorded.343  His politics on his return home to Northern 
Nigeria society, though socially radical and militantly anti-colonial, was not communist.  
Akintola, summing up this period in his own life, reflected that “any educated African 
who was not a socialist or communist before he was forty was a fool, and any who was a 
socialist or communist after forty years was equally a fool.”344 It is not too certain what 
Akintola exactly meant by this statement.  It could, however, be said to reflect his 
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appreciation of whatever insights communism and the left critique of colonialism 
provided in their understanding of the colonial situation at an early stage of their political 
socialization and career and the futility of the adoption of Marxian-type politics to the 
realities of West Africa.  It could also be said to reflect Akintola’s and other African 
politicians’ appreciation of the futility of the adoption of Marxian-type politics at an 
advanced stage of one’s political and professional career when the cost is higher to them 
especially at a time when they were already acquiring political power and wealth.  
 The following section takes some in-depth look at West African students in Great 
Britain through their major organization, the WASU, to see what they were actually 
saying and doing.  
 
Revisiting the West African Students Union (WASU) 
 
 WASU is being examined a little closer here because of its significance as an 
organization that comprised the highest concentration and cross-section of overseas 
students from the four British West African colonies and with which the Colonial Office 
was in constant interaction.  The Colonial Office closely monitored developments within 
WASU, along with other organizations  such as the Nigerian Union (NU), the Gold Coast 
Union (GCU), and the Sierra Leone Students Union (SLSU), but its attention was 
concentrated on WASU as the foremost organization of West African students in Britain 
from 1925-1958.  WASU also represented the primary organ or vehicle through which 
West African students in Britain privileged the discourse of an independent West African 
nation and sought to influence progressive changes in the West African colonies and in 
colonial policy.345  WASU had influenced early at the beginning of the 40s the movement 
for constitutional change in the colonies as witnessed among the chiefs and the Western 
educated Africans in the Gold Coast colony.  Disturbed by what it perceived to be the 
relative quiescent political environment in the West African colonies, WASU through its 
Secretary-General, Ladipo Solanke, became instrumental in stirring up political 
consciousness and activities in West Africa during the war years.  Solanke had written to 
key individuals in the colonies such as Reverend I. O. Ransome-Kuti,346 Adeyemo 
Alakija, Ernest Ikoli, and Nnamdi Azikiwe all of Nigeria, and to Dr. Danquah of the Gold 
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Coast, imploring them to start making political demands.  Aspects of WASU’s activities 
and discourses are explored to some limited extent347 below, including an examination of 
who they were in relationship with, as well as their interaction with the Colonial Office.  
This is partly to validate their proclivities towards communism, if any, and the extent of 
it, and the possible grounds for officialdom’s concern about these types of students as a 
source of communism in the colonies. 
 WASU’s position, discourses, and relationships with those outside the  
organization were varied and complex and spanned many points on the ideological 
spectrum.  WASU was in complex interaction with the Fabian Colonial Bureau and with 
the Colonial Office and its radicalizing initiative was both threatening to, and influential 
upon the gradualist approaches of these bodies.  At one end of the ideological spectrum, 
WASU was in relationship with conservative figures like the colonial chiefs in the West 
African colonies, some of whom, like Nana Sir Osei Agyema Prempeh, the Asantehene 
of Kumasi in the Gold Coast, were its patrons.  Even another colonial Governor of 
Nigeria, Sir Bernard Bourdillon (1935-43), who preceded Governor Arthur Richards, also 
became one of WASU’s patrons at one time.  At the other end of the spectrum, WASU 
was in relationship with leftwing-oriented British MPs in Britain like Fenner Brockway, 
leftwing-oriented diasporic Blacks like George Padmore and African-American 
communists such as Arnold Ward and Paul Robeson, the self-declared, card-carrying 
communist African-American singer, and with leftwing organizations such as the CPGB, 
etc.  WASU went as far as crowning Paul Robeson with a Yoruba traditional title of 
Babasale, i.e. patron of WASU, in 1935.  WASU’s discourses of self-governing West 
African nation-states also ran from Western-liberal to communist leftwing, reflecting the 
variety of perspectives of West African students represented in WASU.  Among 
WASU’s student members also were, at one extreme, sons of colonial chiefs, like 
William Ofori Atta, the son of the Gold Coast colonial chief, Nana Sir Ofori Atta, the 
Omanhene of Akim Abuakwa, Eastern Provinces, and at the other extreme, radicals like 
Kwame Nkrumah and I. T. A. Wallace-Johnson.   
 WASU, however, revealed itself to be in essence an organization composed 
mostly of ideologically moderate students whose main objective was to work with the 
government as partners in progress, as seen in its relationship with the Fabian socialists 
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and in its efforts at cooperation with the British colonial government.  The West African 
Parliamentary Committee (WAPC) established in April 1942 and headed by Reverend R. 
Sorenson, a British MP, represented one of such endeavors.  The WAPC was comprised 
of other members of the British Parliament, some members of the Fabian Society, 
officers of WASU, and others interested in the affairs of West Africa.  It sought to 
coordinate its activities with those of national organizations in the West African colonies 
such as the Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM), the Gold Coast Youth Conference 
(GCYC), the Sierra Leone Youth League (SLYL), and similar ones in the Gambia.348  If 
WASU had any ideology at all, it was diffused.  WASU could be described as centrist 
and at best eclectic as its membership and patrons revealed.   
 WASU’s noted shift towards radicalism in the mid-40s was strategic and 
originated more clearly in its disappointment with its erstwhile ally, the Fabian Colonial 
Bureau, who comprised an important constituency of the Labor Party when it came to 
power in 1945.  Before 1945, WASU was established more towards the center, but its 
disappointment with the Labor Party when it came into power in Britain in 1945 led 
WASU to take a more radical posture and to experience a tactical shift to the left of 
center as the voices of its more radical members became prominent.  They demanded 
more radical and rapid changes in the colonies that WASU had believed its Fabian 
socialist friends in the Labor Party had been in agreement with.  Their dissatisfaction 
with the Labor government and the subsequent leftward shift in their politics contributed 
to the increasingly prevalent view in official circles that the students had become 
contaminated by communism and this further strained relations between them and the 
Colonial Office. 
 However, from its inception in 1925 till 1945, before the Labor Party came into 
power, WASU and its discourses could be perceived to be more moderate.  Also, though 
it was not without its share of internal dissensions which predisposed to factions within 
WASU, i.e., split leading to the British-sponsored Friends’ House, there was some 
appreciable degree of consensus among WASU members.  Their discourses centered on 
the need for planned democratic reforms in the colonies, and later, in the immediate post-
World War II period, for the grant of early self-government.  Initially imagining an 
independent West African nation, WASU had written to inform the Secretary of State for 
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the colonies in 1940 of the desire to have British West African colonies be united under 
one political umbrella.349  In 1941, after the publication of the Atlantic Charter, they had 
submitted a memo to Clement Attlee, the then deputy Prime Minister of Britain, asking 
about the fate of West Africa “in view of Britain’s intention to help countries of Europe, 
Ethiopia, and Syria re-establish national independence.”350 Attlee had assured WASU 
repeatedly that Africans were covered by the Atlantic Charter.  Although the position of 
Churchill, the then British Prime Minister, on this was evasive and actually contrary to 
Attlee’s statement, WASU still insisted on a demand for “internal self-government for 
West Africa immediately and complete independence in five years.”351 
 It was in pursuit of these objectives and rather western “liberal” agendas that 
WASU would use any organization or individuals that would help it realize its goal, 
including communist or leftwing individuals.  Thus, WASU was receptive not only to the 
support given to it by Fabian socialists like Sorensen, Rita Hinden, and Arthur Creech 
Jones, who constituted important members of the then opposition Labor Party, but also to 
that of other members of the Labor Party like the leftwing-oriented Fenner Brockway352 
and Reginald Bridgeman of the LAI.  These leftwing members of the British Labor Party 
took an unequivocal stand against continued colonial rule and for outright grant of 
independence to the colonies, also consistent with the libertarian doctrine of freedom that 
the West used to confront Nazi Germany’s aggression.  As British parliamentarians, 
Brockway and Bridgeman also persistently raised questions in parliament about British 
policies in the colonies and the ill effects of aspects of these policies on the colonial 
subjects,353 issues that were similarly of great concern to WASU. 
 Other socialists in the Labor Party with less pronounced leftwing orientation, such 
as Reginald Sorenson and Norman Leys, also provided support in other forums that 
served to validate WASU’s expectation and discourse of progressive changes in, and self 
government for the West African colonies.  They gave speeches at WASU’s invitation 
and at other instances on the issue of democracy in British African colonies.  As far back 
as 1929, Norman Leys had expressed his opinion in regard to the colonial situation, 
saying that: 
Many, perhaps even most of the problems of our time  
were due to the desire, sometimes scarcely conscious,  
of the people who are now treated as inferiors, to be  
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treated with the kind of equality found in a family.354 
 
Leys further expressed that “in the political relations, democracy is the only means by 
which ordinary men and women can acquire the same status as the specially fortunate in 
some way.”355  But, he observed regrettably, that: 
With few exceptions the inhabitants of most of the 
countries of Tropical Africa are not allowed to aspire after 
democracy, or to organize to win it, or even to get the kind 
of education for themselves that would enable them to learn 
how to govern themselves.356 
 
 Continuing the discourse of democracy and change in similar veins many years 
later, Reginald Sorensen, then MP and as chairman of WASU’s organized conference on 
West African problems in August 1942, said in his opening speech that “in accepting 
democracy we accept decisively certain moral and ethical values, with all that this 
involves, politically and economically.”357  He reiterated that “accepting democracy as 
our criterion we reject racial domination and economic exploitation alike.”358  These were 
succinct statements of what WASU and the African student member-body in WASU 
stood for and privileged in their discourse of the nation but to which the British were not 
receptive in the colonies at the time – not until officialdom’s paradigm shift consequent 
to the 1948 Gold Coast crisis.359 WASU challenged in the 30s and early in the 40s not 
only Britain’s lack of commitment to democracy in the colonies but also British 
continued colonial rule.   
 WASU was also concerned about discrimination against Blacks in Britain.  The 
Colonial Office was not unconcerned about the situation resulting from the color bar in 
Britain and the discrimination experienced by colonial students with housing, etc., either, 
especially as this was felt to be easily exploited by the communists.  Press reports in 
Britain had indicated that the color bar was playing into the hands of communists who, it 
was said, at least treated colonial subjects as equal citizens.360  The Colonial Office 
acknowledged that “the existence of colour prejudice in the UK greatly increases anti-
British feelings amongst colonial students and enhances the attraction of Communism as 
a political creed which repudiates the colour bar.”361  But the Colonial Office, however, 
felt largely powerless to change it.   
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 If WASU’s rhetorics and activism later turned more radical or left of the center as 
it did in post-1945, it was more reflective of WASU’s disappointment with the Labor 
Party’s failure to show itself true to WASU’s expectation of planned democratic reforms 
and the grant of self government in the colonies when it came to power in  
1945.362  WASU had expected the Labor government to use the advantage of incumbency 
to work seriously for these changes in the colonies but they were to be disappointed.  
Expressing WASU’s disappointment, H. O. Davies, the then General Secretary of 
WASU, in his report for the year ended 1945, said that “The Colonial Office proper, in 
spite of the change of Government, has not developed a change of heart in its attitude to  
us.”363   William Ofori Atta, while agreeing with the Labor government on many points 
but not on its colonial policy, expressed his disappointment that “the rank and file and the 
leaders of the Labor Party are all saturated with the missionary ideas of the White Man’s 
Burden.”364  He quoted Sir Stafford Cripps speech at Friends’ House, London in a 
conference on “Peace and Empire” to the effect that there were countries in Africa which 
could not govern themselves.365  WASU’s felt disappointment led to its apparent shift to 
the left of the center for a brief period and was reflected in their discourse of the nation in 
more Marxist terms. 
 Perhaps it was WASU that failed to fully understand the nature of the Fabian and 
Labor socialists’ support for them, that the Party embraced socialists with differing 
ideological shades,366 and that the Fabian and the Labor Party socialists had their own 
agendas which may or may not coincide with those of WASU.  When examined more 
closely, one finds that mainstream Labor Party’s position on some fundamental colonial 
issues was not that far removed from that of the Tory government before it, especially 
when it came to the question of the grant of self determination.367 Colonial students in 
WASU might have been up for a surprise in 1945 and thereafter but the Labor Party did 
not surprise itself.  The position of major thinkers in the Labor/Fabian socialist movement 
reveals that the Labor Party’s advocacy of the colonial cause conformed more to a form 
of enlightened self-interest, more in line with the policy of “development and control” 
originating in the late 30s.368  Rita Hinden, an important voice in the Fabian Colonial 
Bureau (FCB) and its secretary at the time, maintained the position as late as 1945 for 
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what she called “Partnership in Empire” to replace Trusteeship which was by now agreed 
to be outmoded.  This was exclusive of any agenda for decolonization.  She wrote: 
There is always the possibility of a complete dissolution of 
the association between Britain and the colonial empire.  
But no responsible person, either in the colonies or in 
Britain, is calling for that at this particular moment.  
Progressive thought throughout the world looks for a 
greater unity and integration between nations and 
peoples.369 
 
With their disenchantment with the Labor Party, especially when now in power, latent 
leftwing tendencies in WASU began to re-emerge and the discourse of the nation began 
to be framed in radical/leftwing terms.  Select WASU members, already exposed to 
Marxist-Leninist doctrines, began to organize within WASU and to form a small 
revolutionary body, the Cell, in 1946-47.  Spearheading this development was Kwame 
Nkrumah who had stopped in Britain on his way home to the Gold Coast from the United 
States where he had spent several years studying in various institutions of higher 
learning.  In the course of studying there, he had also had considerable exposure to 
revolutionary/radical movements and figures, from Pan Africanists, and Garveyists, to 
Black communists! 
 The immediate post-World War II period, from 1945 onwards, would thus 
witness a shift in WASU as it drifted towards radical/leftwing politics and the impact 
would be felt in the colonies and among the officially perceived more moderate Africans 
in the colonies.  Given these developments at this time, the colonial authorities could be 
said to have reasons to be worried.  The moderates within WASU had seemed in the past 
to have successfully stemmed the tide towards what British officials had feared might be 
extremism.  But the colonial government had not really worked with them as partners in 
progress, contrary to the stated objectives of their renewed definition of Trusteeship, and 
of Partnership in this period.  The closest they got to a working relationship with the 
students in WASU was in the West African Parliamentary Committee (WAPC) 
established in April 1942.  The Colonial Office was now faced with a real threat in the 
shift to radicalism among moderate WASU intellectuals and had to contend with the 
radicals in WASU like Nkrumah who now seemed about to gain supremacy. 
 68
 WASU’s apparent shift to more radical stance in the post 1945 period also 
involved a belief in extra-institutional means to effect the desired changes in the colonies.  
Thus, they criticized the 1947 West African delegation to London which had come to 
demand change in the colonies.  Having lost faith in the Fabian Colonial Bureau’s 
policies and in the Labor Party’s ability to recognize what they believed was the fact that 
Africans were now ready to take over the administration of their own countries, they felt 
the attempts to influence policy in old ways, i.e., through delegation, etc., at that stage 
would not yield expected results.  Rather, they believed it was better to focus on internal 
social protest movements in the colonies and to effect direct action there that would bring 
the colonial government to its knees.  The delegation of the National Council of Nigeria 
and the Cameroons (NCNC) to Britain in 1947 was similarly criticized by WASU as they 
did the West African Cocoa delegation, in line with its new thinking.  WASU’s magazine 
editorial comment in the fall of 1947 brought this out clearly.  It stated: 
The day of such delegation and deputation is long past. The 
game of politics is played, or should be played, on the spot.  
Presentation abroad of one’s own case, when it can be 
heard at home more effectively, is an outmoded form of 
social waste. … If we have the leaders and the following, 
we need never again come to see Creech Jones.  Creech 
Jones will come to see us.  For power understands only the 
language of power.  That is the lesson of contemporary 
history that we ought to be learning now.370 
 
This was indeed a very powerful discourse of what was to be done in regard to fighting 
for democratic change and self-determination in the colonies in leftwing terms and shows 
a decidedly Marxist influence.371  The newly emerging discourse of what was to be done 
in the colonies was occurring at the time when Nkrumah had just arrived on the scene in 
London, as earlier mentioned.372   
 British officialdom’s fear of West African students, many of whom were 
represented in WASU, as potential channels of leftwing ideas and of communist 
influence in their West African colonies appeared to be validated in the light of these 
developments and of the apparent shift of WASU towards leftwing discourse of change 
in the colonies.  This is also particularly so in the light of existing WASU’s links with 
leftwing individuals and organizations in Britain as well as internationally, and their 
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residual influence on WASU.  Hakim Adi records Solanke’s early contact with James 
Ford, the African-American communist who presided over ITUC-NW,373 and his 
response in February of 1929 to an earlier communication from Ford which had included 
ten copies of the ITUC-NW’s Negro Worker publication.374  After thanking Ford and 
promising to send WASU magazine to him in return, Solanke said, in regard to the Negro 
Worker: 
I have read it and found it to be most interesting indeed. It 
is also a great eye-opener because it is full of valuable 
information which hitherto our union has not been aware 
of.  I therefore thank you in the name of our WASU of 
Great Britain and Ireland.  I shall distribute the copies 
forwarded to me among the members.375 
 
 However, in spite of WASU’s actual and potential links with labor and leftwing 
and communist-influenced individuals and organizations in Britain, and even with 
WASU’s disappointment with the Labor Party in power and their noted shift to 
radicalism and communist-style rhetorics in the post 1945 period, WASU could be said to 
remain more at the center.  Its central goal remained the same - the realization of 
progressive and democratic changes in the colonies as well as the grant of early self-
government for the West African colonies mainly through constitutional channels; its 
radicalism at any point in time was tied to WASU’s search for the realization of these 
goals.  Adi notes that many WASU members, including Solanke, were infact hostile to 
communism.  He records anti-communist campaigns within and without WASU, most 
importantly led by Solanke himself after he lost his position as WASU’s Secretary.376 
Solanke claimed that all problems were the result of “communist influence” and hoped 
Sorenson would help him to overcome the influence of communism in WASU.377  
According to Solanke, the new WASU president, J. E. Appiah, and WASU‘s honorary 
Secretary, Adenekan Ademola, were the main communist ringleaders.378  Solanke tried to 
defeat them at the annual election in 1951 by establishing his own “anti-communist 
party” but was defeated.379  Although Solanke’s anti-communist campaign was partly an 
attempt to regain his lost influence with WASU at the beginning of the 1950s, as Adi 
further notes, it is also to be noted that even before he lost influence in WASU, Solanke 
did not show any strong inclination towards communism.  Leftwing publications and 
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discourses were to Solanke and mainstream WASU what Solanke had called them to be - 
sources of information.380  What they chose to do with the information and how they 
chose to act upon it was not as officialdom feared them to be.  WASU’s position was to 
cooperate with all organizations in the world that would help it to advance its liberal 
agenda of self-determination for the West African colonies and within constitutional 
means.  As Solanke had also said: 
There is nothing like co-operation between all 
organizations of the world, especially among Negro 
organizations with a view to defending  their rights and 
liberty.381      
  
 Finally, it could be said that in spite of actual contacts and exposure of overseas 
African students to communist and revolutionary doctrines, they did not prove to be a 
viable source of communist influence in the British West African colonies, as partly 
revealed in the case of WASU.  In fact, many of them return to their home colonies to 
join the ranks of those conceptualized in this study as the ethnopolitical entrepreneurs, 
officialdom’s constituted “moderates” of the 50s and in whose hands they left the care of 
the nation at independence.  Their discourse of the nation was more importantly premised 
on Western liberal terms and not on communist revolutionary terms.  In general, the 
strength of communism as theory and as a movement remained quite weak among the 
West African colonial students, as among many other West Africans in the colonies.  
From the literature available on WASU, it is evident that WASU was, and remained at 
best a sort of avant garde body in relation to West African colonies’ political 
development and a vehicle for change in the colonies through constitutional means.  This 
is more in line with what became mainstream discourse of change and of the nation in the 
West African colonies among African political entrepreneurs and cultural producers, 
many of who had also been members of WASU while studying abroad in Britain.  Adi 
notes that as the colonies moved towards self-government and career prospects opened 
up, many returning “communist” students became as “bourgeois in Lagos” as they had 
been “proletarian in London!”382  Perhaps the CPGB follow-up confidential report on the 
situation in Nigeria in 1953 in regard to former CPGB affiliates sums it up well.  It noted 
with disappointment, in the case of one of its close West African affiliate in WASU, Ayo 
Ogunsheye, that he “no longer represents the revolutionary movement,” and that he was 
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“very anti-Soviet, and very pro-Action Group.”383  The report concluded overall that “our 
Nigerian comrades do return to their Fatherland and that is all we hear of them!”384 
 The following section explores the beginning official perceptions of colonial labor 
activism385 also and of the labor organizer, in particular that of I. T. A. Wallace- Johnson, 
as “communist,” in the light of their developing fear of communism in the colonies.   
 
The Labor Organizer 
 
British officialdom feared the power of organized labor and of the labor organizer like I. 
T. A. Wallace-Johnson and his perceived radicalism of the left.  Because of officialdom’s 
developing fear of communism in the colonies and among labor and in response to labor 
unrest in these colonies and in many parts of the British empire, particularly labor unrest 
in the West Indies in the late 1930s,386 the Colonial Office had initiated labor reforms in 
the colonies, closely tied to the Colonial Development ideas.  The Labor Department 
subsequently passed a legislation providing legal recognition to unions in 1941, with 
general emphasis on the need to keep labor organizations out of politics and from the 
influence of “agitators” and “communists.”  Before then and earlier in the 1920s, the 
British colonial government had passed various regulations in their colonies as means of 
controlling labor.  In the Gold Coast, for example, to further discourage any development 
of labor along perceived radical lines and in their efforts to control labor there, the 
government had passed a Regulation of Employment Ordinance as early as 1920-21 with 
a broad provision against the “strike agitator.”387  This was in direct response to the labor 
unrest and strike threats in the inflationary years of 1919-1921.  In seeking to provide 
legal recognitions to trade unions, part of the 1938 report of the Chief Inspector of Labor 
had stated that: 
It is much better to recognize a reputable and responsible 
organization through whom workers can voice their 
grievances than to allow those grievances to remain 
unventilated.  If such recognition is made there will be less 
danger from the agitators and secret societies.388 
 
 As Kraus has observed, the basic intent of official recognition to trade unions in 
the colonies was less to help trade unions than to control them, to ensure their “proper” 
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and “non-political development.”389  Orde-Brown was appointed to the post of Labor 
adviser in 1938 in the newly-created Labor Department and British trade unionists were 
subsequently appointed to various posts in the colonies in order to offset “irresponsible 
and misguided leadership,” and to “assist and encourage the adoption of collective 
bargaining in preference to the strike weapon.”390 Considerable power was given to them 
to interfere as they would in trade union activities, such as the examination of records and 
accounts, and to deny recognition to duly elected officials by members if by official 
standard they were considered “unsuitable.”  The 1941 Trades Union Ordinance which 
legalized unions compelled union registration with the provincial assemblies of chiefs as 
well “so that there should be no danger now of subversive organizations being 
established.”391   
 In the Gold Coast, officials were most fearful of workers in the Sekondi-Takoradi 
railway and harbor industries because of their perceived proclivities to militancy.392 As 
the most prone to militant action among workers in the Gold Coast they had caught 
official attention right from the start.  Their militancy had led to official fear of 
communist infiltration through these categories of workers.  One of the official reports on 
communism in the colonies singled out the Port of Takoradi as early as 1921 as being the 
main center of communist activity in the Gold Coast, with its believed recurrent contacts 
with seamen and other emissaries and go-betweens “bringing funds and literature from 
Europe.”393  The Gold Coast government remained most sensitive to this cluster of 
workers and fearful of their potentials for militant action. 
 It could be said that colonial officials’ fear was not totally unfounded, given the 
pretensions of the communist movement in its high tide in the 20s and early 30s towards 
the colonies of the West, theorized as the West’s weakest links for easy proselytizing.394  
Specialized organs of the Communist International - the Third International - such as the 
League Against Imperialism (LAI) and the International of Seamen and Harbor Workers 
(ISHW), were set up as sources of communist influence among the Black population, 
specifically among those identified as strategic individuals in the colonies.  In 1924, the 
Baku Conference drew up thesis on how to propagate the movement among the colonial 
peoples.  Many articles published in the ISHW’s magazine, the Negro Worker (NW), 
geared towards revolutionary activities among Blacks, identified Black workers - seamen, 
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dockers, etc. - as the worst victims of discrimination while white workers were regarded 
as less oppressed by comparison.395  They noted the discrepancy in wages between Black 
and White workers in America and the perceived even worse conditions imposed on 
Black seamen and dockers in Africa and the West Indies.  These workers were noted to 
be grossly exploited by companies that did business in these places such as Elder 
Dempster, John Holt, United Africa Company, and Woermann which were said to 
enforce terrible pay, poor working conditions, and extra-official working hours, and were 
known to brutally suppress protests and the attempts by these workers to organize.396  
The same situation against Black sailors and dockers was identified across the board in 
Dakar, Bathurst, Freetown, Monrovia, Gold Coast, Nigeria, Cape Town, and Durban in 
Africa and in the West Indies in Kingston, Jamaica, Port of Spain, Trinidad, Georgetown, 
British Guiana, and Bridgetown, Barbados, as well as in Haiti, Panama, and in all the 
other ports of the West Indies and South America.397  Furthermore, some serious but what 
ended to be weak attempts were made in the interwar years by the Third International398 
to infiltrate the colonial territories before its capitulation in the late 1930s to the Popular 
Front Alliance with Western powers against Nazi Germany.  
 Given these developments and communism’s pretensions towards Blacks and 
colonial subjects, colonial officials could be said to have cause to fear possible 
communist influence in their colonies.  Also, there was evidence to suggest that it was 
beginning to capture the imagination of some of their subjects, particularly some union 
organizers.  In Nigeria, a prominent Zikist trade union leader with labor socialist 
orientation, Nduka Eze, would later write on how “the new doctrines drew attention to 
new facts.”399  However, official fear of colonial labor or of socialist-oriented labor 
organizers as sources or potential sources of communist influence in the colonies was not 
validated by the actual influence of communism on them or of their ability to successfully 
conduct communist-style politics in the colonies.400  But officialdom would continue to 
categorize socialist-oriented labor and their discourse of the nation in socially 
transforming ways as “communist” and would seek to silence them.  
 The following section takes a closer look at Isaac Theophilus Akunna Wallace-
Johnson whose case dramatizes officialdom’s opposition to perceived labor radicals and 
their labeling as “communist,” as well as the extent to which officialdom would go to 
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marginalize such colonial radicals, including their actual physical removal from the 
scene.401  His case also demonstrates the limits of the appeal or strength of communism in 
British West Africa. 
 
The Professional Agitator: I. T. A. Wallace-Johnson402 
 
 At one level of observation, Wallace-Johnson’s personal profile and activities 
could indeed be fitted into the category of a “revolutionary” and as validation of official 
fear of a labor organizer like him as a potential source of communism in the colonies.  He 
was a trade union organizer with labor-socialist orientation; created and headed a West 
African-wide radical social protest organization, the West African Youth League 
(WAYL); 403 was a persistent critique of colonial administration and of imperial rule, and 
privileged the discourse of the nation in socially transforming ways; an energetic critique 
whose voice was heard and presence felt in the West African colonies as well as in Great 
Britain, up to the seat of government in the British Parliament;404 a versatile critique who 
tried to transcend social and physical boundaries and was known to have traveled widely 
and schooled in the birthplace of communism - Russia - in 1932 in the People’s 
University in Moscow;405 and was someone who, in the other West African colonies like 
the Gold Coast, was believed to have his “fingers in all the many pies available for him 
there!”406  These may indeed be cause for British officialdom’s focused attention on him, 
bordering on paranoia.407  This study contends, however, that his potentials as a channel 
of communism into the colonies were more limited than they might appear to be.  
 Wallace Johnson was an informed critic of imperialism and of the shortcomings 
of colonial administration in the colonies and who was tireless in his pursuit of 
progressive and transformative changes in the colonies through organizing, including the 
holding of seminars, etc.  He would, like many other radicalized colonials, use the 
language and discourse of the left, i.e., of Marxism-Leninism, to constitute his opposing 
discourse of the nation and of change in colonial society and to imagine the nation in 
West Africa in socially progressive and mutually-inclusive terms.  LaRay Denzer 
regarded him as one of the most important African politicians in the interwar period and 
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went as far as to say that he was responsible for introducing the technique of mass 
political organization and Marxism-Leninism to West African politics.408   
  Like the Communist International before its capitulation to the Western Popular 
Front Alliance in the 30s, Wallace-Johnson tried to link the phenomenon of imperialism 
and colonialism to that of fascism and to show the contradiction in Western imperial 
powers' position in sustaining the first two while fighting against the latter.409  Wallace 
Johnson pointed to the interconnection between the West position against fascism and 
that of imperialism, what he captioned as “imperial defense and the defense of 
imperialism.”410  He maintained that anti-fascist struggles by the West as constituted by 
the West only strengthened their hold on empire and that the struggle against fascism and 
war should be an inseparable part of the struggle for liberty at home.411  Wallace-Johnson 
was vehemently opposed to the use of the colonies' resources in human and material 
terms to aid the Western Powers’ war efforts.412  He and other colonial radicals argued 
that contrary to the notion of fighting to keep the world safe, the world that would be kept 
safe was the imperialists’ and in ways that would perpetuate the conditions of servitude 
and continued subordination of the colonial Peoples.  Peace in the western world, he and 
others further argued, was being sought at the expense of the freedom and peace of the 
colonial subjects.413  Statements like these in Wallace-Johnson's discourses, some of 
which reflected crucial components of leftwing of socialist and labor movement 
discourses, only served to alarm colonial officials and to validate their fears of 
communism’s infiltration into the colonies and of Wallace-Johnson's potentials as a 
conduit pipe for this.   
 Wallace-Johnson and other handful of colonials like R. B. Wuta Ofei and Bankole 
Awoonor-Renner414 of the Gold Coast could indeed be said to have helped to introduce 
early into the colonies the discourse of anti-imperialism and of the nation in West Africa 
in quite radical, possibly leftwing formulation.  While other colonials were prosecuting 
what Lonsdale referred to as the politics of local activism in this period,415 Wallace-
Johnson was beginning to center the politics of anti-imperialism and implicitly of 
political self-determination for the colonies at this time.  He tried to continue to sustain 
the argument that the pursuit of liberty in Europe could not be divorced from the grant of 
liberty and freedom in the colonies.  He also tried to translate these held beliefs and 
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principles into political action in his WAYL movement which was also geared towards 
the resolution through political means of local and social issues in which workers’ 
particular grievances formed a central part.416  These ranged from issues of taxation, low 
wages, and poor living conditions to land alienation and sedition laws.  These issues 
helped to draw followership to his WAYL in his home colony of Sierra Leone and in the 
other British West African colonies, particularly the Gold Coast.  The WAYL formed one 
of the major opposition mounted in the Gold Coast against the 1934 Sedition and 
Waterworks Ordinances that the colonial government tried to enact there in an attempt to 
suppress unrest in the Gold Coast and in the other colonies.  Wallace Johnson also 
succeeded in winning a workmen’s compensation in 1937/1938 for the Gold Coast mine 
workers whose industry was one of the hardest hit in the depression years of the 30s.  
 Wallace-Johnson’s radical discourses and social and political practices and his 
perceived leftwing leanings by officials caused them such great concern that he was 
carefully watched wherever he went, and in whatever he said – or did not say!  There 
were occasional dissenting voices and opinions within official circles that tried to shift 
official imagination from the sound of Wallace-Johnson’s words to its content, that is, to 
the root cause of the social issues he was drawing attention to and on which his 
movement was predicated in the colonies.  A sympathetic MP, Mr. Paling, questioning 
the decision to detain him when this was being considered in the Home Office, asked: 
Has this man been guilty of any serious crime sufficient to 
keep in detention in this way; and is not his crime that he 
had been agitating for better conditions among the people, 
miners in particular, who are working in the mines for as 
little as 6d per  day?417  
 
Wallace-Johnson was indeed giving voice to the felt dismal living conditions experienced 
by both workers and non-workers alike in these colonies consequent to the depression of 
the 1930s.  Another colonial official, the colonial judge in the trial of the gunners in 
Sierra Leone in 1939 and in which Wallace-Johnson was implicated, would proclaim that 
“even an agitator needs material to work with.”418  
 It is not clear, however, that these official lone voices made any impression on 
mainstream official mind in regard to how they viewed Wallace-Johnson’s activities and 
his criticism of colonial administration and government.  Wallace-Johnson was cast in the 
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category of the “communist” and officialdom meant to keep him frozen in it.  What 
impressed officials and most concerned them was the support he was getting in Britain 
from British liberals and socialists, including leftwing socialists alike, a select few of who 
were MPs sympathetic to his cause.  British officialdom was indeed uncomfortable with 
the presence of Wallace-Johnson in Great Britain where he was also giving them restless 
time through the support of his leftwing contacts and their questions in the British 
parliament.  These were raising questions in parliament in regard to the issues and 
grievances in the colonies that Wallace-Johnson was bringing to light and in regard to the 
shortcomings of British administration in the colonies in general.419  O. G. R. Williams’s 
remark that “his local prestige gains considerable support from the fact that he is able to 
get questions answered by the Secretary of State in the House of Commons”420 
underscores the nature of this support.   
 Wallace-Johnson’s capacity for getting sympathetic response from the seat of 
government in Britain may have increased his local stature but it further alienated him 
from the colonial authorities’ in Sierra Leone who were intent on removing him from the 
colony.  However, because of the nature of this support, officialdom was more cautious 
as to how they carried this out.  Wallace-Johnson was interned in 1940421 but British 
officials would have more readily got rid of him before then but for the fact that they 
were sensitive to the support he had from those important individuals in Britain.  He 
could have been locked up for good indefinitely in possibly unmonitored poor conditions 
without anyone but the colonial officials having knowledge of his internment when 
colonial officials were thinking of locking him up during the war years.   His case was, 
however, brought to parliament by his MP supporters and due to parliamentary pressure, 
a debate had to be carried out in regard to the official plan to intern him for the period of 
the war.  In the light of this support, the Secretary of State wrote to the Governor of 
Sierra Leone advising him that the planned deportation of Wallace-Johnson had become 
an issue in parliament and that while he was anxious to give the Governor all possible 
support and help, they “must be careful to avoid action which would raise serious 
parliamentary difficulty.”422  He asked the Governor to provide him with the facts of the 
case on the strength of which he would want to recommend the Restriction or 
Deportation Order, stating: 
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You will appreciate that the reason for this request is that 
there are political factors at this end which I might have to 
weigh and not any lack of confidence in yourself.423 
 
Attention would continue to be focused on Wallace-Johnson’s case in parliament and 
colonial officials would remain sensitive to this in their dealings with him.  O. G. R. 
Williams further remarked in November, 1939 on how Wallace-Johnson was still 
exciting a certain amount of interest in parliament and on how they “shall probably get 
some more questions about his detention before long.”424 
 Wallace-Johnson’s radical discourse of the nation and of change in colonial 
society, linked to communism in officialdom’s mind, was opposed by officialdom who 
sought to close the space for such alternative imaginings of the nation and of change.  
Wallace Johnson was not, however, a communist as officialdom would prefer to label 
him.  Although LaRay Denzer commented that he was responsible for introducing the 
technique of mass political organization and Marxism-Leninism to West African  
politics, 425 Wallace-Johnson did not prove, from the literature and documentation 
available on him thus far, to have engaged in any appreciable or sustainable Marxist or 
communist-style politics in the colonies.  Wallace-Johnson was at best a would-be social 
reformer, drawing attention to causes of disenchantment and alienation in colonial 
society, particularly among workers in the colonies, and pointing to a desired more 
egalitarian society.  Ibrahim Abdullah, commenting on the genuine causes that gave 
validity to Wallace-Johnson’s WAYL in the 1930s, remarked that:   
Coming into existence at the end of the depression when  
the price of primary producer goods had recorded an all 
time low, when the cost of living of the general populace 
was constantly beyond their earnings, and when workers 
were unable to make ends meet, the birth of an organization 
addressing these issues was more than propitious: the 
organizing-secretary and the movement were the right 
things in the right place.426 
 
Wallace-Johnson sought official intervention through organizing for the goal of social 
change in the colonies.  He would take his cause to the seat of government in Britain as 
part of his strategy to get official action taken in regard to those issues he engaged with in 
the colonies.   
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 In spite of his potentials for radicalizing colonial society through his politics of 
social change based on labor organizing in the colonies and his somewhat connectedness 
with the international left, Wallace-Johnson’s capacity for revolutionary politics that his 
rhetorics and discourses and social and political practice might have suggested and that 
officials feared was, however, quite reduced.  The social realities of Wallace-Johnson’s 
colony of Sierra Leone as well as of the rest of British West African colonies were such 
that did not provide fertile grounds for communist-style politics of social change.427  Nor 
did Wallace-Johnson’s praxis serve to effect this shift.  Although he was able to fairly 
successfully use the language and discourse of the left to constitute his own discourse 
against imperialism and colonialism and to contend with what was becoming the master- 
discourse of the nation, he was unable to successfully make the transition to leftwing 
politics in the colonies.  Closer examination of his thoughts and activities, including the 
nature of his contacts with leftwing-oriented movements and individuals, do not reveal 
communism to be a strong element in the total summation of his discourse or career.  
Neither was it such in the British West African colonies in this period, or even later, as 
revealed in later chapters, and as earlier stated.  The Third International’s attempt to 
infiltrate the colonies was itself very weak, unsystematic, and confused.428   
 Wallace-Johnson may also be better described as an enigma, his thoughts and 
actions being more complex to analyze than what official labeling of him would tend to 
portray.  It could be said that this complexity was also an important part of his failure to 
succeed, although many great thinkers have been known to exhibit complex thought 
structures, albeit more sophisticated than his.  A few scholars who have done some works 
on him like John Hargreaves and LaRay Denzer have remarked that Wallace Johnson 
posed a problem of analysis.  Hargreaves, in his attempt to come to an understanding of 
Wallace-Johnson's brand of politics and of the political events in Sierra Leone in the 
period under study, remarked that Wallace-Johnson was “a critic of colonialism who 
remains difficult to evaluate.”429  Hargreaves, however, did not engage with the challenge 
posed by Wallace-Johnson’s politics and discourses.   
 The problem of understanding Wallace-Johnson’s thought and politics is rooted, 
in part, in the complexity of colonial society itself and of the challenge it posed for the 
politics of social transformation which Wallace-Johnson was unable to surmount. 430  
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Wallace-Johnson is not known to be a sophisticated thinker, like Amilcar Cabral of the 
former Portuguese African colony of Guinea Bissau, to be able to confront such 
challenges successfully.431  Wallace-Johnson, though more anti-imperialist and energetic 
than many other colonial radicals of his time in the British West African colonies in the 
interwar period especially, revealed the difficulty for him of effecting a dialectical unity 
between thought and action.432  Unlike Amilcar Cabral or Cheggan in Guyana or Mao 
Tse Tung in China who succeeded in establishing a revolutionary dialectical exchange 
between thought and action, Wallace-Johnson failed to do so.  With Wallace-Johnson, 
whatever elements of revolutionary Marxism-Leninism may be resonating in his 
discourses, they were articulating with other forms of indigenous radical thoughts without 
transcending them.  Denzer, in trying to grapple with the problem posed by Wallace-
Johnson’s thoughts and politics, rightly noted that he failed, for example, to successfully 
translate the terms of leftwing politics into the terms of indigenous politics, unlike 
Haidarra Contorfilli, a contemporary of Wallace-Johnson, who successfully translated the 
terms of his rebellion into the idiom of Islam.433  The reasons for Wallace-Johnson’s lack 
of capacity in these ways are quite complex and part of this is related to his lack of 
attention to the cultural imperative.    
 However, in spite of Wallace-Johnson’s inability to match his political will with a 
capacity for successful politics of social transformation, 434 official perceptions and 
labeling of him as an “agitator” and “communist,” etc., would remain strong, especially 
in the 1930s.  Colonial officials, unable – or unwilling - to draw the distinction between 
the legitimate reasons behind his agitation for the improvement of labor and other socio-
economic conditions in the colonies and an anti-British seditious movement in Sierra 
Leone, and intolerant of his radicalizing vision and social and political practice, 
imprisoned him for libel in 1940. 435  As the British government focused on preparing the 
colonies to assist in fighting Nazi Germany in World War II, Wallace-Johnson was 
removed from the scene and interred for the whole period of the war.  He would return 
later in the post-World War II period to continue his discourse of imperialism and of the 
nation within the Sierra Leone Legislature where he had gained entry initially on the 
ticket of the Creole party, the National Council, and later as an Independent. 
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 To conclude, British officialdom’s category of the communist and their anti-
communist grid, beginning to be applied as early as the 1920s in West Africa to those 
who officials disliked, would continue in the post-World War II period, in the combined 
context of the Cold War and of the renewed importance of Africa to Britain in the light of 
Britain’s post-World War II problems and crises, including crises in the colonies.  
Officialdom’s fear of communism in the colonies had subsided during World War II, a 
period also of lessened crisis such as labor strikes because of the war situation.  It was 
also a period of rapprochement, though would prove temporary, between the Western 
bloc and the Communist bloc in the Popular Front Alliance forged in order to 
successfully combat Nazi Germany’s world aggression together.  The post-World War II 
period witnessed resumed and heightened crises in the colonies at the same time as the 
rivalry between the Western bloc and the Soviet bloc resurfaced and solidified in the 
Cold War.  With these developments both in the colonies and in the international arena 
also came renewed fear of communist Soviet Union’s infiltration into the West’s sphere 
of influence, especially their colonies.  Accompanying these developments was British 
officialdom’s resort to labeling as communist or communist-inspired436 colonial social 
radicals and any discourses that represented alternative space for the imagining of the 
nation in opposition to that privileged or imagined by officialdom.  The 1948 Gold Coast 
crisis represented a landmark in the active return to this official mindset and British 
officialdom’s anti-communist grid in their West African colonies.437  This is explored in 













This chapter seeks to examine the shifting political boundaries and aspects of the 
contradictory developments towards mutually-inclusive and mutually-exclusive 
categories as individuals sought to reposition themselves vis-à-vis the community and to 
reconstitute rights and belongings in the post-World War II period onwards.  It attempts 
to examine continuity in transition and transitions as moments when contradictions began 
to crystallize.  It examines some socially relevant interventions of colonial social forces 
in the post-World War II period and focuses in particular on the conjunctures of the late 
40s in the colonies, specifically, the 1948 Gold Coast crisis as a moment of transition, 
effecting certain shifts among colonials and British officialdom alike.  It seeks to examine 
the competing visions of community and citizenship in the discourses and practices of 
various individuals and social forces, using as case-studies the Abeokuta Women’s Union 
social movement and the 1948 Gold Coast crises.  In exploring the socially-relevant 
conflicts of interest among colonials, it seeks to reveal how they transcended particular 
categories of i.e., economic, gender, etc., at the same time as they were composed of 
these.  It attempts to provide more adequate understanding of these conflicts and the 
social movements that they gave rise to through their analysis in relational terms and as 
coordinates of other analytical categories, i.e., class, community, and gender, for 
example.  This chapter seeks to begin to explore how these categories were being made 
into “nation” in mutually-inclusive and mutually-exclusive terms by certain colonial 





 The Socially-relevant Interventions  
 
The immediate post-World War II period witnessed heightened crises and a variety of 
social movements among various colonial social forces comprising women, workers, 
farmers, ex-servicemen, western educated Africans, professional and merchant forces, 
and semi-literate forces, etc.438  Studies have noted these crises to be expressions of felt 
economic grievances439 in the immediate aftermath of the war and have also described 
them as the failure of rising expectations.  This chapter seeks to also show how these 
crises and social movements transcended the hidden abode of production – or distribution 
– and, in the case of women, also transcended gender while these categories also formed 
important components of the crises and social movements that developed as expression of 
these crises.  It seeks to reveal the diffused nature of these movements and how certain 
interests and issues were beginning to be displaced and others centered as individuals and 
social forces were repositioning themselves vis-à-vis the community and seeking to 
reformulate rights and belongings. 
Social movements among women, for example, such as those of the Lagos Market 
Women Association (LMWA)440 and the Abeokuta Women Union (AWU) 441 in Nigeria, 
and the Sierra Leone Women’s Movement (SLWM), 442 were, indeed, at an important 
level of observation, economic and gender specific, given the immediate issues that gave 
rise to these movements, their initial composition, and leadership.  They were initially 
composed mostly of market women and traders and arose initially out of the desire of 
these women for changes that would ameliorate their felt condition of hardship in their 
income-generating activities.  The LMWA, under their leader, Madam Alimotu Pelewura, 
appealing against continuation of wartime economic restrictions, appealed to Captain 
Pullen, the Deputy Controller of Native Foodstuffs, at his office in Lagos, and before the 
Commissioner of the Colony, “not to take bread out of the mouth of the Lagos Market 
Women.”443  The AWU, frustrated with continued war-time controls and the way the 
trading activities of the colonial chief, Alake Ademola, were compounding their own 
trade and livelihood,444 petitioned the resident of Abeokuta Province, Mr. J. H. Blair, and 
complained that the: 
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Alake is a voracious trader: he trades with all the different 
firms at Ibara in almost every line of (their) goods and under 
different names.  He buys a great quantity of all fast lines 
with his prerogative as a King ... The small quantity left from 
the month's quota would have to be shared by all the other 
traders both men and women.445  
 
The SLWM was initiated among Sierra Leone women traders in similar 
circumstances by its leader, Constance Cummings-John.  The women’s movements at 
this level of analysis and in origin therefore did present as gender-specific and economic, 
tied to their means of livelihood.  But the economic was also the political and the social.  
Other latent political and social issues soon came to the fore and took on equal 
significance in the process of articulating explicitly economic grievances.  As the AWU 
movement progressed, for example, the discourse of the women soon shifted from “the 
Alake is a voracious trader” to a political discourse of “no taxation without 
representation.”446  AWU’s grievances from 1946 till 1949 was also focused on removing 
the onerous burden taxation imposed on the mass of Egba women as well as on having 
the government provide representative rights to women.447  The women were seeking to 
reconstitute gender norms in colonial society.  In their march on the Alake’s palace in 
1948 they sang: 
Oba Oluwa agbe wa lekee lori aree.  Awa ko da wo Ori 
bowun e e kokowa sago e Awa koda  awa koda Bowun e 
ko ko wa sago awa ko da.448 
 
(The Lord will justify and avenge us of the truth.  We will not pay tax.  If you wish, you 
may put us all into your prison.  We will not pay.  If you like you may imprison us all, we 
will not pay tax).     
 The causes as well as the composition and goals of these women’s movements 
were, however, even more complex and multifaceted, as further analysis would reveal.  
Women’s concerns and issues were never divorced from issues affecting the rest of 
society with whom they were connected in essential ways.  The women’s movements 
were also symptomatic of a complex array of issues that extended beyond particular 
economic grievances or the narrow confines of what directly impacted women.  The 
AWU movement further became symptomatic of a complex array of ills that bedeviled 
the Egba Native Authority (ENA) and local African society in general and which were 
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tied to the Indirect Rule system.  As the movement developed, it came to represent not 
only women but also entrenched male constituencies as the organized body of the 
Ogbonis,449 major religious groupings such as the Christians and the Mohammedans, and 
other social forces in Egbaland all of who felt marginalized and dispossessed in the ENA 
system.  And as the causes and composition became varied so did identities of interests 
and goals the politics tied to this.  The nation and citizenry were discursively constituted 
in mutually-conflicting ways.  Issues of gender, class, and community became 
inextricably mixed in the movement in complex and contradictory ways.450   
Workers activism was similarly diffused though they also appear at one level of 
analysis to present a “group” character, i.e., as originating from the abode of production 
and concerned with issues affecting them as workers.  At other levels of examination, 
however, workers movements and discourses are also more complex and expressive of a 
variety of interests and goals.  Workers self-perceived interests and identity remained 
multifaceted and in flux.451 
Closer examination and in-depth exploration of the trajectory of these 
movements, as attempted below in the case of the AWU, for example, reveals that they 
transcended particular categories of, i.e., economic, gender, class, etc.  Though the 
women’s movements originated as gender-specific, they also transcended gender and 
were complex and diffused.  The women organized in the AWU movement had risen 
against felt harsh economic conditions and in protest against the activities of the Alake as 
a “voracious trader,” who was “disturbing [their] trade in rice and other commodities,”452 
as well as out of a desire to also change gender norms that had marginalized them in the 
colonial economy and in society in more equitable ways.  But, as noted above, they were 
also organized in protest against a variety of other causes453 and goals and the movement 
was composed of other social forces, including men.  In this movement which became 
transformed over time, categories of “gender,” “class,” “community,” etc., intersected in 
quite complex and contradictory ways and reflected inherent mutually divergent goals as 
it developed.   The AWU movement in Abeokuta is examined in detail as a case-study in 
this chapter because it is instructive of these developments in other places and instances 
in many ways. 
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The Abeokuta Women’s’ Movement 
 
The examination of the AWU in this study is not a biographical study of its historically 
famous leader, Funlayo Ransome-Kuti (later changed to Anikulapo-Kuti), though her life 
is played out in significant ways in the course of examining and analyzing the movement 
she led and in the light of the goals of this study.454  The AWU movement and its leader 
have also been a popular subject of study especially among feminist scholars.  Cheryl 
Johnson-Odim and Nina Mba, for example, have done some very valuable works on 
Funlayo Ransome-Kuti (FRK) and the AWU movement.455  This study seeks to examine 
the AWU movement, later turned into the Nigerian Women’s Movement (NWU), and its 
leader, FRK, in ways that previous works have not focused on or fully addressed.  This 
relates to some of this study’s central goals involving the examination of aspects of the 
political and cultural contestations of community and citizenship among certain colonial 
social forces, including how certain analytical categories were being made into “nation,” 
as well as how British officialdom were attempting to delegitimize the socially radical 
intervention of colonial radicals with their label of “communist” and their anti-
communist grid.  FRK’s discourses and practices and her visions and goals in the 
movements she led are located in this study in the category of social radicalism.  Her 
discourses and movements are examined in new light in this study as symbolic of British 
officialdom’s category of the “communist” and of the effects of this categorization on the 
form of social intervention she represented.456  FRK and the movements she led 
exemplify British officialdom’s negative reaction against the terms in which FRK and 
other social radicals were seeking to privilege the discourse of the nation and of 
citizenship.  To officialdom, Funlayo Ransome-Kuti represented the type of colonial that 
they did not want to have any influence in the affairs of the colony.  They perceived her 
kind of social intervention as “extremist” and “communist” and would seek to 
marginalize and undermine her and the movements she led.457    
The AWU movement reveals, on the one hand, the potentials for the development 
of groupness458 as seen in the consensus attained among various social forces within the 
movement which effected the abdication, though temporary (from July 29, 1948 -1950), 
of the Alake against whom all had grievances.  It also reveals, on the other hand, the 
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potentials for the creation of the “nation” and imagining of citizenship in mutually-
exclusive terms.  Both potentials were actualized in this movement, leading in 
contradictory ways, and involving some creative tension.  Categories of “gender,” 
“class,” “community,” etc., were constituted in mutually-inclusive terms in the social and 
political practice of FRK and some other social radicals and progressives in the 
organization simultaneously as these categories were also being constituted in mutually- 
exclusive terms by the ethnopolitical entrepreneurs who were also important 
constituencies in this movement.  As noted earlier, the AWU had come to represent, as it 
developed, not only women but also entrenched male constituencies, such as the 
organized body of the Ogbonis, major religious groupings such as the Christians and the 
Mohammedans, and other social forces in Egbaland all of who felt marginalized and 
dispossessed in the Egba Native Authorities system.  
Thus, the AWU movement soon became an embodiment of conflicting interests 
and of opposing forces or of otherwise strange bedfellows, united only by a common 
immediate goal of getting rid of the Alake and once that was achieved, the many lines of 
division within the organization began to surface.  In the movement were progressive 
forces, such as Funlayo Ransome-Kuti, with a socially radical vision of society and of 
citizenship as based on equal and fair representation of all constituent members.  In the 
movement were also reactionary forces like the Ogbonis, old power brokers in pre-
colonial Egbaland who sought a return to old privileges, privileges that were exclusive to 
them only.  Their vision of the nation and of citizenry was exclusive of equitable 
representation of women and other grassroot constituencies.   
The Ogbonis had joined forces with the women and other interest groups in the 
AWU to fight against the inequities of the Sole Native Authority (SNA) system459 as then 
constituted and as symbolized in the Alake but they were not seeking to democratize the 
system across-the-board – irrespective of some of their rhetorics to the contrary.  They 
had appeared at times to be at the forefront of the tenuous coalition of all aggrieved social 
forces but it was more in pursuit of their narrow interest.  They decried the diminution of 
their erstwhile role and status as well as the perceived threats to their economic base in 
the colonial state.  They condemned the Alake's undue interference, among other things, 
in negotiations between Egba land owners and foreigners in the matter of acquisition or 
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lease of lands for commercial and other purposes.  The Ogbonis, who had also been 
important land owners, perceived their economic interests to be at stake in the land and 
other transactions between the Alake and foreign interests.  They were thus attempting in 
the AWU movement to situate grievances more particular to their group within the 
context of communal grievances and in the otherwise more broad-based AWU 
movement.  Thus, in the name of the people of Egbaland, the Ogbonis decried the fact 
that the Alake, through his “cunningness,” had “impoverished the Egba people and … 
amassed all the good things of the land to himself also at the expense of the people.”460    
The cause of the Ogboni’s grievances was even more fundamentally rooted in 
their continued exclusion from participation or effective participation in those institutions 
that conferred power and privileges in the colonial administrative structures.  The 
Ogbonis, leading the religious coalition as well, were fighting against their exclusion 
from those institutions which they believed should be under their control by tradition but 
from which they were excluded in the colonial Native Authority System.  They 
demanded that the “power and privileges of the Ogbonis” which they “enjoyed up to the 
end of the reign of late Alake Gbadebo,” and which subsequently had been “absolutely 
seized” from them and from the Christians and Mohammedans in Egbaland be “restored 
to them,” as well as the power of the Ogbonis as kingmakers.461  Also, although their 
joint resolution of July 1948 ostensibly embraced democratic principles, whatever 
democratic components that were inscribed were circumscribed in their appeal to 
tradition in the resolution.  The resolution had called for the regularization of the Sole 
Native Authority along democratic lines, “consistent with Egba Native Laws and 
Custom” and for authority to be vested in the Egba Central Council (ECC), the Alake to 
step down as the president of the Council, and the president to be appointed subsequently 
by the Egba people.462  It called for the abolishment of the Native Court of Appeal held at 
the Afin (i.e., the Alake's palace) as this was “being abused by the Alake,” and requested 
that cases from Ake grade “A” Court on appeal should go straight to the Supreme 
Court.463  The Alake, like many Yoruba chiefs, was also using his prerogatives as chief 
and customary court judge to exert influence over the allocation of locally based 
resources as productive resources in land and even women to his advantage.464   
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However, as soon as the goal of the abdication of the Alake was attained and as 
the colonial government started enacting certain changes and creating openings in the 
institutions of power, including the reallocation of resources,465 inherent schisms and 
conflicting interests and reactionary elements among the varied forces that the AWU was 
now composed of started to surface.  The developing trend towards National Societies 
that had initially seemed promising in the AWU became increasingly undermined by the 
inherent mutually conflicting interests of the different social forces within the movement 
that were now manifesting.466  Individuals and forces within AWU positioned  
themselves vis-à-vis the “community” and were privileging the discourse of rights & 
belongings in mutually-inclusive and/or mutually-exclusive terms.   
Among some of the constituent members of the coalition, the “nation” began to be 
imagined in mutually-exclusive terms in their perceived self-interest.  Subsequent to the 
abdication of the Alake, attempts were begun by the colonial administration to effect 
some changes in the Sole Native Authority (SNA) system in Egbaland and to reconstitute 
it along what promised to be democratic lines.  It became part of, as well as impetus for 
the broader process of local administrative restructuring being undertaken at this time by 
British officialdom at various levels of their West African colonies.  Here, in Abeokuta 
Southern Provinces of Nigeria, the Egba Central Council (ECC) was reconstituted in the 
attempt to broaden the base of representation and was also made the Native Authority for 
the Egba Division of the Abeokuta Province in place of the Alake.467  The changes 
involved the incorporation for the first time of a handful of women in the administration.  
Four women, all of them from the AWU executives including Mrs. Kuti, were appointed 
to the Interim Council established to replace the SNA.  The taxes against which the 
women had demonstrated were also abolished at this time.  The Ogbonis, however, cried 
out against the inclusion of women in the reconstituted Egba Native Authority - the Egba 
Central Council (ECC) - and in the Egba Native Courts as “against Egba custom and 
constitution.”468  The Ogbonis in the AWU, in agitating for change, were looking to the 
past and to the restoration of the privileges that had sustained them as a class and to the 
exclusion of women’s direct representation in the governing institutions of Egbaland.   
They failed to take note of the passage of time and of the emerging new social order.   
Their appeal to tradition as if static in these otherwise renewed context was to serve their 
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narrow interests.  Also, contrary to their representation of tradition and of women’s roles 
and positions in Egbaland and in pre-colonial times, women were not devoid of power in 
state and society in Egbaland and in many other African societies in pre-colonial times.  
There were also known to be women Ogbonis, women chiefs, Obas, rulers, and warriors 
in Egbaland and elsewhere in pre-colonial African societies.469  
 
Contradictory Responses and Interpretations 
 
The development towards groupness in the AWU would continue to be undermined by 
the corresponding development towards mutually-exclusive categories.  As changes were 
being made by the colonial authorities and as opportunities were being provided for more 
members of Egbaland to enter into institutions that conferred relative power and prestige, 
conflicting notions of entitlements and of who should be allowed into the new institutions 
surfaced.   Entrenched patriarchal forces sought to capture power for themselves and to 
exclude women from these institutions, as revealed in the case of the Ogbonis, for 
example.  In the on-going reconstitution of the SNA system in Egbaland, the Ogbonis, 
who had now gained representation in the ECC, became strongly opposed to sharing 
power subsequently with the few women that had also gained entry into that body, as 
earlier indicated.  Even though they had earlier claimed to be speaking for all Egba 
people, including women,470 they would now decry the presence of these women in the 
newly reconstituted ECC.  Earlier in September 1948, when the composition of the Egba 
Appeals’ Court had been discussed at the ECC, the Ogbonis had also turned down Mrs. 
Kuti's suggestion to have a woman included in the Appeals’ Court.  Their opposition had 
been defended then also on the grounds that the idea was “against Egba custom and 
constitution” and the motion of Chief Akinwande Thomas which rejected the suggestion 
was carried.471  The Ogbonis’ stand against the inclusion of women in the new 
institutions of power was in spite of the dominance and the very visible presence of 
women in the AWU movement for change and the strength of the women’s opposition in 
facilitating the resultant changes.  This was also in spite of the fact that the Ogbonis, 
along with other male coalitions in the AWU, had earlier petitioned the District Officer, 
in fighting against the inequities of the SNA, for a “democratic and not autocratic 
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government.”472  In reality, however, the Ogbonis and other male interest groups in the 
AWU, in the name of “community interests,” were attempting to foster a “class” project 
that would confer power to them while simultaneously excluding women, a significant 
section of members of the community that they claimed to be fighting for - and with - in 
the AWU movement.  For example, the signatories to the resolution of 9th July, 1948, a 
total of 46 men of “substance and power” in the Abeokuta community, did not include a 
single female signatory, and yet the resolution claimed to have been adopted by about 
“40,000 men and women in attendance.”473 
The abdication of the Alake, the beginning resolution of the conflicts, and the 
changes and openings in the SNA system brought the inherent divisions and 
contradictions among the movement’s participants to the surface.  Gendered-based 
discourse of the nation in exclusive terms by the Ogbonis and some other males in the 
AWU movement intersected with FRK’s and other progressives’ attempts to make the 
categories of gender, class, etc., into “nation” in mutually-inclusive categories.   
The women radicals and progressives in the AWU, on their part, had gone as far 
as advocating the “legitimate” rights of the Ogbonis to be respected in a reconstituted 
native administration, while the Ogbonis were defining those rights in ways that were 
mutually incompatible with those of women.  The women’s goal of seeking a new 
political arrangement that was inclusive of men’s as well as women’s interests was 
democratically based and well-intentioned.  But their own appeal for male representation 
on the basis of the latter’s “legitimate” rights, i.e., based on tradition, was ill-formed and 
only served in the end to strengthen the Ogbonis’ more reactionary appeal to tradition 
based on their perceived self-interest.  In their suggested reforms of the Egba Native 
Administration, the women had advocated, among other things, that “the legitimate rights 
of the Ogboni Chiefs should be restored to them.”474 In seeking changes in the Finance 
Committee, they had also suggested that:  
The present special Ordinance Committee should be 
constituted Finance Committee to be elected annually or 
triennially by the people thus: Majeobaje 6; Women 4; 
Ogbonis 4; Councilors 4.475 
 
Their suggestion for the number of women to be included in a proposed Finance 
Committee was only four, out of a total of 18 members, and disproportionate to the 
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number of women that composed the AWU, or that were in Egbaland society.  It was in 
these and other such contradictory contexts that the aims and democratic components of 
the AWU would be continually challenged and undermined.  It would involve FRK’s 
continued fight to retain the democratic ideals of AWU and women’s issues at the center 
of the political agenda in the movements she led till the end of the 50s.   
 The politics of the AWU in its changing forms would become impacted and 
further shaped in important ways by other varieties of local African politics, particularly 
by what was becoming more mainstream politics issuing from the ethnopolitical 
entrepreneurs and who were seeking who to capture power at the state and national level 
from this period onwards.  The efforts of FRK to create National Societies in her 
movements and political organizations would continue to be undermined by the 
discursive practices of the latter within and without her organizations.  The potential and 
actual divisions and differences within the AWU would also be exploited by the colonial 
authorities who were seeking to create a distinction and a wedge between the 
“moderates” and the “extremist” at the turn of the 50s.  They and the Alake on his return 
would seek to buy off some less ideologically motivated and more self-interested 
individuals, including women, in the AWU.  This would occasion further frictions that 
ran deep and split not only the ranks of such old power elites as the Ogbonis but also 
women in the AWU into sectional groups. 
 The women in the AWU were indeed not monolithic and did not remain cohesive, 
either.  The Alake, on his return to power, and with strong support of colonial officials, 
succeeded in fostering divisions among the women in the AWU.  This involved his 
efforts to buy off some of the women, like Remi Aiyedun, regarded as the Alake’s 
stooge, and to promote them to positions of influence that were denied FRK and the other 
women who remained loyal to the more democratic goals of the AWU and of the 
Nigerian Women’s Union (NWU), a larger body to which the AWU was transformed in 
May 1949.  The AWU founder, Funlayo Ransome Kuti, would, however, continue to 
strive to sustain the vision of inclusiveness of all members of society and of democratic 
change in the AWU and in the subsequent organizations that the AWU was transformed 
or incorporated into.  In the twists and turns of events, FRK would later find herself 
organizing a political party, the Commoner People’s Party, formed from the rump of the 
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NWU, that not only sought political power at the national level, but would also briefly 
ally with the conservative Northern People’s Congress from the North of Nigeria, in the 
hope of winning and sharing power at the national level.  FRK would later regret that 
decision, however, and the alliance did not, understandably, work for her and her 
Commoner’s party.  However, the enduring goal remained the same for Funlayo 
Ransome Kuti: to acquire and use political power for social good. 
 Other aspects of the AWU and FRK’s movements are examined in subsequent 
chapters as relevant.  The next section examines the 1948 conjuncture in the Gold Coast. 
 
The Conjuncture of 1948: Revisiting the 1948 Gold Coast Crisis 
 
The Gold Coast crisis of 1948 is examined in this chapter and in this study also 
for its symbolic significance in a variety of ways.  It has also been a subject of popular 
interest and it is not the intention of this study to detail what may already have been done 
in previous works.  It is the intent of this chapter to revisit and analyze it in the light of 
part of the goal of this study in relation to how community and notions of citizenship 
were being constituted among colonials and their repositioning vis-à-vis the community, 
as well as in the examination of the British officialdom’s category of the “communist” 
and its effect on the processes of the period.  The crises marked a moment of transition in 
which a wide cross-section of social forces in the Gold Coast - workers, ex-servicemen, 
farmers, women, school children, the unemployed,  etc., began to reimagine their world 
and to seek to reposition themselves vis-à-vis the community and to reformulate rights 
and belongings.476  Among British officialdom, the 1948 Gold Coast crisis furthered their 
renewed thoughts on empire and involved a reconstitution of the terms in which empire 
and the nation in British West Africa, including colonial subjects, were being imagined.477   
It effected a reconstitution of officialdom’s distinction between the “responsible” African 
and the “extremist/communist.” 
Furthermore, this study considers the 1948 Gold Coast crisis as a watershed, 
affecting subsequent developments not only in the Gold Coast but also in the other 
British West African colonies.  This position is opposed to that of the school of thought 
typified by Dennis Austin, a notable scholar of Gold Coast history in the period under 
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study.478  In his 1978 review of his work, he stated: “I do not believe therefore that 1948 
constituted a notable watershed in the general story of decolonization or in the transfer of 
power in Ghana (Gold Coast).”479  Others, particularly some colonial officials on the 
spot, such as the then Governor of Nigeria, Sir John Macpherson (1947-1954), were also 
wary of perceiving the 1948 Gold Coast crisis and the changes that followed it in such 
light but for different reasons.480  Macpherson’s and other colonial officials’ concerns 
were more to do with how this perception might influence further demands for changes 
among their West African colonial subjects, especially among the perceived “extremists” 
and “communists” as revealed below.  On the other hand, others among the official ranks, 
such as Governor Arden Clarke who succeeded Governor Creasy, perceived it as such 
and as necessarily so.  They attest to the significance of the 1948 Gold Coast crisis 
especially in relation to subsequent developments in the Gold Coast.  Alfred Alcock, 
commenting later in 1975 on what he termed as the “winds of change” in the Gold Coast 
before independence, would go as far as to say that: 
As a result of the findings and recommendations of a Royal  
Commission sent to the Gold Coast by the Labour  
government in power in Britain in 1948 to examine the  
causes of the riots of that year changes were made in  
colonial policy in the ensuing years which began the  
movement towards Independence.481 
 
Other studies that have noted the significance of the 1948 Gold Coast crisis in regard to 
subsequent developments in British West Africa have not, however, focused on analyzing 
or documenting this significance in relation to subsequent developments in this colony 
and in the rest of British West African colonies as this study seeks to do.  This also 
involves the examination and analysis in this study of the significance of the 1948 Gold 
Coast crisis in relation to British officialdom’s fear of communism in the colonies and the 
effects of this on the process that ended empire and the terms on which it ended. 
This study posits that the 1948 Gold Coast crisis led to a dynamic of change, 
hinged on new constitutional enactments, that took on a life of its own.  It posits that 
crises at the level of local African society and changes at the level of the colonial state 
impacted each other in complex and contradictory ways and led to unintended 
consequences.  The report of the Watson Commission of Inquiry that was subsequently 
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sent by the Colonial Office to investigate the 1948 Gold Coast crisis and the All-African 
Coussey Commission report that followed it had received serious attention in the 
Colonial Office.   The Watson’s Commission, going outside its terms of reference, 
recommended in August 1948 a number of constitutional changes and reforms.482  This 
would lead to reforms involving quicker reviews of pre-existing constitutions in all the 
four colonies to allow for more “democratic” openings, i.e., more unofficial 
representation in the Legislative Councils, etc.    
Some colonial officials, such as the Nigerian Governor, Sir John Macpherson, 
were indeed aversed to any interpretation of the 1948 Gold Coast crisis that would 
elevate it to the level of such significance in relation to subsequent developments or 
subsequent official actions in the Gold Coast and in the other British West African 
colonies.  Macpherson expressed strong concerns about any potential interpretation of the 
changes that were being proposed by officialdom following the 1948 Gold Coast crisis as 
being the result of the 1948 “disorder.”483  On being advised of the impending proposed 
changes following the report of the Watson’s Commission which was signed off at the 
Colonial Office, Macpherson shared his misgivings to this effect with A. B. Cohen, the 
Assistant Under-Secretary of State (1947-1951).  He expressed fear of possible 
perceptions by outside opinion and among Africans that the government was caving in to 
pressure.  He wrote in his reply to Cohen: 
My first thought is that it will be assumed here, as well as 
in the Gold Coast, that any constitutional advance that 
follows upon the proposals of the Commission has been 
achieved as a direct result of disorder; this assumption will 
do great harm in leading colonial peoples to believe that 
advance is more certainly and more speedily achieved by 
violence than by constitutional means.484    
 
Macpherson went on to express his concerns to Cohen, that: 
Apart from the encouragement given to political extremists 
throughout West Africa the proposals in the report will 
cause serious misgivings among those in Nigeria 
(particularly in the North and West) who wish to see 
advance along different lines.485 
 
However, as revealed and documented in this study from available evidence, there is no 
doubt as to the influence of the Gold Coast crisis on the British colonial government and 
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on the subsequent shifts in British officialdom’s position and the turn of events, not only 
in the Gold Coast, but also in the rest of British West African colonies.  The crisis played 
a central part in beginning to move British officialdom along the path of comparatively 
more wide-ranging reforms than had previously been intended and would end in the 
unplanned grant of self-government to these colonies, starting with the Gold Coast from 
the second half of the 50s.   
The study seeks to reveal how British officialdom’s fear of those they perceived 
as ‘extremists’ and ‘communists’ and who they believed would (irrespective of their 
limited number), make the colonies vulnerable to Soviet Union’s incursions in the 
colonies was built in important ways into the dynamic of the process of change at this 
time.  Fearful images which the 1948 crisis conjured in official mind and linked to their 
fear of the “extremists” and “communists,” made concessions by British officialdom to 
those they perceived as moderates more necessary.  For example, although Cohen, 
expressing the general feelings in the Colonial Office, had felt that the recommendations 
in the constitutional chapter of the Watson Commission’s report was “rather radical,”486 
the Colonial Office still felt compelled to accept the recommendations, even if in broad 
terms.   In the words of the Secretary of State, Arthur Creech Jones, in the Cabinet 
Memorandum he later released in October, 1949 in which he explained the need to accept 
the Watson’s and the Coussey’s recommendations along the lines of further constitutional 
changes and developments as advised in both:487  
If we are not prepared to accept it broadly, moderate 
opinion will be alienated and the extremists given an 
opportunity of gaining further and weightier support and of 
making serious trouble.488 
 
Officialdom felt a strong need to avert “serious trouble” by making concessions to the 
“moderates” and not drive them into the ranks of the “extremists.”  Developments in the 
Gold Coast reveal how from this period onwards British officialdom began to oblige the 






The 1948 Gold Coast Crisis 
 
The Gold Coast crisis which began on 28th February, 1948 at the end of Nii Bonne’s 
boycott protest movement and ended around March 15th, 1948 with the government’s 
declaration of the state of emergency and curfew, incorporated a complex array of 
inextricably mixed causes, goals, vision, etc.  At the end of it, British officialdom would 
seek to separate the “moderates” from the “extremists” and “communists.”  In this crisis, 
social, economic, political, anti-colonialist, and other goals more particular as well as 
broad-based goals were inextricably mixed, and also involved limited as well as long-
term goals.490  Its causes and character were multifaceted.  It stretched into different 
phases, spread throughout urban and rural centers, was both organized and spontaneous, 
was rooted in felt grievances and aspirations, etc.  In it, the “nation” began to be 
imagined in more socially-radical ways among a cross-section of the colony’s social 
forces than had been the case.  Before then, socially radical imagining of the “nation” 
tended to be located among select socialist-oriented colonials and organizations, as 
revealed in earlier chapters.   
 The political and racialist/anti-colonialist component of the disturbances could be 
detected in the chantings of the rioters as well as in the involvement of the UGCC led by 
Dr. D. Danquah and with Kwame Nkrumah as Secretary of the UGCC.  The UGCC 
leadership sought to constitute the crisis in nationality terms.  The participants in the 
disturbances chanted slogans such as: “This is the last European Governor who will 
occupy the Castle,” referring to Governor Gerald Creasy, “Go and see the Christiansborg 
Road.  The Europeans are killing the African ex-servicemen,” etc.491  Some young men 
were reported to have told some European observers, “Long Live Our Leaders,” referring 
to the six UGCC members that were detained by the government as a result of the 
disturbances, while some chanted, “All Foreigners Must Go.”492  Pamphlets found in 
circulation in Kumasi on March 17th sounded the same anti-colonial notes.  They read:  
“Release our political leaders immediately.  Lift the ban on our papers at once.  Else 
GENERAL STRIKE.  Give us liberty or give us death,” and was signed, “Working 
Classes, Gold Coast.”493 Open references were also made to Burma, India, and Ceylon as 
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examples of nations that had freed themselves from foreign domination.494  It was also 
aimed directly at European merchants, perceived as agents of the imperial government.   
 The UGCC’s ethnopolitical entrepreneurs, more or less capitalizing on the 
widespread discontent, sought to make the people’s causes their own in their “nation-
forming” endeavors.  Among the causes which the UGCC leaders sought to make their 
own was that of the dissident ex-servicemen.  The Watson’s Commission Report claimed 
that many of the six men detained subsequent to the riot, which included Nkrumah and 
Danquah, were active in addressing meetings of the ex-servicemen at a rally before the 
fatal procession of the Servicemen Union on 28th February, 1948.495  The Watson’s 
Commission Report further commented that the UGCC leadership: 
Endeavored to enlist under their banner everyone who had 
a public or private grievance against the Government and to 
seize upon every complaint, great or small, which might 
inflame a population avid for excitement.496 
 
There is no doubt as to the UGCC’s complicity in the riot and of the leadership’s attempt 
to make political capital out of the disturbances in their desire for some form of self-
government for the Gold Coast.  This included their attempt to focus world attention on 
the crisis.  Evidence presented before the Watson’s Commission, which the UGCC did 
not deny having knowledge of,497 revealed a planned strategic move by the UGCC to 
communicate with the Secretary of State and the World Press by an already prepared 
telegram to the Secretary of State and a distribution list of the telegram to the World 
Press, including the New Times of Moscow as soon as the outbreak gained  
momentum. 498  No doubt this reflected the strong influence of Nkrumah on the UGCC.  
Dr. Danquah, though known to be a moderate, was also seeking to use Nkrumah’s skills 
and contacts for UGCC’s ends at this time and would affirm to the Commission that they 
“wanted the world to know.”499     
 Whatever might have been the attempts of Danquah and Nkrumah and other 
leadership of the UGCC to use the crises to such advantage, there was no doubt as to the 
deep-rooted nature of discontent colony-wide in the Gold Coast at this time, grievances 
which fuelled the anti-colonialist discourse and the “nation-forming” project of these 
African politicians.  At its initial phase, the movement started off in January, 1948 as a 
modest and peaceful boycott movement with limited goals, and as predicated on 
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economic causes and was led by Nii Bonne, the Gold Coast trading magnate and a Ga 
chief who was genuinely concerned with the inflationary trends and the lot of the 
common man.  It ended in February 1948 when some of its objectives were satisfied.500  
But there was no stopping the subsequent spontaneous mass action that followed the 
cessation of the boycott movement.  The “genie” was out of the box!  The outburst of 
riots that followed in February 28, 1948 and subsequently in Accra and elsewhere was 
testament to seething discontent and felt hardship among the cross-section of the Gold 
Coast people, among other causes; the abuse of the terms of settlement of the boycott 
movement only provided an occasion for it.  The unrest in the Gold Coast from February 
28, starting with the march of the Ex-Servicemen Union members to the Governor’s 
house at Christianborg to present their grievance petition to the Governor,501 involved 
strikes, boycotts, organized and unorganized violent acts, looting of mostly expatriate 
firms’ goods, etc.  When it ended around March 15, 29 Africans had been killed, 15 non-
Africans wounded but no death among them, and 237 Africans injured.502  The official 
estimate of damages to property stood at approximately 1,000.000 British pounds 
sterling.503  Widespread discontent many of which were tied in large measures to the 
adverse socio-economic consequences of the 1930s Great Depression and of WW II 
included: inflation and high cost of living (including the cost of locally produced 
foodstuffs), grievances of ex-servicemen who petitioned against major post-war 
resettlement problems, and the cutting down of diseased cocoa trees by the government.  
But it was also expressive of other causes and visions, including those of the UGCC and 
the desire for the grant of self-determination for the Gold Coast colony, etc.504  Although 
the UGCC was also indicted indirectly by the Watson Commission of hatching a 
communist plot in the course of the crisis, their vision of change in the Gold Coast 
society was not socially transforming.  The UGCC denied any involvement of a 
communist plot that the Commission initially indicted it of.   
   
Perceptions of Communism and the Reconstitution of Officialdom’s Discourse 
 
The 1948 Gold Coast crisis undoubtedly fed into colonial officials’ fear of 
communism in the colonies in quite significant ways.  The immediate interpretation of 
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the Gold Coast governor on the scene, Sir Gerald Creasy, was that it was the work of 
“certain extremists and hot-heads,” and “communists,” etc.  This was in quite typical 
officialdom’s fashion of applying such derogatory labels as substitute for the proper 
understanding of the society or the people they governed. 505  Given this official 
predisposition, the Gold Coast riots of 1948 became indeed a “shot in the dark” for 
colonial officials in the Gold Coast as well as in the Home Office some of who would 
acquiesce, to varying degrees, in its characterization as a “communist conspiracy.”  At 
the outbreak of the riot in 1948, the Gold Coast Governor, Sir Gerald Creasy, exclaimed 
in utter dismay in the Gold Coast Legislative Council that he had been  “overtaken by 
events” because it was so unexpected by the colonial authorities. 506  It was unexpected 
because of officialdom’s hitherto failure to take seriously the various discontents in 
colonial society of which the protest actions were symptomatic. 507   
It is interesting that the Secretary of State under the Labor Government, Mr. J. 
Griffiths (1950-1951), would still consider the 1948 Gold Coast crisis a mystery as late as 
1951 and long after the Watson’s Commission had provided some valuable insights by 
detailing specific grievances that were underlying causes of the riots!508  In his May 1, 
1951 address to the Colonial Group of the Royal Empire Society, Griffiths had remarked 
that, “Although the Commission of Enquiry under Mr. Aiken Watson, K. C., examined 
the question very carefully, the cause of this violent outbreak in a placid and harmonious 
colony is still something of a mystery.”509  Part of the problem for him and other officials 
was also tied to their idealization of the Gold Coast society, regarded as the “model 
colony,” oblivious of the seething discontent beneath the surface.  “Placid and 
harmonious” the Gold Coast was not, as partly revealed earlier in chapter two in the 
crises of the interwar period in the Gold Coast and other colonies.510  Griffiths, trying to 
grope for an explanation of the 1948 disturbances, went on: “Economic grievances had 
certainly much to do with the riots, but rather because of an over-abundance of money 
than of want,”511 still showing a lack of proper understanding of the multifaceted 
underlying causes of the riots, including the feelings of alienation and desire for change 
among the Gold Coast people.   
The 1948 Gold Coast crises may have been a rude awakening from officialdom’s 
relative sense of complacency about the colony they governed but the labeling by 
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officials would continue in spite of, or rather because it provided some means of 
explaining the “inexplicable” to them.  The rioting in the Gold Coast was perceived by 
colonial officials to have the character of an insurrection and fed their fear of a potential 
revolutionary upheaval instigated by communists in their colonies.512 The Governor, Sir 
Gerald Creasy, who was witnessing the outbreak of the 1948 Gold Coast disturbances, 
cabled the Secretary of State (SOS) in London and spared no efforts in vehemently 
voicing out to him real and imagined fears of a society about to go down in bloodshed 
unless something urgent and drastic was done from the Home Government to arrest such 
a development!513  He suggested that the Secretary of State send a Minister over to 
urgently carry out investigation of what was happening and was quite adamant about this, 
impressing it on the Secretary of State that the position in the Gold Coast was one of 
“potential gravity.”514  The Governor invoked the danger of communist activities, 
although there was no real evidence of direct communist involvement or links in the 
crises.515  Creasy told Creech-Jones that the connection of the group of detainees arrested 
as a result of the disturbances, i.e., Bankole Awoonor-Renner, Kwame Nkrumah, etc., 
with communist parties abroad was clearly demonstrated through the apprehension of a 
possible Mr. Burt.516  Mr. Burt was alleged to be an intermediary between the British 
Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) and the UGCC.  He further invoked the 
danger of developing strong anti-racial feeling, and of the activities of “evil men,” 
“extremists,” and “hot heads,” particularly in Sekondi-Takoradi, who “have been trying 
to forment real trouble, especially on the Railway.”517  The Governor went on to warn 
that if these “hot heads” were to be allowed to get the upper hand there might be further 
violent disturbances “the consequences of which elsewhere in the country, in the present 
stage of general unsettlement, might well have very serious effects.”518  Creasy was also 
fearful of “sympathetic disturbances” breaking out in Nigeria.519   
Officialdom could henceforth no longer escape the policy implications of such 
social upheavals, what with its suddenness and intensity, and especially with the fear of 
“communist” involvement in the outbreak of the crisis in this period.  The situation, 
Creasy had further urged on the Secretary of State in the same telegram, called for serious 
rethinking of the whole basis of their administration in these colonies and a need to make 
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radical changes.  He wrote, revealing the serious impact of this crisis on British 
officialdom: 
There is no doubt whatever in my mind that when the 
immediate emergency is over we shall have to think very 
hard indeed about the whole basis of our administration, 
and that we shall have to make some radical changes.520 
 
The Secretary of State, in his reply to Creasy's letter, noted and affirmed Creasy’s 
viewpoint: 
As regards the future, I note your remark at the end of your 
letter that we shall have to think very hard indeed about the 
whole basis of our administration and that we shall have to 
make some radical changes.521 
 
In regard to Creasy’s allegation of communist involvement, it should be noted 
that the fear of communist instigation in the Gold Coast crises as expressed by Creasy 
was strongest with Governor Creasy himself.  Although Creasy was able to carry the 
Colonial Office with him in general in regard to the alleged communist involvement in 
the disturbances, the Secretary of State tended to be more guarded.  In responding to 
Governor Creasy in regard to communist involvement in the crisis, Creech-Jones wrote: 
We must clearly endeavor to establish the extent to which 
Communist instigation and influence have been responsible 
for the course of events.  Investigations to that end may 
have to be carried forward secretly until a more precise 
estimate of true proportion of Communist activities can be 
made. 522 
 
Creech-Jones further went on to tell Governor Creasy, in response to Creasy’s telegram, 
that he would be glad if Creasy would “telegraph briefly substance of evidence obtained 
to prove this connection and nature of indications obtained regarding plan for Union of 
African Socialist Republics, etc.,” as Creasy had previously alleged.523 Creech-Jones was 
more anxious to await the report of the Commission of Inquiry that was being established 
to look into the 1948 Gold Coast crises and was not that ready either to send a Minister to 
investigate it as requested by Creasy in his telegram to Creech-Jones.524  Some other 
officials in the Colonial Office also expressed certain reservations in regard to possible 
communist involvement in this crisis, or of the extent of it.  Sir T. Lloyd, the Permanent 
Under-Secretary of State (1947–1956), was also doubtful about the reality and/or extent 
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of communism in this crisis, contrary to the significance that Creasy was giving to it.  In 
his response to Cohen’s letter to him in regard to the draft of the Secretary of State’s 
reply to Creasy’s telegraph on the Gold Coast crises, Lloyd had expressed that he 
personally felt that the Governor - Creasy - was overdoing that aspect, i.e., the communist 
scare.  He expressed his belief that “the Governor’s present judgment that the trouble was 
mainly due to Communists activity likely wrong.”525  However, although not totally sold 
on the communist scare as Governor Creasy was, the Secretary of State and the Colonial 
Office did not altogether dispense with the possibility of communist influence in the 
crises or of communism’s potential pretensions in their colonies.  It is not without 
significance that the disturbances had broken out also at a time when the Cold War was 
well on its way! 
The belief in potential communist influence in this and other British West African 
colonies did carry enough weight with the Colonial Office for it to become a reference 
point in subsequent deliberations on the governance of these West African colonies as 
will be indicated in later sections and chapters.   Even at this point, the Secretary of State 
conferred with Creasy, thus:  
With you I am alive to the danger of communist activities 
and the necessity of helping the public to a clear 
appreciation of the danger as well as method employed. 
Consequently this aspect of the matter must have its proper 
place in our pronouncements.526 
 
He also agreed with Creasy that: 
As regards links with this country, there is no doubt that 
direct connection exists between West African National 
Secretariat and Gold Coast Convention through Nkrumah 
who was General Secretary of WANS527 from its formation 
in December 1945.528  
 
He further agreed with Creasy on the links with the Communist Party of Great Britain 
through the West African National Secretariat (WANS) of others detained – part of the 
“six evil men” - in connection with the riots, such as the WANS chairman, Bankole 
Awoonor-Renner, who “is believed to represent W.A.N.S. on Communist Party Africa 
Committee,”529 and WANS Vice General Secretary, Bankole Akpata, “who is also known 
to be in contact with Africa Committee.”530  Also, although the Secretary of State again 
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cautioned that “this should not (repeat not) be taken to imply that activities of WANS are 
communist controlled,”531 he nevertheless affirmed that: 
Communist support is, however, forthcoming in the form of 
advice, political education of individuals, publicity in the 
Daily Worker, attendance and speakers at meetings, and 
supplies of literature…532  
and that: 
Any movement such as WANS which seeks to embarrass 
the ‘Imperialist’ Powers and to work for Colonial 
independence can be assured of the active support of the 
Communist Party.533 
 
That was as far as the SOS would go in linking the 1948 crisis with any communist party 
support or communist involvement but it was significant enough.  There is no doubt that 
the fear of communism in these colonies tended to reside more in general with colonial 
authorities on the spot in the colonies than in the Colonial Office or the Home 
Government.  But the Colonial Office was also not unconcerned about communist 
influence in the colonies, even if such influence was felt to be indirect, as Creech-Jones 
expressed, in terms of its support for colonial independence.  The Colonial Office was 
concerned enough about it to seek to control African students in Britain from falling into 
leftwing/communist influence there as revealed earlier in chapter three.  Hakim Adi notes 
that between 1946 and 1948, many of the most prominent members in WASU were also 
members of the WANS.534  Moreover, the perceptions of officials on the spot like Gerald 
Creasy from which the Colonial Office was not immune, combined with those of the 
United States Central Intelligence Agency (USCIA) in regard to believed communism’s 
exploitation of the stirrings of the Colonial People for self-determination,535 would 
continue to weigh heavily on the official mind and to impact the British Cabinet as well.  
The Watson’s Commission Report that was produced at the end of the Commission’s 
investigation of the 1948 disturbances further buttressed the belief in potential or actual 
communist influence in the crises of social order in the colonies. 
The Watson Commission’s Report would not dispense with the possible direct 
influence of communism in the 1948 Gold Coast disturbances.  The very involvement of 
Kwame Nkrumah as Secretary of the UGCC, the colony’s main political organization at 
the time and which they implicated in the disturbances, made communist influence in the 
 105
crisis a real possibility to them.  That is, given what they perceived to be Nkrumah’s past 
record and association with militant and communist organizations and from which they 
were not ready to absolve him.  They were convinced that Nkrumah was a direct source 
of communist involvement in the crisis.  The members of the Watson’s Commission, 
expressing their grave doubts and suspicions of Nkrumah, stated that even though 
Nkrumah appeared before them as “the humble and obedient servant of the Convention,” 
who had “subordinated his private political convictions to those publicly expressed by his 
employers,” they were unable to accept his modest posturing from the internal evidence 
about him before them.536  They perceived that, judging from what was the warmth of his 
welcome into the UGCC as reflected in the enthusiastic invitation from one member of 
the Working Committee to Mr. Nkrumah to “use the organization as his own,” as 
recorded in the UGCC Minute Book, he was “occupying the role held by all party 
Secretaries in totalitarian institutions, the real position of power.”537  As if presenting the 
profile of a revolutionary and of the “communist,” or of the “totalitarian,” they 
catalogued Nkrumah’s past records thus, convinced that this Secretary, Mr. Kwame 
Nkrumah: with “a very diversified education in the United States and Great Britain and in 
both countries appears to have taken a prominent part in all political institutions designed 
to promote a forward African policy,” who, while in Britain, “have had Communist 
affiliations” and “have become imbued with a Communist ideology which only political 
expediency has blurred,” who in London “was identified particularly with the West 
African National Secretariat, a body which had for its objects the union of all West 
African Colonies and which still exists,” and which “appears to be the precursor of a 
Union of West African Soviet Socialist Republics”; this Mr. Kwame Nkrumah, they went 
on, “a mass orator among Africans of no mean attainments,” “the one to whom members 
of a communist-type secret organization called ‘The Circle’ were required to swear 
personal loyalty with disquieting threats in the event of infidelity,”538 and one whose 
statement that the Circle document was ‘“a dream’ which he carried around with him for 
some years” they disbelieved, and rather believed, “having seen and heard Mr. Nkrumah, 
that, given the smallest opportunity, he would quickly translate his ‘dream’ into reality,” 
was the same person standing before them!!539  
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Nkrumah was further implicated as a source of communist influence in the crisis 
and in the colony because of what the Commission alleged was his proposal of a 
programme which “is all too familiar to those who have studied the technique of 
countries which have fallen the victims of Communist enslavement.”540  The evidence for 
this was tied to a working programme presented to the Commission and alleged to have 
been circulated just before the disturbances.541  Although the Commission was willing to 
concede that the UGCC itself did not approve of communism as such, they felt that “the 
Working Committee, fired by Mr. Nkrumah’s enthusiasm and drive, were eager to seize 
political power and for the time being were indifferent to the means adopted to attain 
it.”542  This was disturbing to the members of the Commission who expressed that: 
Although from his evidence it must be plain that Mr. 
Nkrumah has not really departed one jot from his avowed 
aims for a Union of West African Soviet Socialist 
Republics, the Convention has not so far taken any steps to 
dissociate themselves from him.543 
 
The implied link with communism in these disturbances, though hinged on the 
activities of a few suspected individuals, chief among who was Nkrumah, and to whom 
much importance was placed,544 takes on even greater significance in the light of the 
world’s geo-politics and the developing post-World War II Cold War rivalry between the 
West and the communist East.  In Britain’s post-World War II loss of real economic and 
world political strength, Africa was still regarded by them as a stronghold of imperial 
strength.  And as the Western Powers lost certain Eastern European countries to the 
communist sphere of influence in the postwar negotiations with the Soviet Union, Britain 
had hoped that Africa was beyond the reach of the Kremlin. Though the Secretary of 
State was agreed on the possible implication of communism in the 1948 Gold Coast 
crises, he had also indicated in his telegram to Creasy that “it is believed that West Africa 
is not yet regarded as suitable … for direct Communist activity,”545 adding as it were at 
that juncture some dose of realism from the Home Office into official discourse of 
communism in British West African colonies.  The United States would not, however, 
leave things to chance or let Britain and the other Western Powers be complacent about 
what the U. S. believed to be the real threat of communism in their colonies.  The U. S. 
was already warning Western European colonial governments that communist incursions 
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into the West’s colonies was an ever present and real danger, especially in the light of 
what they perceived to be the dependent territories’ stirrings for self-governance in the 
post World War II period.546  The U. S. would see to it that the colonies of Western 
European Powers were protected from such “dangerous” influences.  The United States 
therefore got its Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) involved in helping the Western 
European Imperial Powers police their colonial territories, seeking to help them arrest the 
forces of “revolution” before they got out of hand and to channel them into more 
“desirable directions.”547 A 1948 USCIA Report put the issue, including U. S. self-
interest in the matter, clearly thus: 
The growth of nationalism in colonial areas . . . has major 
implications for U. S. security, particularly in terms of 
possible world conflict with U.S.S.R.  This shift of the 
dependent areas from the orbit of Colonial Powers not only 
weakens the probable European allies of the U. S. but 
deprives the U. S. itself of assured access to vital bases and 
raw materials in these areas in event of war.548 
 
The U. S. was warning the West to satisfy the aspirations of their dependent 
subjects and to take the initiative before denied aspirations and feelings of alienation 
make the West’s colonies vulnerable to, or actually fall into communist Soviet’s control 
and which was deemed to not augur well for either the West or the U. S.  Based on the 
waves of radical activism and social upheavals that were being perceived in the West’s 
colonies worldwide, the USCIA Report went on to state that “the existence of leftist 
elements within them,” their “susceptibility to Soviet penetration,” and the “danger of 
shortsighted colonial policies,” will “in the long run cause the Colonial Powers to lose the 
very economic and strategic advantages in their dependencies which they are anxious to 
retain.”549 
The next chapter examines the beginning shifts in British officialdom’s position 
tied in part to the crises in the colonies and their fear of the colonies’ vulnerability to 
Soviet influence in these conditions of perceived instability.  It also examines the shifts in 
the social and political practices of some select African politicians such as Kwame 
Nkrumah of the Gold Coast and Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria in the light of changing 










This chapter seeks to examine further the shifting political boundaries and how 
individuals were repositioning themselves vis-à-vis the community in the post-World 
War II conjuncture.  It seeks to examine in particular the shifts in the discourses of 
British officialdom as well as those of some African politicians.  The chapter seeks to 
explore the making of the category of the “responsible” African, i.e., the “moderates,” by 
British officialdom consequent to the 1948 Gold Coast crisis and their beginning 
legitimization of this category of colonials.  This study posits that the ideological shifts 
among the African politicians who officialdom was now reconstituting into the category 
of the “moderates” also involved among them the imagining of community and of 
citizenship in socially conservative ways, i.e., gendered and closed to popular agendas.  
The study further posits that it was this framing of community and notions of citizenship 
– the framing that is conceptualized in this study as the master-discourse - that was now 
being legitimized by officialdom from this period onwards.  Opposed to this was the 
framing of the community and citizenship in more popular and inclusive terms – what is 
conceptualized in this study as the minority-discourse or supplementary-discourse –  the 
space for which officialdom as well as African politicians – the ethnopolitical 
entrepreneurs – would now seek to close.  This chapter seeks to explore the dialectic of 
change and the discrepancy between change and change itself.   
Among officialdom, the 1948 crisis, followed by other crises in the Gold Coast 
and in Nigeria especially, served to revive their fear of social destabilization and of 
potential communism’s infiltration into their colonies, especially in the light of British 
post-World War II crises and of the Cold War, as noted earlier in chapter four.  To make 
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their West African empire more secure and to arrest the crises of empire in these 
colonies, officialdom embarked on new initiatives involving the grant of new 
constitutions and new administrative changes in the colonies.  The changes also involved 
a beginning reconstitution of officialdom’s African partners.  Colonial officials would 
eagerly search for those Africans that could work with them to help stabilize empire at 
the turn of the 50s.  As they did so, previously labeled “agitators,” “extremists,” and 
“communists,” such as Kwame Nkrumah of the Gold Coast and Nnamdi Azikiwe of 
Nigeria, would become reconstituted in officialdom’s discourse as the “respectable” and 
“moderate” Africans.  These African politicians also, who in reality did not maintain a 
fixed position on the ideological spectrum, in correctly assessing the mood of the times 
and eager to obtain power, were also making shifts to reposition themselves on the 
ideological center as “moderates” and therefore as “partners worth working with” in this 
period.550  This chapter examines the shifts in the position of political “radicals” such as 
Azikiwe and Nkrumah in the era of rapid constitutional changes.   
The shift to the ideological center among some of these erstwhile “radical” 
African politicians was facilitated by the new constitutions enacted for the Gold Coast 
(1950), Nigeria (1951), Sierra Leone (1951), and Gambia (1951), and the subsequent 
elections which had afforded some of them entry into the colonies’ Legislative and 
Executive Councils, and hence to relative positions of political power.  They would now 
seek to use their position of incumbency to satisfy colonial authorities’ desire to establish 
“order” in the colonies, keep communism at bay, and follow the path of constitutionalism 
and gradualism while at the same time seeking to consolidate more political power to 
themselves.  As these African politicians began to prove themselves as “moderates” and 
“worth working with,” officialdom also began to oblige them with more timely grant of 
new constitutions for greater African participation in government and thus more power 
and leverage.  A spate of constitutional proposals and enactment would follow from 1950 
onwards, about every two years for the Gold Coast and every three years for Nigeria, for 
example.  These were officialdom’s efforts to effect constitutional changes along 
‘ordered’ lines as well as to appease the “moderates” and pre-empt the “radicals,” “unruly 
mob,” “demagogues,” “hooligans,” and “communists” from taking control and opening 
up the colonies to believed communist influence.  One of the major British policy makers 
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in the Colonial Office, A. B. Cohen, the Assistant Under-Secretary of State (1947-1951), 
in defending these newly-enacted constitutions that would provide for “full participation” 
by Africans, commented that “such a constitution provides the best defense against 
Communism in West Africa.”551  Cohen further remarked in defense of the reforms and 
constitutional changes that were being undertaken at the end of the 40s and beginning of 
the 50s consequent to the 1948 Gold Coast crisis that “A sense of responsibility can only 
be created by giving responsibility.”552  Also defending the course of reforms and 
concession-granting to “moderates” to stave off the “extremists,” the Secretary of State, 
Mr. Lyttelton, remarked in a Cabinet Memorandum of February 1952 that “if politics is 
the art of what is practicable this course is justified.”553   
These changes and the continued crises in the colony would, however, begin to 
feed into each other and would lead in unintended ways to unintended consequences and 
eventually to what ended as precipitous decolonization.  The more the crises, beginning 
with the conjuncture of 1948, the more officials endeavored to make changes while 
simultaneously putting limits on change; the more officials made concessions that 
empowered certain Africans and closed the space to others, the more the crises in 
colonial society persisted.  A dynamic of crises and change, change and crises ensued 
from the late 40s onwards as crises at the level of local African society and changes at the 
level of the colonial state began to feed into each other in complex and contradictory 
ways.  The crises and changes were reinforced by, and reinforcing the inherent 
contradictions of the colonial state and of colonial society.  Also, to colonial social 
radicals, the changes being effected were too little, too late, and were felt not to be 
addressing issues of popular concerns; they would strive to push the limits that colonial 
officials were attempting to put on change.554  While Nkrumah and Azikiwe and other 
African ethnopolitical entrepreneurs were positioned and/or repositioning themselves to 
the center or right of center vis-à-vis the community, colonial social radicals were 






Turning the Tide 
 
To reiterate, in regard to British officialdom and the warnings from the United 
States Central Intelligence Agency (USCIA), they could not disregard those warnings and 
the USCIA’s interpretation of the crises in their colonies, given also the importance that 
African colonies have come to represent to them consequent to the cessation of World 
War II.  Subsequent to the 1948 Gold Coast crisis, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
Arthur Creech-Jones, had agreed with Gerald Creasy on their need to now confront the 
issue of rethinking policy in major and possibly radical ways to stem the tide of social 
chaos and to meet the threat posed by the “rabid crowd.”555  This would include, 
according to Creech-Jones, possible means of securing more representation of the actual 
working populations and at the same time more effective contact with them.556  The 
Secretary of State had further stated to the Governor of the Gold Coast, in their 
communication regarding the 1948 Gold Coast crisis: 
I agree with you that it is of paramount importance that you 
carry responsible African opinion with you, and that it 
should wherever possible be consulted and associated with 
your actions.557 
 
Mainstream officialdom would also now become more inclined towards 
rethinking and putting into practice the views of a handful of official critics of prevailing 
policy, especially that aspect of official policy that had involved official labeling of, and 
attacks on African critics of local administration.558  H. Cooper, the Public Relations 
Officer (P.R.O.) who was posted to Nigeria in 1947, had called this in various terms as, 
i.e., “negative assault on the critics of Government policy,” etc.559  The predisposition of 
colonial officials to quickly label protest movements in the colonies or African critics of 
colonial administration or social radicals as “extremist” or “communist” had not served 
them well.  By labeling them so had not allowed for healthy interchange of ideas and 
input of more progressive views.  They would now seek to rethink this position and to 





Officialdom’s Shifting Discourse and the Rehabilitation of Official Minority Views 
 
The essence of the subsequent beginning shift in Colonial Office thinking in regard to  
African critics of colonial administration is captured in the prevailing minority views and 
opinions of colonial officials like H. Cooper.  Cooper’s communication with other 
colonial officials prior to the 1948 crisis was expressive of these dissenting views among 
the official class and is examined at some length in the following sections.  
Differentiating views like his had pointed to the bankruptcy of prevalent official position 
that saw protest movements in the colonies and dissenting local opinions and critics of 
colonial administration as dysfunctional.   
When Cooper first took over as the P.R.O. in Nigeria in 1947, he was dismayed to 
find that the Public Relations Office itself was virtually in “a state of war” with the 
NCNC and the Zik Press.560  Cooper, who was most vocal and articulate in critiquing 
official policy, had earlier advocated a rethinking of official policy and attitudes towards 
African critics of colonial administration and their contesting views in more constructive 
ways.  “We have suffered a great deal from the prevalent notion that a Nigerian with 
progressive views is automatically an outcast,”561 he commented, pointing to his 
perceived poverty of prevalent official thinking and policy of dealing with African critics 
of colonial government.  He had recommended working with, rather than alienating these 
African critics, contrary to the views of some other colonial officials or of those who had 
worked before him in the Public Relations Office.562 Cooper himself had led the way in 
this, putting his beliefs into practice in his position as chairman of the Ikoyi Club in 
Nigeria, a position he regarded as potentially of strategic importance. There, he started 
the policy of appeasing the ‘progressives’ by encouraging social interaction between 
Africans and Europeans, held receptions for Nigerian students returning from overseas,563 
etc.  “All this, of course,” he remarked, “has meant a great change from the old tactics of 
pounding away at the extremists in the hope of driving them out of business.”564  Critics 
of Cooper’s position would rather support the denigration of Azikiwe and his colleagues 
as done in the London Daily Mail, the London Daily Mirror, and the Nigerian Daily 
Times.565  In opposition to his critics’ position, Cooper further commented that “to brand 
Zik as a rogue and a traitor merely strengthens his position.”566   
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Cooper went on to comment, rightly, that negative assaults on the critics of 
government policy, instead of a positive promotion of that policy, “inflates the stature of 
the individuals who are attacked and gives them the opportunity to pose as ‘martyrs.”’567  
He was right in that these African politicians certainly used the prevalent attacks of 
government on them to great advantage.  For example, the more colonial officials tried to 
denigrade Azikiwe earlier on,568 the more his stature grew, as was the case with Kwame 
Nkrumah in the Gold Coast, furthered also by their newspaper activities.  Their growing 
stature was only challenged in the competition between them and their African political 
opponents from various points of the ideological spectrum.569  “Part of the trouble,” 
Cooper further opinioned, “is that Zik realizes that he is living in 1947, while too many of 
those who condemn him have taken very little account of the passage of time.”570  The 
Watson Commission’s remarks on the attitude and outlook of some colonial officials in 
the colonies further underscore the failure of some of these colonial officials to be 
forward-looking, as pointed out earlier by Cooper.  The Commission stated that they had 
“equally sought official views among those who by long residence may claim an 
understanding denied to those of less experience,” and went on to remark that, 
unfortunately, among them, they were: 
Oppressed by the feeling that time had stood still.  In a 
world where change was the keynote there appeared to be a 
disposition to let the world go by and to resent the intrusion 
of new ideas.571 
 
In regard to the “problem of Zik,” Cooper had suggested to Blackburne that: 
The only way to drive him out of business is to display a 
more attractive line of goods in our own shop window and 
to make it obvious that we are inviting the customers to 
come and inspect those goods, instead of requiring them, as 
a proof of ‘loyalty,’ to accept them at our own valuation.572 
 
British colonial officials were now ready to put such imaginative endeavors to 
work in their West African colonies subsequent to the crisis of 1948 in the Gold Coast 
and in the changing circumstances of the late 40s.  They were prepared to look for, and to 
work with the “progressives,” i.e., the “responsible” Africans - those they perceived at 
this time to have the credentials to help them in managing colonial society and in 
managing change.  The 1948 conjuncture marked an important transition in official mind 
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towards rethinking policy and an openness to allow for the incorporation of new African 
working partners.  It marked a new phase in the “moral rearmament of empire.”  With a 
preparedness to rethink policy and a somewhat more responsive disposition towards 
dissent in the colonies, officials higher up the structure of power now sought to look more 
closely at the root cause of dissent in the colonies - starting with the 1948 Gold Coast 
crisis.  In one of his communication with the Governor of the Gold Coast, the Secretary 
of State had indicated a willingness to consider “other reasons for the outbreak which 
may have their foundation in sincerely felt cause of dissatisfaction quite unconnected 
with Communism.”573  This was indeed suggestive of a welcome shift in official mindset, 
at least as regards officialdom’s readiness to consider that there may be genuine causes of 
disenchantment that were giving rise to the disturbances and protest movements in the 
colonies other than, perhaps, communist instigation!574  But it was not certain how far 
officialdom would go in exploring the root of social conflicts or dissent in the colonies 
and if the labeling, including that of communist, would cease altogether.  
 
Reconstituting the “Responsible” and the “Irresponsible” African 
 
British colonial authorities’ anti-communist grid in the colonies, predicated also 
on the distinction between the “respectable” African on the one hand, and the 
“irresponsible” African – i.e., the “communist,” etc. - on the other hand, would prove to 
be resilient as their fear of communism in their West African colonies would not go 
away.  The difference with the shift in their discourse of the respectable and the 
irresponsible African at this time was in regard to who would now be invested with the 
title of the respectable African and who would remain in the category of the 
irresponsible/communist.  The policy of appeasement of critics of colonial administration 
would be applied, in the twists and turns of events subsequent to the conjuncture of 1948 
in the Gold Coast, to those African critics of colonial administration who by the turn of 
the 50s were also making the necessary ideological shift to present themselves as 
“partners worth working with!” 
The rethinking among officialdom would, however, first involve a redefinition of 
the progressive and responsible Africans to include those seeking for political 
representation and devolution of power through the institutions by which they were 
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governed.  These were mostly western educated Africans who, till now, the colonial 
government had largely shown quite a distaste for in preference for the chiefs who in 
reality were becoming more and more ineffective in governance and in containing the 
crises of empire.  The colonial power, had, till then, continued to prefer and respect the 
chiefs even with the awareness of the chiefs’ increasing ineffectiveness as working 
partners since the era of the “second colonial occupation” in the 30s, when British 
officialdom was trying to reinvent empire.575  This preference for the chiefs was over the 
more vocal Western- educated Africans who were clamoring for representative 
government in the colonies.  British officialdom had, however, continued to only seek 
reform of the base of government in ways that still gave important power to the chiefs.576  
 The 1948 Gold Coast crisis once again demonstrated to colonial officials that 
chiefly rule as constituted was ineffective and the Watson’s Commission had buttressed 
this fact.  The difficulty for colonial officials also lay importantly in the fact that no other 
group of colonials had been co-opted to work with them for as long as they did with the 
chiefs in the administration of the colony.577  This would become most glaring as they 
prepared to hurriedly hand over power in the mid-50s578 to many of these western-
educated African politicians that officialdom was now reconstituting as “moderates.”  
Part of the indictment of the Watson’s Commission on the Gold Coast administration had 
also included the fact that “the 1946 Constitution did nothing to decentralize the 
machinery of government,” and that “only in Native Administration, residing largely in a 
hierarchy of vested interest jealously guarded by Chiefs and Elders, was the African 
provided with an approach to political expression.”579  It also stated that “there has in the 
past, been a lack of coordination in the planning of Gold Coast development.”580  The 
report of the Commission had further come down hard on the chiefs and the place left for 
traditional interests and regarded the chiefs as being part of the problem of the 1948 
crises that must now be confronted in the Gold Coast.581  The vocal Western-educated 
elements continued to protest against the shortcomings of the 1946 Constitution and to 
make demands for more effective representation in the colonies’ governing institutions.  
In the 1948 Gold Coast disturbances, these vocal Africans in that colony who also 
comprised the leadership of the UGCC, promoted the agitation for responsible self-
government.582   
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The colonial government had all along been opposed to such clamorings and 
perceived politically radical discourse of the nation by Western-educated Africans here in 
the Gold Coast and in the other West African colonies.  The distinction would now be 
made between the discourse of the nation in politically radical terms and the discourse of 
the nation in socially radical terms.  Officialdom’s somewhat adversarial position towards 
these Western-educated Africans would now begin to shift.  Cooper had previously noted 
in 1947, in regard to these Western-educated Africans in Nigeria, the “official opposition 
to government propaganda by a large number of educated young men who,” in his 
opinion, “in this country as elsewhere else, are bound to be the main driving force behind 
political movements of the future.” 583  He had expressed his opinion that this group 
should be co-opted rather than opposed.  He further commented: 
It seems to me the worst kind of wishful thinking to pretend 
that we can batter this group into dispersal or dissolve the 
ardent nationalism which it represents.  I have proceeded 
from the start on the assumption that the growth of 
nationalism in Nigeria is inevitable and natural, and that 
our aim must be, not to damn the flood but to divert it into 
useful channels.584 
 
H. Cooper’s writings in 1947 provide a window into the understanding of the 
subsequent shift in official discourse and position and the distinction that colonial 
officials would now be making in their categorization of the “progressive” and 
“responsible” Africans, as opposed to the “irresponsible” and “extremist/communist” 
Africans.585   In his letter of October 13, 1947 to Mr. K. W. Blackburne in which he 
further advised on how to deal with the “malleable fringe” in colonial society, Cooper 
had advanced a distinction between the “hard core of opposition” as the extremist 
factions, and in whose rank Azikiwe was still included at this time, and the “malleable 
fringe,” the “honest and eager young nationalists,” as the progressives.586  He wrote, and I 
quote at length: 
My estimate of the situation here is rightly as follows.  
There is a hard core of opposition which we should 
probably be wise to regard as irreconcilable.  But that core 
derives its influence and importance from the fringe of still 
malleable material which surrounds it – that is, from the 
honest and eager young nationalists who genuinely believe 
that the leadership of  Zik and his lieutenants is the best 
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available and whose imagination has been caught by the 
slogans of the NCNC.  Hammer blows against the core will 
only bruise and embitter the fringe.  The best hope lies in 
providing, on our side, imaginative leadership which will 
compete with that of Zik and which can, I soberly believe, 
draw a great deal of the fringe away from its present 
confused allegiance to the extremist factions.587 
Although Cooper’s own statements reflect some elements of official bias and labeling, as 
well as a negative view of Azikiwe at this time, his more enlightening outlook and 
solution to the “problem of Zik” and others involved making the system more responsive 
by genuinely identifying and cooperating with those perceived as “progressive” Africans.  
He advanced a fine distinction among Africans between those he perceived, including 
government’s critics, as seeking for change and representative government in the colonies 
and who would be ready to work constructively with the colonial government to achieve 
these ends, and those he perceived to be intransigent and extremist and believed by him 
to remain as clogs in the wheel of progress.  This fine distinction differed from hitherto 
official position in that included in Cooper’s category of responsible Africans are those 
he termed as the progressives.  These were seeking for self-government, for example, but 
who Cooper perceived were willing to do so by working with the government for gradual 
change through constitutional means and not through extra-institutional means.  Till now, 
official predisposition had been to collapse all of them into the category of the 
“irresponsible.”  In other words, the “responsible” Africans were now also the 
“progressives,” extracted from among the ranks of those seeking for change and 
representative government, including self-government, and who were perceived to be 
able to cooperate with colonial officials to stabilize empire at this time in the realization 
of perceived mutual goals.  The distinction, nevertheless, still left a variety of other 
socially relevant interventions in the category of the “irresponsible” and “communist,” 
etc.  As of the end of the 1940s, Nkrumah’s and Azikiwe’s kind of social intervention, 
along with those of grassroot–oriented colonial activists, etc., were still perceived by 
colonial officials in the light of the latter, i.e., as “irresponsible” and “communist.” 
Cooper’s thinking, the idea of regarding critics of colonial administration in 
functional terms and to include from among their ranks those with whom they could work 
to realize mutual goals, began to be echoed in the discourses and pronouncements of 
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officials higher up the hierarchy of power and to enter mainstream colonial official 
discourse consequent to the crises of 1948 in the Gold Coast.  In the flurry of 
communication between the Secretary of State, Arthur Creech-Jones, and Governor 
Gerald Creasy on the occasion of the outbreak of the Gold Coast crises in February 1948, 
Creech-Jones had advised Creasy: “it is of paramount importance that you carry 
responsible African opinion with you, and that it should wherever possible be consulted 
and associated with your actions.”588 
The “responsible” Africans, now synonymous in mainstream official discourse 
with the ‘progressive’ Africans, are those that officials would now need to seriously 
consult and associate their actions with in the new scheme of things in order to provide 
the desired stability – and the new legitimacy.  These would be mostly from the ranks of 
the younger, mostly Western-educated Africans with whom they must deal more 
sensitively and more rationally in order to gain and sustain their support.  Officialdom 
would begin to patronize these Western-educated Africans who began to receive 
invitations to tea or cocktails and other social events from the District Officers.  Into the 
newly created ranks of the “responsibles” would be included in more meaningful ways 
the “constitutional gradualists,” i.e., the “moderates,” such as Danquah and the UGCC in 
the Gold Coast.  The colonial government, previously opposed to any discourse or clamor 
for self-government even as late as in the 1948 Gold Coast crises, was now realizing the 
value of the distinction between those perceived to want it immediately and by any means 
and those who wanted it but were perceived as willing to let it evolve gradually and 
constitutionally.  The Watson’s Commission had also helped to advance this distinction 
by noting that they “have heard at some length the advanced claims of those who press 
for change overnight” and “have been careful not to neglect more moderate and 
conservative opinion.”589  The Colonial Office was now ready to work with the latter.  
Included in the ranks of the latter was now the UGCC, at this time now freed of 
Nkrumah’s presence and influence. 
Previously, Danquah and his UGCC had been indicted along with Nkrumah and 
others by the Watson’s Commission of Enquiry for their involvement in the 1948 crisis 
and in the demonstrators’ agitation for self-government.590  However, the distinction 
between Danquah and the more militant advocates of representative government and self- 
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government that Nkrumah represented then, a distinction which had been inherent all 
along, would now begin to be appreciated by the colonial authorities.  Engwenyu had 
commented that both Danquah and Nkrumah manipulated the riots of 1948 in almost 
opposite directions.591  He remarked that “while Nkrumah capitalized on the events to 
build the C.P.P., Danquah used the experience as a plea for constitutional gradualism.”592  
Danquah would subsequently assert in April, 1948 that total independence for the Gold 
Coast was illegal, and expressed his belief and his party’s, the UGCC, position to the 
effect that: 
Complete self-government or independence was not the 
policy of the Convention … It is not even desirable in a 
British Colony.  I do not know whether it is even lawful for 
people to ask for complete independence at once.  I do not 
think it is permitted.  So that we being constitutionally 
established body would not advise our followers or our 
leaders to ask for complete independence …593 
 
There is no doubt that Danquah and the UGCC had capitalized on the 1948 crises to 
expand UGCC’s membership which they actively pursued during this period and which 
Danquah did not deny to the Watson’s Commission when it was brought up  
there.  His strong position statement above could also be interpreted as geared towards 
distancing as well as differentiating himself and the UGCC from Nkrumah with whom 
there was now an actual falling apart, party-wise and political style-wise. 
In regard to the aftermath of the crises and its impact on officialdom, the 
distinction was now being made, as stated above, between those like Danquah, now 
perceived as the “moderates,” “gradualists,” and the “responsibles,” as partners in 
progress,594 as against the “hard core of opposition,” the “irreconcilable,” “irresponsible,” 
“extremist,” and the “communist.”  The Secretary of State, while indicating the need to 
continue to be alive to the “danger of communist activities and the necessity of helping 
the public to a clear appreciation of the danger as well as method employed,” had also 
cautioned Governor Creasy that: 
At the same time [we] must do this in such a way that [we] 
do not alienate from [your] Government the sympathy and 
goodwill of responsible and educated elements both here 
and in Africa who may fear that this factor in the 
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disturbances may be used so as to obscure or belittle other 
reasons for the outbreak …595 
 
The line of distinction was beginning to be drawn to set apart the “responsible” Africans 
who officials may pander to, from the “irresponsibles” and “extremists,” etc., who 
officials would continue to oppose, carefully watch, and undermine.596  In the ironic 
twists and turns of events, the distinction between the responsible and irresponsible 
African would be subject to new understanding and revision in terms of those who 
composed these.  Hitherto officially labeled “extremists” and “communists,” like 
Azikiwe and Nkrumah, who were still locked into this official categorization at this time, 
would subsequently be welcomed into the ranks of the “responsible” as they also began 
to make the shift towards the center and/or right of center!  This development is explored 
in later sections below. 
The willingness of the Colonial Office to objectively evaluate what may be the 
reasons for the 1948 crises and to find solutions, as enunciated by the Secretary of State, 
as well as the fine distinction being made in relation to African critics of colonial 
administration at this time is indicative of mainstream British officialdom’s opening up – 
albeit strategic – and which allowed for a reconfiguration of the category of Africans to 
co-opt into the administration of the colony in this period.  By the end of 1948, the search 
for the responsible Africans, the Interlocuteurs Valables - the “partners worth working 
with” - had begun. 
In the aftermath of the 1948 Gold Coast crises, the British colonial government  
was ready to make government more responsive by confronting the issue of broadening 
the base of governance.  The Secretary of State, in his 18th March, 1948 memo to Creasy 
in response to the crisis, had expressed the hope that the Gold Coast Government would 
be “considering possible means of securing more effective representation of the actual 
working populations and at the same time more effective contact with them.”597  The 
subsequent Watson’s Commission of Inquiry that was set up afterwards to investigate the 
causes of the disturbances also drove home the need for more radical598 and quick 
changes.  The Commission advised on the need to pacify colonial subjects' demand for 
representation, fuelled by what was then beginning to be heard in some quarters as the 
demand for independence.  The Commission reported: 
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We are satisfied that in the conditions existing to-day in the 
Gold Coast a substantial measure of constitutional reform is 
necessary to meet the legitimate aspirations of the 
indigenous population599 
 
There is no doubt as to the centrality of the 1948 Gold Coast crisis in the changes 
that followed in the Gold Coast and in the rest of the British West African colonies 
subsequently.  It set into motion a dynamic that this study regards as critical in what 
ended as precipitous decolonization in these colonies – the end result of unintended 
consequences.  The 1948 Gold Coast crises quickened the pace of constitutional changes 
in the colonies.   Mr. Griffiths, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, who, trying to find 
an explanation for the 1948 Gold Crisis as late as 1951 and still regarding it as a 
mystery,600 remarked in 1951 that “in any case, what was important about the riots were 
their consequences.”601  Though the constitutional changes that followed were meant as 
part response to this perceived growing political consciousness, aimed at providing more 
“effective representation” for Africans; they were also meant to help the colonial 
government retain control of, as well as the initiative in the colonies by creating and 
managing change.602   
The recommendations of the Watson’s Commission and of the subsequent 
Coussey Commission set into motion a review of the 1946 Burns Constitution in the Gold 
Coast.   The 1946 Burns Constitution was not planned for a review till much later, but the 
crisis, and the reports of the Watson’s Commission and Coussey Commission that 
followed, it shortened the timetable.   Because of the quickening pace of political and 
constitutional changes in the Gold Coast, the process of review of the 1946 Richards 
Constitution was also begun in Nigeria in 1948,603 with Provisional Conferences held in 
Lagos and Onitsha, followed in 1950 by a General Conference held in Ibadan for the 
review of the constitution by representatives of the whole country. 604  Governor 
Macpherson who was of the opinion that he was already in control of the process of 
constitutional review in that colony,605 nevertheless had to admit, in view of the rapid 
pace of change going on in the Gold Coast, that they “may have to alter our timetable for 
revision of the Constitution.”606  A quick revision of the 1946 Constitution in Nigeria was 
set into motion thereafter.  
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The significance of the Gold Coast and the centrality of developments and 
changes there for the rest of British West Africa is also indicated in the Secretary of 
State’s letter to Professor Sir W. Halliday, King’s College, London, during the Colonial 
Office’s search earlier on for a “fitting” Chairman of the then proposed Commission of 
Enquiry into the 1948 Gold Coast disturbances.607  He wrote:  
I regard the enquiry as being one of first-class political 
importance.   In the Gold Coast very likely lies the key to 
our future success in relations between this country and 
West Africa and recent events have demonstrated a state of 
affairs there which certainly requires urgent 
investigation.608  
 
A new constitution was granted to the Gold Coast in 1950, Nigeria in 1951, and Sierra 
Leone in 1951.  Alfred Alcock, looking back later in 1975 and with the benefit of 
hindsight, referring to the recommendations of the Watson’s Commission of Enquiry, 
considered the 1948 Gold Crisis as the immediate precipitant towards decolonization.609 
The Commission had made some wide-ranging recommendations for constitutional 
changes which were adopted.  Although Alcock was right in pointing to the significance 
of the 1948 crises in the Gold Coast in regard to the changes that followed, these changes 
did not, however, automatically “begin the movement towards Independence,” as he 
commented.  The process that ended in the relinquishing of empire by the British was 
facilitated by these changes but the end of empire itself was an unintended result that 
occurred in the twists and turns of events that followed and of which the 1948 crisis was 
a catalyst. 
In spite of the promised changes and openings through the grant of new 
constitutions, or perhaps because of them, the crisis in colonial society, especially in the 
Gold Coast and Nigeria, would continue.  Old crises continued in new dimensions in 
various localities and between different colonial social forces as competition among 
Africans increased in the light of perceived promises of the new constitutions as much as 
because of their limits.610  Tension and crises increased also in the efforts of socially 
radical Africans to realize their vision of desired grassroot change in colonial society, 
including among some, the immediate grant of self-government - through both 
institutional and extra-institutional means.611  Whatever the perceived democratic 
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promise of the changes, these were felt by the radicals to be inadequate or circumscribed.  
Some of the social radicals were seeking for social change, as opposed to mere political 
change, as well as for the grant of immediate self-government.612   
 
Searching for the Interlocuteurs Valables: the Partners Worth Working With   
 
The continued crises in colonial society and British colonial officials’ felt inability to stop 
them, coupled with the perceived implication of these crises in regard to feared Soviet 
influence in the colonies and against the crises in other parts of British empire furthered 
official reckoning on empire and their repositioning.613  In West Africa, the 1948 crisis in 
the Gold Coast had underscored this beginning new reckoning and shift, as indicated 
above.  It also underscored the need for a more sustainable shift from their old “partners 
in progress” - the colonial chiefs614 - to new African players.  However, the British 
colonial authorities’ search for responsible Africans that would help them manage empire 
at this time did not take them too far initially in the Gold Coast where this shift began.   
The intelligentsia and chiefs in the UGCC, also self-baptized as “responsible 
Africans,” had presented themselves as partners worth working with in the immediate 
aftermath of the 1948 Gold Coast crises.  They had shown their support for the 
government and for the state of emergency that was declared afterwards.  Danquah also 
appealed for constitutional gradualism in the aftermath of the crises, in contrast to the 
CPP from among whose ranks the clamor for “self-government now” continued.615  In the 
aftermath of another crisis situation in the Gold Coast in January, 1950 involving the 
General Strike by the Gold Coast Trade Union Congress and the Positive Action by the 
CPP, the “constitutional gradualists” - the UGCC chiefs and intelligentsia - came down 
hard again on the CPP and the workers and on behalf of the government and the 
propertied class.  I. K. Agyeman, in defense of property, asserted that lives and property 
were more important to safeguard than the demand for self-government, adding  
that “‘no responsible African’ had as yet asked for self-government.”616  The “responsible 
Africans” were also self-esteemed “men of property,” the self-described “progressive and 
saner groups” and the “sheep,” as opposed to the “wolf,”617 the latter terminology helping 
to add to official vocabulary of those that officials did not like! 
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But the government could no longer afford to do business as usual, especially 
with the chiefs.  By the end of the decade and beginning of the 50s the British colonial 
authorities could no longer deny the fact that chiefly rule as had been constituted and 
reformed had failed and that new players were needed to help sustain empire.  This was 
made glaring, for instance, in the crises of change in some parts of the Western provinces 
of Nigeria in 1949 and in the failure of the colonial chiefs and of colonial officials 
themselves to resolve the conflicts.  Rather, the crises were abated by the intervention of 
new would-be political power incumbents in this region - the younger and western-
educated men who composed the leadership of the Egbe Omo Oduduwa, an ostensibly 
Yoruba cultural organization, led by Obafemi Awolowo.  Colonial officials were indeed 
quite impressed with the way the crises there were resolved by Awolowo and his team. 618  
As the crises in their West African colonies deepened, officialdom found itself more and 
more in need of such new African “managers” to help them manage the crises of change 
and to contain the “rabid crowd.”  Colonial officials were, by the turn of the 50s, 
particularly worried about labor in the Gold Coast, especially the activities of perceived 
labor radicals there, as well as of the spread of radical activities and movements in their 
other West African colonies.619  
 In the Gold Coast, officials had released Nkrumah, the leader of the CPP, from 
prison on 12th February, 1951 to the CPP which had, surprisingly to officials, won a 
majority of the votes in the February, 1951 first general election following the ratification 
of the new constitution in the Gold Coast.  Nkrumah and other members of the CPP 
leadership were then serving terms in prison for their alleged involvement in the January 
1950 campaign of Positive Action.  Colonial officials had, however, initially been put in 
a dilemma, doubtful of Nkrumah’s ability to work with them if allowed to share power in 
the new administration.620  On the other hand, they were also afraid of the consequences 
of not releasing him from prison to take office, given the popular support he had among 
the CPP constituent members.  In the end, the Governor of the Gold Coast, Arden-Clarke, 
who had replaced Gerald Creasy in August 1949, reluctantly agreed to release Nkrumah 
from prison to take office although he tried to make it seem, in his public statement, as if 
it were an act of grace and not the result of public pressure, which it was.  He did so by 
sabotaging the efforts of the CPP Executive Committee who had approached him to 
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release Nkrumah by releasing him ahead of his scheduled meeting with them and thus 
taking the credit for his release.621  He later gleefully remarked to A. B. Cohen that “this 
took the wind out of their sails and enabled me to claim that the release of these men was 
an act of grace and a gesture of goodwill.”622  Lamenting on his need to release Nkrumah 
and some of his imprisoned colleagues, he however privately confided to A. B. Cohen 
that “the decision, however unpalatable, was in fact inevitable.”623  The Governor, 
expressing the fear of potential mass disturbances should he not release Nkrumah and 
others from prison to serve as their party’s elected members in the House of Assembly, 
wrote: “To have refused to release them would have undoubtedly led to a head-on 
collision and would have received little or no support from the U. K. press or 
Parliament.”624  Here, as officials had perceived Nkrumah all along, was the 
personification of the colonial who they had loathed to have any influence in the affairs 
of the colony.  This is especially so in the light of how they would like to now remake it, 
as opposed to how they perceived Nkrumah and others like him were seeking to reorder 
it.  But here also was one who had proved to have popular support and perceived to have 
the potentials to hold the fabric of Gold Coast society together, if his political will could 
be exercised in that direction.  Officials obliged and hoped they had made the right 
decision - what appeared to be the only right choice for them in the circumstance.  And 
they would not be disappointed! 
As Governor Arden-Clarke watched Nkrumah become elected by the Executive 
Council as Leader of Government Business in the House of Assembly and perceived 
Nkrumah’s beginning cooperation with him in the Council and in the distribution of 
portfolios to the newly-elected ministers, he remarked: “I found Nkrumah very 
reasonable and cooperative.”625  He was taking good note of him as someone they might 
be able to work with, after all.  He had initially expressed some doubt about such 
possibility, noting: 
I do not yet know what to make of Nkrumah.  My first 
impressions, for what they are worth, are that he is an 
idealist, ready to live up to his ideals, but I have yet to learn 
what those ideals really are.626 
 
But, noting Nkrumah’s strengths, he went on: 
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He has … considerable personal charm.  He is slow to 
laugh as he is quick to grasp the political implications of 
anything discussed …  He has proved he can give 
inspiration …  A skilful politician, he has, I think, the 
makings of a real statesman and this he may become if he 
has the strength to resist the bad counsels of the scallywags 
by whom he is surrounded.627 
 
It is colonials with such capacity and political will that they were beginning to observe 
and hoped for in Nkrumah that they needed and were looking for, shorn of any radical 
inclinations.  At this time, the distinction was being further made, on the one hand,  
between a would-be reformed “radical,” “extremist,” or “communist,” labels that had 
hitherto been applied to Nkrumah, and, on the other hand, the “scallywags,” the “die-hard 
radicals,” “extremists,” and “communists.”  The former were to be included in the ranks 
of colonials worth working with and the latter to be denounced and displaced.   
 
The Colonial not Worth Working With: Aminu Kano and British Officialdom  
 
Colonial officials had similarly hoped that such perceived self-reformation as they 
believed they were observing in Nkrumah would be the case with another colonial 
radical, Aminu Kano of Nigeria.  They had believed Aminu Kano was out to change the 
essential power structure in the North of Nigeria, the most conservative region of that 
country, and which the British would rather preserve in those essential ways.  Mr. Knotts, 
the British Chief Secretary to the Nigerian government, had told him earlier when he was 
invited to meet with him in Kaduna at the end of 1947: “You may be critical of us, but we 
really like men like you, who are ahead of your countrymen …we are ready to use your 
capacities ….”628  But they would be disappointed as Aminu Kano continued to prove too 
set on the path of socially radical reforms for the liking of British colonial authorities 
who remained apprehensive of his radicalizing idea of modernity which they believed he 
had brought with him from England.629  Aminu Kano’s discourse of community and 
notions of citizenship were perceived to be counter-hegemonic and too socially radical 
for British officialdom while officialdom would find certain shared commonalities 
between theirs and the African ethnopolitical entrepreneurs’ construction of the nation, 
constituted in rather socially conservative ways.  Officialdom would prefer that these 
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“extremists” leave alone “the decent simple peasants.”  Aminu Kano, however, remained  
uncompromising in his criticism of whatever injustices he perceived in state and society, 
challenged any authority, whether it be the emirs or the British colonial authority, saying 
“I hated government that sat on people.”630  
Aminu Kano tried to be more guarded with his politics of social change in the 
North on his return to Nigeria from England, however, while at the same time moving his 
radical ideas and agenda along.  He returned from England to continue teaching at the 
same school where he was teaching before he left, started the Northern Teacher’s 
Association (NTA), ostensibly as a professional organization but actually to become the 
basis of a political association later on.  He kept his Northern roots intact and he also tried 
to play the Native Authorities and the British colonial authorities against each other by 
exploiting their differences and inconsistencies to achieve his aim wherever possible!  
Thus, he got the Emir of his province Bauchi to agree to the proposal from him and other 
Bauchi radicals to address the townspeople in Bauchi in protest against the new 
Governor, John Macpherson’s, omission of Bauchi from his proposed tour of the North 
which was aimed at his getting to know the North on his assumption of office as 
Governor of Nigeria.631  By going to the emir instead of the Native Authority police for 
permission and by enlisting the support of the emir through pointing at the consequences 
for the development of Bauchi of its omission from the Governor’s Northern tour, he was 
able to organize what became the first rally in Northern Nigeria.  About a thousand 
people were assembled in the marketplace and were addressed by Aminu Kano and Sa’ad 
Zungur632 who passed resolutions urging the Governor to come to Bauchi to see things 
for himself.633  A letter to that effect was sent to the Resident of Bauchi to be forwarded 
to the Governor.  Feinstein recorded that there were reverberations throughout the North 
and that the British officials were shocked that such an unprecedented event could take 
place without warning and admonished them and the Emir of Bauchi on account of 
this.634  
Colonial officials kept a close watch on Aminu Kano’s organizing activities.  One 
of such means was through district officers like Captain C. D. Money, formerly senior 
district officer in Kano, who had been assigned to Kaduna Central headquarters for the 
North as a sort of roving political intelligence officer to observe and control 
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“questionable activities.”635  On his arrival in Zaria, he invited Aminu Kano who he had 
previously asked to spend a weekend at his home in Brighton while Aminu was in 
England, to lunch with him.  On Aminu’s arrival, he had greeted Aminu, ostensibly 
jokingly, with, “How is my friend Stalin, and how is the meeting of the Northern 
Nigerian Soviet progressing?”636 
The British colonial authorities were in a dilemma and did not know what to do 
with Aminu Kano for a long time as he was not amenable to their control.  The British 
administration’s attitude towards Aminu Kano was also influenced by their awareness 
that while he was studying in England he had made extensive connections at the Colonial 
Office and with persons of influence, including leftwing British MPs.637  They tried to 
chastise him, buy him off, and when all else failed, removed him from his immediate 
environment, all in attempts to slow him down and create a break to his radical activism 
and to the growth of political activism in the North.  Aminu Kano was moving too fast 
and too far for them!  Governor Macpherson, in reaction to Aminu Kano’s known sharp 
criticism of him and of the British government that he represented, had remarked to 
Aminu Kano during the surprise meeting638 with him in Kaduna at the end of 1948:  
You have indicated that you think we intentionally keep the 
North backward, and the North and South divided … that 
you want us to go so that your country may have 
independence.  You’re a man from an important Kano 
family, young and full of spirit, but you must realize that 
we don’t intentionally prevent changes and keep the 
country from progressing.639 
 
Mr. Knotts, following the Governor’s remarks and in similar vein, also told Aminu Kano 
that: 
You may be critical of us, but we really like men like you, 
who are ahead of your countrymen.  You have attacked our 
misuse of taxes, claiming we are milking Nigeria for 
Britain’s advantages; yet we are ready not only to show you 
how our funds are spent but to have you participate.640 
Mr. Knotts subsequently offered Aminu a choice of positions in the financial section of 
the government or the post of editor of the government’s Hausa-language newspaper in 
Zaria, both of which he turned down on the excuse that he was fully committed to 
continuing in his vocation as a teacher.  But he and Sa’adu and others with him in Bauchi 
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fully suspected the offer was an attempt to disperse the small group of radical activists in 
Bauchi.  British officialdom was, however, insistent on removing him from his 
environment and from his militant bed-fellows and thereafter offered him another 
position in January, 1949 as headmaster of a new teacher training college being built at 
Maru in Sokoto province.  Aminu did not feel he was in a position to turn down this 
offer, based on his excuse for turning down previous offers, and had to accept it.   
The British colonial administration could not have found a more remote place and 
apparently infertile ground for socially radical activism to send Aminu to than Sokoto, as 
Feinstein, his biographer remarked! Sokoto was the most conservative section of a very 
conservative North, the seat of Uthman Dan Fodio’s nineteenth century Islamic jihad, the 
citadel of Islamic traditional power and religious authority and of its symbol, the Sultan 
of Sokoto, to whom all cowered and bowed – except Aminu Kano as it would turn out!  
The British felt Aminu Kano would be isolated there but they were also ambivalent about 
this, apprehensive that Aminu Kano might also continue to thrive, politically, even in this 
“desert” place!  To counteract the possibility of this happening, they had showed the 
confidential reports they had on him to the Native Authorities and had asked them to 
keep a watchful eye on this “potential troublemaker.”641  The Native Authorities, in turn, 
rightly wondered why, if he was so disquieting a figure, they would choose to send him 
to their province!!642   
Having failed to win Aminu Kano over, officialdom would leave him frozen in 
their imperial anti-communist grid of the communist, the irresponsible, and the extremist.  
Nkrumah, on the other hand, began to enter into the ranks of the respectable in British 
officialdom’s categorization of the African at the turn of the 50s.  Nkrumah had begun at 
this time to show his capacity as a “moderate” and as able to work with colonial 
authorities in their remaking of the colonial state.  It was now the “scallywags” said to 
surround Nkrumah who remained as the “extremist” and the “bad” African!  In the ranks 
of the scallywags in the Gold Coast would be put the radical trade unionists, leftwing of 
CPP, and those seeking social change simultaneously with political change, including 
immediate self-government, etc.   These also conceived citizenship to involve full 
membership of society, denoting civic, political, and social rights.  In the Gold Coast, 
these included Pobee Biney, Anthony Woode, Turkson-Ocran, etc.  The disenchantment 
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of the colonial government would now be focused on these, former bed-fellows of 
Nkrumah, and other perceived doctrinaire social radicals in the other colonies.  Other 
erstwhile radicals who, like Nkrumah, had shifted to the ideological center and were now 
gaining power – and official respectability – were also distancing themselves from the 
“scallywags.”    
Notably, at a time when colonial authorities were looking for “responsible and 
educated elements” and “African opinion” to carry with them and to ‘be consulted and 
associated’ with their actions,643 hitherto officially labeled and denigraded “radicals” 
such as Nkrumah and Azikiwe were also making shifts towards the ideological center to 
show themselves credible as “partners worth working with,” as earlier noted.  At the 
beginning of the 50s and with further planned constitutional openings in the colonies, 
these African politicians interpreted the mood of the time to necessitate such shifts in 
order to take advantage of the openings and to consolidate political power.  Having begun 
to taste power and with a belief in the possibilities of achieving more power through 
further constitutional changes, they decided to stay the course of  “moderation” and 
accommodation as strategically dictated in this period.  Closer examination of these 
hitherto “radicals” such as Azikiwe and Nkrumah will reveal that they did not maintain a 
fixed position on the ideological spectrum but made shifts consistent with perceived long-
term goals. 
The following sections examine aspects of the shifts in the discourses and social 
and political practices of Azikiwe and Nkrumah and the trajectory of their political career 
at this juncture. 
  
The Partners Worth Working With  
 
 Nnamdi Azikiwe 
 
As the grant of new constitutions created openings and thus opportunity for political 
power and resources for would-be incumbents, Azikiwe’s discourses and practices  
began to shift more towards the ideological center.  His talk of the “nation” which had 
been more politically radical would begin to shift more towards the political center.  
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Azikiwe, or Zik as he was popularly referred to by both admirers and foes, including 
colonial officials, was a politician of many sides who shifted back and forth on the 
ideological spectrum as consistent with his perceived goal of winning power.  His 
“nation-talk” had been politically radical but was socially conservative, like Nkrumah’s 
as well, and unlike that of the Zikist left who tried to open up the space in his NCNC 
party for the discourse of the nation and of citizenship in socially radical ways.   
 Azikiwe showed the militant side of him in the 1930s and 1940s, as revealed in 
his political activism and discourses and sharp editorial comments in his newspapers, 
principally, the West African Pilot.644  As co-editor of the Morning Post645 with I. T. A. 
Wallace-Johnson in the Gold Coast in the 1930s, he revealed himself, with Wallace-
Johnson, as early as that period, as an outspoken critic of colonial administration and of 
colonial rule.646  Azikiwe took many militant stance against certain issues in the colonies 
in this period, his militancy declining from the end of the 40s and turn of the 50s as the 
prospect of gaining political power was becoming more feasible.   
The early Zik was associated with known social radicals in the British West 
African colonies such as I. T. A. Wallace-Johnson of Sierra Leone, Michael Imoudu647 
and Funlayo Ransome Kuti of Nigeria, and Kobina Sekyi of the Gold Coast whose 
“radical ideas were after my own heart,” he reminisced about the latter in his later 
writings.648  He also moved with diasporic leftwing Blacks, including the one-time card-
carrying communist like George Padmore.649  In 1947, he toured the country with 
Imoudu and FRK, along with other leaders of the NCNC, in protest against the 
shortcomings of the 1946 Richards Constitution and was part of the NCNC delegation to 
the Colonial Secretary in London later in August 1947 to protest against this 
constitution.650  His NCNC presidential address as successor to Herbert Macauley on 
May 7, 1947 titled, “Before Us Lies the Open Grave,” was like a “call to arms.”  He 
proclaimed: 
I want you to make it plain to me that you are ready for the 
type of militant leadership I envisage – a leadership that 
will not accept the crumbs of imperialism in order to 
compromise issues … Today, I might be with you, but that 
is no guarantee that I would not be prepared to suffer heavy 
blows from the enemy; you must be prepared to make 
sacrifices in order to guarantee for Nigeria a nobler heritage 
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… as from today, under my leadership, you must be 
prepared for the worst. 651 
 
It was this perceived militant side of Azikiwe that the equally radical members of 
the NCNC were responding to in creating the Zikist movement in 1946.652  However, 
although Azikiwe had gained considerable exposure to radical literature and movements, 
including communism, when he was a student in the U. S., had attended meetings of the 
Council of Peoples Against Imperialism in London in 1949,653 and would at times apply 
communist leftwing rhetorics in his political discourses and newspaper articles, he was in 
essence a pragmatist and non-doctrinaire and not a communist.  This is irrespective of 
British colonial authorities’ opinion of him for a long time as an ‘extremist,’ a label that 
in official parlance was also readily equated with the category of the agitator and/or 
communist and into which they cast many critics of colonial government!   
It was such a person that Major Hanns Vischer, formerly Director of Education in 
the Northern Provinces of Nigeria, was expecting to see when Azikiwe met with him at 
the Colonial Office on one of his visits to England in October, 1934.  Azikiwe recorded 
in his autobiography how Vischer was surprised to see a different person than who he had 
come to believe Azikiwe was.  Azikiwe, recalling this visit, said that Vischer: 
Confessed that I was not the type of fellow he had expected 
to meet; he did not appreciate that I was loyal to the British 
Empire.  I humorously remarked: “You must have thought 
that I was a ‘Bolshie!’”654  
 
Azikiwe’s combined non-doctrinaire radical stance and pragmatism was revealed 
quite early on, for example, in the conversation he had with George Padmore, a diasporic 
Black and one-time communist member.  He said Padmore sought to enlist him in the 
plan to start a revolutionary organization for the liberation of Africa, “similar to the 
Kuomintang Party” in the communist tradition, but, according to him, he resisted the 
attempt.655  Their contrasting views on the idea of social change is telling of Azikiwe’s 
more guarded politics of social change.  He warned Padmore of the futility of the attempt 
at such a revolutionary movement in a society such as his and advocated an “intellectual 
revolution” instead.656  Although it is not clear what he meant by his own idea of 
intellectual revolution, it certainly was not going to be achieved, in his mind, by turning 
colonial society upside down!  His philosophy, to the extent that one could be discerned, 
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was eclectic at best, typical of many colonial radicals.  In a letter he wrote to Herbert 
Macauley, the then President of the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) based 
in Lagos, in preparation for his return to Nigeria later in 1934, he stated: 
I respect the King  … I am returning not to stir my people 
blindly to mutiny, nor do I wish to inject in them the 
proletarian philosophy of Marxism …  Nevertheless I am 
returning semi-Ghandic, semi-Garveyistic, non-
chauvinistic, semi-ethnocentric …657 
 
Though his attempt to self-describe his philosophical viewpoint thus is also not  
altogether clear, it is clear that he was not leftwing.  Azikiwe was ready to use any 
political resource, communist or not, to advantage if he felt able to do so without being 
compromised as was his use of two Canadians with communist leanings.658  As recorded 
in his interview in London with Scorey, the former editor of Malta Bulletin who was then 
a freelance journalist, he made arrangements during his visit to Canada with two young 
Canadian journalists to join him in Nigeria to help consolidate his political journalism.659  
The report went on to say that Azikiwe did not deny that these two Canadians may be 
communists, and that for him, that was the sort of practical assistance he believed 
communists could and did offer ‘oppressed Peoples.’660 
The pragmatic side of Azikiwe became more pronounced in the later Azikiwe, 
towards the close of the 40s and early 50s, consonant with the realities of the time and in 
the light of the openings and envisaged possibilities in the new constitutions for acquiring 
political power.  For example, although Azikiwe was initially opposed to the regionalist 
framework in the 1946 Richards Constitution and actively organized against it, including 
his participation in the protest delegation to London in 1947 against this and other 
features of that constitution, he would change his position later to agree to work with it.  
Emergent political competition between him, as leader of the NCNC, and Awolowo, as 
leader of the Egbe Omo Oduduwa (i.e., society of descendants of the progenitor, 
Oduduwa), and later, the Action Group (AG) party in 1950, dictated, for example, 
acceptance of the regionalist framework.  His would-be political rivals, in particular 
Awolowo and the Yoruba professional and commercial class that made up the leadership 
of the Egbe and the AG later, were already beginning to be strengthened by their position 
on regionalism as enunciated in their ideology of Yoruba cultural nationalism, i.e., the 
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unity of the Yoruba nationalities as precursor to the unity of the Nigerian nation.  They 
were also beginning to undermine the strong and unrivalled hold of the NCNC in Lagos 
and in Southern Nigeria’s politics by drawing the Yorubas away from it.  Moreover, the 
British were also in support of federalism as the basis of Nigerian unity.  By the time the 
1946 Richard’s Constitution was being reviewed in 1949/50, Azikiwe had begun to 
cooperate and to get into agreement with the basic principle of regionalism.  This was 
despite the insistence of significant members of the NCNC, in particular the radical wing 
of the party, on a unicameral framework for the country, a principle on which the NCNC 
had been founded and which Azikiwe himself had till then defended vigorously.  Azikiwe 
had before then also regarded political parties as sects and had accused Bode Thomas, a 
lawyer and budding political star of the Egbe/AG, of Pakistanism.661  His acceptance of 
the principle of regionalism made practical sense but it meant, in the context of the 
politics of regionalism as practiced by these ethnopolitical entrepreneurs, the making of  
categories of “ethnicity,” “nation,” etc., in mutually-exclusive and narrower terms.   
Azikiwe’s capacity as a political maverick, or what one observer in the Colonial 
Office, Mr. R. E. Webb, head of the Commonwealth Section of the British Information 
Service, rightly referred to as his Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde personality,662 stood him well 
in his political career and in his quest for political power.  This personal trait was clearly 
revealed earlier during the 1945 General Strike that rocked the seat of government in 
Nigeria.  Azikiwe, the fiery journalist and newspaper owner who would become the 
leader of the most dominant political movement in Nigeria in the 40s - the NCNC - 
revealed his capacity to simultaneously travel both ends of the ideological spectrum for 
political survival!  He needed the masses as much as he needed colonial officials’ 
recognition of him as having the credentials of a leader to help stabilize – or to destabilize 
- colonial society.  In this strike to which officials were opposed, Azikiwe had tried to 
present double images of himself.  Even though the strike was ostensibly backed by 
Azikiwe and his newspaper had been instrumental in helping to present workers’ causes 
by publicizing their grievances,663 he tried to show himself to colonial officials as being 
outside the fray.  Conversely, he tried to sustain an image among the striking workers of 
someone sympathetic to their cause.  He strove to reconcile these contrasting modes and 
images of himself to his political advantage.  With the workers, Azikiwe sought to be 
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seen as a radical and as outrightly anti-status quo.  In this connection, he propagated the 
story that colonial officials were out to assassinate him for his alleged involvement in this 
1945 General Strike.664  That was also his excuse for running away from the turbulent 
scene to his hometown of Onitsha in the Eastern Provinces of Nigeria.  His actual 
involvement, however, was not direct and officials knew this well enough.665  It was also 
what Azikiwe wanted officials to understand and he appeared to have succeeded in this 
political engineering because official response to his assassination story was that he had 
nothing to fear but the shadows of his own self, 666 while the workers venerated him.  The 
Governor of Nigeria at the time, Sir Arthur Richards, commenting later on the 
assassination story, remarked that it was an invention, had no foundation whatsoever, and 
was mere propaganda ploy by Azikiwe “designed to enhance his position as the 
representative of the people and the man who wished to bring them freedom.”667   
Azikiwe would do the same with the radical wing of his party, the NCNC, and 
with the Zikists,668 when he felt they had become a political baggage to him.  He would 
identify with the movement for political gains and denounce it out of political 
convenience at the point he perceived their radical and somewhat doctrinaire stance to be 
embarrassing and costly to his goal of gaining power.  Azikiwe was equivocal about the 
Zikists many times, acknowledging them tentatively as strategically convenient for him.  
While Azikiwe, in his principal organ, the West African Pilot (WAP) newspaper, would 
defend the right of the Zikist Movement to pursue its own policy, he would also criticize 
the policy severely and disassociate the NCNC from the Zikist activities, disavowing the 
militant youth at critical moments.  In April 1949, at the Second Annual Convention of 
the NCNC, Azikiwe critically observed the conduct of the Zikists in October 1948.  He 
denounced them and removed them from holding any positions in the executive of the 
NCNC party.669  Azikiwe’s action and statement were, no doubt, deeply resented by the 
imprisoned Zikist prisoners and their supporters.  The Zikist-controlled newspaper, the 
African Echo, in turn criticized Azikiwe for having dismissed the militant youths.  On 
May 13th, 1950, the NCNC pledged itself to restore the identity of the banned Zikist 
Movement and to reinstate the banned executive members.  But the leaders were again 
expelled from the NCNC subsequently. 670    
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Azikiwe’s equivocal671  stand and conflicting dealings with the Zikists dramatizes 
his political maverick and what made him successful as a politician.  Although he was 
opposed to the turn towards social radicalism towards the close of the 40s and beginning 
of the 50s, spearheaded by the leftwing-oriented labor radicals who had taken over the 
leadership of the Zikist movement, when asked about his relationship with the Zikists he 
affirmed them, and would admit, “I am in complete sympathy with the movement and I 
am proud that my name was considered fit and proper for such veneration.”672  At a later 
time in 1950 when it was politically necessary to do so, he denied them publicly.  When 
challenged in an article in the Daily Times after the Zikist Movement had been outlawed 
by the colonial administration673 to “declare publicly [his] relationship with the Zikist 
Movement, which the governor in the Executive Council recently declared an ‘unlawful 
society,’”674 Azikiwe declared that his nickname (Zik) had been used without his 
knowledge or consent by the recently outlawed Zikist Movement.675  He vigorously 
denied reports that he himself had been a founder member of the movement or that he 
had been a supporter.  This was half truth, in that though the movement was the 
brainchild of Nwafor Orizu and other Ibo enthusiasts within the NCNC, Azikiwe was 
aware of the plan to create it and was gratified by, and in support of the movement.676  
That was before he started shifting towards the ideological center and to distance himself 
from the Zikists while the radical Zikists were moving more towards left of center.  
“Such insinuations are unnecessary provocation, false, and without foundation,”677 he 
said.  He further went on to comment that: 
As to the methods adopted by the Movement to achieve its 
ideals, we must concede that any organization is entitled to 
any means it considers expedient to attain its goal so long 
as it is condoned by the verdict of history.678 
 
Thus, while Azikiwe dissociated himself from the Zikist Movement on the one 
hand, he affirmed them again, on the other hand, by validating their radical methods but 
from a position of distance from them!  Azikiwe needed at least to retain some 
connection with the Zikists in case he needed them even at that point of his career to push 
the system to the left, should it become necessary, in order to advance his goal of 
acquiring political power!  The view of Mr. R. E. Webb of the British Information 
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Service in the U. S. in regard to the relations between the Zikist Movement and Azikiwe 
was quite apt when he commented that:  
It is anybody’s guess what Zik’s real attitude to the Zikist 
Movement is but we are inclined to the view that he is 
prepared to make use of them whenever necessary and will 
certainly never formally dissociate himself from their 
activities.679  
 
Azikiwe was ready to use the uproar of militant activism which uneased colonial 
officials to his advantage by his double positioning, or equivocal stand, with a foot in 
both worlds: as one with the understanding and power of control over the radicals and yet 
not one of them.  He rightly presented himself as someone who understood the nuances 
of politics, including the efficacy of radical politics, and who had the skills to radicalize 
his considerable constituency and/or tame it, as may be necessary for political survival.  
In the era of rapid constitutional changes, he also sought to present himself at the same 
time as someone able and willing to work within official parameters to bring about 
change and to help establish order in his colony of Nigeria – as opposed to the perceived 
intransigency of the radicals and their idea of change.   
Elaborating on his assessment of Azikiwe’s Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde personality, 
Mr. R. E. Webb recorded his impression of Azikiwe on meeting him during Azikiwe’s 
visit to his station in the U. S. in 1950, thus:  
Dr. Azikiwe was perfectly charming, friendly, and 
reasonable throughout his visit and made the best possible 
impression on all who met him here.  He seemed quite at 
home talking to us and gave us no indication of his political 
inclinations nor of his motives in visiting the U. S. A. … 
He is a good conversationalist and no one seeing him in 
circumstances like those pertaining today would have 
imagined him as the politician he really is.  Perhaps in his 
assumption of this Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde personality lies 
a good deal of his power and his danger (emphasis 
mine).680 
 
Colonial officials had always been quite apprehensive of Azikiwe and remained 
unsure of his motives even when he later appeared to be moving into their rank of the 
respectable African.  Earlier, in August, 1947 they had expressed concern about 
Azikiwe’s  impending return to Nigeria from his unsuccessful visit with the Secretary of 
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State in what they perceived as “a soured frame of mind,” fearing the likelihood that he 
“may cause even more trouble in the future than he has done in the past.”681  A 
subsequent memo to another officer in the Colonial Office, Mr. Robinson, later in 
September, 1947 noted that Azikiwe had threatened civil disobedience and that his Press, 
since his interview with the Secretary of State, “has if anything become more abusive and 
violent than ever.”682  They have been particularly worried about Azikiwe’s perceived 
militant press.  Intense discussions were carried out in official circles as to how to cope 
with the problem of Zik’s press. 683  Memos were passed back and forth among officials 
in the Colonial Office as to how to go about this.684  Suggestions ranged from setting up 
private newspapers in West Africa, i.e., British-owned newspapers, as means of 
counteracting the effect of local, especially Zikist newspapers, introducing legislation to 
control the press,685 to setting up public relations apparatus to “counter 
misrepresentations” through propaganda themes,686 and to improving existing press, such 
as the recent setting up of a Nigerian Press Club with the Public Relations Officer as the 
moving spirit.687  It was further suggested, cynically, to “spoon feed” Nigerian 
newspapers “as they had been disposed to,” and “so make use of space which might 
otherwise be turned to mischievous ends.”688  
Even at the point that colonial officials felt that Azikiwe was beginning to tone 
down his rhetorics, they remained worried about him, perhaps in part because of his 
noted ambivalence which they believed also made him unpredictable.  Cooper’s letter to 
Blackburne in April, 1948 had happily noted that: 
The tone of the Zik Press had improved considerably and 
the “Pilot” and the “Comet” had been surprisingly quiet 
over the Gold Coast troubles – much quieter, for instance, 
than the “Daily Service.689 
 
Nevertheless, officialdom’s opinion of Azikiwe would remain guarded, understandably.  
Colonial officials would not readily shake off their perception of Azikiwe as a militant 
and their unease about him would linger on for much longer even when Azikiwe was 
well on his way towards cooperation with officialdom.690  The memo from Cooper to 
Blackburne on April 13, 1948 had noted that “the signs were all in favor of the 
assumption that Zik was veering towards more constitutional channels.”691  Cooper had 
also reasoned that the noted change in Azikiwe might be due to a genuine desire on Zik’s 
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part to give cooperation a trial.  Although Cooper thought this change might be due to 
Azikiwe’s embarrassment over the schism developed between him and his chief Yoruba 
supporters,692 the important point here is that Azikiwe was being observed to be shifting 
towards the path of “moderation.”  “The important thing,” Cooper  further went on, is 
that “we appeared to be moving at last into calmer waters and that there was a good 
chance of the new Governor meeting an atmosphere that would deserve to be called 
‘auspicious.”’693  However, he could not help but feel that Azikiwe could become a “clog 
in the wheel” of the administration at any time and that anything could trigger the 
“militant” in him!694   
Cooper’s observation was correct to the extent that Azikiwe, like Nkrumah, 
would be ready to radicalize his constituencies to push the hands of the colonial 
government should the door of opportunity to acquire political power be closed to him.  
But as colonial officials were positioning themselves to work with the “moderates” and to 
become more responsive to them than they had been in the past, Azikiwe was also set on 
the path of giving cooperation a chance, more so as his emerging political opponents 
were poised to enjoy the fruits of moderation and cooperation. 
Azikiwe’s beginning shift towards accommodation was not, however, so readily 
perceived or believed by the colonial authorities.  Officials would experience a sort of 
cognitive dissonance as they could not readily make the transition in their mind from 
what they had come to perceive Azikiwe to be to what they were now beginning to 
observe differently.695  Hence, later, when Azikiwe’s name was inadvertently omitted 
from the delegation to represent Nigeria at the London Constitutional Conference, 
Cooper expressed concern about the omission of Azikiwe’s name and was disappointed 
with his office at the fact that Azikiwe was excluded from this delegation.  He feared this 
could make Azikiwe sour against them.  Even in situations where the Colonial Office or 
colonial officials had nothing to do with Azikiwe’s exclusion, concern was felt at the 
implication of this.  In one such situation, Cooper lamented that it would be impossible to 
convince “Zik and his friends that government had nothing to do with the conspiracy.” 696  
Cooper went on to remark that, “having had the door of Legco more or less slammed in 
his face, he may well be on the point of deciding that the way of the extremists is now the 
only way open to him.”697   
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But Azikiwe did not go “the way of the extremists;” he chose instead to abandon 
“the extremists,” his “radical fringe,” time and time again, and to continue on the path of 
“moderation.”  Azikiwe was in the business of winning.  He would change his opposition 
on federalism (i.e., regionalism) to accept it as the basis for the future political 
development of Nigeria in the light of what would facilitate his goal of acquiring political 
power, as stated above.  Once he quickly realized that the federalist principle, i.e., the 
reservation of residual powers in the region, was there to stay, given the strong preference 
for it by the other regional parties and the strong backing it got from the British Colonial 
Power,698 he began to waffle on his position on it though his party, the NCNC, still held 
firmly to the unitary principle.   The 1951 Macpherson Constitution strengthened the 
federalist basis of future governing of the country and the 1954 Lyttelton Constitution 
would further entrench regional predominance and revenue allocation on regional basis.  
By the time the 1951 constitution was being reviewed, Azikiwe had already accepted the 
regionalist framework as opposed to the anti-regionalist, unitarian wing of his party 
which the social radicals in the party especially firmly held on to.  Regionalism as the 
basis for national unity was one of the cardinal principles of the Action Group (AG) 
party, created in 1950 from the main body of the Egbe and its leadership.  It was also on 
this principle that the AG was already gaining and consolidating political power in its 
own region in the West and continuing to lure Yoruba supporters of the NCNC away 
from the latter.  It served to strengthen Awolowo and the AG political party.  As the 1951 
constitutional proposals and actual constitution legitimized power in the region, and as 
the AG became the Western regional government party in 1952, many of the staunch 
Yoruba supporters of the NCNC began to change their allegiance and to carry with them 
considerable constituencies from the NCNC to the AG.699  Its strength there subsequently 
began to decline and the NCNC party became limited to only two main constituencies in 
the West - Ibadan and Ilesha - and to its own regional base - the Eastern Province.  
Azikiwe realized he needed to secure his base among the Ibos, his own nationality 
grouping that composed most of the Eastern Region Provinces, if he were not to lose out 
altogether, while pursuing the goals of wining constituency among the Yorubas and other 
non-Ibo would-be supporters.  The AG was also campaigning for votes after its creation 
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in 1950 among the non-Ibo minorities in the East, invading its political opponent’s 
territory as the NCNC already did with the AG in the West. 
The swing of Azikiwe’s party from the principle of unitary government to that of 
federalism could be anticipated with the NCNC party delegation to the London 
Conference in 1953 which endorsed the principle of regionalism.  There, Azikiwe, ahead 
of himself and of the party, proclaimed gladly that “Nigeria has been offered self-
government on a platter of gold.”700  This shift was subsequently officially made NCNC 
party principle at the 5th Annual Convention of the NCNC in January 1954.  The unitarist 
viewpoint was rejected in favor of the principle of federalism and on October 1954, 
Azikiwe was appointed Premier of the Eastern Region based on the regionalist 
framework, subsequent to the September – December 1953 Eastern Regional election.701  
This led the radicals in his party to complain that the NCNC had abandoned the way of 
socialist idealism for bourgeois nationalism.702   
Azikiwe’s endorsement of the principle of federalism as the basis of Nigeria’s 
unity exemplify the fundamental difference between him and the NCNC/Zikist left.  The 
radicals criticized the shortcomings of regionalization and its believed adverse effects on 
the nation in the terms in which African politicians were perceived to be conceiving and 
practicing it.  They also criticized the culture of ethnicity that they believed regionalism 
was predicated on.  They further criticized the negative effects of office on the party 
holders of office while Azikiwe and the party leaders in turn continued to expel the 
NCNC radicals and critics from office.  At the sixth annual convention of the party in 
1956, Nduka Eze, an ex-Zikist and a member of the National Executive Committee, was 
expelled from the party along with others.  Their associates, former Zikist leaders such as 
Osita Agwuma and Mokwugo Okoye, were also expelled for circulating a document 
titled an “Appeal to the NCNC Convention Delegates.”703  The document, released to the 
press, alleged a betrayal of the unitarist, socialist, and democratic principles of the party 
by a “monied” group that  included the National President and other parliamentary 
leaders.704  The radical youths, detailing the abuses of the National President and of the 
National Secretary, including the perceived departure of the NCNC from party policy and 
the manner in which Azikiwe appeared to have turned his back on them, continued in the 
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document (and I quote at length for what it reveals of the formal divorce between him 
and the radicals in his party, as well as the differences in their ideological position): 
As ministers, the party leaders have shamefully perverted 
the policy of the Party and the significant thing about them 
is their willing collaboration with Imperialism and the 
betrayal and sacrifice of the Party’s forward elements.  
Government patronage … has been disposed of in a 
questionable manner and membership of Government 
boards had depended more on wealth and good connection 
rather than intelligence and ability … Social amenities … 
have been extended only to favored areas, contrary to party 
policy of fair and equal distribution.   The open abuses of 
the Party … the National Secretary’s blatant misstatements 
on party policy or the National President’s published 
obloquies against the young men should have earned for 
them a disciplinary measure; when the monied dominant 
group intrigues against the ineffectual young men … they 
were all ‘toeing the party line,’ but when the young men 
make any attempt to defend and sustain the ideals and 
policy of the Party they are branded as rebels, bevanites, 
communists, irresponsibles and anything that suits the 
dominant leadership. 705  
  
As some of the allegations above reveal, Azikiwe and the party leadership, now 
entrenched in office, were now applying the same labels of  the “communist,” 
“irresponsibles,” etc., to the radicals in the NCNC as officials once applied to them!  
Criticism of Azikiwe by those who had been in his inner circle previously and former 
radical bed-fellows such as the ex-Zikists, as well as allegations of others against him 
also afford additional insights into Azikiwe’s political character.  Though their views 
may not altogether be disinterested, they confirm already observed traits about Azikiwe. 
Nduka Eze, a very prominent Zikist,706 would comment in his memoirs afterwards that:  
We in the Central Committee decided that whether Zik 
liked it or not, the struggle would be spearheaded by him 
but we miscalculated for we did not know that we were 
dealing with someone who was intuitively cleverer than 
ourselves ….707   
 
The watchword here is “intuitively cleverer.”  Azikiwe was politically astute and 
“intuitively clever.”  Although his critics were also assessing him from their own value-
position and bias, his own self-assessment would confirm the view of him as intuitively 
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cleverer.  Azikiwe, in his own words, describing the cunning way he strategically 
positioned himself to gain advantage, wrote, “From athletics I learned how to suffer in 
silence … how to act as if I was helpless even though I was as powerful as an ox …”708  
Also, from the international left and consistent with the assessments of Azikiwe by 
radicals in his party like Osita Agwuma, Mokwugo Okoye, and Nduka Eze, were the 
London Daily Worker’s editorials, for example, which characterized Azikiwe in various 
terms as a “decadent nationalist leader,” etc.  
By the beginning of 1950, colonial officials were starting to take Azikiwe a little 
more seriously as being ready to follow the path of moderation, i.e., the path of 
constitutionalism, even though they would also remain mindful of his potentials to 
exploit a different path as he perceived to be in his interest.  Referring to a copy of 
Azikiwe’s Minority Report on Constitutional Reform prepared by him at the meeting of 
the Legislative Council in Enugu in March and April of 1950, the Colonial Office Secret 
Document to J. K. Thompson noted that they thought it “reasonable to claim that he is 
anxious to use constitutional methods”709 but, it also noted: 
On the other hand, we have no doubt that he will always be  
ready to profit by violence so long as he is not directly 
associated with it.  The position is then that Zik himself is 
not under any kind of restriction nor for that matter is the 
NCNC as such.710 
 
However, colonial officials were ready to begin to ease their concern about Azikiwe at 
this time, irrespective of whatever doubts may remain in their mind about him.  “As far as 
we know there is no reason why it should be thought necessary to impose any kind of 
restriction on the liberty of Zik and the NCNC,” the secret document observed.711  Sir 
John Macpherson, the Governor of Nigeria, in further validation, also noted by 
comparison the methods advocated by the Zikist Movement and the more constitutional 
methods of Azikiwe himself.712  Furthermore, the Secretary of State, in his telegram of 
27th April, 1950 on Zik to the Colonial Attache in Washington suggested, subject to the 
views of the Governor of Nigeria, that he pointed out essential difference between 
methods of violent revolution advocated by Zikist Movement and the peaceful 
constitutional method freely used by Zik to further the aims of NCNC.713  With the clear 
distinction made between him and the “revolutionary” Zikists, British officialdom’s 
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“respectable African” was born in Azikiwe, what with the implied endorsement of the 
Secretary of State himself! 
Officials were correct in their assessment that Azikiwe was ready to use 
constitutional methods at this time.714  Azikiwe was also beginning to distance himself 
from radical trade unionists and to actually begin to seek to “tame” them now as he began 
to gain political power.715  Sklar observed that since 1951, the representation of organized 
labor in the NCNC executive had been relatively minor and confined to the conservative 
wing of the trade union leadership.716  He further remarked on how in this period, 
Azikiwe “had no commitment to the labor leaders and little sympathy for the extremist 
element among them.”717  Although it is doubtful that a leftist mass party might have 
emerged, as Sklar otherwise believed, he was right when he commented that the ensuing 
ineffectual, sectarian radicalism of the isolated labor left might have been averted but for 
the fact that the NCNC/NNDP were unwilling to share their leadership with the 
laborites.718 “In short,” Sklar summised, “the labor leadership of 1950 was too diffuse 
and erratic, and the politicians of the NCNC/NNDP were too obdurately ambitious to 
conclude a durable alliance.”719 
Azikiwe, on a quest for the acquisition of political power, was a political 
maverick who was in politics to win and to achieve precisely that.  Anything or forces he 
perceived to be in his way of achieving this would have to be removed or sidetracked.  
Azikiwe would not maintain a permanent position on the ideological spectrum but 
traveled along all points of the spectrum and would shift positions and discourses as 
perceived consistent with his goal of winning.  If it meant moving to the ideological left, 
he would make the shift, using the radical constituencies that comprised his base, or even 
European communists, albeit in limited, strategic ways;720 if it meant shifting back to the 
center or to the right of center, he would.  And if it meant positioning himself on multiple 
points of the ideological spectrum, however confusing it may be to the ordinary observer, 
he would do so for as long as he achieved his objective of gaining political power.  In the 
circumstances and changing fortunes of the 50s and with the constitutional changes that 
were creating openings for the acquisition of political power, the strategy for winning 
dictated location at the political center and that was where Azikiwe was to be found!  
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Azikiwe shifted to the center and stayed the course.  Azikiwe was, indeed, a politician to 




Kwame Nkrumah was also politically radical but socially conservative.  Like Azikiwe in 
Nigeria and other select aspirant political incumbents, Kwame Nkrumah of the Gold 
Coast was similarly making the necessary shifts in his discourses and actions at the turn 
of the 50s that would establish him at the ideological center and serve to facilitate the 
rehabilitation of his image in official mind.  What served him and others like him well 
was their ability not to maintain fixed positions, unlike what remained the radical fringe 
of their movement and/or organization.  Nkrumah, like Azikiwe and others like them, 
moved in and out of position on the ideological spectrum based on what he perceived 
served his goals best at particular moments in time.  
It is also possible to identify the early Nkrumah and the later Nkrumah.  The early 
Nkrumah was a radicalized Nkrumah, if one were to trace the trajectory of his career 
from the end of his stay in the U. S. where, also like Azikiwe, he had been sufficiently 
exposed to, and radicalized by the existing revolutionary fervor of the Black protest 
movements and the communist movement.  He would bring this radical perspective to 
bear on the politics of WASU in London while he was en-route to his home country at 
the completion of his studies in the U. S.721  While in London, Nkrumah was positioned 
rather left of center in the WASU.  There, he tried to use the language and organizational 
skills of the communist movement to advantage.  He and a handful of leftwing-oriented  
radicals in WASU had set up the West African National Congress (WANS) 722 which 
facilitated the shift of WASU to more radical politics.723  However, like Azikiwe also, 
although exposed to communist revolutionary literature and doctrines, he was not of 
communist persuasion and would seek to adapt aspects of communist rhetorics and 
organizational strategies to advantage both in London within WASU and in his home 
colony of the Gold Coast in the Convention People’s Party (CPP) which he would later 
head.   
 Nkrumah made shifts along the ideological spectrum as consistent with his goals 
at particular moments and had a stable center to which he retreated at opportune 
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moments.  He journeyed to that center on his immediate return to the Gold Coast as he 
made himself an attractive candidate for the secretaryship of the more moderate United 
Gold Coast Convention (UGCC).  He was moderate when he needed to be, although the 
Watson Commission found it hard to believe in 1948 that he was truly “the humble and 
obedient servant of the Convention” who had subordinated his private political 
conviction to those publicly expressed by his employers!724  They were wrong in that 
Nkrumah was able to make the shift towards accommodation or moderation when 
necessary but correct in that he would not sacrifice his long-term political agenda or goals 
to remain tied to any organization or position if that agenda or goals were better served 
otherwise, i.e., by a shift to militancy in this particular case.  Indeed, his reputation as a 
skilful speaker and radical activist was also what had made him attractive to the 
leadership of the UGCC who were looking for such articulate and charismatic leadership 
and they used his star quality to increase membership of their organization.  As the 
Watson Commission remarked, soon after Nkrumah’s arrival in the Gold Coast as the 
UGCC Secretary, the UGCC “held meetings in the towns at which according to the local 
press Mr. Nkrumah became the star attraction.”725  At the time they employed Nkrumah 
as Secretary, the UGCC leaders had hoped they would be able to moderate his radical 
propensities at the same time as they hoped to reap political dividends from his political 
style and charisma.  But Nkrumah would prove to be no party’s hidden agenda, especially 
one that may not necessarily advance his own political ambition of gaining power.   
Nkrumah did not long survive in the UGCC which was caught in the 
contradictions of its own making.  They wanted someone, the kind of Secretary who 
would help to advance their goals more effectively but not one that would take the 
momentum away from the rest of the leadership and radically change the UGCC’s 
agenda or engage in what they were perceiving to be the politics of confrontation with 
colonial authorities.  The very attributes and skills that made Nkrumah attractive to them 
as a candidate for the post of Secretaryship of the UGCC also became what the UGCC 
officials came to fear as threatening to the stability and more modest politics of the 
UGCC.  They thought they could keep Nkrumah under their control but they were not so 
sure anymore once he got on board!  He was becoming the bull in the china store!  His 
use of the suggestive revolutionary rhetoric of comrade and his continued connection 
 147
with the WANS bothered the UGCC.726  They remained suspicious of him, and more so 
of the role they came to believe he played in the 1948 disturbances in the Gold Coast 
colony.  In August 1948, after the Gold Coast Crises, Nkrumah was suspended from the 
post of Secretaryship of the UGCC.727    
Nkrumah had shifted to the center to gain strategic entry into the most viable 
political organization in the colony at the time - the UGCC - and had tried to make the 
leadership feel more comfortable with him initially, but long enough, however, to survive 
in the organization till his perceived more opportune moment came.  And, at the right 
time, consistent with the mood of the time, Nkrumah left the UGCC altogether on 31st 
July, 1949 to head a more grassroot-oriented political movement, the Convention 
People’s Party (CPP), composed of a cross-section of Gold Coast people, along with 
trade unionists, particularly the radical wing of Gold Coast labor.  But Nkrumah in the 
CPP was no revolutionary leader either even though his fiery rhetorics at particular 
moments may tend to invest him with such credentials.  The 1948 disturbances and the 
1950 Positive Action Strike in the Gold Coast for which the colonial government held 
him and a handful of others accountable were more the spontaneous outburst of an 
aggrieved population, although the role of his press, the Evening News, cannot be 
underestimated. 
 In the January 1950 Positive Action by the CPP, Nkrumah had, in fact, tried to 
stop the planned action from being carried out when the Acting Colonial Secretary, Sir R. 
Saloway, remonstrated with him against it.  Saloway had believed that Nkrumah would 
help to stop it from being carried out, based on what he believed were the signals he had  
received from Nkrumah.  But Nkrumah’s signals to both officials and to the CPP would-
be participants of the Positive Action were contradictory, at best ambiguous, and capable 
of different interpretations!   
Nkrumah, like Azikiwe, was a political maverick.  Like Azikiwe in the Nigerian 
1945 General Strike, Nkrumah had one foot in the world of officialdom and another 
among his CPP constituency in the Gold Coast.  Saloway was able to convince himself, 
perhaps wishfully, on account of his meeting with Nkrumah and the CPP Executive, that 
the planned Positive Action had been called off.  He therefore went publicly with the 
announcement to that effect, saying: 
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I am happy to be able to tell you … that wise counsels have 
now prevailed and the threat of the Positive Action has now 
been removed … I am sure that all whose hearts are set on 
ordered progress in the Gold Coast will have heard this 
statement with relief and satisfaction.728 
 
But he was mistaken as the Positive Action went ahead anyway!  Not even Nkrumah 
could have succeeded in stopping the momentum that was already built up for it, what 
with the beginning of the General Strike action of the Gold Coast Trade Union Congress 
earlier in January 1950, which, though apparently separate from it, was inextricably also 
tied up with it.  The CPP leadership under Nkrumah totally lost control of the masses 
during the crisis while the latter were more responsive to the TUC in terms of leadership 
and direction.  As the newly-appointed Governor to the Gold Coast, Sir Arden-Clarke, 
would later comment in regard to the spontaneous and popular outbreak of the Positive 
Action and the ineffectual effort, if any, of Nkrumah and the CPP leadership to stop it, 
“the tail wagged the dog.”729  He believed that some of the party leaders would have 
preferred not to resort to the Positive Action but that they found themselves “enmeshed in 
the coils of their own propaganda” and as such, the Positive Action was duly declared in 
January 1950.730  
Nkrumah, like Azikiwe, was interested in winning and in capturing power, and, 
able to better read the times, “changed character”731 at crucial moments to try and achieve 
success.  One of his old “comrades,” Peter Abrahams, assessing Nkrumah later, said: 
“We were concerned with ideas, with the enunciation of principles.  He was concerned 
with one thing only, getting power and getting it quickly.”732  Nkrumah might also have 
been concerned with ideas but unlike some of them, he was not doctrinaire.  Like 
Azikiwe, his approach was more pragmatic.  His dictum, “Seek ye first the political 
kingdom and all other things will be added,” truly moved his politics. 
The shifts in Nkrumah’s position, to the point of becoming officialdom’s watchdog and 
“hatchetman” against the “communists” – especially his former “comrades” - in the Gold 





Officialdom’s Right Hand of Fellowship 
 
As these erstwhile ardent critics of colonial administration began to move towards 
accommodation, or, the paths of “constitutionalism,” colonial officials also continued to 
take serious note of them and their potentials as possible players in the task of stabilizing 
empire, especially at a time when the crises of empire seemed to be taking on new life.  
In summarizing the new Gold Coast constitution of 1950 and referring to the current 
situation in the Gold Coast in his May 1, 1951 address to the Colonial Group of the Royal 
Empire Society, the Secretary of State, Mr. Griffiths, remarked that, “Recently the C.P.P. 
have sought to realize their political aims in a constitutional manner.”733  Also, remarking 
on the demeanor of CPP officials in office, he said: “They had the courage to accept, and 
are carrying in a most responsible manner, the heavy burden of office in the new 
Government, in which they hold six out of eight African seats.”734  He further remarked 
that the CPP had openly stated that they regarded the present constitution as a first step 
but were willing to work with it.735  This pleased officials, although Griffith cautioned 
that it was too early to tell.736  Assessing the situation later in 1952 and with a willingness 
towards making further changes to the Gold Coast constitution as concessions to some of 
Nkrumah’s demands, the new Secretary of State, Mr. O. Lyttelton, remarked on the 
beginning effectiveness of Nkrumah thus: “Dr. Nkrumah and the Executive Council 
recently showed some signs of being run off their feet by the back benchers of the party,  
though they now appear to have regained control.”737  In Nigeria, Governor Macpherson 
also remarked in his memo to Lyttelton that the two Southern parties, the NCNC and the 
AG political parties, had both “decided to try out the new Constitution,” quipping that 
“responsibility has a sobering effect.”738  He further remarked, in regard to the NCNC 
majority party in the Eastern House of Assembly that, “the majority party gives hopes of 
being reasonably responsible,” and that, “at least they have excluded from consideration 
for Ministerial posts the wildest and least worthy of their number,”739 referring to the 
social radicals in the NCNC.  In regard to the AG majority party in the West of Nigeria, 
he remarked that “The Action Group in the West … want to make the Constitution a 
success.”740 
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The “partners worth working with” were also proving their worth in other ways.  
In the protracted struggle and crisis of social order in Iperu and Ogere division in 
Western Region of Nigeria at the end of 1949 and beginning of 1950, the Awolowo-led 
Yoruba-based organization, Egbe Omo Oduduwa (EOO), later transformed into the 
Action Group political party in 1950, had got themselves involved as peace brokers 
seeking to bring a successful resolution to the conflicts and managed to have done so, as 
earlier indicated.741  The ability of the EOO to arrest the crisis in this particular occasion 
was even more significant in the light of the fact that colonial officials had tried 
previously to bring a successful resolution to the conflicts but had failed, as earlier 
indicated.  It further commended Awolowo, who was at the forefront of this peace 
initiative, along with his EOO organization, to colonial officials.  Later, the Governor 
could not help but express his pleasure at the “very satisfactory outcome” of the efforts of 
the Peace Mission at the end of his letter to the Secretary of State.  He noted that it gave 
reason to hope that the difficult problems of the Western Provinces in the sphere of local 
government can be resolved in a spirit of cooperation and goodwill.742  
Awolowo was able to achieve a double objective.  He was able to use the 
occasion and its apparent success to demonstrate his ability to help resolve the  
conflicts743 which were bedeviling local government administration more so at this time.  
He was also able to show the viability of a political organization based on the unity of the 
Yorubas.  Although the conflict was resolved at this time, and as Awolowo also rightly 
stated, through the combined efforts of the widely respected Oni of Ife, regarded as father 
of all the Yoruba chiefs,744 the Alafin of Oyo, and members of the Egbe under Awolowo, 
Awolowo’s stature as the chief player was increased in the eyes of colonial officials.  
Awolowo, who indeed had been very actively involved in the reconciliation process both 
before and after the Peace Mission, tried to downplay the significance of his role and of 
the Egbe in the resolution of this conflict but colonial officials were not taken in by his 
attempt to appear modest.  The Governor of Nigeria remarked that “Awolowo … 
performing one of his inimitable mental somersaults, told the Majeobaje leaders that the 
honor of settlement should be given to the four Obas, the traditional Yoruba leaders, and 
other members of the Egbe Omo Oduduwa delegation.”745  The Governor went on:  
“This, he stressed, would prove that the Yorubas were capable of settling their own 
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differences in spite of opposition by the Administration and efforts by them to settle the 
matter.”746  And that was a critical point that Awolowo also wanted to get out to the 
administration as well in involving the Egbe to help resolve the conflict and he succeeded 
very well in doing so for that message was not lost on the administration at all.   
The ability of the new African players to help arrest the upheavals in local African 
society, especially where colonial officials themselves had been incapable of doing so, 
must have served to also facilitate official determination to continue to give them more 
leverage and to make political concessions to them even in cases where they would have 
opposed or overruled them.  One of such instances occurred in the 1953-55 crisis in 
another Yoruba province in the Western Region of Nigeria - Oyo.  The resistance of the 
Alafin of Oyo, Oba Adeyemi, to the Action Group’s (AG) attempt to capture the base of 
his power747 brought him into conflict with the AG which now controlled the Western 
Regional Local Government Council.  The 1952 Western Regional Local Government 
Ordinance had set up the Council as means of effecting partial democratization of the 
Oyo Native Authority.  But the Alafin was resistant to this and to the exercise of the 
powers of the Counselors elected under this ordinance who were mainly Action Group 
supporters.  In September, 1954 disputes flared into rioting between the Action Group 
party supporters and the Alafin supporters.748  The Alafin was subsequently removed as 
president of the Oyo Native Authority by the AG Western Regional Government which 
advised him to go on exile to Ilorin.   
The colonial administration felt unable to change the decision of the AG 
government to send the Alafin on exile, in spite of the advice of the Commission of 
Inquiry that was set up after the disturbances under the Senior Crown Council, Mr. D. 
Lloyd, to the contrary.  The Report had advised against the exiling of the Alafin.  The 
governor of Nigeria wrote that he did not feel justified in acting contrary to his ministers’ 
(AG ministers) advice though, he said, he could have done so under Clause 8(2) of the 
Royal Instructions in cases where he considered it expedient “in the interest of public 
faith, public order or good government.”749  The Western Region Ministers were bent on 
rejecting the Report of the Commission of Inquiry and were insistent on deposing the 
Alafin and not publish the report.  Though the Governor felt persuaded otherwise, he was 
still willing to go along with the AG Ministers’ decisions and advised the Secretary of 
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State to also go along with his own decision in support of the AG’s action against the 
Alafin.750  The governor did not feel it necessary, based on the Alafin’s own poor record 
anyway, according to him, to go against the wishes of the Ministers and to force an 
“acute constitutional crisis with the Ministers.”751  This was more so in the case of a chief 
who, in the assessment of the Governor and colonial officials, “is old and reactionary” 
and “has proved unable to adjust himself to modern conditions.”752  Worse still, as the 
governor confessed, the Alafin “has long been an anxiety to the administration!”753  
Officialdom was ready to work with such new African mangers as the AG 
leaders, etc., and to concede more powers to them as they helped to manage empire and 
to arrest the crises in their colonies.  In Sierra Leone, after the series of riots in 1956, for 
example, a high SLPP official reported that Dr. Margai, the leader of the SLPP, was told 
that before there could be any further constitutional advances there he had to show that he 
had the confidence of the country by clamping down on the riots and by winning the 
forthcoming District Council elections.754  On the other hand, another partner worth 
working with would be commended for his ability to help manage empire in helping to 
resolve some crucial issues that could have led to conflicts and impasse.  The Secretary to 
the Government, Mr. Foot, referring to Azikiwe’s success in breaking the deadlock 
between the North and South on the question of representation at the Center in the two 
Houses in the Central Legislature, was happy to remark that:  
Our feeling is that a man like this has some worth, and we 
would suggest that you should make this plain as far as you 
can, being careful, of  course, to make it quite clear that Zik 
is in no sense a stooge of Government. … There may be 
some danger that it would appear that he had gone over to 
the Government side.755  
 
If Azikiwe had not gone over to the Government side, he had definitely positioned 
himself well on the path of enhancing his political fortunes. 
As these new African players were gaining further entry into the institutions of 
power, colonial officials would also continue to watch for further signs of cooperation 
from them - these “radicals” of yesterday turned cooperationists of today - as they sought 
to develop more confidence in them.   And officialdom continued to be pleased at what 
they were observing from this time onwards.  As early as June 1951, in the preparatory 
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talks that Nkrumah had with Mr. Griffiths of the Colonial Office before his meeting with 
the Secretary of State, Cohen, who was present at one of the two long talks with Mr. 
Griffiths, had remarked afterwards that he regarded Nkrumah’s visit as a “great success,” 
and the outcome of the talks as “satisfactory.”756  Cohen also gladly noted in his memo of 
20 November, 1951 that “it is significant that Moscow has written off Dr. Nkrumah as a 
bourgeois politician.”757  It must have been reassuring to officialdom to learn that 
Moscow had written Nkrumah off as Moscow’s reject of the “decadent nationalist leader” 
was true testament of the latter’s credentials as the West’s “partners worth working 
with!”  Did not the classic communist doctrine theorize these “nationalist/bourgeois 
politicians” as sold out to the imperialists and unsuitable to carry out “the revolution” in 
the colonies?!  By 1952, the Secretary of State felt certain that the Governor of the Gold 
Coast, Arden-Clarke, with whom he was impressed as “one of the aces in the Colonial 
Office pack,”758 “has obtained a great personal hold over Dr. Nkrumah and the African 
Ministers.”759  That was exactly how officialdom would like to have it.  Nkrumah and the 
CPP Ministers also had their own agenda and would allow this apparent “hold” while 
they pushed from within for constitutional advance as against the push from without by 
the officially labeled “extremists,” believed to have “a lust for personal power,” but 
“have at present lost much of their power,” 760 according to official estimate of the 
“extremists”!  
The interests of both officialdom and those of the “moderate” African politicians 
were beginning to coincide more and more and as the “extremists” were alienated further 
and further.  The former would prove to be able partners.  In fact, Azikiwe and Nkrumah 
would prove to be more able partners than colonial officials had imagined!  They 
cooperated with colonial officials in clamping down on suspected “communists,” 
removing these from leadership positions and actual membership in the political parties 
they led – the NCNC and the CPP – what were now becoming mainstream political 
parties.  Azikiwe removed Zikists like Mokwugo Okoye, Nduka Eze, and Osita Agwuma 
from the NCNC, and Nkrumah likewise removed from the CPP and from his government 
officially labeled “communists” like the labor radicals Pobee Biney and Anthony Woode, 
all of who sought to sustain the discourse of social change and of the nation and 
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citizenship in socially radical and mutually-inclusive terms and at the center of national 
agenda.761  
 
The Idea of Change and Change Itself 
 
A central concern of colonial officials by the end of the 40s and beginning of the 
50s was the stabilization of colonial society, in view of the recurring crises, and efforts at 
political reforms in the colonies through constitutional changes were more or less tied to 
this objective.  Reiterating this commitment against any impression that might be given 
that the British might be influenced by France or South Africa to slow down the pace of 
reforms, Andrew B. Cohen, head of the African branch of the Colonial Office, affirmed:  
We are in fact committed to our present policy by statement 
from both political parties in this country and the facts of 
the situation in West Africa itself (emphasis mine) make it 
necessary that we should adhere to that policy.762 
 
The crises in the colonies necessitated official response and changes in order to seriously 
address them at this time, given the lessons learnt from the 1948 Gold Coast crisis.  The 
dissatisfaction with the many aspects of the 1946/47 Constitutions in many of the 
colonies,763 and which the Watson’s Commission Report also regarded as part of the root 
cause of the Gold Coast crises of 1948,764 led to a spate of constitutional reviews in all 
the colonies.  In the honest opinion of the Watson’s Commission of Inquiry, “the 1946 
Constitution was outmoded at birth.”765  The Commission commented that: 
The concession of an African elected majority in the 
Legislature, in the absence of any real political power, 
provided no outlet for a people eagerly emerging into 
political consciousness.  On the other hand it provided a 
powerful stimulant for intelligent discontent.  The real and 
effective political government remained in the hands of the 
Executive Council.  Composed of an ex officio and 
nominated members it was the instrument of power.766  
  
The eventual grant of new constitutions to the Gold Coast (1950), Nigeria (1951), Sierra 
Leone (1951), and Gambia (1951) was officialdom’s attempt to seriously meet some of 
these challenges.  Colonial officials had believed that the new 1950/1951 Constitutions 
would take care of the felt shortcomings of the previous ones and would satisfy the 
demands of the “moderates” who they believed would work with them for gradual 
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change.  Cohen had also believed that the CPP, which won a resounding victory at the 
last election, was finding that the country was not ready for substantial advance in the 
immediate future, 767 although it is not clear what Cohen premised that belief on.   
The new constitutions granted to the colonies at the beginning of the 50s, 
however, proved to be further causes of conflicts and crises, creating demands for further 
and radical changes.  Those clamoring for change beyond the limits of what officials 
would allow and through means that officials disapproved of were dismissed as 
“extremist.”  Cohen would further remark, in regard to the CPP and the party leaders that 
were now in government and believed to be working cooperatively with the colonial 
authorities, that: 
The leaders of this party will be pressed by their own 
extremists and by their opponents to demand further 
advances but if full confidence can be maintained            
between them and the Gold Coast Government, as well as 
H. M. Government, it may well be that they will be  
satisfied with a slower pace.768 
 
There were indeed various voices seeking for further constitutional changes.  
Among these were the radicals, those seeking for social change, such as the Northern 
Element Progressive Union (NEPU)769 in the North of Nigeria, Funlayo Ransome 
(Anikulapo) Kuti and her Nigerian Women’s Union in the South of Nigeria, some 
leftwing-oriented labor radicals in all the colonies, etc.  These various social forces 
continued to contest the limits put on change in the new constitutions and to push the 
boundaries of change.  They sought to take the limits off change and to resolve 
fundamental social issues in the course of resolving political issues.     
Though the new constitutions marked an advance on the previous ones in certain 
ways, there was a genuine basis for continued discontent as colonial officials had 
embarked on the process of creating change while at the same time putting breaks on 
change.  Officialdom tried to control change and to legitimize the discourse that they 
wanted privileged by setting the parameters of change, what discourses were allowed, 
and which colonials were included or excluded from participation in the constitutional 
review process.  This involved officialdom’s efforts at largely pre-setting the agendas for 
constitutional reviews and the structuring of the discourse in ways that constrained 
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against other modes of discourse and agendas.  In Nigeria, for example, Governor 
Macpherson, in moving the resolution to establish a Select Committee of the Legislative 
Council to make recommendations for the review the 1946 Richards Constitution, said, in 
regard to the methods to be employed for reviewing the constitutions, that they should 
“make a statement of the principal questions to be decided regarding constitutional 
changes,”770 stating that: 
A simple statement of the main questions to be decided 
would be of great assistance to Provincial Committees and 
others who at the moment may have a very hazy            
idea of what the questions at issues are.771 
 
Although it is helpful to be able to propose issues or questions to be discussed as 
guidelines, this was to be done by the committee of a body - i.e., the Legislative Council - 
that had already been claimed by significant sections of colonial society as 
unrepresentative and which had more or less been a rubber stamp for officialdom’s 
decisions.  Even the government’s own commissioned body, the 1948 Watson’s 
Commission of Inquiry, criticized the Legislative Councils in the colonies as such.  In 
preparing for review of the 1946/47 constitutions, colonial officials were setting the 
parameters ahead of the review committees of what should be discussed in the 
committees to allow space for only the discourse officials approved of.  The questions at 
issue were questions officials wanted raised as opposed to questions or issues which they 
were not ready to confront.  Andrew Cohen had let the governor of Nigeria know ahead 
of time what the Secretary of State's predisposition was in regard to the way the 
constitutional review should proceed.  It was the Secretary of State's understanding, he 
said, that the review would “involve only various points in the constitution with a view to 
its improvement and development and not a complete re-writing of the constitution.”772  
But many voices in the colonies - in Nigeria and the Gold Coast, as well as in Sierra 
Leone – were demanding more than just official tweaking around the edges of the 1946-
47 Constitutions.  They were demanding radical and fundamental changes.  One of the 
participants of the constitutional review conferences, Eyo Ita,773 got so disenchanted with 
the narrowness of the issues discussed – or lack of proposal for substantive changes – that 
he produced a comprehensive statement of fundamental issues at stake for the nation and 
for full-fledged citizenship.  His Minority Report is examined a little further below 
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because of the insights it provides into the shortcomings of the new constitutions being 
proposed and enacted at this time and of the possibilities for more wide-ranging changes 
that were closed off in the mainstream review committees and review process. 
Officialdom’s notion of change involved an exercise by the state of its power to 
decide how colonials would be represented and by which type of colonials.  By 
attempting, for example, to control who got to participate in constitutional review 
committees and by structuring the agendas for change, officialdom embarked on the 
process of managing change.  On paper, the process of constitutional reviews did promise 
to be a more democratic one, ostensibly involving consultation from the grassroot level.  
In Nigeria, for example, officialdom’s preference for a special committee composed of 
members of the Legislative Council with power to co-opt others for the review of the 
1947 Richard Constitution was dropped later in 1949, at the Chief Commissioners' 
Conference, in favor of one that would appear to link up more directly with the people.774  
This was done in order to weaken the grounds of opposition anticipated from Western-
educated Africans such as those, for example, in the NCNC or in the Nigerian Youth 
Movement (NYM ) in Nigeria, who they felt were prone to view the constitutional review 
process as not being fully representative.775  The changed procedure adopted in 1949 
would involve the formation of Provincial Committee members who would send 
representatives to sit with members of the previously constituted House of Assembly on a 
proposed regional body; a Central reviewing body would then be made up of members of 
these regional bodies.  The idea, according to the Governor of Nigeria, Sir John 
Macpherson, is that if they were to bring into the reviewing bodies men from outside the 
Legislature, the best way of doing so would be “to draw on representatives of Provincial 
Committees.”  These, it must be noted, were those who, according to the Governor, “at 
the moment may have a very hazy idea of what the questions at issues are,” a telling 
commentary on the people involved in these review exercises.  
Although officialdom believed that by this process the population would have 
been given “full opportunity to express their views on all the great issues involved,”776 
consistent with the believed intent of the memorandum from A. B. Cohen to Governor 
Macpherson of Nigeria, in reality, the new arrangements still contained many pitfalls.  In 
spite of the modified procedure to consult, ostensibly, from the grassroot level through 
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formation of Provincial Committees, questions still remained of the democratic potentials 
of this process.  Salient questions as to who really got into these Provincial Committees 
and how, what the agendas raised were, and how the issues were discussed are at issue.  
If examined closely, the provisions would be seen to contain a lot of shortcomings that 
constrained against whatever inherent democratic potentials the arrangement might have 
had.  In Northern Nigeria, for example, the arrangement involving channeling grassroot 
consultation through Provincial Councils, etc., only served to silence the voices from 
below and of new voices as the old traditional ruling elites manipulated the provision for 
indirect election into regional and central bodies through a system of electoral colleges in 
their favor.  It facilitated the exclusion of members of grassroot-oriented bodies such as 
the Northern Element Progressive Union (NEPU) from direct and full participation in the 
political process and entrenched power in the hands of the traditional conservative elites 
who were able to manipulate the procedures in their own self-interest.   
This provision remained unchanged in the 1951 constitution and served to 
continue to constrain against popular representation and against NEPU’s political 
fortunes in the North and in the nation.  In Northern Nigeria, as elsewhere where Indirect 
Rule through Native Authorities was practiced and still retained, as also in Sierra Leone, 
the Provincial Council which formed the electoral colleges was heavily composed of the 
old traditional elites who were nominating into the Provincial Committees men of their 
choice - the old traditional elite as well as a handful of perceived middle-of-the-road new 
Western-educated Northerners such as Abubakar Tafawa Balewa.777  Furthermore, the 
special technique built into the electoral regulations in early elections there in the 1951 
constitution also gave undue advantage to the ruling elites in the Native Authority 
system.  The regulation permitted every Native Authority, typically an emir, to nominate 
a number of persons equal to 10% of the final electoral college who were then 'injected' 
into the college.  These nominees included the choice of the emir and various pressures 
operated to induce the members of the final electoral colleges to vote for them.  
The 10% nominated candidates by the Native Authorities circumscribed whatever 
beneficial effect the primary open voting stage introduced there may have served.  In 
reality, it only served to weigh the vote in favor of traditional and conservative elements.  
In these contexts, any alternative political force seeking for democratic change of the 
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Northern feudal system such as that which NEPU represented in the North, for example, 
faced great odds.  Such opportunities by the ruling elite for manipulating the limited 
democratic openings that the new constitutions were affording only served the cause of 
reactionary forces and to constrain against social change.  In this particular place, in 
Kano, for example, it created such anomalous situation in which ten of those who had 
been defeated in the early balloting were among the twenty elected finally into the House 
of Assembly in Kano in 1952 and all four candidates of the radical NEPU who had been 
successful at the intermediate stage were defeated in the final College by previously 
defeated nominees injected into the College by the Native Authorities under the 10% 
formula.778  As a result, no member of the NEPU got elected into the 1952 House of 
Assembly which served as an electoral college for the House of Representative, thus 
further constraining NEPU's ability to participate in national politics on its own terms. 
 
 Radical Critique of Mainstream Trends from Within  
 
The radicals continued to privilege contending and oppositional discourse of the nation 
and of citizenship in more inclusionary terms to those being privileged by officialdom 
and African cultural producers and political entrepreneurs.  Their critique of mainstream 
discourse and of on-going constitutional changes pointed to the limitations and 
circumscribed democratic potentials of the new constitutions being proposed and enacted.  
Right from the beginning of the process of constitutional reviews in the late 1940s, the 
NEPU, for example, had raised opposition to the principle of nomination, in view of the 
inherent potentials for abuse and for which they would be proved right.  Emphasizing 
NEPU’s concern for democratic change and popular representation, an official of NEPU 
expressed to a member of the press during an interview in 1950 that “this age is that of 
the common man and nobody can claim to speak for the North now without full 
consultation with the masses of which we form a reasonable part.”779 
There were also critics of the constitutional process within the mainstream from 
left of center involving a very few radicals like Eyo Ita in the NCNC in Nigeria and I. T. 
A. Wallace-Johnson of Sierra Leone who had now gained entry into the Sierra Leone 
legislature.  They raised serious objections to what he regarded as the undemocratic way 
the new constitutional arrangements there were being patterned.  He complained that the 
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country could not really boast of a real democratic legislature because of the 
undemocratic way the Protectorate was being allowed to elect its representatives through 
electoral colleges780 consisting of Paramount Chiefs “who are stipendiary and dependent 
on government approval.”781  He argued for direct voting throughout the Colony and 
Protectorate.782  He traveled to Britain on account of his objections in order to discuss 
with the Colonial Office what he felt to be the most glaring anomalies of the 1951 Sierra 
Leone Constitution and of political developments there since the election in November 
1951.783  Wallace-Johnson would continue his critique from within the Sierra Leone 
Legislature subsequently as an Independent candidate.  The critique of the Constitutional 
Review Conferences in 1949/1950 in Nigeria by Eyo Ita, one of the NCNC 
representatives to the review conferences, provides an in-depth and detailed account from 
within the formal institutions of power of the shortcomings of mainstream trends and 
constitutional changes and from a socially radical perspective and is examined in some 
detail a liitle further down below.   
The constitutional review process and provisions were also critiqued by other 
social forces elsewhere in the colonies, including rightwing radicals.  In Abeokuta, the 
on-going organized movements against the Alake and the Native Authority System also 
critiqued the way the constitutional review process was being handled there.  The 
Ogbonis who formed an important opposing group in the overall movement complained 
that: 
The procedure now being employed in making the 
Constitution for Egbaland is too circumscribed and narrow 
... the people should be consulted... If as it is now being 
done a provisional draft preceded consultation it might give 
rise to unnecessary and possibly unfair criticism, suspicion 
and noise, and thus prejudice its chance of a wholehearted 
acceptance.784 
 
The Ogbonis had further complained that they “have discovered that in certain major 
issues the wishes of the electorate were either disregarded or not even consulted at all.”785 
One instance was in regard to the appointment of a new African Administrative Secretary 
to replace the outgoing British official who had held this post till then.  The Ogbonis 
complained that the Egba Executive Committee, backed by colonial officials, took 
arbitrary steps in choosing an unacceptable candidate as replacement.  They complained 
 161
that the secretary was appointed against the expressed wish of the majority of the 
electorate.  They petitioned that “the Egba Executive Committee was flouting the wishes 
of the Egba people and placing an Egbado at the head of their affairs.”786  Although the 
complaint of placing an “Egbado” instead of an “Egba” was partisan, there was a basis 
for the allegation.  The obvious and popular choice for the post was the Egba official who 
had been the assistant and was reported to have acted successfully many times in the new 
office now open.787  Perhaps because of his family's connection to Funlayo Ransome-
Kuti who officials remained uncomfortable with, he was passed over for someone else 
who had to be trained for the post by first being sent to England.788 
 
Eyo Ita and the Discourse of Community and Citizenship: the Minority Report  
 
Eyo Ita, in his Minority Report contended with the “Master Report,” i.e., the officially 
endorsed report of the 1950 General Conference on the review of the Nigerian 
constitution, as lacking popular base. 789  His critique of the new constitutional proposals 
was painstakingly written out in his Minority Report790 as a member of the Constitutional 
Review Committee and it affords some insight into the shortcoming of the new 
constitutional proposals in this period and is examined at some length here.791  His 
recommendations represented many of what other colonial social radicals were 
advocating and fighting for but which they did not have the opportunity to present in an 
official forum such as that afforded to Eyo Ita.  The latter became as it were, 
unselfconsciously, a voice within the mainstream for colonial radicals in the way he used 
his presence in the Constitutional Review Committees and Conferences to seek for 
fundamental and progressive changes. 
Eyo Ita’s more progressive and differentiating views of the nation and notions of 
citizenship from within the NCNC would also lead in the end to his later split from the 
party after which he would form his own party, the United National Independence Party.  
While still in the NCNC, he used the opportunity he had as a member of the 
Constitutional Review Committee to put forward socially progressive views and 
recommendations that he believed would establish the Nigerian nation-state on a more 
representative and democratic basis.  He advocated equality of status and universal 
franchise for all citizens - male and female - popular representation, and abolition of 
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parallelism in government which he believed privileged one group of citizen against 
another.  He was also against indirect election through Provincial or Divisional Electoral 
Colleges, believing that representatives so elected could not feel directly responsible to 
the people, etc.  Eyo Ita indeed saw the constitutional review process of the late 40s as a 
unique opportunity to change the direction of the country in more progressive ways.  But 
his voice was a lone voice that was marginalized in mainstream discourse of change at 
the constitutional review conferences.  He therefore presented his views as Minority 
Report.  
Eyo Ita opened his Minority Report by stating that “the new constitution for 
Nigeria should seek to give the people of this country a genuine and thoroughly 
consistent democracy.”792  In his opinion, the declared aim of the constitutional reform 
was to maintain the unity of Nigeria but, he said, inequality of status and inequality of 
opportunity will not secure it for them.  In line with the views of social radicals like 
Funlayo Ransome Kuti, Wallace-Johnson, and other radicals who critiqued the 
undemocratic and unrepresentative nature of colonial governing institutions, Ita stated 
that it would be undemocratic to call people to obey laws made by a body 
unrepresentative of them or to pay tax to a government that was unrepresentative and 
unresponsive to their basic needs as expressed in their legitimate desires, discussions, 
resolutions and demands.793  “Colonial Legislature without colonial representation is 
entirely undemocratic,” he wrote, citing for example, one of the consequences as 
dragging the country into foreign wars and other “abnormal relations” with foreign 
Peoples that were inimical to their welfare and “retardative to human progress.”794  He 
went on to detail his views and recommendations of what a popularly-based and 
responsive government should be, stipulations that he believed the Constitutional Review 
Committees were in a vantage position to put forward.   He pleaded for the provision in 
the proposed new constitution that would guarantee to every citizen irrespective of tribe 
or creed equal political status and equal opportunities to all citizens, including equal   
economic, cultural, and social rights and privileges, as well as other basic human rights, 
without any discrimination whatsoever.  Ita advocated universal suffrage and gender 
equity that would enable women as well as all non-Northern Nigerian males and females 
to vote in the North of Nigeria, as the radicals like Hajiyya Sawaba and radical 
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organizations in the North like NEPU were advocating in the North.795  He criticized the 
recommendation of the Northern Regional Conferences that only all adult Northern males 
of twenty five years of age or older should be qualified for election as unofficial 
members.  He critiqued it as “denying rights of citizenship and equality of franchise to 
teeming populations of Southerners living in the Northern Sabongaris, paying taxes into 
the Northern Treasury and obeying Northern Legislative laws.”796  He further criticized it 
as tacitly denying these rights to Northern women and also to a vital Northern generation 
aged between 21 and 24 years, believed by him to be more than sixty percent of the 
Northern population.797 
Advocating the sovereignty of the common people, he stood against the principle 
of parallelism supported by the drafting committee whereby the House of Assembly and 
the House of Chiefs would have “concurrent and equal powers.”  He considered this as 
undemocratic and “evil,” and that they did not have equal popular representation. “The 
people in one are in a privileged class with superior status as compared to the other,” he 
said, and saw the arrangement as feudalistic.  He went on to comment that:  
It is too well known that the power of Princes and the 
power of the people are never ‘concurrent and equal,’ and 
in the twentieth century democracy, it is the power of the 
people which must prevail.  Today, we are out to abolish 
Feudalism, not to reform it.798 
 
 He also opposed the recommended development of parallelism of local  
government and central government and described this as “water-tight departmentalism 
of aspects of human existence which should be interactive and vitally related.”799  This 
issue had long been raised as a problem in the Colonial Office itself by official Think 
Tanks but were not resolved.800  Eyo Ita advised that both local government and central 
government must be integrated in the national government and that both must interact to 
release the total social energy.  Considering local government as “one of the essential 
organs of government, constituting an integral part of the whole National Government 
and being vitally related to the more ‘superior organs,”’ he went on to point out what he 
regarded as essential building blocks of a government predicated on popular 
representation thus, and I quote at length:    
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Local Government should, as a matter of fact, be an 
important instrument with which we produce democrats as 
the bricks with which we must build our democracy.  It is 
at this point that all adult citizens, men and women, should 
take their shares in the Government, not only as voters of 
representatives, but as actors in the day to day direction of 
their lives as farmers, workers, traders, members of the 
innumerable families, unions, clubs and societies.  The 
discussions of problems and expressions of the needs and 
desires of the masses of the people, crystallized as the 
peoples’ resolutions, should reach Government directly on 
this level, and flow up the veins of government, through 
intermediary organs to the central organ and influence and 
determine the policy of Government …801 
 
He further recommended the setting up of Village Councils where people should 
be represented at the rate of 1:100 citizens and where help from the central government to 
local farms, unions, industries, schools, hospitals, women and children welfare, would 
come as responses to the discussions and resolutions of the people, reaching the 
government through their Local Council and special committees.  He viewed as 
untenable and comparable to nomination the principle of indirect election through 
Provincial or Divisional Electoral Colleges.  Representatives so elected could not feel  
directly responsible to the people, he wrote.  “A new local bureaucracy thereby created 
will become oblivious of the needs and desires and problems of the masses.”802  He 
advocated direct representation on all levels of government for more responsiveness.  In  
advocating equality of status, he advised that no town or vested interest should be directly 
represented in the Regional or Central Legislature.  “Proportional and direct 
representation is the only democratic solution,” he wrote.803    
Eyo Ita also stood against the division of the country into three large and 
perceived unimaginable regions on the basis that the methods of distribution of franchise 
and grants and representation on the various levels of government violated the 
fundamental principles of democracy.804  The situation, he said, demanded immediate 
reforms.  In regard to his views on national unity, he further wrote:   
In the last analysis the unity of Nigeria is the unity of the 
individuals in it.  The individuals are bound together by 
political ties of nationality.  Identical nationality of any 
country must surely carry with it identical political rights 
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within the country, subject always to certain well defined 
general disqualifications.805 
 
Ita rejected resolutions which, he said, virtually “makes aliens of certain Nigerians in the 
North,” stating that:  
If the intention of the Conference is to have a united 
Nigeria, then it must ensure different citizenship and 
citizenship rights are not created within the country by the 
various regions for persons born in Nigeria and regarded as 
natives of Nigeria. Any other course would of necessity 
give rise to the creation of different national status among 
Nigerians.806 
 
Eyo Ita’s recommendations were indeed wide ranging, also covering judicial and 
financial matters.  He advocated the separation of the judiciary from the legislature as 
long overdue and supported the reform of the judiciary itself on the basis of fundamental 
human rights.  In regard to fiscal matters, he advocated revanching the whole fiscal 
policy to provide equality of opportunities for all citizens in order to produce “the 
greatest happiness of the greatest number.”  He decried the use of taxes from 
“disinherited unprivileged masses” to pay exorbitant sums on “lazy bureaucrats … rolling 
in luxury.”807  He advocated the creation of a new system whereby the payment of costs 
to keep offices and other overhead costs would be compatible with the economic status of 
the poor citizens of the country.  Sky-scraping salaries and interminable allowances from 
revenues cannot be paid and expect to have enough money left to build schools and 
hospitals for all citizens, including the provision of good clean water and enough light 
and other amenities for all, he went on to say.  He further wrote that: 
Progress is impossible without radical reform on this most 
basic issue.  If we do not do it now in pleasant honorable 
terms we shall be compelled to do it with pain and 
bitterness when enough men and enough women who pay 
taxes will read their situation rightly and will have an 
intelligent say in the use and expenditure of their tax 
monies and others of their own resources.808 
 
Eyo Ita’s Minority Report and views could perhaps be regarded as the most 
forward-looking critique launched from within mainstream organization and institution 
and which underscored many of the shortcomings of the constitutional process and the 
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terms in which self-government was eventually won.  It could also be regarded as 
anticipating many of the challenges of governance in post-independent Nigeria, as well as 
of other many former African colonies.  It underscores the failure of African politicians 
as well as that of British officialdom to confront such challenges as those raised by Eyo 
Ita in the pre-independence period.  His advice went unheeded then and at independence, 
and many of them still remained as challenges for current African governments.  The 
crises and ensuing struggles for the “second independence” in many of these erstwhile 
African colonies have been predicated on the failed Independence Constitutions in 
important ways as well as on subsequent failure of many African politicians to consider 
democratically-based societies and responsible governments as serious programmatic 
agendas. 
Eyo Ita’s Minority Report predicated on the vision of a more inclusionary and 
democratically-based notion of citizenship was not seriously considered by the 
Constitutional Review Committees in the era of political decentralization.  His motion 
was turned down for a variety of reasons.  His suggestion for a universal adult suffrage 
was, for example, regarded as too difficult to organize, and he and Ojike who was a 
minor party to the Minority Report were told to not “take the nation by storm.”809  A few 
select items in his Report were, however, covered in later constitutional reviews, such as 
the grant of universal male suffrage.  However, Ita’s recommendations in general were 
not esteemed by officialdom.  The British and the African ethnopolitical entrepreneurs 
were not committed to effecting social change which his recommendations embraced.  As 
the demand for change in colonial society became unrelenting across the board, 
officialdom was committed to creating some measure of political change involving some 
devolution of power to their African working partners while seeking to manage the 
process.  Both they and the British colonial authorities were not in the business of 
creating grassroot change but in containing grassroot crises.  Accommodation was the 
watchword. 
The following chapter seeks to examine aspects of the terms in which African 
ethnopolitical entrepreneurs were constituting the “nation,” including an examination of 
what they were doing with the categories of, i.e., “ethnicity,” “gender,” “religion,” class,” 
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This chapter seeks to examine the shifting political boundaries and how individuals were 
positioning themselves vis-à-vis the community and the coordinates that determined 
individual formulations of rights & belongings in the period of rapid constitutional 
changes of the late 40s and 50s.  It attempts to explore, in particular, aspects of the terms 
in which African ethnopolitical entrepreneurs were reconstituting community and notions 
of citizenship in this period.   It examines how they were endeavoring to combine 
materials that provided potential community or groupness,810 such as language, religion, 
and culture, into “nation” and to what effect. 811    In this period, the “nation” was being 
imagined among them in more exclusionary terms, demarcated discursively around 
systems of negative distinctions in relation to not only differences of race vis-à-vis the 
colonizer, but, internally, of “ethnicity,” “religion,” “gender,” “class,” etc.  The chapter 
seeks to explore aspects of how ethnopolitical entrepreneurs were attempting to reshape 
lines of identification and the effects of their categorization on self-understanding, social 
organizations and political claims of colonials.  For example, the NPC political party in 
Northern Nigeria,  in their attempts to win constituencies among the Hausa-Fulanis in 
their regional base in Northern Nigeria, discursively constituted minority Southerners 
living in the North, especially the Western-educated and Christian Yorubas and Ibos from 
Western and Eastern Regions, as the “outsiders” and “infidels.”  The then Provincial 
Commissioner in Zaria, Alhaji Ladan Baki, reported in an interview with Billy Dudley on 
how they “had to teach the people to hate Southerners; to look on them as people 
depriving them of their rights in order to win them over.”812  Many Hausa-Fulani 
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commoners were receptive to this too, as seen in their participation in the May 1953 
political disturbances in Kano.813  
 In this period, as opportunities for gaining power at the local and national levels 
were began to open up and as the resources of the state were being redistributed to the 
regional and local administrative units, competition for resources and to the means by 
which they were controlled became intensified among Africans.814  Hitherto 
developments towards National Societies and/or mutually- inclusive categories, 
especially in the cities, began to be increasingly undermined in the discourses and 
practices of ethnopolitical entrepreneurs especially.  Local and regional tensions 
intensified as ethnopolitical entrepreneurs, seeking to acquire political power, 
discursively constituted the “nation” in “ethnic,” “gendered,” and other exclusive terms.  
There was talk by Awolowo and the leadership of the AG party of the “Yoruba nation,” 
of proving to the British colonial authorities that the “’Yorubas’ can govern themselves;” 
talk by the Northern Nigerian Islamic ruling elites of driving out the “the infidels,” in 
reference to the Christian Yoruba and Ibo nationalities in the North; talk by the Creoles 
of Freetown in Sierra Leone of their supremacy and their rights of ascendancy over the 
“illiterate” Protectorate Africans in the hinterland; talk of the “Ashanti nation” and cry of 
Asante Kotoko, woyaa, woyaa yie among the Asantes in the Gold Coast as the Ashanti 
National Liberation Movement was inaugurated on September 19, 1954 in the Gold 
Coast, etc.  “Nation-talk” was being privileged in divisive and virulent religious terms, as 
seen in the 1953 Kano riots in Northern Nigeria explored a little further below in which 
the Moslem Hausa-Fulani supporters of the NPC Northern political party war-sang: “the 
pagans have killed a Hausa woman, we must kill the pagans before they kill us,” etc., 
referring to the Christian Southerners in the North.  Men in their male-entrenched 
political organizations were privileging the discourse of the “nation” and notions of 
citizenship in patriarchal gendered terms.  In the most dramatic case, the provision of 
franchise to women was perceived as “revolutionary” and the men would rather seek to 
put women in their place, i.e., as disenfranchised, disempowered party members in 
parallel women’s wings in their political organizations, or in “purdah,” in the case of 
Moslem women. 
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 This chapter seeks to examine the gap between the “nationalist” organizations and 
the putative groups in whose names they claimed to speak.  It examines what 
ethnopolitical entrepreneurs and their political organizations were doing with categories 
of, i. e., “ethnicity,” “religion,” “gender,” “class,” etc., in their political organizations in 
this period and to what effect.815  It attempts to examine aspects of the process of 
delegitimation and entitlement among citizenry and the language and mechanisms of 
inclusion and exclusion involved in this process.  It seeks to show how, in this period, the 
language of ethnicity, race, religion, class, etc., which may signal the recovery of the 
history needed to bind diverse elements, i.e., subgroups, into a single whole, was being 
applied by African politicians – the political entrepreneurs and cultural producers – in 
ways that concealed the actual inequities and exploitation and patterns of domination and 
exclusion inevitably involved. 
 
                          II 
 
The making of categories of ethnic, race, religion, class, and gender, etc., into “nation” in 
this period also involved the redefinition of the structural conditions under which the 
conflicts of interest at the level of local African society were shaped.816  In this period, 
age old conflicts in local African societies within and between communities and 
individuals, including competition between settler and non-settler natives in local 
communities, and conflicts arising from relations between old (chiefs) and aspirant new 
power holders, i.e., Western-educated Africans, and with other sections of the 
community, began to be reconstituted into conflicts carried on in nationality terms.  
African politicians, seeking political power and already reinventing themselves as 
‘partners worth working with’ to colonial officials, went to the people and got involved in 
local conflicts, ostensibly to help resolve these but in the process sought to discursively 
transform these conflicts into ones carried on in the name of the “nation.”  “Nationalist” 
politics began to interconnect in quite complex and contradictory ways with other 
varieties of African politics and discourses.  Socially-relevant conflicts of interests which 
in local African societies remained rooted in the sphere of, i.e., economic life, religion, 
kinship, relations between age and sex categories, etc., began to be increasingly 
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transmuted into nationally-relevant conflicts of interest.817  Major sources of local 
conflicts taking on new life at this time and being reconstituted in nationality terms 
included conflicts between old and new aspirant status holders, i.e., “class”-related 
conflicts, and conflicts between colonial chiefs and commoners in local administrative 
units, i.e., community-/grassroots-related conflicts, etc.  The anti-Agbaje Movement in 
Ibadan, Western Provinces of Nigeria, in 1949-52, and the crises between the colonial 
chiefs and commoners in Iperu and Ogere, and in Oyo, Western Provinces of Nigeria 
explored a little further below, illustrate how ethnopolitical entrepreneurs were 
attempting to reconstitute the conflicts in local African societies through their political 
organizations818 in this period and to what effects. Languages of exclusion, couched in 
religious, ethnic, class, and gendered terms, became more privileged even while the 
rhetoric was unitary.     
 
The “Native/Settler”-“Autochthon/Allochthon” Dichotomy 
 
The politics of this period also involved a redefinition and politicization of the 
native/settler distinction.  This was in the efforts to limit access to resources for the 
categorically constituted “outsiders.”  In Nigeria, for example, as the resources of the 
state were now being directed to the regions and distributed by the regional political 
power and as the administrative units were becoming channels through which the state 
afforded limited redistribution in on-going changes in local administration, non-native 
status began to be politicized in host communities.  In Ibadan, Western provinces of 
Nigeria, for example, on-going tensions between natives and non-native settlers such as 
over ownership of land, taxation, etc., which had previously been kept to a minimum 
became heightened in this period.  In the desire of native Ibadans to appropriate new 
resources and power to themselves, they sought to retain stranger origin as a permanent 
status attribute on non-natives and to oppose them as ineligible to purchase land.  On the 
other hand, inclusion in the community was competed for and claimed by the “non-
natives” as they contested such attempts to exclude them from resources and institutions 
that conferred power and privileges in their host communities.  In many localities, efforts 
to redefine native/settler status and rights and entitlements were spearheaded by the 
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ethnopolitical entrepreneurs and the coalitions that they built around them to this effect.  
The anti-Agbaje movement examined below exemplifies these endeavors by 
ethnopolitical entrepreneurs in Ibadan.  
 In the anti-Agbaje conflict, Chief Agbaje’s citizenship status in Ibadan was 
questioned by his political rivals who attempted to redefine him as a non-native settler in 
Ibadan in their efforts to thwart the chances of his becoming the next Olubadan in 
Ibadan, the highest-ranking political post equivalent to that of the colonial chief.  By 
February 1951, a new United Front Committee was formed by Ibadan natives, 
spearheaded by Agbaje’s political rivals, though composed of otherwise internal warring 
factions, to counter “the new threat of the native settlers in Ibadan over the questions of 
alienation of land to non-Ibadans and representation of non-Ibadans on N. A. Council.”819  
One of its constituent groups, the Ibadan People’s Union (I.PU), on February 10, 1951 
called on the Government to re-affirm the settlers’ status as “strangers ineligible to 
purchase land although,” they went on, “the settlers had been allowed to mix 
indiscriminately with native Ibadans.”820  Indeed, they had been allowed to “mix 
indiscriminately” with native Ibadans before but now, with the new resources and power 
being allocated to the regions and provinces, much was perceived to be at stake and the 
“natives” – the omo ibile, i.e., sons of the soil -  were eager to appropriate these for 
themselves only, exclusive of the “settlers!”  In Ijeshaland, also in the Western Provinces 
of Nigeria, the Egbe Omo Ibile Ijesha (the “Society of Native Ijesha Sons”) which had 
been founded as far back as July, 1940to express resentment at the employment of non-
Ijeshas around the town and had argued that Native Authority positions be held only by 
Ijeshas had more or less lapsed. 821  But it was now reactivated in the era when access to 
resources was being determined on regional/divisional basis. 
 
The Anti-Agbaje Movement 
 
The anti-Agbaje Movement is significant in a variety of ways but above all for 
this study is its significance in the way that certain vested interests in the community 
sought to reconstitute the native/settler dichotomy, as well as the contestations over rights 
and entitlements by both native settlers and non-native settlers alike in Ibadan.  It 
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involved struggles by the latter not to be made into non-native settlers, i.e., as a 
disenfranchised constituency, alienated from access to resources and the means to control 
them, whereas the distinction between natives and non-native settlers had been blurred 
hitherto.  These contestations patterned the anti-Agbaje movement. 822  The movement 
also became redefined by those constituted as “outsiders” – non-native settlers – in 
Ibadan such as the Ijebus and the Egbas, and led by Awolowo, as a struggle for 
citizenship rights, i.e., for democratic rights and for equal representation and voting rights 
of all tax payers in Ibadan, further broadening the terms of the discourse in which the 
struggle was constituted.  
The anti-Agbaje conflict was essentially a “class” conflict, involving rivalry 
among old and new aspirant power holders.  However, it soon became reconstituted to 
involve sub-nationality conflicts, communal conflicts pertaining to boundary issues, 
settler versus non-settler conflicts (i.e., immigrant issues), generational conflicts, and 
nationally-relevant conflicts, etc.823  The immediate cause of the Anti-Agbaje movement 
in Ibadan in 1949 was, however, more narrowly and class-based, issuing from conflicts 
between the old and the new nobility.824  It involved the desire of certain Ibadan chiefly 
elites to arrest the meteoric rise of a new elite, Chief Salami Agbaje, the Otun Balogun, 
one of important Ibadan chiefs, and to prevent him from potential access to a coveted 
post - that of the Olubadan.825  Agbaje’s success as a capitalist had become threatening to 
his opponents, particularly the old nobility who felt that he would use his Western 
education and wealth to reach to the top position as Olubadan, felt to be the preserves of 
the old nobility.826  Agbaje, as the Otun or second ranking chief in the Balogun’s line, 
was eligible for the Olubadanship should it become available.  His opponents therefore 
attempted to depose him and deprive him of his current chieftaincy title as the Otun 
Balogun in order to preclude his chances of rising through the ranks to become the next 
Olubadan.   
In the process, the struggle became discursively constituted into a nationality 
issue, first as Ibadan natives versus non-natives as Agbaje’s opponents tried to depict him 
as a native stranger, etc.  The criteria of native became subject to new sets of 
interpretation and tradition was construed to legitimize newly-constructed definitions of 
native/non-native status and citizenship rights by Agbaje’s political opponents as they 
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tried to depict Agbaje as a non-native and therefore ineligible to the post of chieftaincy 
that he currently held.  But the claim against him was contrived as Agbaje had legitimate 
claims as a citizen and native of Ibadan.827  As Post and Jenkins summized in regard to 
Agbaje’s opponents, “opportunism was their strongest common feature.”828  As the 
struggle progressed, the personal became the communal as it became discursively 
couched in a community, patriotic ethos, i.e., in the name of “the people” to whom the 
struggle was carried.  Hitherto conflicts between different constituencies among Ibadan 
natives based on differences in education, wealth, age, etc., were subsumed as many 
erstwhile and oppositional organizations among the Ibadan natives came together to form 
a grand coalition, the United Front Committee.829  The coalition was formed “in the name 
of the people” against Agbaje and to oppose non-natives in the attempt to exclude the 
latter from the resources of the province.  The anti-Agbaje alliance was united only by 
opportunism.  Post and Jenkins aptly remarked in regard to this movement that “the most 
personal, ancient, and opportunistic elements entered into the dispute in the absence of 
any clear rules as to the boundaries of the conflict!”830  They further summized that “in 
the name of ‘the town’ and of a rather dubious and eroded tradition the forces gathered to 
pull down a strong man.”831   
The settler issue which was an important component of this struggle also became 
the vehicle by which the movement was reconstituted into a nationally-relevant struggle.  
This occurred as the largely Yoruba-composed Egbe, and later the AG in 1951, and the 
NCNC waded into this conflict, as they and other ethnopolitical entrepreneurs and their 
organizations in this and the other colonies would do in many other local conflicts in this 
period, to move the movement along and to transform it into a struggle carried on in 
pursuit of the attainment of regional and/or national unity and freedom.  The Egbe/AG 
led by Awolowo and other Yoruba Western-educated and commercial class, mostly 
Ijebus and Egbas, and who supported Agbaje, would appeal for unity among Yorubas of 
which the Ibadans formed a sub-nationality group, against perceived Ibo hegemony under 
the Azikiwe-led NCNC.  The NCNC allied itself in support of native Ibadans against the 
Agbaje faction as means of gaining some leverage against its political rival, the AG.  The 
anti-Agbaje coalition did not, however, in the end succeed in displacing Agbaje.  The 
Butcher Commission of Inquiry that was set up by the colonial government to look into 
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the anti-Agbaje agitational movement dismissed the allegations against him as unfounded 
and British officialdom rejected the attempt to get rid of him.832  In the end, the Agbaje 
crisis only set into motion a train of events that helped to hasten the government’s reform 
process, reform initiatives that also inadvertently fed local conflicts and competition. 
 
Going to the People 
 
The Iperu/Ogere Crises  
 
The involvement of African politicians in local struggles served to further intensify and 
to redefine the conflicts and struggles in local African society.  African politicians went 
to the people and sought to reconstitute the conflict and competition within and between 
groups and communities into ones carried on in the name of the “nation” and of 
“national” freedom.  In Iperu and Ogere, Ijebu-Remo sub-division of the Western 
Provinces of Nigeria, the Yoruba Egbe organization got involved in the on-going 
grassroot movements of the people of Iperu and Ogere against their rulers - the colonial 
chiefs the Ologere of Ogere and the Alaperu of Iperu, and sought to resolve the crises in 
terms of the wider unity of the Yoruba nation.   Awolowo would subsequently say in 
regard to what he perceived to be the successful resolution of the conflicts in these 
localities that it would prove to the colonial authority that “we,” the Yorubas, “are able to 
resolve our differences ourselves.”  This was in part to legitimize Awolowo’s and the 
Yoruba politicians’ support for the country’s governance and political advance on 
regional basis.  However, it is not clear that the popular issues, i.e., issues of democracy, 
etc., involved in these crises were successfully or fully resolved.  
The agitational movement in these localities had issued as a distinct conflict in the 
relations between the colonial chiefs - the Alaperu of Iperu and the Ologere of Ogere - 
and a cross-section of the community who were seeking for changes in the perceived 
undemocratic local administrative system in these provinces.  The conflict had been long-
standing since 1945 but would soon incorporate other causes and interests.  By 1950, the 
movement had quickly developed into a united opposition of the mass of the people: 
commoners who formed important part of the agitational movements here, disaffected 
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sections of the old chiefly nobility, junior chiefs, and sections of the Western-educated 
Africans.  The junior chiefs, still unreconciled to their downgrading in the colonial 
administrative hierarchy, included in Iperu the Olisa of Iperu, Olugbade Oremade, the 
chief Asiwaju of Iperu, Awoniyi Jogbodo and the Lemamu of Iperu, J. O. Gisanrin.  In 
Ogere, they included the chief Oliwo of Ogere, chief Jomu.  Among the ranks of some of 
these lesser chiefs were also the new Western-educated Africans who were also 
beginning to take on chieftaincy titles at this time to strengthen their social base of power.  
These new aspirant power holders, together with the disaffected chiefs, formed 
themselves at this time into quasi socio-political organizations called Majeobaje Societies 
(i.e. society for the prevention of social destabilization) in both places.  The Ogere 
Majeobaje Society included those like S. T. Oredein, A. Shofunmade, and J. O. 
Akinbowale, those who would subsequently emerge into greater prominence as 
significant actors on the Nigerian political scene in quest of self-government for the 
country.   
The struggle of the people against their Obas in Iperu and Ogere in Ijebu Remo 
sub-division was essentially tied to local issues and involved disputes over governance 
and laws as well as over rights and entitlements.  The participants were reacting against 
the ills of the Native Authority system involving principally the perceived unbridled and 
arbitrary use of power by the colonial chiefs as well as their own lack of representation in 
the system.  The colonial chiefs were accused of wrongfully controlling and misusing the 
judicial system in their capacity as sole adjudicator in criminal cases, illegally taking 
communal lands, misappropriating funds, and engaging in “anti-social” practices such as 
seduction of married women.833  The conflicts had been long-standing, and the colonial 
authorities had tried unsuccessfully to resolve it previously, as earlier mentioned.  At 
Ogere, what they did, in the usual officialdom’s fashion, was simply to order the 
dissolution of the Town Council at the meeting where the petition against the Ologere 
and the request for his deposition was first brought to official notice during the Chief 
Commissioner’s tour of both areas in September 1949.834  The reason given for the 
dissolution was also typical of officialdom’s normal response to popular pressures.  The 
Council was ordered to be dissolved by the Chief Commissioner “because of its 
irresponsibility.”835  Officials had just then realized that the title “Town Council” was 
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“unbefitting of Ogere anyway as Ogere is no more than a village.”836  By the beginning of 
1950, the movement had resulted in the participants’ demand for the resignation of the 
colonial chiefs and which the chiefs refused to do.  When the Chief Commissioner was 
later approached by the reconciling parties of Yoruba Obas and members of the Egbe, 
after the initial meeting summoned in Ibadan by the Oni of Ife, with a request to grant 
permission to them to send a Peace Mission to Ogere and Iperu, he was obliging.  The 
involvement of the Egbe under Awolowo was able to help arrest the further deterioration 
of this crisis at this time837 at the same time as it also served to broaden the political 
discourse in this and other localities in “nationalist” terms.   
The Egbe/AG became involved in other conflicts and movements in Yorubaland, 
seeking to introduce into the conflicts in these places a nationality discourse predicated 
on the creation of the unity of the Yorubas as a precursor to the unity of the Nigerian 
nation.  They were not successful at capturing all social movements or organizations as 
constituent parts of the AG,838 however.  The AG sought, unsuccessfully, to bring the 
AWU movement and the Nigerian Women’s Union (NWU) under its umbrella at the 
same time as it was supportive of the return of the Alake against which the AWU under 
FRK was opposed.  FRK, who sought to sustain the democratic component of the AWU 
movement and was insistent on the permanent removal of the Alake,839 refused to allow 
the AG to bring the AWU under its tutelage and cooperated more with the NCNC which 
it perceived to be more progressive.  The AG succeeded, however, in getting support 
from factions within the AWU and became an opponent subsequently of the AWU/NWU 
under FRK leadership.  The outright patriarchal/gendered nature of the AG, from which 
the NCNC could also not be absolved, made the AG and AWU under FRK leadership to 
be diametrically opposed to one another, among other considerations.  The AWU/NWU 
under FRK’s leadership sought to reconstitute gender norms in more equitable terms, 
norms that the ethnopolitical entrepreneurs in the AG and in other mainstream political 






Community and the Mechanisms of Inclusions and Exclusions 
   
This section seeks to examine more closely aspects of what African politicians were 
doing with the categories of ethnicity, religion, gender, etc., and how community and 
citizenship were being constituted in their discourses and practices and in their political 
organizations.  It seeks to examine the mechanisms and language of inclusion and 
exclusion involved in this process.  
 
Languages of Inclusion and Exclusion 
 
The privileging of the discourse of unity along vertical lines, i.e.,  “we are all Yorubas,” 
“we are all Asantes,”  “we are all Moslems,” etc., intended to bind groups into a 
collective whole not only excluded certain others but also served to blur the horizontal 
lines of division that cut across the would-be inclusive group.  In Nigeria, the Western 
regional political party, the AG, imagined the “nation” as predicated on the unity of the 
Yoruba people and of other major nationality groupings.  But the discourse of the 
“nation” based on the unity of major nationality groupings and in the way it was being 
constituted was not only potentially discursively excluding other nationalities vis-à-vis 
the other, it was also serving to marginalize sub-nationality groupings within the major 
nationality groupings.  This involved the blurring of inherent lines of division and the 
competing interests between and among individuals and groups within each major 
nationality groupings based on western education, wealth, religion, gender, etc.   
 In the Western Region of Nigeria, Oladoke Akintola, the charismatic leader of the 
Ogbomosho Parapo (OP) party and later the Deputy Leader of the AG and known for his 
oratory, 841 was very skilful in his use of pun and play on words to mobilize the Yoruba 
constituencies and to gain electoral votes based on what was believed united the Yorubas 
in opposition to others.  To woo the Yoruba voters from the AG’s rival party in the West, 
the NCNC party which had been dubbed the ‘Ibo party’ as it was indeed highly 
composed of Ibos by this time, Akintola would further appeal to the Yorubas through the 
play on words suggestive of the fact that it was the Ibos in the NCNC party that were out 
to dispossess the Yorubas.  He would, for example, use the Ibo leaders’ names, such as 
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“Ikejiani,” which bastardized translation into a Yoruba word meant “the other person has 
accumulated wealth at your expense” and would ask, playing on the word Ikejiani, “Ekini 
a ni, Ikejiani, ni’gba wo ni iwo na y’oni ti e?” (translation: ‘this one has and that one has, 
when are you ever going to have your own?”).  This was to imply that support for the 
NCNC (the “Ibo party”) would only accrue more wealth into the hands of the Ibos at the 
expense of the Yorubas and that it was only when the Yorubas acted in unison that the 
resources of the nation would flow into their own region - Western Region - and into 
individual hands.  It worked for the AG.  But the appeal lacked substance and also did not 
address how the mass of the Yorubas to whom this appeal was directed would be able to 
access the promised resources and accumulate these for themselves.  For example, not 
one cocoa farmer was directly put on the Cocoa Marketing Board when it was 
decentralized to the regions.  Yet the wealth of the Western Region was based in this 
period mainly on the income generated from cocoa production.  Except for its resounding 
success and attention to the issue of education which the AG’s Universal Primary 
Education (UPE) program signified,842 his AG political party that dominated the Western 
Region of Nigeria did not seriously address many of these issues. The AG and the 
politicians that headed it, as with other ethnopolitical entrepreneurs and their political 
parties, were more out to win electoral votes and to consolidate their power position and 
control of the West.   
Also, the major nationality groupings on which the discourse of regionalism was 
predicated were not monolithic.  The Yorubas, for example, were certainly not a 
monolithic group.  Though a highly homogenous people in terms of culture and formed a 
well-defined society with a common history, shared experience, distinct and common 
language, single and contiguous geographic area and even the belief in a common 
eponymous ancestor, Oduduwa,843 they had differences in regional traits and 
characteristics and recognized their membership in sub-groups such as Ijebu, Ibadan, 
Ijesha, Ekiti, Ondo, Akoko, Oyo, etc.  Hence the conflicts of interests between and 
among them which dated into the nineteenth century and continued, in renewed contexts, 
especially in the era of new constitutional provisions and re-allocation of revenues to the 
regions and which afforded access to power and resources by those that controlled the 
regional government.  Throughout most of the nineteenth century, the Yorubas were 
 180
known to have been busily engaged in fratricidal internecine warfare, after the collapse of 
the old Oyo Empire which had been a powerful political center, and as new centers of 
power were being established and new political alignments were being made.844  The 
differences and causes of disenchantment among the Yoruba nation were no less so in the 
era of colonial rule,845 or now, in the era of political decentralization.  In fact, the very 
promise of a new era in which power and control of funds and resources were being 
devolved to Africans by the foreign power actualized the differences and made the 
competition among them more volatile.  It was such that certain sub-groups of the 
Yorubas, some constituencies among Ibadan natives, organized into the Egbe K’Oyinbo 
Mai’lo846 (the “society for the white man not to depart yet”).  They would rather have the 
foreign power – the British - remain in power and in control than have the perceived 
Ijebu-Egba-composed Yoruba Western regional political party – the AG - hold sway over 
them.  It was also due to the rivalry and competition among the Yoruba sub-groups that 
many Ibadan and Ijesha constituencies went into alliance with the Ibo-composed NCNC 
as means of gaining leverage over their Yoruba compatriots who formed the leadership 
and membership of the AG.  
 It was these and other differences among the Yoruba nationality groupings, 
including gender inequities, that the AG’s discourse of the unity of the Yorubas, for 
example, stood to discursively obliterate.  The unity of the Yoruba ‘nation’ was being 
constituted by Awolowo and the leadership of the AG at the expense of the meaningful 
inclusion of important constituencies such as women, farmers, etc., who also comprised 
the ‘nation’ being constructed by them.   The AG did not seriously engage, for example, 
with how the resources that were now being directed to the regions would be equitably 
distributed among the various groups  that composed the Yoruba nation in its region of 
control – the Western Region – or how they would be equitably represented.  Hence some 
Yoruba sub-groups perceived the AG party as the party that privileged the interest of 
certain other Yoruba sub-groups and class, i.e., the Egbas and the Ijebus and who were 
also the professional, Western-educated, Christian, and commercial class that comprised 
the AG party leadership, over that of other sub-groups such as the Ibadans, and other felt 





African politicians – the ethnopolitical entrepreneurs - were also politicizing religion in 
their “nation-forming” endeavors and in their desire to acquire power and/or consolidate 
their power base.  In the North of Nigeria, the ruling elites that also composed the 
leadership of the NPC party privileged the discourse of “One religion” and appealed to a 
shared Islamic faith that potentially united rulers and most of the ruled in the North of 
Nigeria to construct a “homogenous” nation in the North.  However, the NPC’s discourse 
of “One Religion” in a territory composed also of significant Christian population, as 
well as animists, though in the minority, was more reflective of its attempts to sustain the 
hegemony of the Northern political elite by seeking to sublimate internal religious 
differences in the North while using the category of religion as a political weapon.  
Radical rightwing groups and stalwarts within the NPC such as the Association of 
Madmen formed in 1953, operated for sometime as rightwing extremist groups seeking to 
realize the NPC’s goals by mobilizing on religious grounds against “unbelievers,”847 i.e., 
all non-Moslems in the North.  The NPC also used its control of the Native Courts - the 
alkali courts - in the North, to put non-Moslems, as well as women, at a disadvantage in 
its procedures and judgments.  The Report of the Commission of Enquiry that was set up 
later to look into the fears of minorities in Nigeria found, for example, that “in theory … 
the evidence of a male Muslim is of greater value than that of a woman, a Christian, or a 
pagan.”848  
 The use of religion to bind diverse elements, i.e., subgroups, into a single whole 
also conceals the inherent inequities and exploitation and patterns of domination and 
exclusion.  The NPC party’s endeavors and representation of Northern society in 
homogenous terms concealed the otherwise lines of division between the wealthy and 
ruling elites that composed the leadership of this party on the one hand, and the mass of 
the impoverished populace, on the other, though the lines of division were mediated in 
certain ways by, i.e., patron-client relationships and other and complex forms of 
relationship people were involved in.  The NPC would exploit the very structure of 
inequity in the Northern Native Authority system, based in part on unequal access to 
resources and to the means by which these were controlled, to amass votes in the North 
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and to legitimize its discourse of the “nation” in the terms in which it sought to privilege 
it.  Allegiance to the NPC party was derived in ways that included the fear of losing 
privileges controlled by the Native Authorities such as the right to jobs in the Native 
Administration, the ability to enroll children in the Native Authorities schools, or the 
ability to enjoy the patronage of the Native Authorities in the award of contract to both 
small and big businesses.  Those who in spite of these went ahead to join more popularly-
based political movements or parties such as the NEPU that challenged the NPC and the 
structure of inequities that it was perceived to be based on suffered recriminations from 
the state.  These included loss of jobs and property, including summary arrests, beatings 
and imprisonment.  The memoirs of Mallam Ringim, a Moslem intellectual and an 
avowed NEPU leader and activist, are filled with such incidents of beatings, deprivation, 
and constant imprisonment at the hands of the Native Authorities.849   
The NPC’s discourse of “One North, one People, irrespective of religion, rank 
and tribe,” was in reality, a myth and represented a further attempt by the NPC to 
sublimate internal differences and divisions, as well as to undermine the rights and 
entitlements of other sub-nationality groups within its region, even while the rhetoric 
acknowledged these differences.  The NPC was built on, and was meant to sustain these 
very differences and structure of inequity.  The minority Tivs and other sub-groups that 
comprised part of the Northern region at the time did not feel well served in terms of 
access to the resources or the institutions of power in the North.  Even among the Hausa-
Fulanis that made up the bulk of the Northern population, the erstwhile lines of division 
between Hausa indigenes and the Fulanis who came as conquering and aristocratic 
invaders in the pre-colonial period850 remained in important ways, blurred only by such 
ties as patron-client ties, etc.  It was these differences and structures of inequity that 
privileged the aristocratic Hausa-Fulani ruling elites against the mass of the Hausa 
peasantries and other sub-groups that the NEPU stood to challenge, though fairly 
unsuccessfully, in its counter discourse of community and citizenship in mutually-
inclusive terms.851   
In the North of Nigeria, as in other similar cases in the other colonies, the ruling 
elites were able to manipulate resources at their disposal to their advantage and to turn 
the “class” divide on its head fairly well by exploiting the “ethnic” or “nationality” and/or 
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religious divide between Hausa-Fulanis and non Hausa-Fulanis.  They were able to fairly 
successfully invoke their shared Islamic faith with the talakawas, i.e., the mass of the 
peasantries, to enforce some degree of obedience and conformity and to evoke, stir, 
summon, and mobilize them against their political opponents and competitors in the 
North and from outside their regional base of power in their efforts to consolidate their 
hold on power.  Within their region, the Western-educated Southerners, and other 
Southerners, many of whom were also Christians, and who formed the mainstay of the 
Northern regional administration and important sectors of the Northern economy outside 
the group of expatriates, were identified as the “class oppressors” by the NPC in its 
efforts to win mass support.   
The May 1953 Kano crisis demonstrates what more recent studies have shown of 
how rulers’ practices of naming, classifying, and summoning and evoking “groups” 
affected/shaped the self-understandings, social organizations, lines of identification, and 
political claims of subjects.  Commenting, for example, on the performative character of 
categories of ethnopolitical practice and the ways in which, and purpose to which 
ethnopolitical entrepreneurs evoke “groups,” Brubaker  writes  that “by invoking groups, 
they seek to evoke them, summon them, call them into being … to justify, mobilize, 
kindle, and energize.”852  He adds that “by reifying groups, by treating them as 
substantial things-in-the-world, ethnopolitical entrepreneurs can … ‘contribute to 
producing what they apparently describe or designate.”’ 853  In the May 1953 crisis in 
Kano, Northern Nigeria, significant segments of the Hausa peasantries and talakawas 
whose interests NEPU was organized to fight for, bought into the appeal of the NPC for 
support based on their shared Islamic faith and many of them rose in support of the rulers 
and Northern elites, who composed the NPC party leadership, against the “infidels” 
(Christians) from the South with whom NEPU was affiliated.  The May 1953 Kano 
disturbances occurred as a result of the attempts of the Southern parties - AG and NCNC 
- in conjunction with NEPU, to hold political rallies in search of electoral votes in this 
part of the nation.  The Kano Native Authorities, composed of many of the leaders of the 
NPC political party of the North, were bitterly opposed to the “invasion” of the North by 
the Southern political parties and mobilized against them.  In the political disturbances 
that followed in Kano, many talakawas demonstrated against NEPU and the Southern 
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parties - the AG and the NCNC - on behalf of the NPC, shouting ethnically- and 
religiously-charged slogans such as, “We do not want the Yorubas here,” “the Ibos had 
killed all the Northerners in the Sabon Gari,” and “the pagans have killed a Hausa 
woman, we must kill the pagans before they kill us.”854  The 1953 crisis in Kano could 
also be said to demonstrate in some ways the symbolic power of the state, according to 
Foucault’s notion of governmentality, to state what is what and who is who and thereby 




The creation of boundaries of exclusion in the discourses and practices of African 
ethnopolitical entrepreneurs also involved the making of the category of gender into 
“nation” in mutually-exclusive forms.  It involved the closure of political opportunities 
allowed discursively for women’s presence and agency in their political organizations as 
well.  Gender boundaries were created in mainstream political parties such as the AG, 
NCNC, CPP, SLPP, etc.  Membership and formal participation of women in these parties 
were predicated on various kinds of containment and subordination.856  Parallel women’s 
organizations – women’s wings - were created in these mainstream parties but the 
purpose was mainly to strengthen the base of power of the male-dominated parties 
without giving political agency to these women.  Women were not in the executive or in 
decision-making bodies such as could influence party policy or agendas.  Instead, they 
were seen as another source of acquiring electoral votes.  One was through the use of 
whatever influence they could exert on the electorate, i.e., through the women’s wings of 
the parties.  The Sardauna of Sokoto, Alhaji Ahmadu Bello, leader of the NPC party that 
controlled the Nigerian Central Government at independence in 1960, saw women’s 
enfranchisement, if at all conceded, as serving to empower men and the party, for 
example.857  “It would, of course, greatly strengthen our position as a party,’ he 
commented later in his reflection on the issue of voting rights for women, ‘for all the 
women would vote in the same direction as their men folk and thus our support would be 
more than doubled by a stroke of the pen.”858   
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 African ethnopolitical entrepreneurs were more successful at putting women on 
the agenda of their political organizations as symbolic of inclusiveness or of the need for 
change, than for incorporating gender analysis and gender equity into the discourse of the 
nation or of change.  Mainstream political parties, led and managed by men, constrained 
against women’s presence in terms of visibility, efficacy, and recognition, and in some, 
as in the NPC in Northern Nigeria, women virtually had no presence.  There, the 
invisibility of women was near total - in physical, social, and political terms.  The case of 
the NPC party dramatizes the highly gendered dimension and ways in which what had 
become mainstream political organizations in the 50s silence and marginalize women 
within and without these organizations. 
The NPC, more or less the party of the Moslem mallams, did not even make any 
pretensions of its patriarchal and gendered bent which the leadership believed to be 
legitimized by Islamic religious norms.  In his autobiography, Alhaji Ahmadu Bello, 
president of the NPC until his assassination in the 1966 Nigerian military coup, reflecting 
on the position, or rather the marginalization of women in the NPC, remained 
condescending towards women till the end.  In his reflection on the issue of voting rights 
for women, he stated that he believed that it would be socially destabilizing, with 
potentials for revolutionary upheavals, to give women the vote!859  He was convinced that 
“the unrest and trouble that would ensue would … be serious and widespread,”860 and 
that most of the men would be incapable of understanding the need for “such 
revolutionary change.”861  He recalled further in his autobiography that his party – the 
NPC - was often taken to task about votes for women, and said, “I dare say that we shall 
introduce it – but – and this is important – it is contrary to the wishes and feelings of the 
greater part of the men of this region that I would be very loathe to introduce it 
myself.”862  In this very patriarchal society, the male position and interest was the 
yardstick of what happens in regard to the status of women.  Thus, when the Sardauna 
conceded that women could be considered to have the vote, it was in terms of male role 
and empowerment, as stated above.  
The gendered dimension and the marginalization of women in colonial society as 
well as in mainstream parties was contested by the social radicals who attempted to 
reconstitute notions of gender in more equitable terms in their own discourses and 
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political organizations as is revealed in the following chapter.  Eyo Ita’s Constitutional 
Review Minority Report863 which emphasized the need to put women’s interest and 
agenda at the center of national discourse, and the discourses of alternative movements 
and organizations led by women radicals and other social radicals, provide apt 
commentary on the marginalized position of women in these mainstream parties and in 
colonial society.  The position of women in other more progressive political 
organizations, mainly those of social radicals like the WAYL, NEPU, or the NWU, 
compare more favorably to their position in mainstream political parties in which women 
remained subordinated.  Wallace-Johnson’s WAYL, for example, was the first political 
organization to put women in the executive of the party.864  
The marginalized position of women in mainstream political parties is not only 
reflective of the ways in which categories of “gender,” “religion,” “ethnicity,” etc., were 
being made into “nation” in these parties in mutually-exclusive and narrow terms but also 
of the political culture that defined the drive towards political independence in these 
societies.    
 
The Marginalization of Popular Issues, Part 1 
 
The political opportunities allowed discursively for other constituencies and other 
popular agendas were similarly constrained in mainstream political parties and in the 
“nation-forming” endeavors of ethnopolitical entrepreneurs.  From the 1950s onwards, 
and as these political parties - AG, NCNC, NPC (Nigeria); CPP, UGCC, NLM (Gold 
Coast); SLPP, NC (Sierra Leone) - were becoming more dominant in the colonies 
through the opportunities afforded them with the new constitutions, the discourse of the 
“nation” and of citizenship was being privileged in various ways and to varying degrees 
at the center of party and national agenda to the near exclusion of serious discussion of 
popular issues.  The vision of a self-governing nation and of its promised rewards was 
being substituted at this time for the discourse and resolution of popular issues affecting 
the mass of the people.  There was no discussion or serious discussion of how the various 
segments of society, especially the grassroot, would be included in the power structure or 
in the institutions by which they were governed, or of how they would gain equitable 
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access to the resources of the “nation,” causes that had galvanized these marginalized 
constituencies into action at various times.   Many of these had also joined what were 
now becoming mainstream political organizations and parties in the hope of realizing 
these goals.  
These political parties, seeking legitimacy and electoral votes, could not afford to 
ignore popular concerns initially or altogether, however.  In fact, the ability to thrive 
politically especially at the onset was based precisely on the degree to which efforts were 
made to address popular issues and concerns.  Initially, therefore, these political parties 
showed some openness to popular issues, such as the provision of amenities related to 
health, education, etc., in their discourses and to match their rhetoric of  “of life more 
abundant” if voted for.  The AG and the NCNC, for example, the two rival Southern 
Nigeria’s political parties, competed for electoral constituencies on a program based on 
welfare socialism, meant to promise equal opportunities for all citizens.  The Universal 
Primary Education Program (UPE) was the most succinct of such programs that were 
embarked upon.  Political leaders of the early 1950s – the ethnopolitical entrepreneurs - 
were in fact gaining popular support by promising such benefits to all citizens that neither 
the British nor the chiefs were likely to provide.  But the openness to popular issues 
became closed over time and remained more or less at the level of rhetoric in most 
instances.  Even where serious and sustained efforts were made to meet popular 
expectations as the AG and the NCNC attempted to do in their introduction of free 
universal primary education, popularly known as UPE, this had to be scaled down in the 
course of its implementation.  The UPE program is examined in some brief detail below 
as one of the select instances where some ethnopolitical entrepreneurs seriously 
addressed popular issues in socially radical terms in their political organization.  
 
The Universal Primary Education (UPE) Program 
 
The AG’s and NCNC’s welfare politics in Nigeria and which the UPE program 
typified was about the most effective in linking political leaders with the masses in these 
places.  The program was bigger than life in conception and overreaching in terms of 
actual financial and human resources available, but it matched popular expectation and its 
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very grandiosity, irrespective of the ability to deliver, recommended it highly to all 
constituencies.  The AG’s motto, “Freedom for All and Life More Abundant,” promised 
increase in the standard of living of Nigerians, reinforced by its name, the Action Group, 
translated as Egbe Afenifere which meant “the society of the lovers of good things.”  Its 
symbol, the palm tree, symbolized prosperity.  Both parties upped the ante, promising 
more than they could deliver, though the West had more financial resources to meet its 
obligations better than the East.  But both had to revise the U.P.E. program plan in the 
course of implementing it. 
The UPE program in the West was the most laudatory and it still lived on in 
popular consciousness in Nigeria till today, especially in the Western states of Nigeria 
where it was operative, as “Awolowo schools.”865  It was indeed a program conceived to 
meet, and in a lot of ways met popular expectation across the board, providing equality of 
opportunity to education for all irrespective of social background, religion, gender, and 
place of origin in the state, including previously underserved areas.  It was conceived and 
proposed as an “all-out expansion of all types of educational institutions,” a cornerstone 
of the principles that guided the AG party,  according to one of the authors of the program 
who was also regarded as the primary brain behind its formulation, Chief S. O. Awokoya, 
the Minister of Education for the Western Region.866  Chief Obafemi Awolowo, who 
became the Western Region’s Minister for Local Government and unofficial Leader of 
Government Business in the Western Region,867 only two days after the Western House 
of Assembly had assembled for its budget session, stated:  
As far as possible expenditure on services  which tend to 
the welfare and health and education of the people should 
be increased at the expense of any expenditure that does not 
answer to the same test.868    
 
 This commitment to free and easy access to education to all indeed showed the 
otherwise more narrowly-based mainstream political parties in their best light in Southern 
Nigeria as responsive to popular opinion.869  There is no doubt that education was one 
major issue on which the AG - and the NCNC - tried to meet popular pressure and 
expectation, and though both had to modify their initial grand scheme, they still 
succeeded in gaining public satisfaction over this.870   
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 Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the leader of the AG party, personified the belief and 
the values placed on education by the AG party.  He was convinced that education was 
the fundamental basis and cornerstone of any development program and the most potent 
weapon left to mankind to transform itself and its environment.871  He believed that a 
minimum level of education was required to have an enlightened citizenry for rapid 
development, that education was the prerequisite for leadership at all levels, and that it 
was an inalienable and fundamental right of every citizen.872  Because he recognized that 
not everyone would be able to afford to educate themselves even at the primary level 
because of their background, family, and class, etc., he came to the conclusion in 1954 
that the purpose and goal of education could not be attained unless it was free for all at all 
levels.873  He stated: 
In order to attain to the goals of economic freedom and 
prosperity Nigeria must do certain things as a matter of 
urgency  and priority.  It must provide free education  
(at all levels) for the masses of its citizens.874 
 
Although the AG gained major political capital from this program, there is no 
doubt that Awolowo, especially, was not out to play politics with the issue of education 
and free primary education for he was genuinely convinced of their merits.  He is widely 
believed and known in Nigeria to be the first Nigerian to advocate a free education policy 
and to implement it as leader of Government in the West.  This belief remained with him 
and he campaigned for it consistently and vigorously even after Nigeria’s independence 
to the extent that he also became in 1966, the first to suggest that it be included in 
Nigeria’s Constitution.875  It also formed one of the cardinal points of the Unity Party of 
Nigeria (UPN) which he formed in the 70s to contest the election for Nigeria’s Second 
Republic.876   
 
The Marginalization of Popular Issues, Part 2 
 
Free primary education was, indeed, an issue that these parties could not afford to 
neglect, as it was also dear to the heart of the populace and the underprivileged who saw 
western education as the way out of the ranks of the dispossessed and into the good life.   
These mainstream political parties and their leadership did not, however, exhibit the same 
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serious commitment to a variety of other popular issues such as, for example, the 
broadening of the base of representation to include other social forces as women, farmers, 
etc.  Grassroot constituencies remained marginalized in these political parties and neither 
did they have direct representation in the colonies’ governing institutions.  Even when the 
Marketing Boards were decentralized and afforded regional control in early 1954, no 
farmer or their representative was brought into these Marketing Boards, for example.   
The gendered and exclusionary terms in which nationhood was being constructed by 
these African politicians are reflected in their political discourses and party agendas and 
structure.  Although the franchise regulations limited Africans that could vote or be voted 
for, those who met the franchise regulations and could have served to effect the discourse 
of the nation in more popular terms, like the few social radicals who had been important 
members of these political parties, such as the labor radicals in the NCNC and in the 
CPP, were expelled or silenced.  The labor radicals’ attempts to continue to strive to 
privilege popularly-based discourse of rights and entitlements at the center of national 
agenda within these mainstream political organizations were deemed to be inconsistent 
with the goals and aspirations of the African politicians that controlled these parties.   
The hierarchical structures of mainstream political parties predisposed to the 
undermining of the discourse of popular issues and constrained against the realization of 
any democratic potentials in them.  The leadership components issued from a narrow 
select group: Western-educated, wealthy commercial group, chiefly elites, etc., i.e., the 
AG, UGCC, NPC, SLPP, and whose influence bore heavily on party policies and 
decisions.  Even in political parties that originated as more mass-oriented parties such as 
the NCNC in Nigeria and the CPP in the Gold Coast, the space for popular discourse 
became narrowed over time as the political entrepreneurs that controlled these parties 
began to gain and to consolidate political power in the 50s.  These mainstream political 
parties in the various colonies became characterized by a lack of open discussion and the 
silencing, in various ways, of voices from below or of alternative imaginings of the 
nation in more inclusive terms.877 
In the NCNC, dissensions with the views or position of the president, Azikiwe, 
were not usually received by him in good faith and had led to suspensions and/or 
dismissals of such critics, if not voluntary resignations by the latter.878  Azikiwe was 
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dexterous in having the NCNC party arrive at a decision that he was in favor of, even if 
this circumscribed the democratic process.  This is seen, for example, in the way the 
NCNC’s position was changed from its advocacy of a unitary constitution to its 
acceptance of a federalist one,879 as well as the way in which he tried to maneuver to his 
advantage the African Continental Bank scandal in which he was implicated.  Many party 
leaders that were critical of his financial dealings and wanted to get to the root of the 
matter were expelled or forced to leave the party.880  Those that left the party as a result 
of the ACB controversy and their felt frustration with Azikiwe included Eyo Ita. 
Internal dissensions and resignations within the mainstream parties also provide 
some glimpses into the narrow structural base of these parties.  Both Awolowo and 
Azikiwe in Nigeria and Nkrumah in the Gold Coast, for example, were severely criticized 
as their party’s president for dictatorial tendencies by some of those that had also held 
leadership positions in their parties and which led to some of these critics’ decision to 
resign from the party - that is, if they were not expelled as expulsion was a popular 
weapon of Azikiwe, especially.  More democratically-inclined leaders of the AG such as 
the Minister of Education, Mr. Awokoya, the Minister of Works, Mr. Babalola, and the 
AG Publicity Secretary, Mr. Amos, all criticized the perceived authoritarianism of the 
AG party and of the leader, Mr. Obafemi Awolowo, and resigned from the party. 881  Mr. 
Babalola described Awolowo as an “autocrat.”  Awokoya, who was also the primary 
author of the AG party’s educational schemes, resigned in 1955, opposed to what he 
perceived as “a totalitarian government dominated by the personality of Chief 
Awolowo.” 882  He subsequently established a new political party named the Nigerian 
People’s Party, indicative of Awokoya’s desire for a democratically-based party.  His 
political party did not, however, have the clout or the following that the AG had already 
acquired and it soon became disbanded.  The views of those disenchanted with the parties 
and who resigned from them may not be altogether disinterested and the squabbles in the 
party might also be indicative of a struggle for power among the party elites and 
leadership. 883  Nevertheless, their critiques of the party offer important validation of 
some of the shortcomings of these political parties and of their leadership components, as 
revealed in other contexts.    
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Also, the manner in which these political parties supported local issues served to 
marginalize popular issues as well.  The political parties that became mainstream in these 
West African colonies were lacking in ideology and were more geared towards what 
would win votes.  They were, as many African political parties at independence had been 
popularly referred to in studies of this period, mostly electoral machines.  These parties’ 
involvement in local conflicts/struggles and the positions staked out by the parties were 
usually contingent on the perceived advantage of what would advance the interest of the 
party and those of its leadership against rival parties and not necessarily on the merits of 
the conflicts or of their resolution in popular terms.   
The AG’s goal of creating a united Yoruba nation from a power base made up of 
new and old nobility, for example, often meant that its involvement in on-going local 
conflicts was determined by this singular goal which sometimes ran in opposition to 
popular interests.884  Thus, in two popular local movements against the colonial chiefs, 
the AG supported the chief in one and opposed the chief in the other, because one chief 
was compliant and harmonized with the AG’s goal and the other was not.  The AG had 
argued for the reinstatement of the deposed Alake of Egbaland on the basis of the unity of 
the Egbas and of the Yorubas even though the Alake was forced to abdicate as a result of 
popular grassroot movement against him.  In this case, the Alake was using the AG to 
help him gain back his position as much as the AG hoped to gain by subsequently 
appropriating his base of power in their support of him.  The same was true of their 
support of the Ologere of Ogere and Alaperu of Iperu in the conflicts between these 
chiefs and the populace in Ogere and Iperu although the Egbe/AG did not appear as 
partisan.  They helped to retain the chiefs in power while also gaining their support in the 
course of helping them.  In the case of the crises in Oyo, the AG which positioned itself 
on the sustenance of the Yoruba chiefs as crucial authority figures in Yoruba society, did 
not hesitate to undermine the authority of the Alafin of Oyo and to align against him 
when he proved to be a clog in the wheel of the AG’s advancement in that part of the 
Western region.  The Alafin of Oyo, Oba Adeyemi, was seen as an impediment to change 
and to the AG’s goal of extending its base of power in Oyo, the Alafin’s province.  The 
Alafin, fearful of the potential erosion of his power base, was resistant to the changes 
being made in the Native Authorities by Councilors elected under the 1952 Western 
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Regional Local Government Ordinance and who were mainly AG supporters; he also 
supported the movement against the Capitation Tax introduced by the AG-controlled 
Divisional Native Authority Council.885  The AG in turn supported the anti-Alafin faction 
and used its leverage and the political influence of the Councilors to thereby erode the 
base of power of the Alafin.886  The focus of the AG in all of these interventions was on 
the consolidation of its power base in these localities and provinces.   
The overriding factor in the NCNC alliances, as in the case of other parties 
elsewhere, was the drive to win votes and in competition with rival political parties.  In 
the case of its alliance with the Alafin of Oyo in his conflicts with the AG, the advantage 
went to the NCNC.  The NCNC, AG’s main political opponent, took political advantage 
of the disturbances in Oyo and gained the support of the Alafin, including that of the 
main organization of the Alafin’s supporters in Oyo, the Oyo Parapo, to gain a 
significant foothold in that part of the Western Provinces.  The question of the future of 
the Alafin was an important issue in the Western Regional election of May 1955, and the 
return of the Alafin who the AG had forced into exile was one of the main points in the 
NCNC program.  In the aftermath of the April 21st disturbances and of the election that 
followed in May 1955, the NCNC succeeded in having three of the five elected members 
from Oyo province as NCNC.887  
The constituent grassroot party members or supporters were also part cause of the 
displacement of issues of concern to them.  Some would, however, try to maneuver the 
process and the inherent ambiguities to their perceived advantage, making some winners 
and others losers.  Party affiliation by the people was also strategic, based on perceived 
gains, or what they had come to believe the political party could achieve for them – as 
opposed to what these parties could actually deliver to them!   
In what became the master-discourse of the nation, the rhetoric of life more 
abundant and promise of good things to come replaced the substance of that life more 
abundant.  The lack of ideological commitment to issues of social change and the 
imagining of the nation and citizenship in the terms in which African ethnopolitical 
entrepreneurs that led these mainstream parties contrasted with the colonial radicals’ 
ideological commitment to those issues, including issues of inclusiveness, and their 
attempt to privilege such issues in their discourses and political organizations.   So much 
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weight was now being put by the former on the grant of self-government to usher in the 
good life in the mid-50s that there was no serious discussion of the social and political 
arrangements that would ensure these and the rights of the citizens in the new 
independent states, or of the challenges to be overcome.  Rather, they placed the burden 
on the grant of self-government itself to usher in the life more abundant to all and as the 
panacea to all ills: social, political, economic, etc.  This position is captured in 
Nkrumah’s famous political dictum, “seek ye first the political kingdom and all other 
things would be added.”  It more or less represented the philosophical underpinnings of 
these mainstream parties in terms of their position on many of the compelling social 
issues of the time and of many other issues that could be anticipated in post-colonial 
African societies.  The ethnopolitical entrepreneurs did not, for example, confront the 
problem of African states’ social pluralism but blurred over it in their construction of a 
“homogenous” community which failed to address the underlying divisions and 
inequities.  The colonial social radicals attempted to confront this as well as many other 
pertinent social issues.  Post-independent African societies proved that all other things 
did not get added on automatically.  What it led to are the continued crises of democracy 
and citizenship in many post-independent African states, the spate of military coups 
especially in the first few decades of self-government, civil wars, genocide, etc. 888  
Mainstream party leadership’s goal of the acquisition of state/national power 
became synonymous with the nation-state.  There was no principled commitment among 
them to what would effect democratic change or how the nation-state would be sustained 
or be made viable.  And this is the critical factor and major shortcomings of the drive for 
self government among mainstream African politicians at this time – the lack of 
commitment to social change and democratic principles.  What there was among many of 
these political parties and the ethnopolitical entrepreneurs that composed its leadership, 
was, rather, a rush to self-governing statehood, to be paralleled by British officialdom’s 
own rush to decolonize from the mid-50s onwards.889 
Eyo Ita’s critique of the constitutional proposals being put forward during the 
General Conferences for the review of Nigeria’s constitution from 1949 was poignant in 
regard to the limitations of the terms in which the idea of self-government was being 
discussed, sought for, and was eventually given.  His alternative proposals for 
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constitutional change was premised on the notion of citizenship in more inclusionary 
terms, and was predicated on the resolution of, and centering of popular issues, such as 
the grant of universal suffrage, the provision of equality of opportunity to all Nigerians, 
etc.890  Mr. Eyo Ita, who was also at the Provincial and Regional Conferences for the 
review of Nigerian constitution, opened his minority reports by stating that “the new 
Constitution for Nigeria should seek to give the people of this country a genuine and 
thoroughly consistent democracy,” and lamented that the methods of distribution of 
franchise and grants and representation on the various levels of government being 
proposed “violate the fundamental principles of democracy.”891   
Critiques from the center and left of the center point to the shortcomings of the 
proposed new constitutions and to what had become mainstream politics of self-
government and the discourse of the “nation” and of citizenship in terms that negatively  
impacted the framings of the new constitutions.  Some parties, like Adunni Oluwole’s 
Self-Government Fiasco Party in Nigeria, were created to oppose the grant of 
independence altogether for these colonies given the terms in self-government was being 
proposed and endorsed by the mainstream.  The name of the party itself was an open 
indictment of the circumscribed terms in which independent statehood was being 
discussed and sought for.  The resolution of the social issues were deemed by social 
radicals to be as important as, if not more important than, the grant of independence 
itself.  Mokwugo Okoye, an ex-Zikist, touched on some fundamental issues of concern to 
the social radicals in regard to mainstream construction of the nation-state and notions of 
citizenship when he wrote to Azikiwe, lamenting what he perceived to be Azikiwe’s lack 
of concern for issues of popular concern and social change, thus: 
You may not realize it, but nationalism is no longer enough 
in the modern world of interdependence and social welfare 
and may in fact be a cover for atavism or swindle.  What we 
want today is a vital social ideal for which to live and labor 
and a mechanism that will ensure the equitable distribution 
of the fruits of our labor.892 
 
Political organizations and parties such as NEPU, FRK’s NWU and Commoner Peoples’ 
Party, Eyo Ita’s and Alvan Ikoku’s United National Independence Party, the SLPIM in 
Sierra Leone, etc., represented alternative construction of the nation-state and notions of 
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citizenship to that of the mainstream in certain significant ways.  Their failure to gain 
center stage notwithstanding, these alternative discourses, organizations, and political 
parties were significant in pointing to other possibilities, and perhaps to a vision of the 
nation-state and of citizenship that was socially transforming and more democratically 
based.   
The following chapter examines to some extent the contrasting discourse of the 
“nation” and notions of citizenship, i.e., the supplementary- discourse, of colonial social 
radicals to those, i.e., the master-discourse, that became mainstream in the late 40s and in 
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This chapter seeks to examine aspects of colonial social radicals’ discourse of the 
“nation” and notions of citizenship, involving their attempts to reformulate rights and 
entitlements, and to make categories of, i.e., ethnicity, class, gender, religion, into 
“nation” in mutually-inclusive terms in their social and political practices.  It seeks to 
examine their discourses and practices in opposition to what was becoming the dominant 
discourse privileged by the ethnopolitical entrepreneurs.  The colonial social radicals 
contested the differences among citizenry that were ordered by class, religion, gender, 
and other logics of centeredness and marginalization inscribed in mainstream 
construction of the “nation” and notions of citizenship.  They sought to create a new kind 
of community based on citizenship conceived of as a kind of “fraternity of equals” and “a 
deep horizontal comradeship”893 and premised on the realization of equality before the 
law and to become an underlying principle for social, economic, and cultural action.   
This chapter also explores British officialdom’s reaction to the social radicals and to their 
form of social intervention.  The labeling of colonial social radicals by officialdom as 
“communist” and officialdom’s attempts to constrain them through this and other forms 
of containment served to undermine the colonial radicals and their socially relevant 




The Colonials Not Worth Working With 
 
Who were the colonial social radicals and what were they saying and doing about 
the nation and citizenry?  These were the Pobee Bineys894 and the Anthony Woodes895 of 
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the Gold Coast, the Nduka Ezes,896 Raji Abdallahs,897 Mokwugo Okoyes, 898 Osita 
Agwumas,899 and Michael Imoudus900 of Nigeria, etc., - all labor-socialist-oriented; 
middleclass feminists like Funlayo Ransome-Kuti of Nigeria, Constance Cummings-
Johns of Sierra Leone, and Mabel Dove of the Gold Coast; path-breaking Islamic 
feminists such as Hajiyya Sawaba Gambo901 of Northern Nigeria; native intellectuals like 
the Islamic Mallam Ringim,902 Mallam Lawan Dambazair,903 and Muda Spikin Darma904 
of Northern Nigeria, etc.  They came from different walks of life: from among the ranks 
of trade unionists who evinced a form of labor socialism, from the ranks of native 
intellectuals, imbued with radical Islamist reformist fervor; they also came from the ranks 
of Western educated, middleclass women, and the handful of Islamic feminists, etc.  
They stood in opposition to the dominant social forces in their colonies, i.e., Native 
Authorities, African politicians and aspirant political incumbents, etc., as well as the 
British colonial authorities, contesting and reconfiguring received understandings of 
rights and duties, entitlements, etc., and the institutional structures/constitutional 
arrangements that upheld these in inequitable ways.   
In general, colonial social radicals sought to privilege the discourse and politics of 
social change and social transformation at the center of national discourse.  They 
privileged anti-hegemonic discourse and program of political freedom and social justice.  
They tended to be the more ideologically inclined and more predisposed to attempting a 
“class” analysis in the understanding of the colonial situation and to their program of 
social change and discourse of the nation and citizenship.905  The intellectual origin of 
many of these radicals was mixed, deriving from indigenous forms of radicalism - in 
particular, Islamic reformist tradition - Christian tradition,906 diasporic Black militancy, 
as well as Western and international revolutionary tradition in Marxism-Leninism and its 
variants.907  They drew on a mixture of these traditions - radical, Marxist,908 womanist, 
and indigenous ideals, etc. – in imagining and propagating new and distinct visions of 
society.  To the British colonial authorities, opposed to the framing of the nation or 
society in socially radical terms, and afraid of colonial radicals’ alliance with the 
international left, the radicals were the “colonials not worth working with,” i.e., the 
“extremists” and “communists” - the refuseniks, and the people of “the party of we don’t 
agree.”  Officialdom would seek to close the space for their form of social intervention.  
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Their vision of society and its citizens, including the ways they hoped to achieve their 
imagined new community, were perceived by officialdom as socially destabilizing and 
threatening to empire. 
As revealed in chapter five, British officialdom had reconstituted their categories 
of the “responsible” African and the “communist.”  This had involved the further 
distinction, on the one hand, between erstwhile colonials who were labeled by colonial 
officials as “agitator” and “communist,” etc., such as Nkrumah and Azikiwe, and, on the 
other hand, those perceived as doctrinaire and die-hard “agitators” and “communists.”  
The former were being rehabilitated in official mind and included in the ranks of the 
“respectable” and “moderates,” officials being careful to note, for instance, that a man 
like Azikiwe could be of some use.909  Those believed to be insistent on pursuing socially 
radical agendas and the immediate grant of self-government, on the other hand, remained 
in official mind as the “extremists” and “communists,” etc.  Anthony Woode, for 
example, a socialist-oriented labor leader in the Gold Coast, was deemed to be “one of 
the worst of African extremist agitators.”910  These were, in official reckoning, the 
colonials not worth working with.  The colonial social radicals examined in this chapter 
belong to this official category and within officialdom’s anti-communist grid. 
It can be said that where the radicals of the 30s and 40s, such as Azikiwe and 
Nkrumah, were politically radical and socially conservative, the radicals of the late 40s 
and 50s were politically and socially radical.  Many of the latter were Nkrumah’s and 
Azikiwe’s former fellow-travelers but who continued, or were perceived to continue to 
steer a more doctrinaire course even when it was reasoned by the more mainstream 
African politicians that the British colonial power was already effecting perceived desired 
political changes through new constitutional provisions from the turn of the 50s.911  The 
social radicals were closely watched and monitored on the official radar and officialdom 
would seek to alienate and structurally exclude them. These attempts also involved 
making difficult for them the chances of their participation in the colonies’ representative 
institutions such as the Legislative Councils, a cause and effect of their proclivity to 
extra-institutional means of making their voices heard.  Officialdom would seek in 
particular to undermine the radicals through the help of African politicians like Nkrumah 
and Azikiwe who by early 50s were beginning to enter into these institutions and were 
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acquiring political power.912  They were prevailed upon to use their new powers and 
offices in party and government to expel the social radicals - also now being labeled by 
these political entrepreneurs as “communists” or “communist sympathizers” - from their 
political party and from government offices.913  
In general, colonial social radicals sought to effect in their practices and through 
extra-institutional means what some other critics of colonial society and of the 
shortcomings of the on-going constitutional changes, progressives like Eyo Ita in Nigeria 
and the later I. T. A. Wallace-Johnson in Sierra Leone, sought to effect through 
constitutional or institutional means alone in the late 40s and beginning 50s. 914  While 
Eyo Ita, for example, was able to offer his alternative views and recommendations on 
constitutional change and nationhood from within official institutions by presenting his 
own minority report at the constitutional review conferences,915 colonial social radicals 
took to the street, to the countryside, and to the market place, etc., to make their views 
known and to mobilize the citizenry in defense of their perceived rights.  The radicals 
sought to galvanize the grassroots to make their voices heard and their presence felt in 
any proposals for change in the institutions by which their lives were being reordered.  
They sought to sustain the resolution of grassroot issues and grievances at the center of 
political discourse and national agenda.  Mokwugo Okoye, an ex-serviceman who 
became the Secretary-General of the Zikist movement,916 wrote in his memoir about “the 
revolutionary agitation by Zikists” at the time and of how they tried to carry out political 
education among the working people and in the rural areas.917  He recorded that 
revolutionary groups were formed in many towns and that there seemed to be a 
considerable degree of favorable receptivity to these.  As a result of the Zikist agitation, 
students’ strikes broke out in Lagos, Onitsha, Ibadan, and other places.  Okoye said it was 
not difficult to recruit members for their movement because “Nigerian youths were 
waiting for just such an organ.”918 
Some of the colonial social radicals were exposed to the communist movement, 
mostly indirectly through its front organizations, and to other leftwing-oriented 
organizations and individuals abroad, including the African diasporas in Britain and in 
the U.S., but so also were some of those classified by officialdom as the “moderates” and 
the “responsible.”  Although elements of Marxism-Leninism were reflected in the 
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formulation of some of the colonial social radicals’ discourse, they were not leftwing or 
“communist” as officials would like to perceive them to be.  Marxism-Leninism was 
articulating with labor radicalism, militant Islamism, and different forms of indigenous 
radicalism to produce counter hegemonic and contesting discourses among the social 
radicals but it was without its effective assimilation into these other cultures of 
radicalism.919  Nevertheless, some of them did try to bring their albeit limited 
understanding of Marxist and leftwing revolutionary doctrines to their analysis of the 
social situation in their territories and to their politics and discourse of community and 
notions of citizenship.  Nduka Eze, a leading labor radical activist in Nigeria in the 
period, reminiscing later on the events of the time in the post-World War II era, recalled 
the important role of ex-servicemen in shaping their radical perspective.  These African 
ex-servicemen had themselves been exposed to the influence of British leftwing 
intellectuals in the army during the war.  Eze wrote that hitherto their complaint was 
purely about conditions and that they had no positive complaint against the paternalism 
of the British administration, “but now, the new doctrine drew attention to new facts.”920  
He mentioned that these men incited the labor leaders to take 'positive' action and that 
many ex-servicemen were later to be among the most militant Zikists.921  Women radicals 
who had had direct and indirect exposure to leftwing ideologies similarly also tried to 
apply the insights they had gained from these doctrines to the understanding of the many 
dimensions of women's perceived alienation and to seek to change the norms that had 
marginalized them in colonial society.  
 




Women radicals attempted to reconstitute the categories of gender, as well as of class, 
ethnicity, religion, etc., into “nation” in inclusive and more democratic terms in their 
discourse and in their social and political practices.  They contested prevailing gender 
norms and sought to shift/reconfigure in their perceived interest gender norms which 
under colonialism had undermined women’s status,922 such as the division of labor into 
gendered reproductive and productive roles,923 and to sustain the emancipatory aspects of 
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colonialism on women’s status, such as the removal of marriage restrictions imposed by 
community elders.924  Women radicals organized against measures and norms that  
subordinated and marginalized them and sought to discursively change these as well as 
the gendered terms in which the “nation” was being constructed by African ethnopolitical 
entrepreneurs.  They sought to create, discursively, the space for women’s political 
agency as equal citizens and to remove the various kinds of constraints that had 
subordinated them and excluded them as players in their own rights in society.  They 
challenged the exclusionary gender norms and “containment” in the women’s wings of 
mainstream political parties that had also served to marginalize them.     
In their imagining of community and citizenship, women drew on actually 
existing cultures, along with radical, Marxist, womanist ideals to imagine and propagate 
new and highly distinct visions of social justice and gender equity.  Women organized 
against male domination drew effectively on pre-colonial methods using customary forms 
of resistance such as the use of the calabash, ‘sitting on a man’, symbolic references to 
female genitals in songs and performance arts, etc., to express their dissatisfaction and 
their rejection of the ruler or of prevailing perceived unjust practices, as the case may be, 
and to construct new gender norms.925  In their March against the Afin, the Alake’s 
Palace, on the 29th and 30th November, 1947 the AWU women totaling over 10, 000 
during their demonstrations and sit-ins against payment of taxes, swore by their vagina, 
what was revered in that culture as the symbol of women’s fertility, singing: “Ori Obo ni 
obi yin eyin okunrin.  Ori Obo ni olu yin eyin okunrin.”926 (translated: You men came 
into the world through the vagina.  The same vagina will see the end of you - you male 
oppressors). 
As post-colonial feminists have pointed out, the indigenous woman’s body 
became a crucial site of contestation during the colonial era - among both women and 
men.927  New meanings were reclaimed for women’s bodies and as symbols of resistance 
and opposition.928  British and French imperialists and white suffragists’ part-justification 
of imperialism on the need to redeem suffering indigenous women was turned on its 
head.  Colonial powers saw the veil in Algeria, widow burning – the Sati - in India, etc, 
as emblematic of a whole range of customs that kept women subordinated to men in these 
places and had positioned themselves as champions of these women.  Women activists 
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reclaimed the veil in the Algerian anti-colonial struggles against France929 and British 
opposition to clitoridectomy helped make female genital cutting a site of early nationalist 
mobilization in Kenya, for example.930     
Women radicals also drew on new forms of organization, creating unions, and 
mass women’s associations to privilege more inclusive and popularly-based notions of 
community and citizenship.  They were committed to realizing their goals through 
political action – through both institutional and extra-institutional means, i.e., social 
movements.  Cummings-John of Sierra Leone, Funlayo Ransome-Kuti931 and Hajiyya 
Sawaba Gambo of Nigeria, and other such select women radicals were deeply committed 
to politics as means of effecting social change and, specifically, positive change in the 
position of women.  Constance Cummings-John’s Sierra Leone Women's Movement 
(SLWM) was aimed at the emancipation of Protectorate as well as Freetown women in 
Sierra Leone.  Like the other women’s organizations, the SLWM's two main goals were, 
specifically, “to enhance the educational, economic and social status of women,” and to 
seek their “representation on official and non-official bodies concerned with the 
educational, social and economic welfare and advancement of Sierra Leone.”932   
 
Hajiyya Sawaba Gambo 
 
In the North of Nigeria, Hajiyya Sawaba Gambo, the then President of the 
Women's Wing of NEPU in 1951-52, was exceptional among the extremely few women 
radicals in Northern Nigeria, if not alone, in her discourse of society and citizenship as 
encompassing social, political, economic, and legal rights, and in fighting for the 
emancipation of women in that extremely patriarchal and stratified Islamic society.  
Gambo attempted to reconstitute the categories of religion, gender, ethnicity, class, etc., 
in mutually-inclusive terms in her discourse and social and political practices.  
Reminiscing on her career as a political activist in Northern Nigeria in the 50s, Gambo 
said she fought against the injustices of the traditional system in the North, partisan 
religious politics,933 the continuation of Northern Nigerian women in purdah, as well as 
for the enfranchisement of women934 – all the disadvantages to women that the NPC 
party stood to perpetuate and on which it was also predicated.  Gambo stood to directly 
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challenge the representation of Northern society as one, i.e., “One North,” “One 
religion,” etc., in the Native Authorities’ and NPC political party’s discourse and to 
unmask the inherent inequities within that society.  For this and in her outright 
commitment to the cause she fought for, she came under constant retribution by the 
ruling authorities in the North.  Sawaba Gambo’s efforts were remarkable in her defiance 
of convention to fight for women’s rights in a society where patriarchy was reinforced 
and sanctioned in even more entrenched ways by a ruling ideology based on Islamic 
principles.  Her views of appropriate gender norms were diametrically opposed to those 
of the Northern Authorities and of their party, the NPC whose views Ahmadu Bello 
symbolized when he expressed that giving women the vote or such rights would be 
socially destabilizing and “revolutionary.”935   
In my interview with Sawaba, a very warm and amiable person still full of radical 
vigor, she recalled her tireless efforts to fight for the cause of women and to educate rural 
women especially of their rights.  Speaking in colloquial English, she mused that, “if you 
don't know book you fit know your rights,”936 i.e., even if you are not literate, you should 
know your rights.  She was multilingual and saw issues in national terms.  She spoke 
English and two of the three main Nigerian languages: Yoruba and Hausa.  For her 
radical views and tireless activism on behalf of women and the nation and of social 
change in the North, Gambo said she was constantly jailed by the Native Authorities.  
“Prison was my second home,” she mused, and went on, “they think I will shut my mouth 
when they let me out of prison but each time they let me go, I come out and immediately 
start talking and fighting for women again and then they take me straight back to 
prison.”937  She was not afraid of being put back into prison or of being beaten, she said, 
because she perceived the cause she fought for as more important to her than her life.938  
Conspicuously displayed on the wall of her house during my interview with her was her 
dictum: “Whoso fighteth in the way of Allah be he slain or be he victorious on him we 
shall bestow a vast reward.”939  “They jailed me like sixteen times between 1950 and 
1951, beat me mercilessly with 90 strokes of koboko,940 whipped me every morning in 
front of the alkali judge,”941 she continued.  “One time I was pregnant with child and they 
still beat me.  It was so bad I just collapsed on the ground.  They rushed me to the 
hospital for operation and my womb was taken out,”942 she bravely but painfully recalled. 
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While Gambo was of a more humble origin and her radicalism informed by her 
Moslem faith, Funlayo Ransome-Kuti943 and Constance Cummings-John944 were of 
middleclass origins and Christians.  But they reached outside their more privileged status 
to also embrace grassroot issues and issues pertaining to less privileged women and 
similarly conceived of community and citizenship in all-embracing and inclusive terms.  
In her quest for democracy in the government of Egbaland, Abeokuta, and in her 
envisioning of community and citizenship in inclusionary terms, FRK stated that: 
When popular discontents have been very prevalent, it may 
well be affirmed that there has been generally something 
found amiss in the constitution or in the conduct of 
government … This is an age of liberty, an age of franchise 
and brotherhood, when rulers should give way to popular 
opinion.945 
 
The women radicals were careful in their own organizations and parties to ensure 
that women of all social backgrounds were represented in the decision-making bodies and 
processes of these organizations, unlike the norm in mainstream political parties.  They 
would not let the lack of Western literacy prevent illiterate women from taking up high-
ranking positions in their organizations.  They were all committed to the politics of 
inclusiveness and grassroot democracy.  Cummings-John would insist that all women 
members of SLWM tie headscarves during their demonstration as a symbol of 
fraternization with the dress habits of most of these women and as a symbol of solidarity 
and unity with all women.946   
Cummings-John, like FRK and other such select women radicals, believed in 
bridging the gap between all classes and all “ethnic” groups in their envisaged new and 
independent nation-states.  Rather than join the Creole ethnically-composed National 
Council, though a Creole,947 she joined ranks with the Sierra Leone Protectorate Party 
(SLPP) led by Milton Margai, in her drive for political inclusiveness of all constituent 
groups.  This was also an attempt to bridge the gap which the 1951 Constitution 
perpetuated between the Creoles of Freetown and the Protectorate people.  Wallace-
Johnson, now a member in the Sierra Leone Legislative Council and as Organizing 
Secretary of the West African Civil Liberties and National Defence League had protested 
against this potential divisiveness in the 1951 Constitution as one of the shortcomings of 
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the new constitutions being enacted from the 50s onwards.948  Funlayo Ransome-Kuti in 
Nigeria, likewise in her drive for national unity and representative government, did not 
allow her Yoruba ethnic origin or nationality to deter her from aligning her AWU 
movement with the Ibo-identified NCNC instead of the Yoruba-based Egbe turned AG.  
She perceived the NCNC to be more progressive and more unifying. 949   
Women radicals and the movements and organizations they led were not without 
their own inner contradictions, as with other colonial social radicals and social forces.  
Within these organizations, as the case of the AWU reveals for example, inherent lines of 
fractionalization surfaced even among women as new opportunities arose for gaining 
political power and influence as well as access to the nation’s resources.950  Other 
interests and forces within the women’s organizations served to undermine the broader 
and more democratic goals of these organizations.  Women radicals’ attempt to create 
National Societies would also intersect with officialdom’s and the ethnopolitical 
entrepreneurs' nation-forming in rather mutually-exclusive terms.  Colonial authorities 
and African politicians alike would try to exploit the contradictions and differences 
within women’s movements and organizations to undermine them and would succeed to 
a large extent in doing so.  Some women in the AWU, like Remi Aiyedun, were receptive 
to the offers for advancement being made to them by colonial authorities and the now 
reinstated Alake Ademola in Abeokuta.  These offers and overtures were meant to break 
the potential cohesiveness of the women and to undermine FRK, in the particular case of 
Aiyedun, in FRK’s insistence on achieving the goals of grassroot democracy.  Thus, the 
British colonial authorities would attempt to separate, among the women also, the 
“moderates” and the “respectable” from the “extremist” and the “communist.”  Women 
like Remi Aiyedun were discursively constituted as the “respectable” and were 
differentiated from the “extremists” and the “communists,” the ranks in which 
officialdom sought to collapse women radicals like Ransome-Kuti and Cummings-John.   
 
Women Radicals and British Officialdom’s Category of the Communist 
 
Women radicals’ known links with leftwing individuals and organizations abroad 
served to validate, in officialdom’s mind, their perceptions and/or labeling of them as 
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communists.  Colonial officials would remain watchful and apprehensive of the activities 
of these women radicals, as they would with other perceived “agitators” and 
“communists!”  However, in spite of these women radicals’ exposure to leftwing-oriented 
international figures and movements and their efforts to draw on Marxist ideals to 
propagate new gender norms and women’s rights, they were not communists or 
communist-oriented.   
Indeed, some of the women radicals have not only had early connections with the 
international leftwing movements and exposure to variants of Marxism-Leninism, they 
also continued to maintain an on and off contact with communist-affiliated organizations 
like the Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF) in their own organizations 
in their colonies.  Both FRK and Cummings-John had at some stages of their political 
socialization been exposed in varying degrees to the contemporary international radical 
and leftwing-oriented movements and organizations and to communist politics in direct 
and indirect ways.  A biographical sketch of Mrs. Cummings-John951 shows varying 
degrees of exposure to, and active involvement in radical and leftwing organizations at 
home and abroad.  She was a member of the WAYL in Sierra Leone (1938-1939), the 
League of Colored People (LCP), and the International African Service Bureau (IASB)952 
in London, and the American Council on African Affairs (ACAA) 953 founded by Paul 
Robeson and Max Yergan who were self-proclaimed communists in the United States.  
As Denzer reported, she joined the latter organization from 1946 to 1951 in spite of 
warnings from her distinguished step-brother in the United States as to the risk of 
association with such leftwing organizations which were on the government's black 
list.954   
The varying exposures of these women to leftwing-oriented movements and 
radical organizations had also helped to sharpen their insights into the nature of alienation 
and inequities in colonial society.  Denzer noted in the case of Constance Cummings-
John that her participation in radical movements in postwar America deepened her 
resolve and sharpened her insights.955  There is also evidence to show that they 
maintained some form of association with leftwing women's organizations and 
movements abroad even when they returned home and formed their own movements.  
Cummings-John’s SLWM became affiliated with the Women's International Democratic 
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Federation (WIDFA) based in the Soviet Union.  Funlayo Ransome-Kuti's AWU and, 
later, the NWU also maintained contacts with the WIDFA and was represented at one of 
the WIDFA meetings on 15th February, 1949 by one Theos O. Ogunkoya.956 
Furthermore, the AWU in 1949 agreed to observe the communist WIDFA’s March 5 
Women’s Day.  They resolved, among other issues, that: 
The Nigerian Women's Union, Abeokuta Branch, 
wholeheartedly agrees with the decisions set out by the 
W.I.D.F.A. at their last conference and fully support the 
idea that March 5 be set apart as Women's day in the whole 
world.957   
 
Their albeit tenuous connections with leftwing/communist organizations thus 
became further cause for officialdom’s concern about them.  However, any careful 
analysis of their movement and the trajectory of the career of these women radicals will 
reveal that their connections with international radical and/or leftwing-oriented 
movements were fleeting and somewhat peripheral and did not translate into leftwing-
oriented politics or discourse of social transformation in the colonies for them.  
Cummings-John might have left Sierra Leone an anti-colonialist and returned “a radical 
Pan-Africanist and nationalist,”958 as Denzer rightly observed, but she certainly did not 
return a communist nor later become one, except in the perceptions and imagination of 
colonial officials. 
These women were social radicals in their own right and not revolutionaries or 
communists.  They sought to work for change in their colonies using both institutional 
and extra-institutional means.  Although they did not self-consciously describe 
themselves as social radicals, except perhaps for Hajiyya Gambo,959 their discourses and 
practices, particularly in regard to their idea of society and citizenship and the 
emancipation of women, tied to the desired changes they sought in their societies, were to 
varying degrees socially radical and transforming.  They initiated and led movements in 
which women membership and leadership were significant and waged a struggle in which 
women’s agendas were sought to be placed at the center of national discourse and agenda 
as well.  What some critics of the proposed 1951 constitutions for Nigeria and Sierra 
Leone, for example, saw as lacking, such as the provision of popular franchise, and 
sought to change within the acceptable channels of official discourse,960 women radicals 
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tried to realize these for women and for other perceived disadvantaged segments of 
society by organizing and taking to the street. 
In spite of the remarkable efforts of these women radicals to organize in quest of 
democratic change and to reconstitute gender norms in more equitable terms, especially 
at a time when the discourse of change was also being privileged at the level of the 
colonial state, women remained largely marginalized then and in post-independent 
African societies, however, until more recently.  Gender roles did not become radically 
changed in these West African societies.  Even in such places as, for example, Zimbabwe 
and South Africa where liberation struggles took the form of armed struggle and women 
entered the arena of struggle as armed soldiers, thus transforming the roles of women in 
such contexts and undermining conventional gender practices, gender roles failed to be 
permanently transformed in those post-liberation societies.  Although liberation 
movements often mobilized, trained, and politicized women, and promised to address the 
question of women’s liberation with independence, they did little to address women’s 
issues once in power and decidedly ignored patriarchal relations in the private sphere.  
When liberation movements came into power, there is a return to traditional gender 
norms and women’s exclusion from political power.961  Geisler notes, for example, that 
when liberation movements came to power, women were generally restricted to being 
“dressed in party colors singing and dancing praise songs for the male leadership, raising 
money and support.”962  It has taken newer international and national initiatives such as 
the United Nations Women’s Conference in 1972, the international women’s 
movement,963 non-governmental organizations, regime change in Africa and the turn 
towards multiparty democracy in the 1990s, etc., to begin to change gender identities, 
relations, norms, and political practices in post-colonial African nations.  
The internal contradictions within women’s organization in the period under study 
was also a source of weakness.  For example, the formidable AWU in Abeokuta, Nigeria, 
on the one hand and at one important level, reveals the potential ability and power of 
women to unite for collective action in a more modern setting and in making a difference.  
On the other hand, however, it also reveals the potential weakness of such organizations 
and efforts, related in part to mutually-divergent interests of social forces that composed 
these organizations and the kinds of alliances they engaged in and which militated against 
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the actualization of their potential strengths.964  Women radicals began to make what 
were perceived to be strategic alliances of their organizations with what were becoming 
mainstream political parties, alliances that would in the end only serve to continue to 
constrain against women radicals’ goal of putting women’s issues at the center of 
national agenda. Cummings-John allied the SLWM with the SLPP and FRK allied the 
AWU with the NCNC.  As noted in chapter six, the discursive space for women in these 
mainstream parties was highly constrained and women failed to meaningfully impact 
these male-dominated political parties’ agenda, even though they had aligned with them 
as political parties or organizations in their own right and added considerable 
constituencies to them.  FRK would even later affiliate the NWU, transformed from the 
AWU, and, later, her own political party, the Commoner People’s Party, with the 
Northern NPC party in 1959, in spite of the latter’s staunch conservative base!  Perhaps 
she felt that was the only realistic way of working for inclusiveness and as a tactical 
move on her part at a time when the NPC was the party in control of the Nigerian Central 
government.  She would later regret her move to form such a coalition with the NPC and 
would pull out of that coalition within a short period of time.  “Perhaps I am not a 
politician,” she later reflected.965   These women had perhaps believed in their ability to 
impact these parties from within in the direction of social change.  At best, they could be 
said to represent the voice of conscience within those parties, that minority, i.e., the 
supplementary, that insinuates itself into the terms of reference of the dominant discourse 
and “antagonizes the implicit power to generalize, to produce the sociological 
solidity.”966 
 
Islamic Radicals  
 
The Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) 967 
 
Militant Islamic discourse, i.e., the supplementary-discourse, as represented in NEPU, 
best existed as a critique from within the mainstream itself, challenging its inherent 
inegalitarianism.968  NEPU also represented at its best a symbolic matrix used to 
construct demands against both the ruling traditional elites and the colonial state in the 
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period under examination.  NEPU radicals, like other colonial radicals and their 
organizations, sought to make the categories of religion, gender, class, ethnicity, etc., into 
National Societies.  While NEPU may not have succeeded in transforming the status quo, 
it impacted it in contesting the narrow and exclusive terms in which the “nation” and 
citizenry were being imagined and privileged in the dominant discourse among  
ethnopolitical entrepreneurs.   
The Northern Element Progressive Union (NEPU) represented the salient radical 
organization in the otherwise conservative and patriarchal Northern Nigerian society and 
attempted to fundamentally change the norms in this society.  NEPU was founded in 
Kano on August 8, 1950 based on the emancipatory precepts of militant Islam.969  Its 
ostensible purpose, initially, was to operate as a political vanguard within the broader but 
more conservative Northern Peoples’ Congress (NPC) which was then a more or less 
cultural organization but the conservatives in the NPC soon worked to exclude NEPU 
from it.970  Powerful emirs and certain administrative officers regarded the NEPU within 
the NPC then, with its radicalizing initiatives, as a dangerously radical group and sought 
to eliminate the radical elements from the NPC.  NEPU was founded with the objective 
of fighting for the emancipation of the Talakawa – the peasantries and the ordinary man 
and woman in this society - from the constraints of the feudal social structure of the 
emirate system which the British Indirect Rule system had largely preserved and 
perpetuated in many ways.971  Part of its motto Yama (freedom) symbolized three 
freedoms - political, economic and social.  It was a program that directly challenged both 
the traditional rulers and the colonial authority.  
At its formation in 1950, NEPU combined the rhetorics of radical Islamic 
reformist tradition and those of Marxism-Leninism to declare the existence of ‘class’ 
struggle between the talakawas and the Native Authorities in Northern Nigeria.  In its 
“Declaration of Principle,” and defense of the rights of citizens in this society, the NEPU, 
calling for social change, proclaimed that: 
The shocking state of social order as at present existing in 
Northern Nigeria is due to nothing but the Family Compact 
rule of the so called Native Administration in their present 
autocratic form.972  
 
 It went on to declare that: 
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Owing to this unscrupulous and vicious system of 
administration by the Family Compact rulers, there is today 
in (our) society an antagonism of interests, manifesting 
itself as a class struggle, between the members of the 
vicious circle of the Native Administration on the one hand 
and the ordinary 'Talakawa' on the other.973 
 
In its imagining of a new kind of community and citizenship predicated on brotherhood 
and equality, it envisioned, as part of its guiding principle, that: 
This antagonism can be abolished only by the emancipation 
of the Talakawa from the domination of these conduits, by 
the reform of the present autocratic political institutions 
into Democratic Institutions and placing their democratic 
control in the hands of the Talakawa for whom alone they 
exist.974 
 
The NEPU proclaimed its aims to be based on upholding the interests of the 
downtrodden, the alienated, and the dispossessed - the impoverished talakawas - against 
those of the ruling and wealthy few in this Islamic society.  Its central philosophical 
underpinnings and ideological orientation, predicated on the defense of the interest of the 
ordinary men and women and the transformation of the Native Authority system in 
Northern Nigeria in socially inclusive ways, were opposed to those of the Northern 
Peoples Congress (NPC).975  
In NEPU’s program and discourses, Marxism-Leninism was resonating with 
militant Islamism in seeking to create a linkage between social inegalitarianism and the 
pursuit of “class” interest and in seeking to effect social change and a more egalitarian 
society from an envisaged struggle between the classes.  In their ideal forms, Marxism-
Leninism and radical Islamism could be said to find meeting points in their stated 
vehemence against “class” oppression and capitalist greed (accumulation of wealth in 
Islam) and selfish individualism, their stated concern for lack of community ethos in 
capitalism, and their advocacy of the pursuit of the interest of the community over that of 
the individual.  For example, the bulk of NEPU's political verses and songs, championed 
by Mallam Lawan Dambazair, a versatile poet and legal adviser to NEPU, strongly 
denounced sharp discrepancies in wealth and ostentatious living.976  Islamic radicals in 
NEPU believed that the ethical ideals of equity, justice, and freedom could be realized in 
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Northern Nigerian society and in the Nigerian nation at large for all citizens in this ideal 
type of society.  
However, the idea of equity, justice, and freedom was not so clearly defined 
especially in NEPU radicals’ attempt to apply a class analysis.  The northern Islamic 
society in which they operated, like the rest of these colonial societies, was indeed not 
amenable to a simple class analysis that NEPU and the other radicals attempted to apply 
to them.  Class analysis among the radicals tended to oversimplify the forms of social 
relations that colonial subjects were engaged in, given those ties that cut across the class 
divide, even while “class” issues remained pertinent.  The difficulty of class analysis is 
evident in such societies in flux where horizontal and vertical lines crisscrossed in quite 
complex and contradictory ways.  In the Northern Nigeria Islamic society, shared 
allegiance among many to a common Islamic faith which sanctioned a form of 
enlightened despotism cut across horizontal lines of division that may be based on 
class.977  The 1953 crisis in Kano reveal how those lines of affinity were actualized to 
ensure allegiance of important segments of the talakawas to the NPC party and to the 
Native Authorities’ cause.978  Also, while militant Islamism was resonating with the 
language of Marxism-Leninism in NEPU’s discourse, it was not effectively assimilated 
into the culture of Islamic protest movements or into the idiom of the ordinary people to 
whom NEPU’s program of social change was directed.  Notions of class struggle, or of 
the rule of the common man, were foreign to the worldview of many of these talakawas, 
steeped in the culture of Islam that dictated obedience to the rulers and to receiving 
largesse from the “divinely” privileged wealthy,979 i.e., the Weberian ascribed status.  But 
NEPU remained significant and popular, nevertheless. 
NEPU represented a serious attempt to redefine the political culture and norms in 
this Northern Nigerian society in more egalitarian ways.  Its program for local 
government reforms involved a serious attempt at establishing grassroot democracy.  It 
envisaged the setting up of democratic village councils, district councils, and town or 
urban councils as units of self-government and the councils to be directly under the 
Minister for Local Government in the region.  NEPU sought to amend the Native 
Authority Law No. 4 of 1954 which it felt “has accumulated all power in the hands of one 
man”980 and to make it more consistent with “the democratic aspirations of the 
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people.”981  The Nigerian government has adopted this form of grassroot democracy in its 
latest constitution and is attempting to seriously pursue it as one means of trying to 
resolve the crisis of citizenship and problem of governance in post-independent Nigeria. 
NEPU also sought to reorder gender norms in more equitable terms.  Its  
followership included women in the North who otherwise would not have had any venue 
at all to attempt to empower themselves as a few tried to do.  Even the rights of 
prostitutes were defended by NEPU.  In April, 1951 a meeting was called to launch the 
Northern Women’s Association.982  At a subsequent meeting of the Kano branch of 
NEPU on 6th May, 1951 the decision was made to encourage women prostitutes in the  
North to form a union and to advise such women to appeal to the Supreme Court in all 
cases in which they were convicted by the Native Courts on account of their profession, 
citing the fact that “under English law harlots cannot be imprisoned.”983   
NEPU had significant followership.  Radical Moslem scholars and their disciples 
were very important in setting up the NEPU movement all over the Northern Provinces 
and in propagating its goals among the commoners in the pre-independence period.984  
Islamic intellectuals and activists within the organization, such as Mallam Illa Ringim, a 
Moslem scholar, and Muda Spikin Darma, an Islamic poet, evoked passages from the 
Koran, traditions and sayings of the Prophet Mohammed, and certain historical practices 
and attitudes of tolerance and piety by early Moslem Caliphs to construct radical social 
texts of their own.  They sprinkled political speeches with religious allusions, allegories, 
images and justifications.  Most of them wrote poems which dealt with social concerns.  
Both Illa Ringim and Muda Spikin Darma approximated to the ideal radical type in their 
unwavering commitment to the cause they fought for.  Ringim, a poet, social analyst, 
political activist, orator, and a freedom fighter, lived and practiced chiefly as a Koranic 
scholar.  His biographer, Beita Yusuf Ahmed, claimed that he was regarded as a born 
radical with a lasting commitment to fighting for the truth.  He said he was characterized 
as a man with a passion for justice and freedom and with a total commitment to fighting 
for the liberation of the peasantries and of Nigeria and Africa from foreign domination.  
Ringim was imbued with a belief in the total emancipation of one's immediate 
communities in order to liberate Africa as a whole.985  His commitment to the cause of 
NEPU, i.e., the cause of the common man and of the nation, remained total to the end of 
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his life, in spite of series of imprisonment and other forms of persecution he suffered 
from the ruling elites.986   
Beita Yusuf Ahmed commented that on the whole, NEPU, more than the NPC, 
substantially contributed to the remarkable politicization of the peasantry in Northern 
Nigeria and that regional mobilizers or spokesmen like Mallam Ringim were to be 
commented for their persistent awakening of the rural folks, thereby taking party politics 
to the grassroot levels.987   NEPU’s Declaration of Principles stated that “this 
emancipation must be the work of the Talakawa themselves.”988  It was set up to be a 
political movement of commoners, i.e., petty traders, small producers, farmers, artisans, 
youths, and women all of who played substantial roles in the organization.  It tried to 
successfully apply Islamic and traditional symbols in building its base of membership and 
in trying to advance its cause989 which involved the political education of the peasantries.   
 
NEPU and British Officialdom’s Category of the Communist 
 
NEPU was an organization that British officialdom perceived as communist, including its 
leadership.  It was a label that the British applied to NEPU more out of their fear of its 
growing importance and what it represented than any real influence of communism on it.  
Right from its inception, the British had ridiculed it as an “invented political society” and 
its members as “extremist group.”990  But NEPU was developing in the early 50s and 
gaining in importance as a viable alternative political organization that was addressing 
important social issues in the North of Nigeria – issues of inequity, women’s 
marginalization, corruption, and nepotism as existed in the Indirect Rule Native 
Authority system under the Emirs.  The NPC, on the other hand, sought to sustain the 
status quo and the hegemony of the ruling elites and its privileges that NEPU was seeking 
to abolish.  The NPC, along with the British colonial authorities, remained opposed to the 
NEPU and continued to hold it in derision.  For example, after the interview between 
NEPU’s representatives and the British Resident of Kano Province on 25th June, 1951 
regarding NEPU’s objections to the elections under the new 1951 Constitution, the 
Resident wrote to the Secretary of the Northern Provinces in Kaduna and indicated that 
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he was giving a fairly detailed account of the meeting because ‘it reveals the attitude of 
mind of extremist group in Kano.’991   
In spite of official opposition to NEPU and officialdom’s attempts to reduce its 
significance through negative labeling, however, NEPU continued to gain popular 
support and to grow in strength.  The British Resident in Kano, Northern Nigeria, could 
not help but to subsequently acknowledge NEPU’s growing importance and credibility as 
an alternative political organization and movement in the North of Nigeria.  He had to 
admit, in his own words, that NEPU’s “strength lies in its campaign against corruption 
and nepotism,” and that “it represents an organized body of political opinion in the 
North.”992  Nevertheless, the tendencies towards official labeling and categorization of 
NEPU and its members in derogatory terms and as communist would remain enduring.  
British officialdom insisted on perceiving NEPU as an “extremist” organization.  
Although the British colonial authorities, unable to deny any longer the legitimacy or 
deep resonance that NEPU was having in the North than they had acknowledged or 
would want to admit, would be forced to acknowledge NEPU’s growing and substantial 
strength occasionally,993 they would remain opposed to NEPU and would seek to 
undermine it because of its growing importance and not in spite of it.  This is because of 
the challenge it posed to the hegemony of the British and that of the Native Authorities in 
Northern Nigeria.  Sklar noted that the transformation of the NPC into a political party in 
1952 to become a suitable instrument for the use of conservative politicians was possibly 
the immediate consequence of electoral victories by the NEPU in the primary stage of a 
protracted general election through a system of electoral colleges.994  British colonial 
officials affirmed the intention of the NPC party and Native Authorities in the North, 
consistent with their own position, to adapt and not to destroy the traditional system of 
authority which NEPU sought to reform or transform.  The NPC, along with British 
officialdom, were therefore determined to do all they could to neutralize NEPU as an 
opposing political force.  One way this was facilitated was through the pitfalls of the 
1951 constitutional provisions which gave capacity to NEPU’s political opponent, the 
conservative NPC party, while it constrained against NEPU’s ability to continue to thrive 
politically.995  Another was through labeling.  Through labeling as “extremist” and 
“communist,” officialdom was fairly able to delegitimize NEPU’s and other challenges to 
 217
the ways they and African ethnopolitical entrepreneurs sought to remake African 
societies. 
NEPU and the social radicals that composed it were, indeed, like many colonial 
radicals and their organizations, exposed to the international leftwing currents of ideas 
and their discourse of the nation and citizenship was influenced, perhaps to more limited 
degrees, by these.  Through Western-educated and semi-Western educated radicals in 
NEPU like Raji Abdallah who headed both NEPU and the Zikist Movement at varying 
times, elements of Marxism-Leninism had penetrated NEPU’s discourse.  Many of these 
Western-educated NEPU radicals were non-Northerners from the then Middle Belt and  
from the South of Nigeria and had had some direct or indirect contact with international 
communist and leftwing movements.  Through them, NEPU was brought into contact 
with international organizations such as the World Congress of Defenders of the Peace in 
Paris with which it maintained some links.996  In a letter to the President of the 
Committee of World Congress of the Defenders of Peace in October, 1950 the Secretary 
of NEPU, Bello Ijumu, confirmed receipt of the letter from the Bureau of the World 
Committee of the Defenders of Peace at Prague, dated August 18th, 1950 to NEPU.  
Ijumu informed him that NEPU fully endorsed the proposals laid out in their Appeal for 
the 2nd World Congress of the Defenders of Peace.997  The letter went on to reiterate some 
of the issues that NEPU engaged with and were believed by NEPU to be of similar 
concern to the World Congress: 
The World cannot plan for a stable peace when half of its 
population enjoy freedom and the other half wallows in 
bondage.  The African continent in particular is a great 
challenge to the conscience of World leaders who only 
think of us as raw materials for the furtherance of their 
design.998 
 
NEPU was also linked with WASU in London and through WASU with the left in 
Britain such as Fenner Brockway.  NEPU regularly communicated with them to inform 
them of developments in the colony as well as of their concerns.  In a 5th July, 1951 
telegram to Fenner Brockway, for example, they informed him of some of the 
retributions they were suffering at the hands of the Native Authorities.  The telegram 
read: “Northern elements progressive union members live in danger certain section of 
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community alleged instigated by native authority.”999  NEPU was also in touch with the 
World Festival of Youths and Students for Peace in Berlin.1000   
Though in contact with some of these leftwing-oriented organizations and 
individuals, neither NEPU nor other such radical-oriented colonial organizations were 
communist or known to be representative of communist front organizations.  NEPU and 
many of the colonial social radicals and organizations were more democratically oriented.  
However, colonial officials would collapse them into their anti-communist grid and 
would remain watchful of their movements and fearful of their perceived potentials for 




Labor radicals were foremost in contesting mainstream discourse of the nation 
and notions of citizenship and in seeking to reconstitute these in mutually inclusive and 
socially transforming terms.  They also sought to move developments in the colonies 
along the paths of more rapid and fundamental change.  Trade union leaders like Nduka 
Eze of Nigeria, Pobee Biney and Anthony Woode of the Gold Coast, and Wallace 
Johnson of Sierra Leone were notable in these endeavors.  They sought to effect changes 
in their societies through organizing for direct political action with workers as central 
actors.1001  It was these labor radicals in the Gold Coast, for example, not Nkrumah, who 
at the turn of the 50s remained pivotal in trying to resolve popular discontent through 
labor protest movements such as occurred in the Gold Coast Trade Union Strike and the 
Positive Action in January, 1950.  Through theirs and other labor radicals’ dual and 
strong presence in both the Gold Coast Trade Union Congress (GCTUC) and the CPP, 
and in Nigeria in the Nigerian Trade Union Congress (TUC) and the NCNC, for example, 
the quest for change and immediate self-government in the Gold Coast and in Nigeria 
became widespread among the grassroots. 
Unlike Azikiwe and Nkrumah with whom these labor radicals had been in 
previous close association but like other social radicals such as the Islamic native 
intellectuals and women radicals, they tried to sustain the agenda of social change at the 
center of national discourse.  While Azikiwe and Nkrumah could be said to have 
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identified with the culture of labor radicalism at certain important stages of their career, 
they evinced a certain practicality1002 - or political correctness - that these social radicals 
failed to do.  Azikiwe and Nkrumah were able to make strategic shifts to the ideological 
center as dictated by the turn of events at the end of the 40s and beginning of the 50s in 
order to gain political leverage and power at the state and national levels.  They were 
ready to do so and actually did so at the expense of the radical constituencies that had 
provided them with important political base and legitimacy and which had sustained them 
till then.  The growing disconnect between them and their former radical bed-fellows 
resulted in recriminations and counter recriminations between them.  It also involved 
Nkrumah’s and Azikiwe’s expulsion of the radicals from the political parties they led –  
the CPP and the NCNC - as their own power position became more entrenched in the 
50s.1003  The radicals, on their part, were opposed to Azikiwe’s and Nkrumah’s shift to 
the center, calling them opportunists, while Azikiwe and Nkrumah, on the other hand, 
condemned the perceived die-hard position of these radicals.   
Officialdom was fearful of labor activism and its believed destabilization of 
colonial society.  As examined in chapter three, labor radicals, along with returning 
overseas students, were the most feared in the colonies by colonial officials as direct 
source of communism in the colonies.  The resonance of Marxism-Leninism in the 
discourses and activism of labor radicals and official proof of some form of contact 
which they had with leftwing organizations and movements abroad were further 
validation to officials of the influence of the latter on them.1004  The rhetoric of Marxism-
Leninism was indeed resonating in labor radicals’ discourse but it was also without its 
effective assimilation into the developing culture of workers’ protest in these West 
African colonies.  As earlier noted in regard to the weakness of “class” analysis,  the 
element of class which formed an important philosophical underpinnings of Marxism-
Leninism was diffused in these colonial social formations, apart from Marxism-
Leninism’s own weakness as an analytic tool in these and other societies.  Nevertheless, 
Marxism-Leninism was part of the intellectual origin of colonial labor radicals and they 
did attempt to draw on elements of it to constitute their discourse of the “nation.”  
Applying the “new doctrine,”1005 i.e., Marxism-Leninism, in imagining the future of his 
country, the labor radical and the then Deputy President-General of the Zikist Movement, 
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Osita Agwuma, in his public lecture titled a “Call to Revolution” on October 27th, 1948 
and in what has become the famous “Seditious Lecture” in the annals of Nigerian pre-
independence history, called on the workers and the masses to rise up in strikes and revolt 
against the government and to make demands for self-government.1006  He bitterly noted: 
“My country has for over a century been panting under the oppressing heels of British 
imperialism,”1007 and went on to state that: 
Thirty to forty million inhabitants of my country … labour 
and toil to answer to the needs of their oppressor who is 
backed up by crude force.  They are economically 
strangulated and they starve in the midst of plenty.  The 
potential wealth of our fatherland is being drained steadily 
and relentlessly while we are assigned to an inferior status 
in what they hypocritically call a commonwealth of 
families.1008  
 
Communism’s own direct intellectual origin in Marxism-Leninism and colonial officials’ 
association of labor radicals and other colonial radicals with communism in the colonies 
made the language of Marxism-Leninism,1009 however crudely applied by these colonial 
radicals, to be suspect by officialdom and to carry more significance than it deserved. 
 Because they straddled both the trade unions and some of the political parties 
before they were expelled from these parties, some of them in leadership positions in 
both, the impact of labor radicals was more immediately and deeply felt in the colonies.  
In Nigeria, for example, the Zikist left1010 maintained a strong presence in both the trade 
union movement and in the NCNC till the end of the 40s and the beginning of the 50s for 
some, and likewise the labor left in the Gold Coast trade unions and the CPP.  Nduka Eze 
at a time held leadership positions as the first Secretary of the Zikist Movement, 
Secretary of the Amalgamated Union of the U. A. C. African Workers (UNAMAG), and 
Secretary of the newly formed Nigerian National Federation of Labour (NNFL), as well 
as membership of the NCNC Cabinet in Nigeria at the same time.  In the Gold Coast, 
labor radicals in the Gold Coast TUC and in the CPP were crucial in the staging of the 
Trade Union Strike as well as the Positive Action that occurred there in January 1950.1011  
Both occurred, in spite of the CPP President, Nkrumah’s attempts to temporize on the 
staging of the Positive Action.  The “tail wagged the dog,” Sir Arden-Clarke, the Gold 
Coast Governor, would later comment, in agreement with the Acting Colonial Secretary, 
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Sir R. Saloway, who had sought the intervention of Nkrumah to put a stop to the 
proposed Positive Action.1012  Nkrumah was unable to stop the planned Positive Action 
as the initiative had been seized by the labor radicals and the rank and file CPP who 
hoped to force the issue of immediate self-government for the Gold Coast on the colonial 
government.  At the forefront of both movements were Pobee Biney and Anthony Woode 
and the other Gold Coast labor radicals, with a foot in both the world of the TUC and the 
CPP.  The presence of the labor radicals in both the GCTUC and the CPP in the Gold 
Coast and in the TUC and the NCNC in Nigeria served to radicalize the culture of both.  
The labor radicals had developed from within the womb of more mainstream political 
parties, such as the NCNC in Nigeria led by Azikiwe, and the CPP in the Gold Coast led 
by Nkrumah, and had desired to radicalize these parties from within.  These attempts, 
however, would begin to alienate them from the party leadership at the turn of the 50s in 
the light of changing political fortunes for these parties and their leadership as they began 
to meet and to benefit from officialdom’s expectation of moderation.  They could not 
long subsist in these parties because their contrasting discourse of the nation and notions 
of citizenship in socially radical terms contrasted with, and challenged those of the 
leadership of these parties.  From the early 50s onwards, both colonial officials and the 
leaders of both political parties, Azikiwe-led NCNC and Nkrumah-led CPP, instituted 
reactionary measures against them, including expulsion from the parties.  These measures 
served to undermine them and to decimate their ranks. 




In Nigeria, labor radicals in the NCNC were instrumental in the creation of the Zikist 
movement and in effecting a shift within the movement towards more radical  
politics and the discourse of the nation and citizenship in socially transforming terms.1013  
The movement was inaugurated within the umbrella of the NCNC on 16th February, 
1946 and was composed of many young men and women - trade unionists, ex-
servicemen, teachers, and students - eager to carry out active political propaganda.  Raji 
Abdallah,1014 the President-General of the Zikist movement at its inauguration, threw 
some light on the Zikist philosophy of action when he declared in 1948 in his famous trial 
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for presiding over what the colonial government regarded as 'seditious' lecture by Osita 
Agwuma,1015 that: ‘We have passed the age of  petition.  We have passed the age of 
resolution.  We have passed the age of diplomacy.  This is the age of action - plain, blunt 
and positive action.’1016  The Zikists believed in direct political intervention to bring 
about social change. 
The radical Zikists, like the NEPU, made serious attempts to reconstitute the 
discourse of the nation in mutually-inclusive terms and to seek to redefine the form and 
content of the Nigerian political culture in more egalitarian ways at the end of the 40s 
before they were proscribed by the colonial government.  Mokwugo Okoye, an ex-
serviceman who became the Secretary-General of the Zikist movement, wrote of 
appalling conditions in the village and in the city which provided fertile grounds for their 
radicalizing work:1017 
Soil erosion and the use of primitive methods in agriculture 
naturally led to food shortage and mass exodus from the 
villages of the able-bodied youth.  But life in the cities was 
not as rosy as many of the fugitives had expected, what 
with inflation and the ogre of unemployment to stare them 
in the face; in the villages themselves, deprived of most of 
their vivacious youth and the frescos, festivals another 
customs that once added lustre to native life, life became 
duller, hunger stalked the land and epidemics broke out in 
one district after another, baffling an unimaginative  
    government. 1018 
 
 The initial goal of the Zikist movement when it was established was to radicalize 
the NCNC from within but the more leftwing-oriented radicals in the Zikist movement 
soon effected a shift within the movement to present it as a more viable alternative to the 
parent NCNC organization itself.  Labor radicals who comprised the leadership of the 
Nigerian trade unions also comprised the leadership of the Zikist movement and in 
particular, its leftwing, and their influence was felt in both.  These included Nduka Eze, 
Mokwugo Okoye, Osita Agwuna, and Raji Abdallah.  Nduka Eze was the first secretary 
of the Zikist Movement and had at the same time risen to a position of power and 
influence within the Nigerian labor movement as both secretary of the Amalgamated 
Union of the U. A. C. African Workers (UNAMAG) and of the newly formed Nigerian 
National Federation of Labour (NNFL), as noted earlier.  Sklar commented that Eze’s 
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object since 1946 had been to link the labor movement to the Zikist Movement for 
revolutionary action.1019  In 1947, Eze had facilitated the affiliation of the Nigerian Trade 
Union Congress with the NCNC, a successful move which eventually won him a position 
as a member of the NCNC Cabinet but he would later be expelled from the Cabinet.  In 
1949, Eze became Acting President of the Zikist Movement.  His stature rose immensely 
by mid-1950 with the merger of the TUC and the independent Government Workers 
Union with the leftwing-oriented Nigerian National Federation of Labor (NNFL) to form 
a united central organization, the Nigerian Labor Congress (NLC) under leftwing-
oriented leadership.  Nduka Eze assumed the post of secretary of the NLC. 1020  Eze 
reached the pinnacle of his career when in 1950, he led the 18,000 member of the 
UNAMAG in an effective strike against the United African Company (U.A.C.) which 
resulted in substantial increase in the cost of living allowance for the workers.1021  His 
beginning decline, however, started four months later.  In January 1951, Eze joined the 
Freedom Movement, led by ex-Zikists who had renounced Zikism for “revolutionary 
socialism.”1022  Eze, Agwuna, and a select few colonial social radicals came closest to 
being the “revolutionaries” that officialdom feared.  Nduka Eze, for example, applied the 
language of Marxism-Leninism and its variants more outrightly.  Osita Agwuma initiated 
the “revolutionary” program within the Zikist Movement, with admonition to prepare for 
physical sacrifice, even death, for the sake of fighting for freedom.1023  In his celebrated 
speech, “Call for Revolution” of October 1948 for which he and a number of other Zikist 
leadership were jailed, he had proposed youth internationalism. 
The Zikists tended to draw more strongly on the language of Marxism-Leninism 
in their discourse of the nation.1024  At the movement’s last conference in 1950, before it 
was banned by the colonial government, the resolutions passed revealed the radical 
Zikists’ intent to move the colony’s political process along a left of center course, if given 
the political space.  Their vision of a future independent Nigerian society, as seen in the 
conference resolutions, embraced the ideal of a West African Socialist Union, the 
nationalization of the basic industries, direct action against imperialism, and extensive 
development of the cooperative movement.  These resolutions remained more on paper, 
however.  But they nevertheless served to affirm officialdom’s perception of the Zikists 
as extremist and as “dangerous to the good government of Nigeria.”1025 
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British colonial officials had all along had a very negative opinion of the Zikists 
and the Zikist Movement, as they did of NEPU and its leadership.   The Zikist Movement 
was regarded as aimed “to stir up hatred and malice and to pursue seditious aims by 
lawlessness and violence,” and its purposes and methods as “dangerous to the good 
government of Nigeria,”1026 etc.  The secret document from the Colonial Office to J. K. 
Thompson of the British Embassy in Washington in 1950 stated that the Zikist 
Movement had been, right from the start, and I quote at length: 
An extremist movement with a tendency to violence … 
appears to have become the refuge of young semi-literate 
junior employees of Government and of other organizations 
who are actuated by envy in two senses, in that they envy 
any European because of his apparent wealth and because 
of his superior intellectual ability … they preach the need 
for the break-up of existing order in order to rebuild a new.  
It is far from clear what they would intend to rebuild but it 
is quite clear what they intend to destroy …1027 
 
A spokesman in the British Embassy in Washington also reported to the New York-based 
Amsterdam News that the Zikist Movement was “a splinter party of ‘extremists’ which 
broke away from the NCNC.”1028  British officialdom subsequently moved to disband 
them on April 13, 1950 after a series of disturbances in which the Zikists were implicated 
and for which many Zikists were jailed.  The government proclaimed the Zikist 
movement an unlawful society and was banned.1029   
The radicals in the Gold Coast Convention People’s Party (CPP), like the radical 
Zikists in the NCNC in Nigeria, also attempted to radicalize the CPP from within and to 
try to move it left of the political center.  These were also composed mostly of trade 
unionists who espoused a form of labor socialism.  They had pushed for Positive Action 
against the colonial establishment in January 1950 at a time when the leader of the party, 
Kwame Nkrumah, like Azikiwe in Nigeria, was becoming predisposed towards working 
with the colonial authorities.  Both Nkrumah and Azikiwe had perceived such positioning 
to be politically expedient at the turn of the 50s because proposed constitutional changes 
and newly-enacted constitutions were creating openings and opportunities for political 
advancement, based on cooperation with British officialdom.   
 225
At a time when colonial officials were beginning to look for effective “moderate” 
African leaders they could work with and Nkrumah was beginning to make important 
shifts in order to work with the system and to gain political power, the radicals in the CPP 
such as Anthony Woode and Pobee Biney continued to seek to push the CPP to the left of 
the center in their desire for grassroot change and immediate grant of political 
independence.  Colonial officials were fearful of such perceived intransigent and 
“extremist” actions and position.  The radicals in the Gold Coast as well as in Nigeria 
were closely followed and watched by officials and attempts were made to effectively 
exclude them structurally, i.e., from membership of the CPP and NCNC, as well as from 
institutions that potentially conferred power and prestige, such as the colonies’ 
Legislative Councils.  Officials sought and got the cooperation of leaders of these 
political parties, Nkrumah and Azikiwe, to this effect.1030 
 
Breaks to Radicalism: Structural Limitations 
 
The colonial authority, in trying to “guide” change in the late 40s and beginning of the 
50s, sought to create breaks to the development of radical politics and to close the space 
for the discourse and imagining of the nation and citizenship in socially transforming 
ways as the radicals were attempting.  One of the ways officialdom sought to do this was 
to remove political capacity from the radicals as means of containing them.1031  This 
involved direct and indirect measures.  One way this was done was to exclude the 
radicals from institutions that conferred power and influence, such as the Legislative 
Councils, as noted above.  For example, the retention of the principle of nomination in 
the 1951 Constitutions for Northern Nigeria and the Sierra Leone Protectorate, places 
where the principle of indirect rule through Native Authorities was still dominant, served 
to undermine the ability of NEPU and progressive organizations in the Sierra Leone 
Protectorate, such as the Kono Progressive Movement (KPM) in the diamond area of 
Kono, to remain effective political forces in Northern Nigeria and in Sierra Leone.  
Officialdom’s actions also involved their encouragement of leaders of what was 
becoming mainstream political parties to expel the radicals from their party, including 
their dismissals from government posts, etc.  Officialdom’s attitude towards radicalism 
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and perceived “ideologues,” equated with extremism and communism, remained the 
same – to be feared, watched, and silenced.  By the end of the 40s, the British colonial 
authorities were out to cultivate the “respectable” African,1032 as they tried to make 
changes from the top, and to include this category more and more in the machinery of 
government by granting capacity to them.  As these new categories of Africans acquired 
some degree of recognition and power from the British colonial authorities, they were 
used in turn to create breaks to the development of radicalism in colonial society by 
encouraging them to take actions against the “communists” within their political parties.   
As leader of Government Business in 1954, Nkrumah had made the government’s 
position on communism clear even against members of his own party when he announced 
in the Legislative Council Session of 25th February, 1954, for example, that any person 
who had been proved to be an active communist would be refused employment in the 
public service.1033  He followed this by the expulsion of “communists” from the CPP.  
These included his former compatriots like Anthony Woode and Turcson-Ocran, the 
General Secretary of the Gold Coast Trade Union Council.1034  Ironically, it was the very 
activism of these radicals and the fear of them by colonial officials that had been partly 
contributory to officialdom’s decision to open up the system to the “moderates” and to 
such “radicals-turned-moderates” like Nkrumah himself!1035  Nkrumah in government 
further worked with colonial officials in the Gold Coast to ban the possession of 
communist or pro-communist literature believed to be dispatched in bulk to trade union 
leaders and private individuals.  The banned publications were reported to include those 
of the World Federation of Trade Union (WFTU) and the World Federation of 
Democratic Youth (WFDY), including those of other communist-affiliated  
organizations, as well as English-language publications emanating from Eastern Europe 
and the Soviet Union.1036  
In Nigeria, state actions and constraints against the chances of any socially radical 
politics and intervention involved more reactionary measures in the North.  The attempts 
by the few women radicals and radical organizations such as the NEPU to raise political 
consciousness at the grassroot level and among women, in particular Moslem women in 
the North, and to change the status quo met constantly with strong resistance from the 
ruling authorities - the Emirs of the Native Authorities system.  The radicals there were 
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imprisoned, beaten, and expelled from their jobs in the Native Authorities, etc.  The 
handful of radicals like Mallam Ibrahim Illah Ringim and the radical women activist, 
Sawaba, documented or spoke of how they were constantly jailed for their activism and 
political beliefs and of how prison became to them a second home.1037  Such punishment 
was also to deter other social activists and women from following in their footsteps.   
Mallam Ringim recalled the many felt injustices, hardship, and cruelty he and his 
family suffered at the hands of the Native Authorities in the North as a result of his 
political activities and his membership and leadership position in NEPU.1038  He recalled 
how, at one time, the Kano Native Authority which had complete jurisdiction over the 
town of Ringim where he was based seized his farm and those of his supporters and sold 
them to the Nigerian Railway Corporation without any compensation given to them.  He 
reported in his memoirs that: 
To fight for my rights and those of my townsmen, I 
instituted a legal action against the Kano Native Authority 
in the Emir’s Court, which was at that time presided over 
by the late Alhaji Abdullahi Bayero, the then Emir of Kano. 
During the trial, my detractors informed the Emir that I was 
a member of NEPU.  For this reason the case was 
subsequently struck out and I was chased out of the Emir’s 
court; no land, no compensation, simply driven out with 
ignominy.1039 
He further reported on how he was always severely beaten up and imprisoned without 
trial many times.  Even members of his family were not exempt from some of these 
reported cruel treatment.  He stated that his brother and his daughter were all beaten up at 
various times for no offense other than that they were part of his family.  He recalled the 
fate suffered by his daughter at one time and his own travails in the efforts to get justice 
for her thus: 
One evening of Ramadan, I sent my daughter to buy me 
some gruel.  Certain supporters of the NPC beat her up 
severely, on the ground that her father happened to be a 
member of NEPU (a rival party to NPC).  When I brought 
an action for damages to the court the judge simply went 
into his house and came out with a cutlass and started to 
shout for help that I came to kill him with a cutlass.  That 
very night I fled to Kano on foot, a journey of fifty miles 
from Ringim.1040 
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The exercise of state power in this manner by the ruling elites in the North of 
Nigeria did indeed make it difficult for organizations such as the NEPU which was 
grassroot-oriented and also pro-women's emancipation, to continue to effectively sustain 
its attempts at creating mutually-inclusive categories.  It made it difficult for NEPU to 
continue to make any significant inroads in helping to change the status of commoners 
and women in this society.1041  For example, NEPU seemed to be making a headway in 
forming a Northern Women's Association at its initial meeting on 25th April, 1951 at the 
Colonial Hotel in its headquarters in Kano.  This inaugural meeting was reported to be 
enthusiastically attended by about 60 women of “mixed tribe.”  Although 40 were Ibos 
and other Southerners, the remaining 20 were Hausa-Fulani Northern women.1042  From 
this meeting, a number of Northern women were reported to have been chosen to be 
members of the interim executive of the proposed Women's Association.  However, by 
the time a second meeting was held on 2nd May, 1951 to consolidate the grounds for the 
formation of the Association, attendance had declined considerably.  Among important 
reasons for this decline as cited in the Police Report was the fear of retribution from the 
Emir.1043  The Report says that: 
Amongst the Northern women there was some trepidation 
regarding the probable reactions of the Emir as he is wont 
to order from time to time women of the class who formed 
the majority of the first meeting get married within 7 days 
or to leave Kano.1044 
Many people – men and women – were indeed deterred from joining any organization 
that threatened the status quo especially in the North where they suffered great retribution 
and punishment, especially in the hands of the Native Authorities.  
The colonial government also came hard against any radical organizations or 
movements directly by decimating their ranks, i.e., through imprisonment, “buy-outs,” 
transfer to another state as they did with Aminu Kano, or simply by banning such 
organizations as against law and order, as they did with the Zikist movement in 1950.  
The Zikists movement was announced banned by the government Order in Council, No 
19, dated April 13, 1950 under section 62 of the Criminal Code.1045  Before then, the 
government had also been decimating their ranks by jailing many of the leaders and 
members on alleged crimes of sedition.   In 1948, on the alleged charge of sedition and 
subsequent trials of many Zikists implicated in this charge, many of the Zikists received 
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various terms of imprisonment ranging from six months to nine months and some for 
much longer.  For example, Mokwugo Okoye, the General Secretary of the Zikist 
Movement at the time, was jailed 33 months, and Francis Ikenna Nzimiro, the then 24-
year old president of the Onitsha branch of the Zikist movement, was also sent to prison 
for nine months, both of them on allegation of possessing seditious pamphlets and 
publications.1046 
 
Critique of Radicalism and the Radicals 
 
The radicals’ attempts to reconstitute community and notions of citizenship in 
more inclusive and socially transforming and progressive terms failed to occupy or be 
sustained at the center of national discourse in the period under study.  Their failure to 
fundamentally change the status quo in the pre-independence period was due to a variety 
of interrelated causes.  A major reason was British officialdom’s reaction against them in 
conjunction with opposition and measures against them by African ethnopolitical 
entrepreneurs, as noted earlier.  Another major reason were the objective conditions in 
these West African colonial societies which acted as breaks to the success of the politics 
of social change and social transformation in the terms in which the radicals were seeking 
it.  A countervailing force to the success of any politics of social transformation in these 
places was tied to the inherent contradictions of colonial society1047 and of the radical 
spectrum itself which the radicals failed to transform, as noted in earlier chapters.  
A major contradictory element was that of class.  While the discourse of “class” 
and the related issue of inequities, etc., that the radicals sought to privilege in their 
discourse and practices were pertinent as serious political issues, the category of class as 
an analytical concept was not successfully conceived by the social radicals in the form 
that reflected the social realities or the forms in which it was manifesting in these colonial 
social formations.  “Class” elements were articulating with other elements or analytical 
categories in quite complex forms.  For example, while on the one hand new forms of 
social stratification was emerging based on the acquisition of wealth, western education, 
etc., on the other hand, the “class” divide was being mediated and blunted by other ties 
of, i.e., religion, gender, etc., by which people were connected, as already revealed in 
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earlier chapters.1048  In such contexts, class as a category of practice and/or of analysis is 
a problem to be confronted and analyzed, as also indicated earlier.  The West African 
colonial social radicals did not succeed in confronting the problem of class as a category 
of practice or as a tool of analysis of the colonial situation and for social change.  The 
category of class presented a problem for political organizations or movements such as 
those of the social radicals which sought to mobilize people, especially the 
disenfranchised, on the basis of class divide.  On the other hand, these divisions and 
inequities were being exploited and perpetuated in the discursive practices of 
ethnopolitical entrepreneurs, as this study has also attempted to reveal.  “Ethnic,” 
“religious,” “gender,” and other categories were being appealed to and used as instrument 
of “nation-forming” by the ethnopolitical entrepreneurs.  As Brubaker noted in regard to 
the performative and group-making practices of ethnic entrepreneurs, categories of 
ethnopolitical entrepreneurs are for doing.1049  African ethnopolitical entrepreneurs’ 
making of categories of “ethnicity,” “gender,” “religion,” “class,” etc.,  into “nation” 
served in important ways to shape the self-identification of many colonial subjects in this 
period.  Identification with particular struggles among the rank and file of colonials was 
often made on non-class lines even when class-related issues were important components 
of this.  In many instances, we find the ranks of the “privileged” being augmented with 
the ranks of the “non-privileged” to fight a similar coalition of forces from other 
communities or regions, even when the gains might be limited to a more narrowly- 
defined interest group within each coalition.  In the 1953 crisis in Kano,1050 Northern 
Nigeria, categories of “religion” and “ethnicity” were successfully applied by the 
Northern ruling authorities/NPC elites and in ways that sublimated any “class” 
differences between them and the mass of the Hausa-Fulani peasantries to whom they 
turned for support and who they rallied against the Southerners and Southern politicians.  
This served to give the conservative NPC party the advantage as the planned rallies by 
Southern politicians in Kano had to be cancelled as a result of the volatile situation there.  
The oppositional discourse against the Southern politicians and Southerners in the North 
also served to create a wedge between Northerners and Southerners in the North and in 
the nation.  The divisiveness and hatred along “ethnic/religious” lines climaxed in the 
pogrom against Ibos (Southerners) in the North less than a decade after independence and 
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quickly led to the Nigerian civil war in the second half of the 1960s.  The appeal of the 
National Symbolic1051 undercut that of “class” and class divide. 
The radicals also suffered to some extent from the romanticism and idealism that 
characterized utopian-type movements.  After his expulsion from the NCNC in 1955, 
Mokwugo Okoye, an ex-Zikist would write, “As I go, … I trust that our country shall yet 
produce able, true and brave sons and daughters who can effect her deliberations and 
usher in the socialist millennium we all visualize today.’1052  It was not so much the 
desire to create a new social order based on social justice and equity, but a question of 
how well conceived this was as praxis and what the chances were for success.  In British 
West African colonial societies, if it may be agreed that there were ingredients for 
radical/left of center politics, it is not certain that there were sufficient ingredients to 
facilitate the success of such politics.  Part of the radicals’ inability to succeed, apart from 
the very persistent and fairly successful attempts of the colonial state to constrain them, 
was their own failure to confront the challenges as well as the limits to radical/leftwing-
oriented type politics in the West African colonial social formations.  They sought new 
political possibilities in a social structure and within an ideological framework that 
constrained against these possibilities in their very contradictions and without being able 
to successfully resolve these contradictions in their discourse and social and political 
practice.  
 The radicals could also be said to lack a proper appreciation in their own society 
of the levels of what Gramsci analyzed as the relations of forces to succeed politically.  In 
his theory of passive revolution which he specifically directed to his study of bourgeois 
national movements in the late 19th century Europe, Gramsci identified three moments of 
the political situation or levels of the “relations of forces” that provide limits to fighting a 
“war of movement.”1053  These are: the objective social structure, the level of the 
development of the material forces of production and the relative positions and functions 
of the different classes in production, and the relation of political forces and of military 
forces.1054  The importance of Gramsci's analysis is in pointing to the relevance of 
adopting appropriate strategy by any aspiring social force or class, in his case, the 
national bourgeoisie in conditions of a relatively advanced world capitalism, and in the 
case of this study, the radical social forces in colonial capitalist society in flux, for 
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political success in a given situation.  In Gramsci's analysis, he distinguished between the 
choice of waging a war of movement and waging a war of position.  Colonial radicals 
and would-be leftwing were seeking to wage a war of movement where the conditions 
were not sufficient for such to succeed and/or where they were unable to transcend the 
challenge of the cultural imperative. 
The radicals lacked a proper appreciation of the role of culture as a signifying 
system, “the signifying system through which necessarily … a social order is 
communicated, reproduced, experienced and explored.”1055  As Raymond Williams has 
also attested, culture has two aspects: ‘the known meanings and directions, which its 
members are trained to; the new observations and meanings, which are offered and 
tested.’1056   
The social radicals lacked an understanding both of the fairly successful 
manipulation of the cultural dynamics by the political entrepreneurs and cultural 
producers, as well as of how they could have successfully applied them in their own 
efforts to create new societies predicated on democratic principles.  The political 
entrepreneurs and cultural producers, in their own case, were fairly successful at evoking 
the symbols that marked the boundaries between them and “others” in their very 
ambiguities to compel to action.  Abner Cohen has noted that boundaries are marked by 
symbols: “objects, acts, relationships or linguistic formations that stand ambiguously for 
a multiplicity of meanings, evoke emotions, and impel [people] to action.”1057  The 
Native Authorities in the North were able to use these symbols to good effects in the 
1953 Kano disturbances as they mobilized the people against the Southern politicians in 
the AG and the NCNC political parties who had gone to the North to canvass for electoral 
votes.1058 
 Social activists like Amilcar Cabral in another part of Africa under foreign 
domination succeeded where the radicals in West Africa failed by rooting praxis or his 
social movement in culture as means of harmonizing divergent interests, resolving 
contradictions, and defining common aims in the search for liberty and progress.1059    
The radicals’ failure to recognize the challenge of the politics of social transformation in 
these colonial social formations posed internal limits to the success of their politics, apart 
from other constraining factors.  Where Cabral concerned himself with creating unity of 
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thought and action and the identification of his movement with the “masses,” the radicals 
were unable to create such homogeneity of the various social categories and forces, even 
though they envisioned it.  Cabral stated the objective toward which he worked to 
achieve political victory thus: 
The political and moral unity of the liberation movement 
and of the people it represents and leads implies the 
achievement of the cultural unity of the decisive social 
categories for the struggle.  This unity takes the form on the 
one hand of total identification of the movement with the 
environmental reality and with the problems and  
fundamental aspirations of the people and on the other  
hand of progressive cultural identification of the various 
social categories which take part in the struggle.  The latter 
process must harmonize divergent interests, resolve 
contradictions and define common aims in the search for 
liberty and progress.1060 
It is a daunting task but Cabral nevertheless confronted it in his struggle.  Cabral was able 
to make categories of “ethnicity,” “class,” “religion,” “gender,” etc., into National 
Societies in his discourse and social and political practices.  The colonial radicals failed 
to successfully do so; they therefore failed where Cabral succeeded.  
Though well-meaning and imbued with varying degrees of sharp analytical 
insight and critical consciousness, the social radicals failed to become a credible 
alternative to the status quo and to mainstream discourse and construction of the “nation.”  
They were very much a social force in flux and did not sufficiently evolve or crystallize 
into a coherent alternative.  Most of them rejoined political parties or organizations that 
throve politically when their own organizations were officially proscribed or when they 
were displaced from more mainstream political parties.  This was the case with the 
radicals who rejoined the AG party in Nigeria in the late 50s and existed as its left of 
center wing.  They tried to resurrect radical politics in 1962-63, in the immediate 
independence period, and this involved a chain of events that led to the first military 
coup-d’etat in Nigeria in 1965 and to the dissolution of the short-lived Nigeria’s first 
Republic.1061   
To conclude, although the colonial social radicals also pose a problem of analysis 
and although they may not have successfully addressed all the problems of post-
independent African societies, they were of crucial significance in the period under study.  
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They remain so in post-independent African states’ contemporary challenge and crises of 
democracy and the search for sustainable government.  Colonial social radicals are 
significant in two major symbolic ways.  One is related to their representation of a 
possible alternative path to self-governing nationhood that was not taken, and/or closed 
off by British officialdom.  This significance also relates to colonial social radicals’ 
representation as critique of the paths taken.  Their other symbolic significance is tied to 
British officialdom’s perception of them, i.e., the colonial social radicals, as “communist” 
and the effects of this labeling by officialdom.  These are central to a main thesis of this 
study and its argument that the imperial anti-communist grid into which British 
officialdom collapsed colonial social radicals’ intervention and other forms of social 
intervention among colonials that officialdom did not like constrained against what could 
have mapped out a different, perhaps more democratic terrain for the future governance 
of these colonies as independent African states.  Colonial social radicals remain 
significant in the resonance of their imagined African society in the re-imagining of 
society and citizenship among intellectually and/or socially engaged Africans in post-
independent African states.  Democratically-inclined Africans are seeking to open and to 



















This study has represented an attempt to explore the phenomenon of nationalism in 
British West Africa in the pre-independence period from a reconstituted methodological 
framework in order to fill a gap in the literature of this phenomenon and to provide 
further understanding of the subject and of the end of empire in British West Africa.  It 
has attempted to focus on certain colonial social forces, such as colonial social radicals 
and ethnopolitical entrepreneurs and on aspects of the contesting notions of community 
and citizenship in their discourse and social and political practices and their outcome.  It 
has also attempted to explore the phenomenon of social radicalism and communism, 
including the British imperialist category pf the “communist,” and their effects.1062  In 
exploring the fear of communism in the colonies among British officialdom and their 
labeling of colonial social radicals and other forms of social intervention that British did 
not like in the colonies as “communist,” it seeks to reveal the ways in which this 
categorization impacted the dynamics of the events of this period and the process that 
ended in what this study regards as precipitous decolonization.  This includes its impact 
on the contestations over community and citizenship among colonial social forces.  The 
study posits that British officialdom’s distinction among Africans between the 
“respectable”/“moderate” African and the “extremist”/“communist” African served to 
legitimize the discursive practices of certain colonial social forces, i.e., the ethnopolitical 
entrepreneurs, while it delegitimized those of others, i.e., the colonial social radicals, with 
significant implications in the immediate pre-independence period and for post-
independent West Africa.  The study argues that by opening up space for the discourse 
that officialdom only wanted privileged, officialdom served to facilitate and shape in 
important ways the social, cultural, and political context that formed the basis of the 
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Independence Constitutions for these colonies.  This is revealed to largely involve the 
terms of the social, political, and cultural imaginings that ethnopolitical entrepreneurs’ 
idea of the nation entails and which became the dominant form – the master-discourse – 
but was predicated on narrower forms of cultural and political address.  This study further 
argues that by closing the space to colonial social radicals’ intervention and other forms 
of social intervention in the period under study, British officialdom constrained against 
what could have shaped out to be a different terrain, perhaps more democratic society for 
post-independent West Africa.   
 This chapter seeks to bring to a conclusive end the salient themes in the narrative 
of the phenomenon of nationalism in this study and to provide a brief historicized 
reflection on what this study considers to be precipitous decolonization.  It seeks to 
examine the role played by British officialdom’s perceptions of communism in these 
colonies and the imperial anti-communist grid on how and when empire ended there.  
The study posits that the grant of self-determination to these colonies was an unintended 
result of a dialectical process tied to a complex of factors and impacted in important ways 
by British officialdom’s fear of communism in the colonies.  
 
Officialdom’s Social Engineering 
 
British officialdom’s fear of communism in their colonies and their response to 
what was perceived as the radicalism of the left at the end of the 40s and early 50s in 
West Africa involved taking reform initiatives that they believed would serve to reduce 
the influence of colonial social radicals and the crisis of empire. One major area of 
reform was through the grant of new constitutions that they believed would allow for 
greater degree of discussion and participation by Africans in the affairs of their country.  
Officialdom believed that with these constitutional changes, those who would be entering 
these institutions would be Africans who, as revealed in chapter four, officials had 
discursively constituted as “responsible” and “moderate.”  They also hoped that the 
chances of colonial “radicals,” “extremists,” and ‘communists,’ entering into these 
institutions would be highly reduced.  By seeking to open up the political space for 
“moderates” through constitutional changes, officials hoped to marginalize the colonial 
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social radicals and the discourses that officials did not want to have privileged.  A. B. 
Cohen of the Colonial Office, in defending the grant of new constitutions that they 
believed would provide for “full participation” by Africans in the colonies’ governing 
institutions at the turn of the 50s, had stated that “such a constitution provides the best 
defense against Communism in West Africa.”1063  They would now seek to cultivate the 
African “moderates” and to work with them as these began to gain entry into the 
institutions of power through the openings that the new constitutions were affording 
them.  “A sense of responsibility can only be created by giving responsibility,” Cohen 
had further commented in defense of the reforms and constitutional changes that were 
being undertaken at the end of the 40s and beginning of the 50s consequent to the 1948 
Gold Coast crisis.1064  Also defending the course of reforms and concession-granting to 
“moderates” to stave off the “extremists,” the Secretary of State, Mr. Lyttelton, had 
remarked in a Cabinet Memorandum of February 1952 that “if politics is the art of what 
is practicable this course is justified.”1065   
British endeavors at social engineering involved attempts to decide and define the 
boundaries of legitimate discourse.  The social radicals would, however, contest those 
boundaries and the limits that officialdom was attempting to put on change and the 
discourse of community and citizenship in quite significant ways.  They sought to force 
open the space that colonial authorities would rather have closed and to privilege the 
discourse that officialdom would rather not have centered.  Paradoxically, the social 
radicals’ continued attempts to center the discourse of community and of citizenship in 
the socially radical terms that officialdom was opposed to fed more and more into 
officialdom’s fear of the potentials of these radicals as sources of communism in the 
colonies and therefore to their continued alienation by officialdom.  It furthered 
officialdom’s reaction against them and against all those who officials had collapsed into 
the same category as “extremists” and “communists.”  Colonial officials would continue 
to seek for ways to marginalize and deny capacity to these Africans, derided in various 
ways as “extremist,” “misguided and mischievous,” “irresponsible,” and “communist,” 
etc.1066 
From the beginning of the 50s, British officialdom’s negative reaction to the 
radicals and to their discourses and practices, and to the party of any whose slogan is “we 
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don’t agree,” such as the NEPU,1067 also involved their continued accommodationist 
response to those they perceived as moderates, largely located among the ethnopolitical 
entrepreneurs.1068  The radicalism among some of the latter, exhibited perhaps at certain 
stages of the trajectory of their career was more of the right and/or “political” rather than 
social radicalism.  The cooperation of this social force with officialdom would involve 
further grant of new constitutions as part concession to them, perceived as “moderates.”  
At the beginning of the 50s, these were those whom the British felt would work with 
them to more effectively manage empire than their former but now largely “inept” allies, 
the chiefs, could.  They were also those who officialdom believed would, in the light of 
the new world geo-politics and Cold War rivalry, enable them to keep their West African 
colonies in the sphere of British influence then and in any future self-governing status for 
their West African colonies.  Perceiving these colonial “moderates” as able to retain the 
colonies in the sphere of the West in the possible future, though not yet quite planned, 
self-governing West African nations, the British would in the end hurriedly hand over 
power to them.  This involved, as this study contends, a pre-emptive move to forestall the 
possibility of the Soviet Union from gaining further inroads and advantage in the colonies 
should the crises of empire continue and the colonial social radicals gain the upper 
hand.1069  The U. S. had already warned Western Imperial Powers of this possibility and 
of the need to take pre-emptive steps by granting independence to these colonies.  The 
1948 USCIA Report which warned of the presence of leftwing elements in the crises in 
the West’s colonies and of their “susceptibility to Soviet penetration,” as well as of the 
“danger of shortsighted colonial policies,”1070 had also stressed that unless the European 
Colonial Powers could be: 
Induced to recognize the necessity for satisfying the 
aspirations of their dependent areas and can devise 
formulae that will retain their goodwill as emergent or 
independent states, both these Powers and the U. S. will be 
placed at a serious disadvantage in the new power 
situation.1071 
 
In continuation of his defense of the constitutional changes on-going in the four 
British West African colonies and against France’s criticism that the British were moving 
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too fast, A. B. Cohen, echoing similar sentiments as in the USCIA report above, wrote in 
1951 that: 
These reforms are based on the following principles … that 
no constitution which did not provide for full participation 
by Africans would have any chance of success under 
present conditions in West Africa; … such a constitution 
provides the best defense against Communism in West 
Africa, the only chance of friendly co-operation between 
this country and the West African territories and the best 
chance when the time comes of securing a favorable 
decision by the Gold Coast and Nigeria to stay within the 
British Commonwealth (emphasis mine).1072  
 
He also went on to say that:  
Our policy has been criticized by the French as moving too 
fast.  We cannot for the reasons just given accept this 
criticism if it means that we have gone too far in reform.1073  
 
What his defense amounted to was that the “moderates” must be enabled and appeased 
through the on-going reforms and timely grant of new constitutions that would allow 
them “full” participation in government in order to have them remain West-friendly in 
the future independent West African nations.  This was also simultaneously to avoid what 
officials believed to be the unwelcomed alternative, that is, the “extremists” taking 
control and the felt more likely possibility of future pro-Soviet independent West African 
nations if they did, as earlier stated.   
These changes, in other words, involved a pre-emptive reformist response by the 
British colonial power.  A pre-emptive reformist response was not new, either, to the 
British or to the other European powers.  In other contexts, the fear of communist 
insurgency or insurrectionary politics, or even the chance that this might happen, had 
elicited similar reformist response in various ways.  In the international revolutionary 
conjuncture of 1917 to 1923, non-socialist governments of Western Europe undertook 
bold reforms in their countries to pre-empt a revolutionary upsurge or prevent the  
possibility of such developing.1074  Faced with the realities of events in the colonies at the 
end of the 40s and beginning of the 50s, and the fear - real or imagined - of communism 
gaining a foothold in West Africa, the British colonial power in the end took the 
important step of handing over their colonies to the “moderates” before the Commies got 
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a foothold in their West African colonies as they already had in other places outside the 
continent.1075  The Colonial Office, monitoring Azikiwe’s activities closely while visiting 
the U. S. in 1950, for example, recorded his speech to the local branch of the United 
World Federalists in the Washington Daily News to the effect that “the happy note was 
that the Commies had made no headway in Nigeria.”1076  However, the report continued, 
recapping Azikiwe’s comment, “he warned of the possibilities if things didn’t 
change.”1077   
Subsequent to the conjunctures of 1948 in the Gold Coast, the British colonial 
power embarked on the process of change in the colonies and would become more 
responsive to the demands of the “moderates” to whom in the end they would also 
concede the demand for self-government.  They needed the continued cooperation of the 
“moderates” in managing empire and made concessions to them before these 
“moderates” became radicalized, or, “re-radicalized,” as the case may be, should the 
colonial government continue to stall on, or deny their perceived moderate demands.  
“Re-radicalized” because among significant segments of the “partners worth working 
with” of the 50s were the hitherto officially labeled extremists, agitators, and communists 
of yesteryears!1078  Colonial officials knew that among their most important working 
allies now and who headed organizations and political parties now strongly represented in 
government were once the officialdom’s constituted radicals and extremists of yesterday, 
such as Kwame Nkrumah, Nnamdi Azikiwe.  They knew them enough to the extent that 
they knew they could change character again, i.e., shift their position and rejoin the ranks 
of the refuseniks1079 - the colonial social radicals - and to further mass agitation and rouse 
public opinion against the colonial government, especially through their press, should 
their own demands not be met.  The possibility of such occurrence was, however, getting 
slimmer as Nkrumah and Azikiwe began to gain more political power from the beginning 
of the 50s through the constitutional openings that had put them in positions of relative 
power in their colonies’ governing institutions, etc.  From these vantage positions, they 
were able to continue to consolidate their power position as they worked with the colonial 
authorities as “partners in progress.”   These African politicians – the ethnopolitical 
entrepreneurs - were set on staying this course while skillfully pushing the boundaries of 
change gently from within.   
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The Colonial Office had also observed, in 1950 in relation to Azikiwe, that: 
It does not appear that Zik had any direct contact here in 
London with known Communists.  He says that he is still 
studying whether extreme Left, Center or Right parties 
would afford Nigeria most aid to freedom, but feels it is 
only a question of time before Communism dominates the 
world.  He himself is none too confident that Communism 
will be in the best interest of Nigeria but feels its 
dominance is inevitable.  Zik said that he, personally, 
would be content with a Constitution for Nigeria similar to 
that of Malta, - a diarchy, with Imperial interests similarly 
safeguarded; he thought that such a Constitution would not 
be granted if asked for.1080 
 
That was in 1950.  Whatever Azikiwe’s idea of a diarchy was, by 1953 Azikiwe and the 
“moderates” were asking for full self-government,1081 but were still unequivocally pro-
West, still sure communism would not be in the interest of Nigeria.  Before its dominance 
became “inevitable” and Azikiwe and the rest of the “moderates” turned “the way of the 
communists,” the British colonial power decided to hand over the mantle of power to the 
“moderates”; the grant of full self government became an official reality in all the British 
West African colonies, beginning with the Gold Coast in 1956.1082   
 The question is raised as to why the British decided to grant full self-government 
status to their West African colonies at this time, within a short period, and contrary to 
their expressed views and pronouncement and intentions till shortly before then.  This 
chapter seeks to address this question to some extent.  The debate on decolonization in 
Africa remains open-ended among scholars of the end of empire in Africa and this study 
is also an attempt to shed some light on this theme by examining the role played, if any, 
of the fear and perceptions of British officialdom of communism in their West African 
colonies and among certain colonial social forces in the process that ended empire and at 
the time it did.  The rest of this chapter explores aspects of the process in which the 
British colonial power suddenly relinquished their West African empire.   
 
The Dialectic of Change  
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The study regards the grant of political independence to the British West African colonies 
as precipitous and unplanned and as the unintended result of a dialectical process 
involving a variety of interconnected factors, including the fear of communism in the 
colonies among British officialdom and their perception of colonial social radicals as 
sources of Soviet infiltration into these colonies.  As late as the mid-40s, the British 
colonial power was still not envisaging political independence to their West African 
colonies.  It is true that the makers of empire had envisaged at various times hitherto 
some kind of self-governing status for the colonies.  However, it remained largely vague 
and in terms of some unforeseeable future, “a good many generations,” perhaps even 
“centuries,” as Governor Stevenson of Sierra Leone would cynically comment to O. G. 
R. Williams, head of the West African Section in the Colonial Office as late as 1943.1083  
Stage five of the “Tentative Plan for Constitutional Development” drawn up in mid-1943 
by O. G. R. Williams had no timetable for self-government.1084    
At the very beginning of imperial occupation, any notion or discourse of self 
government for the colonies was tied to the notion of Trusteeship.  The colonies were 
being held in trusteeship,1085 to impart Western civilization - the three Cs: Christianity, 
Commerce, and Civilization - to “the People without history”1086 till such a time as they 
could enter the Community of Nations.  That was as far as any idea of eventual self 
government that could be teased out would allow at the time.  When they would be ready 
to enter the Community of Nations and how were undefined.  That these West African 
colonies, pacified and fully occupied only by the beginning of the twentieth century, 
would become self-governing in less than six decades later, was definitely not an idea 
that was or could be seriously envisaged by the makers of empire at the time of 
consolidation of empire; neither was it so long afterwards, even in barely less than a 
decade before the grant of full self-government occurred there!  As late as 1946, Rita 
Hinden, the Secretary of the Fabian Colonial Bureau (FCB), was still uncertain about full 
independence and self-government for their African colonies, in spite of the FCB’s strong 
advocacy of progressive changes in the British colonies.  In her retort to Kwame 
Nkrumah during a Fabian conference in April 1946, she had declared that “British 
socialists are not so concerned with ideals like independence and self government, but 
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with the idea of social justice.”1087  The best that could be foreseen then was some form 
of self-governing status within the British Commonwealth - but in some distant future.  
It was not just the arch imperialists like Winston Churchill of Britain or Charles 
de Gaulle of France who could not envisage an end to their empires, “over which the sun 
never sets.”1088  Otherwise more forward-looking advocates of progressive British 
administration in the colonies in Britain, including other British Fabian socialists like 
Arthur Creech Jones and Herbert Morrison, were also deeply attached to the continued 
sustenance of their empires in Africa as late as the post-World War II period.1089  Even at 
a time when the Labor Party of which the FCB formed a significant and influential 
component were in power (1945–1951) and could have been committed to carrying out 
more radical changes, this did not occur.   
The grant of new constitutions to the British West African colonies, starting with 
the Gold Coast in 1946, two decades after the grant of the last one, was also not planned 
to be a stage in the development of the colonies towards self government – certainly not 
within a decade or two.  In his prepared dispatch to the Secretary of State (SOS) in regard 
to constitutional reforms for Nigeria in 1945, Sir Arthur Richards (Lord Milverton), then 
Governor of Nigeria, stated the limited nature of these constitutional changes and the best 
that could be envisaged from them as being to enable Nigerians “to secure greater 
participation in the discussion of their own affairs” (emphasis mine).1090  The scheme for 
the dispatch was laid before the Legislative Council on March 5, 1945 and the same 
constitutional proposal was passed, with only one person, Dr. N. T. Olusoga, not 
supporting it.1091  In just a decade and a half later, however, self-government occurred in 
all the four British West African colonies.   
Within only six decades, “Trusteeship” had changed during World War II to 
“Partnership,”1092 which was revised to “inter-dependence of the UK and colonial 
economic unit,”1093 and then to “self-government within the British Commonwealth,” and 
thereafter to full self-government by the mid-50s.  The question must be asked as to how 
this rapid turn of events and policy shifts came about in what turned out to be the last 
decade of British rule in West Africa?  As already indicated in this study and in my 
earlier works,1094 it was the unintended consequences of, i.e., the complex interplay of 
events in the colonies and in the international arena, the inextricably mixed crises at the 
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level of the colonial state1095 and at the level of local African society, as well as the post- 
World War II Cold War rivalry between the West and the Soviet Bloc.  The latter became 
important prism through which British colonial power also perceived crises in the 
colonies, particularly the socially relevant intervention of colonial social radicals in the 
late 40s and at the turn of the 50s onwards.   
The 1948 Gold Coast conjuncture is regarded in this study and in my earlier 
works as a catalyst in the turn of events that resulted in the end of empire about a decade 
later in these West African colonies.1096  The crisis played into British officialdom’s fear 
of communism in the colonies.  It facilitated the rapid grants of new constitutions and led 
to a momentum that took on a life of its own, with the Gold Coast colony leading the 
way.  In the Gold Coast, once colonial officials were assured that Nkrumah, as leader of 
the CPP, and the rest of his party leadership in government were on the path of 
“moderation” and constitutionalism, they became responsive to him and to his party’s 
requests for the grant of more political concessions.  The pace of political change in this 
colony subsequently became increased, more than was ever intended by the colonial 
power.  In fact, the stated preference of the Colonial Office was to go slow on the pace of 
change.  During the meeting of the Secretary of State with Nkrumah in the Gold Coast in 
June 1952, he had warned Nkrumah in their discussion to “not ask for too much too 
quickly.”1097  Irrespective of their stated preference, however, colonial officials became 
more and more drawn into granting concessions to Nkrumah and the CPP party leaders in 
government, preferring them to their feared alternative, the “extremists.”  The perceived 
radical activism and discourses of colonial radicals made the concessions to the 
“moderates” more necessary. 
The momentum of concession-granting was set into motion and would continue 
until in the end the grant of full self-government was given to the Gold Coast even when 
the British assessed that the country was not ready for full self-government, especially in 
the light of its weak administrative structures.  The British officialdom felt that it was the 
most efficacious decision for them in the circumstance: to cut and run, hoping that 
Nkrumah and his government will be able to deal with the “genie” that had been let out 
of the box but which they had thus far succeeded in keeping at bay - barely!  And post-
independent Gold Coast (Ghana) as well as Nigeria and Sierra Leone governments did 
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have to continue to face the crises of nationhood that were already inscribed in pre-
independence African societies and unresolved in the Independence Constitutions.1098 
The momentum of change was also sustained in spite of reservations by certain 
other colonial officials, from the higher-ranking to the lowest, in the colonies1099 and in 
the Colonial Office who felt the pace of change in the Gold Coast was moving too fast 
for the stability of the political situation in other places such as Nigeria, and even as far 
away as in Kenya.  The Governor of Nigeria, Sir Macpherson, for example, believing that 
Nigeria was bound to be affected by the developments in the Gold Coast, had expressed 
concern at the pace and mode of constitutional changes in the Gold Coast.1100  In his 
January 8th, 1952 letter to Sir T. Lloyd, the Permanent Under-Secretary of State, (1947-
1956), Macpherson expressed how shocked he was to learn after the facts that the former 
Secretary of State, Mr. J Griffiths,1101 had agreed that it would be necessary to allow 
Nkrumah to win further political advance along the lines of what Arden-Clarke had just 
informed Macpherson he would be asking H. M. G. to agree to.1102  He went on to 
express, reacting to what he had just learnt from Arden-Clarke, that “the failure to tell us 
about these conversations is very hard to understand - having regard to the great and 
ever-increasing repercussions here from events in the Gold Coast.”1103  He expressed 
appreciation of the challenge of the “critical situation in the Gold Coast” but implored 
that “in considering what action may be necessary there to save the Gold Coast for the 
Empire,” those in London should “not fail to realize that the result may be to pose the 
same question for Nigeria.”1104  Furthermore, he informed that the new 1951 Constitution 
in Nigeria was being well responded to there by all parties involved in working it but that 
the proposed changes to the 1950 Gold Coast constitution, planned to be announced by 
the Secretary of State soon, would likely upset the chances of the new constitution in 
Nigeria having a favorable reception.1105  “Both political parties had decided to try out 
the new Constitution,” he continued, referring to the two Southern regional political 
parties in Nigeria, the AG and the NCNC, “but if the concessions proposed by Arden-
Clarke are given to the Gold Coast I shall have the gloomiest forebodings about the 
future here,” he went on to warn.1106  “If Arden-Clarke’s programme is adopted that 
becomes a pipe-dream, and we may well join the number of those colonies who have had 
to fight a rearguard action doomed to defeat,” he summized.1107  A year later in 1953, 
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Macpherson continued to express the same objections.  In response to Sir Thomas 
Lloyd’s personal letter of 5th March, 1953 to him, Macpherson wrote to Lloyd on March 
16th, 1953, more or less expressing exception to the rapid constitutional changes in the 
Gold Coast and to what he believed was the negative impact on Nigeria’s development, 
thus: 
We have held the country together and much good work 
has been done.  Had it not been for the constant comparison 
with the Gold Coast, situation would have been very 
encouraging.  Southern politicians would not have felt 
compelled to press for advance and would have allowed 
time for the main inter-regional jealousies to be overcome.  
But the Gold Coast political advance, actual and bogus, has 
been a persistent canker.1108  
 
Sir Charles J. Jeffries, the Deputy Under-Secretary of State (1947–1956), also in 
1953 regarded as a “misfortune” the way constitutional developments had been allowed 
to occur in the Gold Coast and had hoped that it might be their general policy to “call a 
halt to this process,” as far as they could.1109  But the process could no longer be halted as 
it had, unwittingly, taken on a life of its own, given the benefit of hindsight.  Sir Thomas 
Lloyd, stating that the repercussions of the Gold Coast’s advance on Nigeria was 
inevitable, made it known to Governor Macpherson that the course of constitutional 
change in the Gold Coast was set and that it would be impossible for H. M. G. to justify 
to the British Parliament and before world opinion the use of force that might be 
necessary should they do otherwise.1110  Recognizing what was perceived as the broadly- 
based demand for full self-government in the Gold Coast, the SOS, Mr. Lyttelton, in a 
Cabinet Memorandum in 1953, and also in further validation of Lloyd’s point, stated that, 
“if the government of the Gold Coast is to continue to be by consent constitutional 
changes are inescapable.”1111  By the end of 1953, it had become increasingly clear that 
the Colonial Office had committed itself to the path of self-government for the Gold 








Changing Stasis  
 
The British colonial government was, indeed, not aversed to making changes.  In the  
30s, in the aftermath of the worldwide depression and the weakening of the sterling vis-à-
vis the dollar as well as in the face of the crises in their colonies within and outside 
Africa, they realized the need for making changes in the colonies.  It led at that time to a 
rethinking of empire and an engagement with the moral rearmament of empire involving 
a focus on the economic development of the colonies.  The Colonial Development and 
Welfare Act (CDWA) enacted in 1940 was the codification of this change and focus.  The 
significance of African colonies had also loomed large in officialdom’s thinking in the 
face of another European war which began in 1939.  As the war began and dragged on, 
even stronger emphases were placed on the importance of the colonies to aid the war 
efforts by both the Tory and Labor governments in Britain.  In anticipation of post-World 
War II Allied victory, they indicated the need to make changes in order to be able to 
continue to hold on to their colonies.  A. J. Dawe, the Deputy Under-Secretary of State 
(1945-1947), in his conversation with Reginald Coupland also of the Colonial Office, 
remarked, in anticipation of Allied victory and anticipated post-World War II settlement 
by Allied forces, that:     
The strongest argument for resisting any attempts at a 
Peace Conference to transfer our colonies to a Sovereignty 
is that we are training them towards political self-
sufficiency and self-government.  If we make this position 
clear to the world we shall be in a strong position.1112   
 
The changes were, indeed, proposed out of an enlightened self-interest. 
At the end of the 40s, the British colonial power again realized that “change there  
must be,” as the SOS. Mr. Griffith stated in May, 1951,1113 especially after the 1948 crisis 
of social order in the Gold Coast.  The Watson Commission’s report was hinged on the 
very need for change.1114  But change in official mind also meant controlled change; self-
enlightened, reactive, and, paradoxically, also pre-emptive.  It also contained the self-
contradictory idea of change without change, i.e. managed change.1115  New initiatives 
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usually tied to the plans of economic development which aimed at making empire 
economically self-sufficient and profitable were to secure empire and not the result of 
any plan of political development1116 or towards the grant of full self-government for the 
colonies.1117   
The start of a rethinking process on policy in Whitehall and the drive towards the 
moral rearmament of empire in the mid-30s did not signal the start of a policy of 
relinquishing empire in Africa; it was meant to make empire more secure, meant to 
achieve the opposite of what, paradoxically, occurred in the end from the mid-50s 
onwards.  In the late 30s and early 40s, in anticipation of Allied victory, the British took 
steps to pre-empt their colonies from achieving self-governing status at the Peace 
Conference of Allied Powers by embarking on a course of “development.”  The intent of 
the new policy of economic development was to secure empire and to retain them under 
British control, not to relinquish it.  Jane Bowden has revealed in her significant study of 
Britain’s new developmental policy in regard to Nigeria and the Gold Coast (1935-48) 
how the plans of economic development of British West African colonies in the period 
were aimed at retaining these colonies in the anticipated post-World War II talks among 
Allied Powers. 1118  She showed how colonial development was an important aspect of 
Britain’s domestic reconstruction plans during World War II and noted that the 
development of these colonies was for the purpose of control.1119  At the turn of the 50s, 
British officialdom embarked on a plan to widen the base of African representation in the 
Legislative and the Executive Councils and to work with them as partners in progress in 
order to better secure their West African empire and not to relinquish it.  The sudden turn 
towards relinquishing empire was an unintended result of a process over which they had 
lost control. 
 
Control and Self-determination 
 
The control factor in principle remained at work in new contexts in the period 
under study.  The British colonial power would again take steps, in the late 40s and 50s, 
to pre-empt their colonies from disintegrating into chaos and from falling out of their 
control and into Soviet hands.  This time, however, it involved a focus on political 
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development, mainly through the grant of new constitutions to allow for greater African 
discussion and later, participation in their own affairs, as well as to set the boundaries of 
legitimate discourse - again as a way of control.  But this time, it would end in the grant 
of self-government to the colonies as the contradictions of the colonial state also played 
themselves out, i.e., the contradictions between economic development and political 
stasis, of local authority rule (Indirect Rule) and Central government along Western 
parliamentary system (two mutually divergent forms of rule in individual territories), and 
of economic centralization and political decentralization.  Paradoxically, the grant of self-
government was also meant as a way of continuing to maintain control, i.e., to retain their 
sphere of influence in West Africa1120   
By 1953, it was becoming quite clear to the British colonial power that they were 
losing control, going especially by the events in the Gold Coast and Nigeria, and that 
their hold on their West African empire was at best tenuous, especially if force was not 
an option for them to use in keeping colonial society together.  The alternative to force 
was the continued grant of concessions to the “moderates.”  As the moderates continued 
to seek for more and more concessions and, ultimately, for the grant of self-government, 
officialdom perceived in the end that the best way of gaining, or of continuing to gain, 
influence and control in other forms in these territories was to grant self-government to 
the “moderates.”  These were those that they perceived would be able to retain the 
colonies in the sphere of the West and of Britain after independence had been granted and 
would continue to model the political institutions and governance in these states along 
British liberal ideals.1121  It led, therefore, to the move to forestall their West African 
colonies from falling into the hands of the “ social radicals” and into what they believed 
also would be, by default, into the Communist/Soviet sphere of influence.  Hence their 
handing over power, precipitously, to “moderate” Africans.  Full self-government was 
granted by default, not as a planned policy initiative.  By the time the British decided to 
make it “policy,” it had become the only option available to them, given the 
circumstances of the time, and of the official mind. 
 The contention of this study and of my earlier works on the phenomenon of 
nationalism that the end of British West African colonies was not a planned process by 
the British but the unintended consequence of an unpredictable process involving the 
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interplay of events in the colonies and internationally, is in contradistinction to the school 
of guided devolution among earlier schools of revisionist studies of decolonization in 
Africa.  This earlier school believed that the end of British West African empire was a 
planned process by the British with whom lay the real initiative all along.  Lee and Petter 
in Colonial Development and Good Government, contended that Africans’ demands for 
self government were of little or no consequence and rather emphasized the initiatives of 
the official classes as most crucial.1122  Other significant studies in the school of “guided 
devolution” have included Curtis R. Nordman’s work, “Prelude to Decolonization in 
West Africa: The Development of British Colonial Policy, 1938-1947,” and R. D. 
Pearce’s work, The Turning Point in Africa: British Colonial Policy, 1938–1948.1123  
Also deviating from the school of guided devolution or the idea of planned 
decolonization was Jane Bowden’s position in regard to official policy in the colonies in 
the same period that Pearce and Nordman examined.  Bowden reformulated the problem 
of policy making in the period in context of the effects of the changing balance of internal 
and external pressures on policy, as well as in light of the weight of colonial pressures on 
metropolitan policy making.  She pointed out that the interesting question in this regard 
was: 
Not merely why did the planning initiative occur at this 
time, but what was the weight of the various factors that 
had to be taken into account in the formulation of a 
coherent strategy of economic and political development 
because it is this that explains the direction and pace of 
change.1124  
 
This study posits that at the turn of the 40s and beginning 50s, the weight of the 
crises in the colonies and of the role of perceived communist-influenced radicals in those 
crises, tied to officialdom’s fear of a potential future shift of the colonies to the Soviet 
sphere of influence, was important in moving officialdom along a path not planned by 
them in this period - the eventual grant of independence to these West African colonies in 
less than a decade.  It was necessary to grant the “moderates” the request for self-
government as officialdom believed the latter would keep the new states in the sphere of 
the West/Britain.  Though the reality may be different from their perception, perception is 
also reality and what the makers of empire perceived things to be became their reality and 
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influenced their decision to hand over power to the colonial “moderates” at the time this 
occurred.  It is the argument of this study that the perceptions of British colonial 
authorities of communism in the colonies and of the potentials of these colonies to fall 
under Soviet control was significant in the process and the decisions that resulted in the 
grant of self-government in these colonies.   
As to the question of “policy” in the unpredictable circumstances of the time, it 
could indeed be said that policy made itself as John Cell replied to his rhetorical question 
“who made policy?”1125  In the light of lack of observed clear-cut direction or 
understanding among officials high and low of the world the colonial Master sought to 
create in Africa, Cell remarked that policy had made itself in the unfolding events of the 
last quarter of British colonial rule in West Africa.1126  The colonial state structure itself 
was in disarray and fractured internally.  The crisis at the level of local African society1127 
was also, at other levels, a crisis of governance, and of policy, at the level of the colonial 
state.  There was no clear-cut policy in many instances1128 and “policy” initiatives tended 
to be reactive, in reaction to crises, and pre-emptive, in attempts to gain control of a 
runaway situation in order to steer it in officially acceptable ways, or as officials would 
term it, along “ordered progress.”  The constitutional enactments/changes were as much a 
reaction to crisis and challenges at the level of local African society as they were also 
believed to be blueprints for moving the colonies forward.  
The crisis at the level of the colonial state had also involved major contradictions 
of British rule in these colonies: the simultaneous existence of two mutually divergent 
forms of rule in individual territories – local authority rule (Indirect Rule) and Central 
government along Western parliamentary system (Legislative Councils), albeit in  
attenuated forms; the fractionalization of the state structure in the role of colonial chiefs 
whose interest straddled both the colonial state and local African society; the 
contradiction of economic development and political stasis in the era of development; 
and, in what became the last decade of colonial rule, the major contradiction of  
economic centralization and political decentralization.  The colonial partners worth 
working with of the 50s – the political entrepreneurs and cultural producers - would, in 
the end, succeed in having the dilemma and contradictions of British imperial rule 
reconciled in their favor, as Margery Perham unwittingly predicted at the 6th October, 
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1939 Carleton meeting.  She said, despairingly: “We shall probably give in to them too 




British officialdom’s attempts at change through political development at the turn 
of the 50s, i.e., constitutional changes, involved efforts to stem the tide of feared chaos 
that might undermine empire.  It was also directed against any kind of change that they 
perceived to be socially transforming.  A prime example earlier on was their intent in 
establishing a Labor Department for the colonies in the late 1930s, even when the idea 
was not readily welcomed among British colonial authorities in the colonies.  The 
Colonial Office was particularly very anxious about labor and developments in the trade 
union movements in the colonies.1130  The intent in creating the Labor Department in 
1938 and in giving recognition to trade unions in the colonies was to control colonial 
labor, as earlier works on colonial labor have also indicated, and as also indicated earlier 
in this study1131  Damachi, Seibel, and Trachtman commented that “what was being 
introduced via government support was a kind of ‘guided democracy.’”1132 
British officialdom’s notion of change in the late 40s and early 50s, like the 
British initiative in introducing the idea of colonial development or the establishment of 
labor department for the colonies in the late 30s, involved taking pre-emptive steps and 
making state-sponsored changes precisely so as to enable them maintain control and 
prevent any radical change, i.e., change from below.  It involved attempts to tailor the 
course of development in the colonies in the direction of ordered progress.  Their idea of 
change was also predicated on what would enable the British to maintain influence in 
these colonies in the vaguely-defined future possibility of self-government for these 
colonies.  In her study in which she attempted to deconstruct political development 
theories, Gendzier noted that the need to make change and take control of change in the 
era of industrial capitalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was aimed at 
preventing the “entry of the masses into politics.”1133  British endeavors towards change 
in their West African colonies was also predicated on the need to prevent the possible 
loss of their colonies to communist control, as happened in the case of French 
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Indochina,1134 and which such mass politics or colonial radicals’ intervention in these 
colonies evoked in official mind. 
A poignant example of official engineering to prevent such possibilities was also 
revealed earlier on in the way the British, through Edgar Parry, the Labor Adviser in 
Sierra Leone, hand-picked Siaka Stevens, perceived to be a more moderate and therefore 
amenable trade unionist, to replace Wallace-Johnson whose politics of social change felt 
threatening to officials.1135  Denzer’s remark that “the government thus succeeded in 
isolating Wallace Johnson from a movement which might have been able to generate a 
broad movement for self-government,”1136 was precisely what officials wanted to prevent 
by such intervention and through the limits they tried to imposed on Wallace-Johnson 
and his activities in the interwar period.  Perceived in various undesirable terms as an 
“extremist,” “communist,” and “unscrupulous professional agitator,”1137 the colonial 
authorities were anxious that he did not gain or retain the initiative in the colonies and 
thus take the colonies on the feared and believed path of extremism and communism.   
Such examples of state engineering were rife in what turned out to be the last two 
decades of British rule in these places.  British officialdom would go against popular 
movements such as the FRK-led AWU movement in Abeokuta that had resulted in the 
forced abdication of the unpopular colonial chief, Alake Ademola, and would connive in 
his return - a return more or less to the status quo.  The AWU movement was by this time 
beginning to be included in some of the progressive changes in local authority rule, tied 
to the overall changes that were beginning to be made in the Indirect Rule system.  FRK 
had gained access into one of the governing institutions in Egbaland but unlike the 
Azikiwes and the Nkrumahs, she continued on the path of seeking for grassroot changes, 
and therefore of potential confrontation with colonial authorities.  The space for her kind 
of social intervention was being made difficult partly by continued official maneuvers in 
local authority rule in Abeokuta provinces as elsewhere and through the constitutional 
changes.  The Abeokuta case exemplifies the way in which officials were seeking to 
engineer the changes being introduced in the colonies along officially desired “ordered” 
paths. 
In Abeokuta, the abdication of the Alake in 1948 and the changes made to the 
Sole Native Authority (SNA) system promised developments along more democratic 
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lines.  Part of the changes involved the incorporation for the first time of a handful of 
women in the administration, along with the Ogbonis who were also represented in the 
newly constituted Egba Central Council (ECC).  But victory would not be so readily won 
or sustained for the women organized in the AWU and the gains were limited.  The 
women in the AWU might have won the battle at the stage of the Alake’s abdication and 
in the setting up of what promised to be a more responsive reconstituted institution, the 
ECC, into which a few women had gained access, but they had not won the war.  Even 
the taxes against which they had also demonstrated that were abolished subsequently 
were revived later.  The colonial authorities’ connivance in reinstating the Alake within a 
couple of years and their continued support of him irrespective of his shortcomings and 
failures served as much in the end to limit the democratic potentials of the changes being 
effected at this time.  It also served to further undermine more progressive forces and 
agendas, including women’s effective representation in the structures of power.    
In spite of the Alake’s gross abuses and mismanagement, British officials 
continued to favor him.  By comparison, they disparaged FRK and the grassroot-oriented 
AWU movement she led and constantly singled her out for denunciation, as well as 
placed several bans on her freedom of movement.1138  The Alake, on the other hand, was 
venerated and praised, in spite of his widespread abuses and the intense popular 
disenchantment against him.1139 Representations made against the Alake by many 
important organized bodies and interest groups in Egbaland had also been made up to the 
seat of government in Britain - to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and to the 
British Parliament.1140  Before he was exiled and after his return, colonial officials would 
use the occasion of official speeches and utterances in the Legislative Council, in the 
Egba Central Council (EEC), and in the press, etc., to show their fervent patronage of 
Alake Ademola, regardless of his alleged misrule and opposition to him, or perhaps 
because of the grassroot opposition to him!  Earlier, in a prepared statement before the 
Council on February 27, 1948, the Resident in Abeokuta had declared support for its 
decision to ban Kuti from the palace, stating that he regretted the “insulting of the Alake” 
and other activities of “certain persons who had disturbed the peace and tranquility of 
Abeokuta.”1141  Grassroot opposition movements were constantly derided and reduced to 
the activities of a “misguided and mischievous few.”  Thanking the Alake and regretting 
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recent demonstrations and “defiance of authority which had occurred in Abeokuta,” 
Hoskyns-Abrahall, the Chief Commissioner for Western Provinces, declared in his 
address in Council Hall, Abeokuta on 27 April, 1948 in regard to the AWU’s agitational 
movement that “all true sons of Abeokuta must feel with him this sorrow at the 
misguided and mischievous activities of some of her children.”1142   
After the exiling of the Alake in 1948, the democratic process was not allowed to 
work itself out and the Alake was returned within a short time to head the reconstituted 
ECC.  Reading through the various documents relating to the process by which the Alake 
was returned to office, it is clear that his return was stage-managed by the 
administration.1143  In the interim, colonial officials had promised free and fair election of 
a new Alake while also promising that the decision regarding the return of the previous 
one would be determined by popular vote.  This would not be adhered to, however, as 
colonial officials would manipulate the process differently.  Votes taken in the Council 
periodically from then on till November 1950 to decide on this issue indicated a lack of 
considerable support for the return of the Alake, Oba Ademola.  But colonial officials 
continued to stall on the issue of the election of a new Alake and on the action to take 
resulting from the votes against the return of the old Alake till November, 1950.  
According to the protest letter from FRK to the SOS, James Griffith, and enclosed in 
papers sent to him,1144 attempts by Egba Alake Chiefs and people to have the Native 
Authority Council grant permission to install a new Alake was not supported by the 
Council.  According to her, each time they submitted their notification to the Council, 
they would be told that no consideration would be given to the appointment of a new 
Alake or discussion held on the return of the old one till the Constitution for Egbaland 
had been completed.  She went on to protest that the same administration had always 
shown favor to pro-Alake supporters in different motions before the Council for the 
return of the ex-Alake.1145 
Having failed to respond to what seemed to be the popular wish, the colonial 
authority in the person of the District Officer, J. D. Hamilton, used the occasion of the 
ECC meeting of November 30, 1950 which had ended in disarray over the issue of the  
return of the Alake to send out a release suggesting that the only way to settle the 
question was to appoint a Peace Commission.  No such committee was, however, set up 
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and no investigation or commission of enquiry was made before Ademola was returned 
to Abeokuta secretly without the knowledge of the people of Abeokuta.  This was after an 
official meeting held at night in Ibadan on 3rd December, 1950 at which were present the 
Chief Commissioner, Western Provinces, the Resident, and the D. O., Abeokuta, along 
with the ex-Alake Ademola.  The administrator, in his letter to the Secretary of State on 
8th December, 1950 justified the return of the Alake on the basis of the ECC votes of 30th 
November, 1950 regardless of the fact that the number of votes in favor of his return out 
of a possible 95 did not validate a resolution.1146  This vote meant a reversal of the 
decision of the same body, the ECC, only a month previously which stated that a 
resolution could only be carried by a majority of the Council.  The administrator, 
nevertheless, went on to report that “as a result the Alake, having called on the Chief 
Commissioner in Ibadan, returned to Abeokuta early yesterday morning, 3rd 
December.”1147  It glossed over the fact that the Alake did not just “call” on the Chief 
Commissioner but attended a more or less pre-arranged secret official meeting in Ibadan 
to plan for his surreptitious return to Abeokuta.   
The AWU under its ardent spokeswoman, FRK, and the anti-Alake Ademola 
faction of the Ogboni fraternity opposed the way and manner in which the Alake was 
returned and what was perceived to be official complicity in the return of the ex-Alake.  
In the protest letter signed by FRK on behalf of the AWU, she objected to such 
undemocratic official procedures.  Her remarks on the secret meeting and its composition 
is commentary on some of the ways officials went about managing change: “These 
people discussed and sealed a whole nation’s fate without consulting the affected 
people,” she lamented.1148 
The nature of official involvement to produce the kind of result that occurred in 
this case was characteristic of the way in which officialdom dealt with popular protest 
movements and how they attempted to engineer the process of change in these places 
along officially desired ends.  It was to repeat itself in this and other forms throughout the 
remaining period of their rule and was not uncharacteristic of how they had dealt with 
such challenges in the past.  Where they retained or re-installed unpopular rulers such as 
revealed in the case of the Alake, they hoped at best that by a process of self reformation, 
etc., such rulers would transform themselves to become more responsive to the 
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people.1149  By that reasoning, it would not involve the much needed changes or 
transformation of the structures of authority at that level without which good intentions 
could not be readily translated into good government.   
 
Ordered Progress – 1948-1953  
 
Even though the hands of officials were being forced in the turns and twists of events to 
embark on constitutional changes, or perhaps because of it, in what became the last years 
of colonial rule in British West Africa, officials were resolved to guide the changes along 
officially desired ways, i.e., what they termed ordered progress.  In addressing the 
proposed amendments to the Gold Coast constitution which had just come into existence 
barely a year before then and in response to the wishes of Nkrumah and the CPP, the 
Secretary of State, Mr. Lyttelton, in February 1952 had defended the amendments in 
those terms.  The decision to make those amendments was based on the advice given by 
Arden-Clarke, the Governor of Gold Coast, and with which he was in agreement.1150  He 
said Arden-Clarke had advised that if they did not make those concessions, he did not 
think he could hold back demands for self-government and Dominion status now, 
referring to the platform of “self-government now” on which Nkrumah and the CPP had 
won the landslide victory in the 1951 Gold Coast election.  He continued, in reference to 
the advice given to him by Arden-Clarke, that if they refused, “substantial numbers of 
troops would be required to keep the country quiet.”1151  Lyttelton then went on to report 
in his Cabinet memo that, “if, on the other hand, [we[ make concessions, there is at least 
a chance of a policy of ordered progress.”1152  
It was important to take and retain the initiative for ordered progress.  Reflecting 
on the1948 crisis, Mr. Lyttelton regretted that: 
It was the Government’s failure properly to assess the 
strength of nationalist aspirations, and to retain the 
confidence of the people and the initiative for ordered 
constitutional advance, that was the root cause of the riots 
and bloodshed of February/March, 1948.1153 
 
Officialdom believed that such disorders like those of 1948 in the Gold Coast 
could be avoided for the future by taking proper charge of affairs thereafter and steering 
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the course of change along ordered lines.  Ordered progress in official parlance also 
involved allowing the kind of changes that facilitated the acquisition of power by, or gave 
responsibility to those Africans that officials liked or preferred - the “moderates”- and 
marginalized  those they did not like - the “extremists.”  Officialdom’s notion of ordered 
progress meant managing change, involving an exercise by the state of its power to 
decide how colonials would be represented and by which type of colonials.  By 
attempting, for example, to control who gets to participate in constitutional review 
committees or enter into the new legislatures and by attempting to structure the agendas 
for change, officialdom embarked on the process of managing change.   
Following the Watson Committee’s recommendations for constitutional changes 
in the Gold Coast, the “wise men” that officials chose to represent the people of the Gold 
Coast in the all African Coussey Constitutional Review Committee that was set up 
subsequently in the Gold Coast were hand-picked, men that officials perceived to be 
“responsible” and  “moderate.”  But they could not be said to be representative of 
colonials across the board.  It was stacked with UGCC leaders and chiefs.  These had 
gone out of their way to prove their loyalty to the colonial power after the 1948 Gold 
Coast crisis, and even more so after the January 1950 General Strike and Positive 
Action.1154  
Nkrumah and the CPP were blamed by both the chiefs and the UGCC for the 
crises of January 1950.  To the UGCC members who had dominated the Coussey 
Constitutional Committee, the crisis of 1950 appeared as a direct challenge to their 
potential access to state power, commented Engwenyu.1155  The chiefs were also rebuked 
by the UGCC and blamed, indirectly, for the January 1950 situation.1156  In the UGCC’s 
“Open Letter to Nnanom in Council,” the chiefs were indicted and told that the reckless 
declaration of the Positive Action by the CPP had unfortunately “given opportunity for 
reactionary forces in the country to strengthen their position not only against the 
revolutionary and radical elements but even to question some of the plans of the 
progressive and saner groups.”1157  The younger and Western-educated and non-chiefly 
elements in the UGCC were the self-described “progressive and saner groups,” 
attempting to distinguish themselves from the chiefs, on the one hand, and Nkrumah and 
the social radicals, on the other hand.  They sought to put themselves at a vantage 
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position vis-à-vis both the “revolutionary and radical elements,” as Nkrumah and the CPP 
were being conceived at this time, and the “reactionary forces,” in reference to the chiefs, 
for the acquisition of political power at this time.  
The “revolutionary and radical elements” would indeed agree with the UGCC that 
the chiefs were “reactionary forces.”  But the voices of the former were silent in the 
Coussey Constitutional Committee deliberations.  As seen in this significant case in the 
Gold Coast, the Committee’s composition left out voices of other constituent forces - 
workers, ex-servicemen, women traders, and ordinary Gold Coast member of society – 
all key players who had been at the forefront of the crises and the movement for change 
in the Gold Coast colony, i.e., the 1948 and the January 1950 Gold Coast social protest 
movements.   
 
Voices from Below  
 
A pitfall of official tendencies to reduce to the level of mere agitators, extremists, 
and communists those they did not like was in the way it collapsed into one category a 
variety of socially relevant interventions in the colonies – democratic, leftwing-radical, 
populist, grassroot, etc. - some of which, given the political space, could have otherwise 
enriched the discourse of change and of community and citizenship and produced more 
broad-based and enduring constitutions, particularly in what became the Independence 
Constitution in these places.  The marginalization of these other social forces and 
constituencies only served to produce a more narrowly based Independence Constitution, 
engendering continued tension and crises before and after independence in these West 
African societies. 
 In the era of constitutional changes that began in the late 40s and continued into  
the 50s, certain colonials with contrasting vision of change and of society contested the 
perceived limits being put on change.  Some of them sought to broaden the potential 
democratic base of the new constitutional arrangements.  In places where Indirect Rule 
through Native Authorities was practiced, for example, the constitutional provisions put 
great limitations on the prospects for democratic change.  In these places, such as the 
Sierra Leone Protectorate and the Northern Provinces of Nigeria, the provision which 
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remained unchanged in the 1951 constitution for indirect election into regional and 
central bodies through a system of electoral colleges constrained against popular 
representation, as earlier revealed in he case of the NEPU.1158  In Sierra Leone, the 1951 
Constitution there provided for the election of only three of the ten unofficial minority 
and all the three elected came from the Colony only.1159  The remaining representatives 
from the Protectorate were elected through electoral colleges consisting of Paramount 
Chiefs who elected their favorites.  Such provisions served to remove capacity from more 
grassroot-oriented political organizations and parties such as the Kono Progressive 
Movement (KPM) in the diamond mining area of Kono in the Sierra Leone Protectorate.  
On the other hand, it gave capacity to the more elitist and rather conservative political 
organizations or parties in these places such as the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP) in 
the Sierra Leone Protectorate and the NPC in the North of Nigeria, and to the 
conservative elites who largely composed their leadership. 
In Sierra Leone, the Freetown-based Sierra Leone Progressive Independence 
Movement (SLPIM) demanded equal justice for all citizens, an end to oppression of the 
young by the chiefs and court presidents, respect for the rights of indigenous population 
by the government and foreign commercial interests, etc.  Their demands were partly 
expressed in a later issue of Kono Mannda paper, which became the Kono journal of the 
SLPIM.  The December 1, 1958 copy which was dedicated to explaining Kono problems 
to a visiting delegation of British Parliamentarians, stated thus: 
Many of the chiefs in the mining areas have completely lost 
their originality since their contact with the capitalist 
monopolies.  The company’s goodwill mission in Kono has 
been in the form of old Land Rovers, cases of whisky and 
65,000 (British pounds sterling) which was loosely thrown 
into their pockets last year in order to …  suppress other 
Africans so that their freedom of movement, speech and 
assembly can be banned.  Behaving like capitalist robots, 
the chiefs in collusion with the government and the 
company have conspired to make inhuman legislations to 
make an iron-curtain around Kono to safeguard the 
demands of monopolies.1160 
 
Also, the Kono Progressive Movement (KPM) established in the diamond mining town 
of Kono, having failed to influence the SLPP mainstream political party in government to 
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reallocate resources as deemed more equitably, sought to control the apparatus of 
national government themselves by organizing from without.  Hence they merged with 
the SLPIM in 1958 to “prosecute more vigorously a political campaign for national unity 
and independence.”1161  They also organized protest through riots and civil disobedience.  
 In Northern Nigeria, the NEPU, a grassroot-oriented political movement which 
was addressing issues of social concerns and of citizens’ rights in the Native Authority 
Emirates there, was looked upon with disfavor by the emirs in the Native Authority 
system as well as by the British, as earlier indicated.1162  British officials had preferred to 
leave the status quo in the North largely in place and to have unpolluted “the Hausa and 
Fulani of the North, Muslims and warriors, with the dignity, courtly manners, high 
bearing and conservative outlook which democracy and the Daily Mirror have not yet 
debased,”1163 in the words of the Secretary of State, Mr. Lyttelton.  The British and the 
Native Authorities chiefs – the emirs - sought to constrain the ability of NEPU to become 
a formidable force in the North of Nigeria partly through constitutional means.   
The NEPU which was gaining ground and popular support from the onset of the 
movement was rather perceived in dysfunctional terms by the British colonial authorities 
who chose to deride it as an “extremist group” and to cast aspersions on it as a 
“dangerous political force in the Northern Provinces.”1164  “This organization,” the 
Political Intelligence Summary of October 1951 warned,  
Continues as the most active and dangerous political force 
in the Northern Provinces.  Active in setting itself up as the 
protector of the poor and politically down-trodden, 
dangerous in that it is a minority movement whose 
expressed aims conflict with the existing system of Native 
Administration.1165  
 
However, they could not ignore the fact that “their zeal and organizing ability 
have already succeeded in winning them a commanding position in a number of Urban 
Intermediate Electoral Colleges.”1166  NEPU’s drive against corruption and other ills of 
the Native Authority System in the North was beginning to draw popular support and 
response and colonial officials, no longer able to ignore NEPU’s growing and substantial 
strength, were anxious to arrest its growing importance.  The British had expected the 
NPC, the party of the ruling elite which they favored, to wipe out NEPU as a player on 
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the Northern political scene.  The Political Intelligence Summary of June, 1951 had 
expressed that, “As regards the future, it cannot be denied that NEPU has begun to make 
a substantial progress,” and warned that “unless … the N.P.C. pulls itself together and 
evolves a positive political programme, NEPU will become all powerful.”1167  Colonial 
authorities were anxious that NEPU did not become all powerful! 
It was such kind of social intervention as the NEPU’s that might have shaped out 
a different terrain, perhaps a more democratic society, for future independent West 
African nations that colonial officials actively prevented from taking root in these 
colonies.  Fearful of the potentials and rise of NEPU, British colonial authorities sought 
to arrest its continued rise.  The provisions in the 1951 Constitution in the North of 
Nigeria helped to take care of that.  A special technique that was built into the electoral 
regulations in early elections there in the 1951 Constitution gave undue advantage to the 
ruling elite in the Native Authority System in the way it was manipulated and served to 
constrain against NEPU’s ability to participate in national politics on its own terms.1168  
This is a telling commentary on the circumscribed nature of the democratic openings in 
the new constitutions and the prospects for building community in more inclusive terms. 
However, officialdom’s attempt to close off certain discourses and to exclude 
certain colonials from popular participation in the political process, including the limits 
being set in the new constitutional provisions, continued to be contested by various 
colonial forces, including the social radicals.  Wallace-Johnson of Sierra Leone, NEPU 
radicals, Funlayo Ransome Kuti, Hajiyya Sawaba, Mallam Ringim, the Zikist left in 
Nigeria, and labor socialist-oriented Pobee Biney and Anthony Woode in the Gold Coast, 
for example, remained critical of the shortcomings of the constitutional provisions of the 
50s and of what was becoming mainstream politics and discourse of the “nation” in their 
colonies.1169  They sought to continue to privilege the discourse of the “nation” and of 
citizenship in more inclusive terms in contrast to what was being legitimized in the on-
going constitutional changes.    
Some of them gave voice, for example, to the removal of constraints on the 
development of nation-wide political party inherent in the new federalist (bicameral) 
constitutions being enacted in Nigeria and the Sierra Leone.  They advocated a unitary 
constitution that they believed would facilitate the growth of National Societies.  Such a 
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provision that also enabled the development of a national political party was deemed to 
facilitate popular participation and representation at the grassroot level.  It could be said, 
however, that the federalist provisions in the 1951 Nigerian and Sierra Leone 
Constitutions which became legitimized in subsequent constitutions was officialdom’s 
attempt to deal with the challenge of multi-national composition of these two colonies.  
In the Gold Coast that was less pluralistic, officialdom did institute a unitary constitution.  
Ironically, in the latter case, the opposition to the CPP – the UGCC and the NLM - 
wanted a federalist constitution that would enable them to better share power at the 
central level.   
Wallace-Johnson raised serious objections in the Sierra Leone Legislature to what 
he regarded as the shortcomings of the new constitutional arrangements there and the 
ways the Constitutions were being patterned.1170  In connection with these concerns,1171 
Wallace Johnson made a trip to Britain in 1952 as a member of Sierra Leone Legislative 
Council and as Organizing Secretary of the West African Civil Liberties National 
Defense League to discuss with the Colonial Office the perceived most glaring anomalies 
of the constitution and of political developments in Sierra Leone since the election in 
November, 1951.  At the meeting in London of April 9, 1952, he issued a statement 
calling for direct voting throughout the colony and the Protectorate.1172  Wallace-
Johnson’s objections to the 1951 Sierra Leone Constitution included what he regarded as 
its anomalous and inequitable features and provisions.  He criticized the fact that a 
quarter million people of the Colony had seven representatives while one and a half 
million people of the Protectorate had only 14 representatives and that elections to the 
Council were only representative and democratic in the Colony while Protectorate 
representatives were elected through electoral colleges consisting of Paramount Chiefs 
who were stipendiary and dependent on government approval.1173  Because the 
Protectorate could not elect its representatives democratically, no party with a program 
for the whole country could get represented in the Protectorate, he further expressed.1174  
As such, he concluded, the 1951 Constitution divides Colony from Protectorate and 
prevents the growth of national parties representing nationwide interests.1175  He further 
pointed to the undemocratic structure of the Executive Council where the Governor alone 
may select and nominate not less than four of the unofficial members who, with the seven 
 264
ex-officio members (government officials) would form the Executive with the Governor 
as president.  Thus, he said, the policy-making machinery remained in the Governor’s 
hands and that even if a political party were to obtain a majority in spite of the 
undemocratic electoral system, it would not control the administration of the 
government.1176 
Wallace-Johnson was also critical of the government, in particular the newly-
elected African Ministers for Local Government, Education and Welfare, Mr. A. Milton 
Margai, and the Minister for Lands, Mines and Labour, Mr. Siaka P. Stevens,1177 who he 
said were mere armchair ministers.1178  Wallace-Johnson was critical of his perceived 
lack of concern for, and discussion of issues in the legislature that affected a wide cross-
section of the Sierra Leone people especially by these African ethnopolitical 
entrepreneurs who were now in the colonies’ Legislative and Executive Councils and had 
been elected to represent the people.  Unlike them, Wallace-Johnson tried to use his 
presence in the Legislative Council to advocate for the grassroot and to privilege a 
discourse of democratic and grassroot change.  
Wallace-Johnson engaged the members of the Sierra Leone Legislature with the 
problems of colonial economic development and the rights of disadvantaged segments of 
that society.  He critiqued the way colonial capital had shaped African economies and 
societies and voiced concern about the pattern of unequal exchange that would continue 
to subordinate African economies to those of industrialized West.  Wallace-Johnson’s 
anti-imperialism was also tied to anti-capitalism, in the Marxist tradition.  But, unlike the 
Marxist tradition, he was not opposed to the idea of economic development in Western 
terms as an engine of progress.  Stressing the need to establish industries in Sierra Leone, 
he regretted that “the government had been in power for five years without thinking of 
introducing any form of industry.”1179  He stated that a mechanized or industrialized 
agricultural base would prevent the drift of the mass of the youths to the mining areas by 
providing them with gainful employment in the countryside.  Instead of spending so 
much money on the building of new police buildings as budgeted in the current year 
estimate, money should rather be invested in social development schemes and in the 
development of education, he stressed.  He believed that changing the emphasis on these 
would arrest the trend towards social unrest in the Colony and Protectorate of Sierra 
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Leone as recently witnessed in the Northern Provinces tax riots.1180  He believed that it 
would also help to curb the high incidence of stealing among young boys who came from 
the Protectorate to the Freetown Colony with no educational credentials whatsoever and 
who swelled the ranks of the unemployed in the cities.  These young boys also swelled 
the ranks of prison inmates in Freetown as well.  He said: 
This money that we are now spending to build police 
station, to establish police state in this country, would have 
been better spent if we had built schools and technical 
institutions everywhere to have youths of the country 
trained so as to keep them away from crimes, but we have 
not done that.1181 
 
Wallace-Johnson was similarly concerned about producer prices for farmers of Sierra 
Leone’s exported items such as palm kernels, kolanuts, ginger, palm-oil, groundnuts, 
bennissed, cocoa, and coffee.  He expressed concern about the operation of the Marketing 
Board as another source of government’s expropriation of the wealth produced by 
producers and advocated direct control of the Marketing Boards by producers 
themselves.1182  
The NEPU in Nigeria also decried the many perceived shortcomings of the new 
constitutions in Nigeria and the manner in which they were being established.  It opposed 
the “strict” Federal System as entirely unsuitable to the circumstances of Nigeria and 
proposed instead a “quasi-Federal System as practiced in Canada until a Constituent 
Assembly considers a Constitution for the country on attaining independence.”1183  The 
NEPU emphasized that the decision regarding what form of government was best for 
Nigeria be made through popular consultation.  It emphasized that:  
The debate on Federal, Quasi-Federal or Unitary 
Constitution for Nigeria must be carried into every village 
and the pros and cons explained to the people.  The NEPU 
will not support the attempt of the Regional Governments 
and the Colonial Office to make the division of Nigeria a 
fait accompli by granting self government to the Regions 
before the people of Nigeria know what is actually 
happening.1184 
 
NEPU was concerned about the perceived unrepresentative ways in which the 
constitutional review process and constitutional changes were being effected in Nigeria in 
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the 50s.  It regarded the 1956 Conference as critical because it was the last of its kind 
before Nigeria’s independence which had already been agreed to by officialdom and the 
political incumbents – the ethnopolitical entrepreneurs.  NEPU believed that the 1956 
Conference should lay a more solid foundation upon which a permanent Nigerian 
constitution would be established by the Constituent Assembly which would follow the 
British withdrawal from the country.  NEPU therefore drew attention to the weaknesses 
in the previous constitutions on which the final Constitution was being built and 
suggested ways to amend them.   
NEPU was very emphatic on the need for full participation of all citizens in the 
making of the new constitutions.  It expressed its belief that any formal conference with 
the Colonial Office by the political leaders must be preceded by conferences at the 
divisional, provincial and regional levels as it believed was done in 1949/50.1185  
Critiquing the 1953/54 London and Lagos Constitutional Conferences, its position paper 
stated that: 
The London and Lagos Conferences of 1953/4 did not 
reflect the views of the people of Nigeria as the conferences 
were organized by the Colonial Office to effect changes in 
the 1950 Constitution without consulting the people of 
Nigeria.1186 
 
The NEPU was very insistent on the principle of consultation and representativeness.  It 
went on to express that: 
The NEPU does not believe that the changes which altered 
the whole basis of the 1950 Constitution without previously 
consulting the people, can be valid and permanent.  The 
Party wants an opportunity to be given to the people to 
have their say before those alterations are further 
entrenched in the political life of Nigeria.1187 
 
NEPU had also, right from the beginning of the process of constitutional reviews 
in the late 40s and even while still within the Northern Peoples’ Congress (NPC) parent 
cultural organization from which it broke away, raised opposition to the principle of 
nomination, in view of the inherent potentials for abuse.  In such a political culture and 
context, the NEPU ended up not having any of its members represented in any of the 
Northern Nigerian governing councils, i.e., the Emir's Council, the Provincial 
 267
Committees, or the Northern House of Assembly.  In a memorandum to the Kano Native 
Authority, copies of which were reported to have been forwarded to the District Officer 
and the Superintendent of Police, NEPU sought for recognition and active participation in 
the overall problems of Northern Nigeria in particular and of Nigeria in general.1188  
When asked by the press on how the NEPU would participate in the political activities of 
the North as their members were neither represented in the Emir's Council or in the 
Northern House of Assembly, an official of NEPU being questioned replied that was the 
challenge which they (NEPU) must accept.  Emphasizing NEPU’s concern for 
democratic change, the NEPU official reiterated that: 
This age … is that of the common man and nobody can 
claim to speak for the North now without full consultation 
with the masses of which we form a reasonable part.1189   
 
In spite of this and other challenges it faced, NEPU would continue to agitate for reform 
and democratization of the Native Authority System in the North as prelude to self-
government, partly through alliances with other political parties. 
   
Concessions to the Moderates 
 
The process of constitutional change embarked upon from the late 40s and beginning of 
the 50s would take on a life of its own, compound the crises in colonial society, and set 
into motion demands for more changes.  Officialdom’s efforts to introduce changes and 
to democratize the structure of government in some guided ways through new 
constitutions generated more discontent and increased the crises in local African society, 
intensifying competition and struggles among Africans.1190  It also increased demands for 
radical changes, including the demand for immediate self-government among some 
colonials.  Officialdom’s response to the crisis of change in colonial African society was 
always a little too late and generated more discontent.  Changes made at any one time led 
to clamoring for more changes and for greater openings and democratization of the 
structures of government and of society.   
In the Gold Coast, the new constitution had hardly been introduced in 1950 before 
it was subject to further review and changes leading to a new constitution in 1952.  This 
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in turn was quickly subject to review and was superseded by a new one in 1956 which 
became the Gold Coast Independence Constitution.  In Nigeria, the 1951 Constitution had 
barely been introduced before that also quickly became subject to stresses and strains and 
lasted only twenty seven months.1191  A new constitution was granted there every three 
years till the grant of the Independence Constitution in 1960.  These quick reviews and 
grant of new constitutions in these places was in spite of the Colonial Office’s aversion to 
frequent constitutional changes.  The new Secretary of State, Mr. J. Griffiths, had earlier 
in July 1950 advised the Governor of Nigeria against too frequent constitutional changes, 
stating that “if changes are made too often they are bound to have an unsettling effect on 
the political and economic life of a country.”1192   
However, the continued crises in the colonies and the perceived socially radical 
demands of the “extremists,” including their insistence on the grant of immediate self- 
government for the colonies, made officialdom more conciliatory to the demands of those 
who by comparison were seen by them as moderates and gradualists at this time and as 
able to work with them in maintaining empire.  The moderates were perceived to be 
seeking for political change - not social change or immediate self-government - and 
through constitutional means, willing to work within officially-set boundaries.   
Officials had come to accept in principle the need to grant concessions to these 
“moderates” and as means of marginalizing the “extremists” and had started to make 
tactical shifts towards them, consequent to the 1948 Gold Coast crisis and the Watson 
Committee’s and Coussey Committee’s reports that followed it.  In October, 1949 the 
Secretary of State, Creech-Jones, in outlining the recommendations of the Coussey 
Committee’s report and of the Colonial Office’s intended response to it, wrote in a 
Cabinet memo, and I quote at length: 
During the past eighteen months there has been 
considerable political agitation in the Gold Coast and the 
extremists have been conducting a campaign for immediate 
responsible government, which has attracted support 
among the less responsible elements.  There is, however, a 
large body of moderate opinion which, while recognizing 
that the country is not yet ready for full responsible 
government, is convinced, as the Governor and myself are, 
that immediate constitutional advance is necessary.  I think 
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that it is important that the Governor should be placed in a 
position to rally behind him this moderate opinion.1193   
 
Referring to the need to accept the Coussey Committee’s report, subject to certain 
reservations, the SOS went on to say that: 
 
If we accept the report broadly … the Governor hopes to 
have moderate opinion behind him, although the extremists 
will not of course be satisfied.  If we are not prepared to 
accept it broadly, moderate opinion will be alienated and 
the extremists given an opportunity of gaining further and 
weightier support and of making serious trouble.1194 
 
Creech-Jones regarded the Coussey Committee’s report as “a victory for moderate 
opinion.”1195  Officialdom was ready to meet the “moderates” halfway, even if this meant 
moving a little faster in the Gold Coast than their preferred pace of change. 
The “moderates” in the Gold Coast were the UGCC intelligentsia and chiefs that 
had also largely composed the membership of the Coussey Commission, for example.  
Danquah, in what could be said to be his ambivalent role in the 1948 Gold Coast riots, 
had used it to push UGCC’s agenda for political advance as he simultaneously used it as 
a plea for constitutional gradualism.  In fact, he was close to officialdom’s heartbeat 
when he reiterated that “complete self-government or independence was not the policy of 
the Convention.”1196  As of 1949, Nkrumah was still regarded as one of those extremists 
but he would enter into the ranks of the “moderates” as he gained political power and 
began to work cooperatively with the colonial authorities.1197  As Kwame Nkrumah 
would later in his autobiography rationalize in regard to his own tactical shift of position 
to accept office in 1951 as CPP’s Leader of Government Business in the Gold Coast 
Legislature and to work with the status quo: 
It was felt that had [we] not accepted office by virtue of our 
majority in the Assembly, but had embarked on non-
cooperation and remained in the Opposition, we would 
merely have been pursuing a negative course of action …  
Government positions could also help us to obtain the 




Nkrumah was right, in that he had more correctly reasoned, in the light of what he had 
assessed was possible, that there were certain gains to be derived from working with the 
colonial authorities and seeking concessions and change from within the power structure.  
Nkrumah and the “moderates” could be said to be realist, politicians eager to win; they 
considered their agenda was indeed better served by cooperation with the colonial power.  
The interests of both were coinciding well.  Colonial officials were willing to institute 
reforms involving certain degree of political decentralization in the colonies and were 
eager to work with willing Africans in ways they perceived would ensure the success of 
this.  African politicians – the ethnopolitical entrepreneurs - were also seeking for 
political decentralization - and political power – but as opposed, for example, to social 
change and grassroot empowerment and/or the grant of immediate self-government that 
some of the social radicals were seeking for and which officialdom was unwilling to 
effect, and in fact anxious to arrest at this time, as seen in the case of NEPU.  And the 
more the radicals pushed, i.e., for immediate self-government and grassroot changes, etc., 
the more the African politicians, the “moderates,” stood to gain, by default, from 
officialdom’s fear of the radicals and “extremists.”  It led officialdom to seek to empower 
the “moderates” over the radicals by granting more concessions to the “moderates”!  In 
order to forestall the challenge from the “extremists,” officials would meet more of the 
demands of the “moderates” for political change and for the quickening of the pace of 
constitutional change.  By so doing, the “moderates” were, unwittingly, gaining more 
political grounds and power! 
In mid-1951, the Colonial Office, anxious to retain the goodwill of Nkrumah and 
the CPP party moderates in the colony’s governing Councils, indicated a willingness to 
accommodate his and the demands of the rest of the CPP leadership in government for 
certain more changes.  In discussing the next stage of political development in the Gold 
Coast during May and early June, 1951 in preparation for the meeting between the 
Secretary of State, Mr. Griffiths, and Nkrumah, the Governor, Arden-Clarke, had 
indicated to Mr. Griffiths his government’s preparedness to accept two principal request  
of Nkrumah.1199  Nkrumah wanted the title of Leader of Government Opposition to be 
changed to that of Prime Minister and to also be able to get ministers elected on his 
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advice as the Prime Minister and not at the Governor’s discretion.1200  Defending the 
need to make these concessions to Nkrumah, Arden-Clarke advised the Colonial Office 
that there was no alternative to a CPP government and that it could only be replaced by a 
similar one or one of “even more extreme nationalist tendencies.”1201  He wrote to Cohen 
in regard to his policy of appeasement towards Nkrumah that: “We have only one dog in 
our kernel.  All we can do is to build it up and feed it vitamins and cod-liver oil .”!1202  In 
building up the “dog” and feeding it with “vitamins and cod-liver oil,” however, the 
“dog” was also waxing strong in the embrace of its breeder and discreetly gaining one 
concession after another till he got the prize that he had set his eyes on – the Prime 
Ministership of a full self-governing Gold Coast in 1956! 
 An otherwise reluctant advocate of rapid constitutional change in the Colonial 
Office, A. B. Cohen, would also indicate a certain willingness to be responsive to the 
demands of Nkrumah and the “moderates” for more constitutional changes.  This is 
because of the fear of the perceived alternative, i.e., of the “extremists” gaining the 
upperhand.  Cohen, who was one of the three main British policy-makers present at the 
second meeting of Nkrumah with the Secretary of State, Griffiths, in the Colonial Office 
on 13th June, 1951, had indicated a reluctance on moving too quickly on the pace of 
constitutional change in the Gold Coast as Nkrumah would have desired.1203  This, 
according to Cohen, was in order to “develop administrative and political efficiency so 
that the country continues to be well governed.”1204  However, he also indicated his 
recognition of the need to be flexible in terms of setting time-tables and in granting 
concessions to the moderates in order, according to him, to continue to keep on good 
terms with the Gold Coast political leaders.  “It must of course, be recognized,” said 
Cohen, “that we may not be able to adhere to an ideal time-table,”1205 and went on: 
We may be forced, if we are to keep on goods terms with 
the more responsible political leaders such as Mr. Nkrumah 
and his immediate colleagues and not to force the Gold 
Coast Government into the hands of extremists, to move 
more rapidly than ideally we should wish.1206 
 
The Extremists and Communism 
 
The radicals’ demands for immediate self-government and their attempts to force 
the pace and direction of change only served to continue to cause British officials more 
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anxiety, especially in the Cold War context and as this radicalism was being perceived to 
be closely tied to the radicalism of the international left and to labor activism.  In the 
international arena, the so-called rift in the international labor movement in 1949 had 
tended to accentuate anxieties of various colonial administrations over possible 
“communist infiltration” of labor movement and of nascent political parties in their 
colonies.  By December 1949, ideological squabbles within the newly formed World 
Federation of Trade Union (WFTU) had led to the breakaway of western countries and to 
the formation of the rival International Confederation of Free Trade Union (ICFTU).  The 
WFTU became another identified source of communist influence among Africans abroad 
and of communist infiltration into the colonies.  The 1949 Official Assessment noted that 
before the WFTU moved to Vienna, it “trained at least six of the present Gold Coast's 
Communist leaders.”1207  The British had expected that the WFTU would be taking over 
the chain of command control from the disbanded Cominform.  They were therefore 
anxious that unions in the colonies affiliate with the pro-western labor bloc that was 
formed later instead of with the WFTU.  Their anxiety was even more focused on 
breakaway splinter labor groups like the rival Ghana Federation of Trade Unions (GFTU) 
formed in 1951 and the Nigerian Labor Congress (NLC) formed in May 1950.  The 
GFTU and NLC were reported to have been sponsored and dominated by the leftwing of 
labor.  The NLC was formed in Nigeria in May 1950 from the merger of the NNFL 
(which already revealed its preference for the WFTU), the rump of the Nigerian Trade 
Union Congress (NTUC), and the independent Government Workers’ Union.  In Nigeria, 
the division in the labor movement which led to the creation of the leftwing-oriented 
labor-led Nigerian National Federation of Labor (NNFL) had also coincided with the rift 
in the erstwhile unified international labor movement.  The NNFL was closely allied to 
an accretion of militants and intellectuals: the left Zikists who espoused socialism, non-
Zikist Marxian socialists, etc.  Officialdom’s fear of a communist-controlled Nigerian 
labor movement was made real when the Nigerian Labor Congress (NLC) announced on 
the 25th May, 1950 its affiliation with the WFTU.1208   
The colonial government was rightly worried about these developments in the 
labor movements and with the perceived heightened revolutionary fervor in Nigeria and 
in the Gold Coast, including riotings in their other colonies.  In Sierra Leone, the Cox 
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Commission that was chosen to look into the wave of disturbances there, i.e., in the North 
of Sierra Leone in 1955, assessed the situation there as one “better described as civil war 
than as a disturbance.”1209  In Nigeria, other developments such as the Enugu colliery 
uprising and shootings in November 1949 in Eastern Provinces of Nigeria, the attempted 
assassination of the Chief Secretary to the Nigerian government, Sir Hugh Foot, in 
February 18, 1950 by a 24-year old Zikist, a 2s.8d a day laborer, Chukuwonka Ugokwu, 
and the creation in 1951 of the leftwing-oriented political movement, Freedom 
Movement, led by ex-Zikists who had renounced Zikism for the more specific ideology of 
revolutionary socialism1210 alarmed colonial officials.  The government feared strong 
Zikist influence in the colliery uprising and other disturbances in the Eastern Provinces of 
Nigeria which followed the shooting at the Enugu colliery, as well as in the February 
1950 assassination attempt.  In a memo to Sir T. Lloyd from one “L.E” before the Zikist 
movement was banned, it was stated, in regard to the Zikists, that, “there seems little 
doubt that there is a terrorist core in the Zikist Movement, and the attack on Foot shows 
that it is not altogether theoretical.”1211  In reaction to the assassination attempt, 
government agents were sent to search homes of Zikists in several towns & villages and 
seditious literature were said to have been discovered along with plans for revolutionary 
action.1212  The government also indicated that there was a planned revolutionary triple 
alliance of the Zikist Movement, the NNFL, and the Amalgamated Union of UAC 
African Workers (popularly known as UNAMAG).  The evidence was said to be based 
on seized documents produced at the 1950 trial of Francis Ikenna Nzimiro, the secretary 
of the Onitsha branch of the Zikist Movement and an official of the UNAMAG.1213 
The Freedom Movement (FM) could be said to have been the closest to a leftwing 
political organization or movement in Nigeria in this period, seemingly attesting to 
official fear of communism in the colonies.  But all of these organizations did not gain 
traction and lost steam within a few years of their founding.  The FM joined with a 
Marxian study group, the People’s Committee for Independence (PCI), to form a 
“League” to advise the UNAMAG and with intent to direct the “socialist” movement in 
Nigeria.1214  Its members included known radicals in the annals of Nigeria’s immediate 
pre-independence history: S.G. Ikoku, Ayo Ogunsheye, Francis Nzimiro, J. Ola Opara, 
Nduka Eze, etc.  The FM hoped to establish its base of operations in the trade unions 
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under the direction of a new leftwing socialist party.  Central to this was also the plan for 
a newspaper by the small group of leftwing activists believed to be dependent on 
financial support from European communist sources, primarily in Eastern Germany and 
Czechoslovakia.1215  The scheme collapsed, however, in February, 1951 when S. G. 
Ikoku, the delegate chosen to make arrangement in Europe, was seized at the airport 
before his departure.1216  Even more validating of official fear of communism in the 
colonies was the fact that Nduka Eze and the radicals in the UNAMAG had also 
entertained the idea of forming a Communist Party of Nigeria!1217  But that also never got 
off the ground!!   
Other like organizations and movements such as the People’s Revolutionary 
Committee (PRC) and the National Preparatory Committee (NPR) in Nigeria followed  
in the wake of the termination of the NLC/FM initiatives and movements and were 
similarly of concern to colonial authorities, but they also lost steam within a short period 
of coming into existence.1218  The hard core but nonetheless diminishing leftwing-
oriented socialists that formed themselves into the PRC went as far as sending a 
delegation to the Gold Coast.  The PRC was, however, dissolved in September 1951 due 
to factional disputes and was succeeded by the National Preparatory Committee (NPR).  
The NPR was another attempt to create a radical, leftwing-type political party with inter-
territorial connections and it adopted the name of the Gold Coast Convention People’s 
Party (CPP), i.e., the Convention People’s Party of Nigeria and the Cameroon.1219  
Representatives of the Gold Coast CPP visited Nigeria but there were no lasting ties 
established.  Nkrumah, who was already on the path of accommodation and cooperation 
with the British colonial power and its program of constitutional reform, declined to 
support the Nigerian CPP movement and the latter also soon became defunct.1220  
In the Gold Coast, in the light of their displacement and actual dismissal from  
mainstream labor organization by the leadership of the CPP, radical trade unionists 
attempted to form their own independent trade union organization or labor party.  
Anthony Woode, Pobee Biney, along with Kwesi Lamptey, Abubekr, Yeboah Aukordich, 
and B. F. Kusi attempted to form a party named the National Reformation Party (NRP).  
The GFTU there was also reported to be sponsored by radical trade unionists like Woode, 
Biney, C.A. Duncan, Nana Nketsia, and a number of members of the Unemployment 
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Association who were present at its inauguration.1221  In spite of the fact that the colonial 
administration in the Gold Coast was gaining the initiative over mainstream labor through 
Nkrumah's cooperative efforts, these splinter groups continued to give officials anxiety 
about labor radicals.  Official reports regarded the new GFTU to be aimed at 
undermining the authority of the TUC and of the Ministers and to adopt largely 
communist tactics.1222  In an effort to secure their colonies against the influence of the 
Soviet Union, the British joined in Anglo-French Ministerial Talks for concerted efforts 
and defense against communism in their colonies.  They exchanged information on the 
state of communism in their colonies as well as strategies to combat its development and 
spread.  
 
Officialdom’s Paranoia & more Concessions to the Moderates 
 
The upheavals of the dying years of the 40s and early 50s made officials fearful of 
a continuing trend that may get out of control.   The crises among labor in British 
colonies did not help to assuage official fear but only drove it further.  Official paranoia 
of communism in the colonies increased in this period as the crises in colonial society 
developed and the West rivalry with the Soviet Union intensified.  British colonial 
officials began to see “red” in every disturbances, in every demonstration, in every move 
of colonial radicals, and in every labor upheavals.  As the then Deputy President General 
of the Zikist Movement in Nigeria, Osita Agwuma, commented in regard to the perceived 
British officialdom’s paranoia of communism in the colonies and in what became the 
famous “Seditious Lecture” titled, “A Call to Revolution,” in October 1948: “Any 
peaceful demonstrations, processions and campaigns in Nigeria today are bound to be 
denounced as Communist inspired agitation and demonstrators shot in cold blood.”1223  
Every upheaval, union strikes, demonstration, etc., was seen as the work of 
“agitators,” “outsiders,” and/or “communist.”  In Sierra Leone, the government opposed 
the planned demonstration of the SLWM in 1951, accusing them of being communist.  It 
led Cummings-John, the leader of the movement, to comment that “the British thought 
that except for these communistic ideas, the country would be peaceful and the people 
satisfied.”1224  The British colonial officials watched the SLWM women demonstrators at 
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every instance.  When they had a huge prayer meeting which included Moslems and 
Christians at Howe street playing field, the government cabled the Colonial Office to 
report that “this time the women prayed.”1225  Furthermore, the Sierra Leone Governor, 
Dorman, opposed the SLWM’s affiliation with the Women's International Democratic 
Federation based in the Soviet Union.  He advised them, through Dr. Margai, leader of 
the SLPP in Sierra Leone with which the SLWM was in alliance at the time, to join the 
International Alliance of Women based in England instead.1226  
In the Gold Coast, officials kept a close watch on perceived radical trade unions 
and watched every step and move of known radical labor unionists like Anthony Woode 
and Pobee Biney of the Gold Coast and a few known others in the other colonies.  The 
Political Intelligence Reports of March through August 1951 recorded a close watch on 
Woode, Biney, and others for their connection with one Cowan from Nigeria and for their 
attempts to set up their own alternative labor organization and movement.1227  Cowan was 
a Nigerian trade unionist said to be a communist who had arrived in the Gold Coast with 
the main objective of trying to arrange for closer cooperation between workers in the four 
colonies.  The government had then made him a “prohibited immigrant” in its efforts to 
remove his possible influence in the other colonies.   
Officialdom’s fear of communist influence in these colonies continued to 
permeate many of their thinking on future plans as well, even when there was least 
justification for this.  When the British colonial government was thinking of setting up a 
Volta Scheme to produce (aluminum) bauxite for the United States in 1954 as means of 
securing additional leverage from Dr. Nkrumah, should it become necessary, they 
expressed fear of the possibility of communist Russia sabotaging the project.  They 
feared that the Soviet Union might interrupt production and sale to Western nations 
through “manipulation of the forces of labor in a way which need have no ostensible 
connection with Communism at all, provided that indoctrinated and amenable leaders 
were infiltrated into key positions.”1228  But there was no hard evidence to justify this 
fear.   
The fear of Soviet influence and of its infiltration into these West African 
colonies remained with British officialdom in varying degrees till the very end.  In 1955,  
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when the British colonial power was considering the future of British Togoland1229 in an 
anticipated future self-governing Gold Coast nation, they had felt reluctant, initially, to 
continue to administer it as a Trust Territory once Gold Coast became independent.  “The 
administration of such a small strip of territory would be difficult once we ceased to have 
responsibility for the Gold Coast,” the Cabinet memorandum of 10 November, 1955 on 
Togoland had earlier indicated.1230  But the Colonial Office’s fear of the alternative, 
should they choose not to continue to administer it, involving the possible opening up of 
this territory and thus of this African region subsequently to Soviet influence, led to a 
different resolve.  They decided to be prepared to accept continuing responsibility for 
administering the area should the 400,000 inhabitants of Togoland elect to remain under 
Trusteeship in an anticipated plebiscite to be taken at Gold Coast independence.1231  The 
Colonial Secretary, expressing the view that they had no alternative but to be prepared to 
continue to administer it, should that be the case, stated that: 
Among the likely alternatives there were some which 
would have dangerous repercussions for us.  The United 
Nations might, if we refused, elect to administer the 
territory directly, and this would at once give the Russians 
a voice in Colonial affairs and a vantage point for 
interference in Africa.1232 
 
The Colonial Secretary was anxious therefore that in the forthcoming discussions on 
British Togoland at the United Nations, Her Majesty’s Government (H.M.G.) take “a 
position which would exclude any risk of the territory falling into undesirable hands.”1233  
He thereafter undertook to circulate a memorandum to the effect that the Cabinet had 
agreed that, in the forthcoming discussion of Togoland at the United Nations, H.M.G. 
would state their willingness to accept responsibility for the continued administration of 
the territory.1234 
 Given official continued apprehension of communism in the colonies, it became 
even more necessary to concede more to the demands of the “moderates” in government 
who were also desirous of having more power devolve to them.  Although, in the 
aftermath of the 1948 Gold Coast crises, British officialdom had embarked on the path of 
constitutional change in the colonies, having accepted the fact that constitutional changes 
were inescapable “if the government of the Gold Coast is to continue to be by consent,” 
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as they would later rationalize in 1953,1235 they had not been ready, initially, for rapid 
change.  “It is important not to move too fast,” the Secretary of State, Mr. Griffiths, had 
explained British officialdom’s point of view to Nkrumah in his talks with him on June 
13th, 1951 during Nkrumah’s visit to the Colonial Office in London.1236   However, they 
were also not unaware of the forces that were affecting the process and had recognized 
that they might not be able to adhere to an ideal time-table, as Cohen unwittingly forecast 
in his June, 1951 minutes.1237  Events later turned out to validate that observation.   
Whatever the British colonial power’s timetable was, the dynamic of events had 
taken on a life of its own at the turn of the 50s, but still unpredictable which way it would 
turn.  As late as January 1950, Azikiwe of Nigeria was content with a diarchy for Nigeria, 
a constitution that would also safeguard imperial interests, and was still unsure that even 
such a constitution would be granted, as earlier noted.1238  Within a decade, however, the 
process resulted in ways that went beyond Azikiwe’s more modest expectations of 1950 
– the grant of full self-government to Nigeria in 1960.  In less than a decade from the 
Gold Coast crisis of 1948, the Gold Coast itself attained full self-government in 1956.1239  
The fear of the “extremists,” linked to communism, moved the hands of officialdom 
along ways and pace previously unintended.  
The colonial government had come to accept that it was good policy to be 
conciliatory towards the “moderates,” given what they believed to be the alternative.  The 
United States had already warned the Western colonial powers of the “susceptibility to 
Soviet penetration” in regard to these colonies and of the need to be responsive and grant 
timely concessions to the “moderates” in their colonies such that would pre-empt the 
“leftist elements” among their colonial subjects from gaining control.1240  The U. S. had 
further advised the West to “devise formulae that will retain their goodwill as emergent 
or independent states.”1241 
Although the idea of making concessions to the moderates and the possibility of 
internal self-government within the Commonwealth was already beginning to be 
entertained as practical policy in the aftermath of the crisis of 1948 in the Gold Coast, the 
idea of full self-government, or of self-government within such a short a time was not.  
But the “moderates,” beginning to be brought in more and more into government as close 
working partners, would also be seeking for the grant of constitutional changes towards 
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greater political decentralization as they continued to prove themselves to colonial 
officials as able working partners.  Both interests were beginning to coincide more 
rapidly.  Nkrumah, as Leader of Government Business, was proving effective in helping 
to tame the Gold Coast labor movement and officials were able to continue to build 
confidence in him.  With the institutionalization of the CPP as the party in power after its 
electoral victory in 1951, the Gold Coast labor movement from which the CPP had 
derived important impetus began to be made to conform to official expectations of a-
political unionism.  
Nkrumah, who continued on the path of accommodation with the colonial 
government especially with his attainment of limited power as Leader of Government 
Business in 1951, became instrumental along with members of his CPP in government, in 
helping to realize official agenda regarding Gold Coast labor by helping to make it 
conform to official expectations in this colony.  In 1951, the colonial government had 
been worried about Woode and Biney and other labor radicals in the Gold Coast and their 
plans to set up an alternative trade union organization and were not sure whether or not 
their plans or their ideas would be effected or be successful in “changing the complexion 
of the TUC.”1242  They were however satisfied with the assurance from the newly elected 
African Minister of Labor, Mr. Gbedemah, that he would prevent them from going ahead 
with their plans and he did succeed to this effect.1243  Officials, looking for signs to 
further validate such cooperation with their new working partners, analyzed speeches 
made at key places, including the Legislative Assembly.  For example, in awaiting 
Nkrumah's statement at the Budget Session of the Gold Coast Legislative Assembly 
which began on February 2, 1954, Maurice Smith of the Colonial Office had written to 
Mr. Vile, the Assistant Secretary, that “the reception given to this statement, which taken 
with the speech at Achimota may well constitute a fairly open lining up with the 
West.”1244   
As colonial officials became more assured of the loyalty and ability of their new 
working partners, they searched for ways to facilitate the rapprochement with them, 
including the grant of more concessions to them.  They certainly were not unaware of the 
self-interest of their new partners.  As Lonsdale remarked, “the first observers to 
distinguish the private interest which the ‘class of professional politician’ might possess 
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in nationalism from the hopes of the masses were the colonial powers and they were 
scarcely disinterested.”1245  The official report of 1956 on anti-communist propaganda in 
the Gold Coast, noting the banning of pro-Communist literature by the Gold Coast 
government under Nkrumah’s Prime Ministership, had also remarked that: 
While the main motive which prompted the Prime 
Minister’s action was his determination to curb 
Communism, he undoubtedly had his weather eye directed 
towards His Majesty’s Government.1246 
 
The report went on to state that it was deemed that by banning communism, Nkrumah 
disarmed in advance a potential argument against the grant of independence on basis of 
the danger of the Gold Coast joining the Soviet Union after independence.1247  This 
comment in itself, coming from officialdom as late as 1956, is validation of the 
significance of British officialdom’s fear of communism and of potential Soviet influence 
in the colonies in the unfolding events of the last decade of British imperial rule in these 
territories.  Officialdom was reiterating what they and Nkrumah knew to be salient to 
them: their fear of communist influence in these colonies, and their felt need to arrest it.  
It also validates what is known to be their awareness that Nkrumah knew he would be 
pleasing them greatly by curbing communism in his colony.   
On the other hand, the “extremists” attempts to push for social change from below 
was suggestive to the colonial authorities of a leftwing/communist putsch and agenda and 
it fed their fear of possible Soviet influence in the colonies.  It made the aspirant African 
political incumbents – the ethnopolitical entrepreneurs – i.e., the moderates, who were 
working within officially accepted channels for change and largely exclusive of a 
program of social change, more acceptable to colonial officials who became more 
responsive to them.1248  As officials began to grant more concessions to the “moderates,” 
the “moderates” pressed for more concession, until in the end, the grant of self-
government presented itself as the only rational way out, given official perceptions of 
events.  The dynamic of concession-granting to the moderates, propelled in important 
ways by the fear of the alternative if not granted to them, that is, the fear of the extremists 
and hence of communist Soviet Union gaining control in these colonies, and in context of 
events in the colonies and in the international arena – led in the end to what became 
precipitous decolonization.   
 281
The grant of independence, beginning with the Gold Coast in 1956 in British 
West Africa involved a move on the part of British officialdom to deter any perceived 
radicals or extremists from coming into power by granting it to the “moderates” pre-
emptively.  The political parties – the parties of the ethnopolitical entrepreneurs, the 
“moderates,” including those right of center - that became inheritors of political power at 
independence in these colonies could be said in this regard to have got power by default.  
As the Northern Nigerian woman radical, Sawaba Gambo, expressed in regard to the 
NPC political party which became the governing party in the North and in the Central 
government at independence as well, “the NPC did not get independence, we did.”1249  
She was referring to the struggles of such social radicals like herself and those in NEPU 
and elsewhere in British West Africa who colonial officials were very apprehensive of 
and labeled as “extremists” and “communists.”  She contrasted their form of social 
intervention with the self-enlightened politics of the Northern conservative elites who 
composed the NPC party and to whom political power was transferred at Nigeria’s 
independence.  Sawaba judged that the nation, and the NPC, could not have got 
independence without the struggle of people like them who were important catalyst in 
what this study refers to as precipitous decolonization.  Writ large, the inference was that 
the process of decolonization that started in the Gold Coast and which was extended to 
the rest of British West African colonies, was predicated in important ways on the 
activities of social radicals like her.  Their discursive practices in regard to community 
and citizenship had become threatening to the British colonial power and to their 
continued influence in this region of Africa which they believed the Soviet Union would 
like to gain control of, as elsewhere in the Wes’s spheres of influence.  It forced 
officialdom into quickly granting independence and handing over power to those who 
they felt safe with – the “moderates” i.e., the ethnopolitical entrepreneurs - and safe to 
leave at the helm of their nation’s affairs and for the future well-being of the mother 
country, Britain.  It involved a pre-emptive move to prevent those like Sawaba and 
others, perceived by the British colonial officials as communist-influenced or Soviet 
propaganda-prone, from gaining control and allowing the Soviet Union a foothold in 
these countries and region of Africa. 
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Officials were convinced that the “extremists” would take these colonies out of 
the sphere of Western influence and into the Soviet bloc should they gain power in a self-
governing African nation-state.  On the other hand, they perceived that the “moderates,” 
their current working partners, to be more pro-West and able to retain the colonies within 
British/Western sphere of influence should power devolve to them instead.  In his 
minutes on future policy towards political and constitutional evolution, prepared ahead of 
Nkrumah’s meeting with the SOS earlier in 1951, Cohen had expressed that: 
The purpose of our policy in the Gold Coast ought in my 
view to be a smooth and gradual advance towards 
responsible government.  It must be our aim on the one 
hand to keep on good terms with the Gold Coast political 
leaders so that when the time comes the Gold Coast will 
elect voluntarily to remain within the Commonwealth.1250   
 
The Secretary of State, Mr. Lyttelton, in 1953, in inviting his colleagues to approve in 
broad principles the latest proposals by him for new constitutional instrument for the 
Gold Coast (it became the basis of the Gold Coast Independence Constitution) which was 
to be submitted to the Privy Council early in 1954, wrote: 
The Gold Coast proposals, far reaching as they are, have 
been prepared with care by a moderate African 
Government anxious to avoid any break in relations with 
the United Kingdom.  …  Their rejection would bring to an 
end settled government by consent, and forfeit the goodwill 
towards the United Kingdom and the desire to retain the 
British connection (emphasis mine).1251  
 
The “moderates” in government were also already being perceived to be doing a 
good job in shutting the door on any possible communist/Soviet penetration in the 
colonies.1252  In the Gold Coast, the official report in 1954 noted that “overt communist 
activity is non-existent, as far as Government or the Civil Service are concerned.”1253  
This was said to be due to “the energetic action of the Prime Minister, Dr. Kwame 
Nkrumah.”1254  In the Legislative Council Session of 25th February, 1954, Nkrumah, as 
Prime Minister, had made the important announcement that colonial officials had 
expected of him in regard to the new government's position on communism and 
communists in the colony.  On that day, Nkrumah made the desired announcement in the 
legislature that any person who had been proved to be an active communist would be 
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refused employment in the public service.  He even went further to elaborate, quoting the 
1948 statement of the British Prime Minister, Mr. C. Attlee,1255 that such allegiance was 
inimical to the State.  He went on to say that the Gold Coast was not freeing itself from 
one imperialism to fall under another.1256  That must have been sweet music to the ears of 
colonial officials – Soviet imperialism will not be allowed to replace Western 
imperialism under the rule of Mr. Kwame Nkrumah!  What better African partner to 
devolve power to?!!  Kwame Nkrumah and the British colonial officials had indeed come 
a long way!!!   
 
Rushing to Decolonize 
 
In officialdom’s reasoning, it was crucial to grant full self-government to the 
perceived moderates then as pre-emptive moves to deter any extremists from coming to 
power.  They feared that continued denial of full self-government may generate more 
crises which they strongly felt the “extremists” and “communists” would exploit and in 
the process take these colonies “the way of the ‘commies.”’  Although the Colonial 
Office was in doubt about the “ability of the Gold Coast to make the grade as an 
independent country,”1257 they were sure that, given the on-going clamor for self-
government by the Gold Coast electorate, the choice before them, as expressed by R. J. 
Vile, “may well then be one of accepting independence at a certain date because its 
refusal would create worse conditions than its acceptance.”1258  Also, while officialdom 
was convinced that delaying the grant of independence would bring great advantages in 
the field of future domestic administration, they were certain that unless delay was clearly 
the result of internal factors, postponement “would have great dangers for future external 
relations, and these dangers outweigh domestic administrative considerations.”1259   
Colonial officials knew that there was need for more time to develop the 
administrative infrastructures in the Gold Coast, as well as in the rest of their West 
African colonies.  This included the training of more Africans to fill the numerous 
administrative positions that would be left vacant at independence due to anticipated 
voluntary return of many expatriate Britons.  They also felt that in the Gold Coast, given 
time, there could be better choices of “moderate” political parties to hand over power to 
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and with a more developed and effective opposition.  However, though the British held to 
the belief that the leadership of Gold Coast government as constituted was not likely to 
be of high quality, that the political ideas and methods of the CPP were crude, that they 
lacked a sense of reality, and were “mercurial,” and thought better of the opposition,1260 
they stuck with the CPP.  They were ready to hand over the reins of government to the 
CPP for the overriding reasons stated above and because they believed that the CPP 
under Nkrumah had those bases covered - has proved it would be pro-West and anti-
communist!  British officialdom knew time was needed for the opposition and a more 
highly-regarded moderate alternative political party to develop in the Gold Coast, given 
the considerable lack of political development hitherto not only in the Gold Coast but in 
the other colonies as well.  But time was also of the essence to them and officialdom 
could not afford that time.   
The Colonial Office was even more skeptical of the readiness of Nigeria for full 
self-government, given its heterogeneity, the problem of the North, etc.  The SOS, 
commenting on the Nigerian constitutional conference in London in 1953, remarked: “I 
can only claim as chairman to have concealed, I hope completely, the mounting 
impatience and deepening cynicism with which I have looked out upon this motley 
assembly tackling the niceties of constitutional balance.”1261  It will also be recalled that a 
major reason given by Cohen against moving too quickly on the pace of constitutional 
change in the Gold Coast during his attendance at the meeting of the Secretary of State 
with Nkrumah on 13th June, 1951 was his felt need for “developing administrative and 
political efficiency so that the country continues to be well governed.”1262  These had not 
occurred either in the Gold Coast or in any of the other British West African colonies by 
this time.  
There were indeed many compelling reasons not to decolonize at the time they 
did.  It could be reasoned that there was need for more time to properly reconcile the 
contradictions of political decentralization and economic centralization, or of the parallel 
developments of two divergent forms of rule in individual territories, etc.  But 
officialdom had proved incapable of resolving this dilemma and by mid-50s, the concern 
to hand over power quickly to the “moderates” so as to keep these anticipated new states 
pro-West had become overriding.  And once officials higher up saw the grant of full self-
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government to the Gold Coast in 1956 as the solution in the circumstance and had got 
into the mode to decolonize, the rush to effect this and to hand over power to the 
“moderates” in a self-governing nation-state began, starting with the Gold Coast in 1956.  
This was followed by Nigeria in 1960 and by Sierra Leone and Gambia in 1961.  The 
rush was such that colonial officials lower down the scale in the colonies had to be 
persuaded and made to feel ready for the wind of change. 
 The grant of self-government to the four British West African colonies became 
the unintended consequence of a process that officials were unable to “order” or control.  
The significance of officialdom’s fear of colonial social radicals’ alliance with the 
anticolonial left and of communism in the colonies in the process that ended empire is 
underscored in the 1954 Official Reports.  The 1954 Reports happily noted at that time 
the absence of any real localized theme in communist propaganda in the Gold Coast1263 
as a surprising lacuna in the usually efficient Moscow technique and attributed it to be 
due to two causes.1264  One of these causes was believed to be due to “the imminent 
granting of self government to the Gold Coast which has robbed the Communists of the 
familiar 'imperialist argument.”1265  It concluded by saying that “the granting of self 
government to the Gold Coast has cut the ground from under the feet of the 
Communists.”1266  That was a strong affirmation of an essential objective of what 
officialdom intended the grant of self-government to these colonies to achieve.  The grant 
of self-government to the African “moderates” also assured officialdom of the protection 
of their sphere of influence from the reach of the Kremlin.1267  And thus, officialdom 
became relieved of the weight of communism on their mind - in this part of empire. 
 To conclude, officialdom relieved itself of the burden of empire in these West 
African colonies and left, though making sure to leave it in the hands of those they 
believed would retain the newly-independent states in the sphere of the West.  But they 
left unresolved the many problems and contradictions that colonialism created and/or 
perpetuated: the problem of the bifurcated state, i.e., the two regimes of power - urban, 
Western parliamentary-based and rural custom-based under a single hegemonic authority; 
problem of democracy; problem of colonial arbitrary borders; and the problem of 
Africa’s social pluralism, etc.  These continue to plague post-independent African states 
and to create challenges for sustainable governance and for the creation of viable nation-
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states, and beg the issue of social change and social transformation in these societies.  
Many of the current issues confronting African states and society: issues of democracy, 
of individual rights versus collective self-determination, etc., were privileged by colonial 
social radicals but were delegitimized by British officialdom, as this study has attempted 
to reveal.  Colonial social radicals’ discourse – the supplementary discourse – and the 
range of other possible social interventions were closed off by officialdom.  The states 
that African rulers inherited at independence were the product of the construction of 
community and notions of citizenship predicated on more narrow forms of political and 
cultural address.  Also, the language of culture that formed important components of 
African cultural producers and political entrepreneurs discursive practices in the terms in 
which it was constituted intercepted with the language of rights in colonial radicals’ 
discourse and in other variety of moral discourses in the pre-independence period, with 
relevance in the post-independence period.   
African ethnopolitical entrepreneurs gave short shrift to the issue of democracy.  
In post-independence Africa, the state was de-racialized but not democratized.  Both in 
the pre-independence period and post-independence period, the issue of democracy was 
made to play a secondary role to that of development by African politicians and rulers.  
“Development” was a central component of “nation-forming.”  By the end of the 1970s, 
however, the “nationalist” development project failed to materialize, as epitomized in the 
failure of the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) enforced on these less-economically 
developed states by the World Bank.  The failure of the SAP marked a major defeat of 
the “developmentalist project.”  In their imagining of the nation as based on community 
conceived of as fraternity of equals, etc., the colonial social radicals left a legacy for the 
imagining and/or reimagining of community and of citizenship in more democratic and 
inclusive terms.  
The legacy of social pluralism in African states that colonialism left also 
continues to pose challenges for community-building and notions of citizenship in 
African societies.  Thandika Mkandawire commented that neither African politicians nor 
radicalized “nationalists” addressed the significance of Africa’s social pluralism in 
conflating tribalism with identity.1268  He points to the importance of considering the 
alternative construction of the nation-state in terms of (viable) multi-ethnic, multicultural 
 287
or multiracial terms which he noted was never considered by either categories in their 
construction of the nation.1269  The colonial social radicals examined in this study are, 
however, revealed to begin to address such issues in their discursive practices, predicated 
on the building of National Societies, and leaving a legacy for post-independent Africa. 
It is also possible to consider geographically reconstructing the nation-state in 
Africa and the boundaries inherited at independence1270 as these are mostly arbitrary and 
fluid and there is nothing sacrosanct about colonial national borders.  Like all other social 
identities, national identity is also imagined, constructed, and assembled from 
characteristics that, in altered circumstances, can become the basis of quite different 
kinds of social identities.  So why cannot the borders of the state be reconstructed to 
make the boundaries of the African states coincide in the main with those of nationalities 
that want to remain together?  On the other hand, however, borders are very difficult, if 
not impossible to adjust.  As Hechter commented, the permanence of borders is among 
the most tenaciously held givens in political culture.1271   
  In the open-ended debate and question of how far the institutions and culture of 
Western liberal democracy and the historical legacy of liberalism are sufficient criteria 
for democratic citizenship in post-colonial Africa, the challenge of the possibility of an 
African conception of citizenship had been raised among scholars.1272  An examination of 
the terms in which community and notions of citizenship were imagined, claimed, and 
contested among the various social forces, in particular by colonial social radicals, in the 
pre-independence period may provide some valuable insights into the reconstitution and 
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Preface 
 
1 For some of my earlier works on the subject of nationalism in the 80s and 90s, see, Nike L Edun Adebiyi, 
“Radical Nationalism in British West Africa, 1945-56,” University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 
1994@, “Deconstructing Nationalism: Towards a Social History of the Pre-independence Movements in 
British West Africa, 1900-1945,” Paper presented at the Council for the Development of Economic and 
Social Research in Africa (CODESRIA), Methodological Seminar on Social Movements, Social 
Transformation, and the Struggle for Democracy in Africa, Algiers, Algeria, July 18-20, 1990, “Radical 
Nationalism and the Politics of Anticolonialism in British West Africa, 1940-1960,” Paper presented at the 
Project on International Communism, Conference III, Metropolitan and Third World Lefts, 1917-1985, 
University of Michigan, January 27, 1989, “Social Groups in the National Colonial Movement in British 
West Africa: 1945-60,” Paper presented at the Council for the Development of Economic and Social 
Research in Africa (CODESRIA), Methodological Seminar on Social Movements, Social Transformation, 
and the Struggle for Democracy in Africa, Harare, Zimbabwe, June 1-3, 1988, “Nationalism as a Problem 
in Communist Thought: A Case-study of the National Colonial Question in the Communist International 
with Particular Reference to West Africa,” Seminar Paper,  History department, University of Michigan, 
1986, and “Main Ideological Currents in West Africa’s Nationalist Movement: An Exploratory Study,” 
Seminar Paper, History Department, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1985. 
2 Nike L. Edun Adebiyi, “Radical Nationalism in British West Africa, 1945-56,” University of Michigan, 
Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1994@.   
3 The interview with Hajiyya Sawaba Gambo, the Islamic radical woman activist, in Kano yielded more 
desired result.  Chief Orizu was too ill to conduct a proper interview and died before a second one could 
take place.  Orizu was an ex-Zikist who also coined the phrase, Zikism and was the main founder of the 
Zikist Movement, though he was more moderately-inclined.  Michael Imoudu, the Nigerian radical labor 
leader, was also too old to effectively recall the events of the time. 
4 Research in the U.S. included examination of holdings at the Hoover Institute, Stanford University, 
Schomburg Papers in New York Library, the Labadie Collection at the University of Michigan Library, and 
the United States Central Intelligence Agency (USCIA) Papers and newspaper collections at the Africana 
Library, Michigan State University (MSU), Lansing, Michigan.     
5 Roger Brubaker, Ethnicity without Groups (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2004). 
6 Supplementary discourse and minority discourse are used interchangeably in this study. 
7 See Women's Union, “Suggested Reforms for The E.N.A.,” 6/8/48, Ransome Kuti Papers. 
8 Ibid. 
9 “Women Out of Egba Court: Suggestion Contrary To Custom and Constitution.  Hostile Demonstrations 
and Assemblies Are Banned: D.O. Reads Order,” Daily Times, September 22, 1948. 
10 Laurent Berlant, The Anatomy of National Fantasy: Hawthorne, Utopia, and Everyday Life (Chicago, Ill: 
University of Chicago Press, 1991).  Colonial social radicals’ ineffective grasp of the cultural imperative is 
discussed in chapter seven. 
11 The contesting discourses and practices of ethnopolitical entrepreneurs and colonial social radials are 
explored in chapters six and seven, respectively. 
12 Homi Bhabha, “Dissemination: time, narrative, and the margins of the modern nation,” in Nation and 
Narration, ed., Homi Bhabha, 305-306 (London: Routledge, 1990, repr. 1993). 
13 My works since the 80s on the phenomenon of nationalism have also represented my attempts to fill that 
gap because of the importance that I believe these themes deserve.  Although John Hargreaves, a respected 
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British historian of empire, had also drawn attention to the significance of studying the theme of 
communism in regard to the Comintern and anti-colonialism in 1993, it still remains largely an unexplored 
theme, particularly in relation to the phenomenon of nationalism and the end of empire in British West 
Africa.  See John D. Hargreaves, “The Comintern and anti-colonialism: new research opportunities,” 
African Affairs 92, no. 367 (April 1993): 255-263. 
14 Stephen Howe, Anticolonialism in British Politics: the Left and the End of Empire, 1918-
1964 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
15 Hakim Adi, West Africans in Britain, 1900-1960: Nationalism, Pan Africanism and Communism 
(London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1998). 
16 The Secretary of State, Mr. Lyttelton, had expressed this view in 1953, consonant with how the British 
had viewed the Northern emirate system from the consolidation of empire and the establishment of the 
Lugardian Indirect Rule system in this place in 1914.  By contrast, Lyttelton characterized the Yorubas and 
the Ibos of the South, the two remaining of the three major nationality groups in Nigeria, as “Pagan or 
Christian, with higher education and lower manners … somewhat intoxicated with nationalism, though 
loyal to the British connection at least so long as it suits them”!  See “The Nigerian constitution: Cabinet 
memorandum by Mr. Lyttelton,” 17 August 1953, PREM 11/1367, C(53)235, [274], reprinted in David 
Goldsworthy (ed.), British Documents on the End of Empire.  Series A, Vol. III: The Conservative 
Government and the End of Empire 1951-1957, Part 2 (London: HMSO, 1994), 200.   
17 Colonial Office Report, 1947, CO 537/2573/11020/30 and CO 537/2573/11020/30/1, PRO. 
18 Eyo Ita’s objections to the deliberations and outcome of the 1949/50 Constitutional Conferences in 
Nigeria which preceded the granting of the 1951 Constitution in Nigeria was based precisely on the 
shortcomings of previous constitutions and on the need to amend them at that time, given the opportunity 
provided.  His concerns and suggestions were not heeded, however, and he, together with Mbonu Ojike, 
produced a Minority Report of their own which detailed at length suggestions for fundamental and 
democratic changes in all organs of government.  Eyo Ita was a graduate of Columbia University in the 
U.S., and a representative member of the NCNC on the 1949/50 Nigerian Constitutional Review 
Committee.  He and Ojike were told by the colonial government not to “take the nation by storm.”  To Sir 
T. Lloyd from Mr. Cohen, “Political Development of Nigeria, 10.5.50,” in CO 537/5786, PRO. 
19 Northern Elements Progressive Union, “Views on the Nigerian Constitution Conference, 1956,” NEPU 
Papers, Nigerian Archives, Kaduna. 
20 Ibid. 
21 “Egba Alake’s Section Who Are the Paramount Owners of Oba Alake Still Oppose Ademola’s Return,” 
signed by F. Ransome-Kuti, Women’s Union Abeokuta, undated memo, additional enclosure in “Letter 
from Funmi Ransome Kuti to Mr. Griffith, 13.12.50,” Ransome Kuti Papers. 
22 “Abeokuta: Is All Well,” Editorial, Western Echo, February 9th, 1948. 
23 British colonial officials affirmed the intention of the NPC party and Native Authorities in the North, 
consistent with their own position, to adapt and not to destroy the traditional system of authority which 
NEPU sought to reform or transform. “The Nigerian constitution: Cabinet memorandum by Mr. Lyttelton,” 
17 August 1953, PREM 11/1367, C(53)235, [274], reprinted in David Goldsworthy (ed.), British 
Documents on the End of Empire.  Series A, Vol. III: The Conservative Government and the End of Empire 
1951-1957, Part 2 (London: HMSO, 1994).   
24 Ibid. 
25 “Chief Commissioner Speaks On Egba Women’s Agitation,” His Honor and Chief Commissioner 
Western Provinces, Mr. T. Hoskyns-Abrahall, C. M. G., Address to the Chief and People of Egbaland in 
Council Hall, in the Daily Times, Tuesday 27th April 1948.   
26 Ibid.   
27 See, for example, Nike L. Edun Adebiyi, “Radical Nationalism in British West Africa, 1945-56,” 
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1994@, and “Radical Nationalism and the Politics of 
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Anticolonialism in British West Africa, 1940-1960,” Paper presented at the Project on International 
Communism, Conference III, Metropolitan and Third World Lefts, 1917-1985, University of Michigan, 
January 27, 1989.   
28 Hechter notes that there may well be a resurgence of class-based movements if welfarism failed.  See 
Michael Hechter, Containing Nationalism  (Oxford: Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2002). 
29 “[Gold Coast]: minute by A B Cohen on future policy towards political and constitutional evolution,” 11 
June 1951, CO 537/7181, [226], reprinted in Ronald Hyam (ed.), British Documents on the End of Empire. 
Series A, Vol. II: The Labour Government and the End of Empire 1945-1951, Part 3 (London: HMSO, 
1992), 73.  A. B. Cohen was the Assistant Under-Secretary of State from 1947 to 1951. 
30  Ibid.  Nkrumah was by this time being reconstituted into the category of the “moderates.”  This shift 
among officialdom and Nkrumah (and also Azikiwe in Nigeria) is discussed in chapters five and eight. 
31 “[West Africa]: memorandum by A B Cohen on Anglo-French relations: survey of constitutional 
progress in British territories,” [Extract], 20 Nov 1951, CO 537/7148, no 17, [228], reprinted in Ronald 
Hyam (ed.), British Documents on the End of Empire. Series A, Vol. II: The Labour Government and the 
End of Empire 1945-1951, Part 3 (London: HMSO, 1992), 77.  
32 Ibid. 
33 “Gold Coast constitution: Cabinet memorandum by Mr. Creech Jones,” 8 Oct 1949, CAB 129/36/2, 
CP(49)199, [217], reprinted in Ronald Hyam (ed.), British Documents on the End of Empire. Series A, Vol. 
II: The Labour Government and the End of Empire 1945-1951, Part 3 (London: HMSO, 1992), 49. 
34 It is to be noted that the Gold Coast was the lynchpin of developments and changes in the British West 
African colonies. 
35 “[Gold Coast constitution]: minutes by Sir C Jeffries and Mr. Lyttelton, 9 Feb 1953,” CO 554/254, [267], 
reprinted in David Goldsworthy (ed.), British Documents on the End of Empire.  Series A, Vol. III: The 
Conservative Government and the End of Empire 1951-1957, Part 2 (London: HMSO, 1994), 189.  Sir 
Charles J. Jefferies, the Deputy Under-Secretary of State (1947-1956), had expressed to Lyttelton earlier in 
February 1953 that he thought it was a “misfortune” the way British officialdom was moving too fast on 
the pace of constitutional developments and had hoped that it mighty be their general policy to “call a halt 
to this process.” 
36 The proposals would introduce a new government consisting of an All-African cabinet presided by the 
Prime Minister, advised by a European Economic and Financial Adviser and a European Attorney-General; 
it also involved new Electoral Ordinance for fresh elections with an extended franchise, etc.  
“Constitutional developments in the Gold Coast: Cabinet memorandum by Mr. Lyttelton,” 4 Sep 1953, 
CAB 129/62, C(53)244, [275], reprinted in David Goldsworthy (ed.), British Documents on the End of 
Empire. Series A, Vol. III: The Conservative Government and the End of Empire 1951-1957, Part 2 
(London: HMSO, 1994), 204.  His advice was in view of potential dissenting opinions among British 
officialdom in Britain, and the French government, who believed the British were moving too fast on the 
pace of constitutional change and political devolution in their West African colonies.  
37 It became the basis of the Gold Coast Independence Constitution. 
38 “Assessment of Anti-Communist Propaganda,” Accra, April 23, 1956, United Kingdom Information 
Office in the Gold Coast, Political Developments: Gold Coast, CO 554/1177, PRO, London.  The 1954 
Intelligence Reports had happily noted at that time the absence of any real localized theme in communist 




39 In seeking to raise questions about the unit of analysis – the ethnic group - and the domain of analysis – 
ethnicity itself, Brubaker has advocated bringing to bear new sets of analytical perspectives, such as 
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cognitive theory, ethnomethodology, conversation analysis, and institutional theory, in the analysis of the 
concept of “ethnicity.”  He suggested that cognitive perspectives, broadly understood, could help advance 
constructivist research on ethnicity, race, and nationhood.  See Rogers Brubaker, Ethnicity without Groups, 
17, 27. 
40 Kathleen Canning has suggested that notions of gender could be broken up and reconfigured by 
exploring how women sought to contest received understandings of rights and duties and how the resulting 
histories impacted their subjectivities.  See Kathleen Canning, “Class vs. Citizenship: Keywords in German 
Gender History,” Central European History 37, no. 2 (2004): 225-44. 
41 The perspective of citizenship is being explored of recent as an important category through which the 
meanings of such constructs like class, gender, and ethnicity, concepts associated with the construct of the 
nation, could be more successfully reconfigured as scholars explore the fluidity and complexity of these 
concepts.  Geoff Eley has argued, for example, in his works on German history, that the perspective of 
citizenship could provide a new paradigm for understanding the history of Wilhemine Germany.  See Geoff 
Eley, “Making a Place in the Nation: Meanings of ‘Citizenship’ in Wilhemine Germany,” in Wilhelminism 
and its Legacies: German Modernities, Imperialism, and the Meanings of Reform, 1890-1930, eds., G. Eley 
and J. Retallack, 16-33 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003).  The perspective of citizenship also forms the 
central focus of scholarly contributions to the exploration of national identity in twentieth century Germany 
in his latest edited book.  See, Geoff Eley and Jan Palmowski, eds., Citizenship and National Identity in 
Twentieth-Century Germany (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2008). 
42 The notion of citizenship applied in this study includes “cultural citizenship” and is applied in relational 
and non-fixed but general sense to refer to individual’s formal belonging to a state, the objective rights and 
duties enjoyed by the citizen, and the subjective use of those rights and the “meanings” ascribed by 
individuals to the rights they enjoyed as citizens.  This cuts across periods and societies and definitely 
relates to how individuals and groups have conceived themselves and their place in society, including rights 
and duties, in African societies across historical periods. 
43 The African ethnopolitical entrepreneurs are the political entrepreneurs and cultural entrepreneurs and 
are used interchangeably in this study.  They refer to are those who expect their wealth, power or prestige 
to increase with the attainment of self-government as well as to distinct intelligentsia, purveyors of distinct 
cultural goods.  Colonial radicals are those who stood at the critical gateway between various social forces - 
urban and rural social forces - symbolizing the ordinary people seeking to renegotiate the terms of their 
incorporation in colonial society and to reconfigure community and forms of citizenship in more inclusive 
and egalitarian ways. 
44 Brubaker has emphasized the need to examine the process by which categories become transformed into 
groups, how and why and to what effect.  See Rogers Brubaker, Ethnicity without Groups. 
45 As stated in the preface, many of the social radicals and their political organizations had, in fact, 
originated from within the womb of more mainstream political or cultural organizations, like the Zikists in 
the National Convention of Nigeria and the Cameroon (NCNC) and the Northern Elements Progressive 
Union (NEPU) in the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) in Nigeria, etc.  They had initially existed within 
them with the intent of radicalizing these more mainstream political organizations from within and to move 
them along more democratic and socially radical agendas.  But they did not and could not long subsist 
within the parent body as they were removed or forced out from them within a short period because of the 
conflicts in their perspectives on the nation and citizenry!  For example, the radicals in NEPU had initially 
existed in the Northern Peoples’ Congress (NPC) with the intent of operating as a political vanguard within 
the broader but more conservative NPC which was then more or less a cultural organization of entrenched 
interests in Northern Nigeria but the conservatives in the NPC and who dominated it soon worked to 
exclude NEPU from it. Powerful emirs and certain administrative officers regarded the NEPU within the 
NPC then, with its radicalizing initiatives, as a “dangerously radical group” and sought to eliminate the 
radical elements from the NPC.   Conservatives and moderates within the NPC secured the adoption of a 
resolution to the effect that no member of the NEPU could remain as a member of the NPC.  NEPU’s wing 
of the Kano delegation thereupon broke with the NPC and the NPC was thereafter converted into a political 
party for the use of conservative politicians.  See, for example, Richard L. Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties: 
Power in an Emergent African Nation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 95-96.  Some women 
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social radicals also affiliated their organization with the more mainstream parties at certain stage of their 
organizations’ development, such as the Abeokuta Women’s Union (AWU) in the NCNC and Cummings-
John’s Sierra Leone Women’s Movement (SLWM) with the SLPP, with the aim of impacting these 
political parties from within towards more democratic changes but they failed to do so and most of the 
affiliations were short-lived. 
46 See, for example, the account of the resistance of men in such regions as the Futa Jallon, notorious for its 
religious and social conservatism, in Elizabeth Schmidt, “‘Emancipate Your Husbands!’ Women and 
Nationalism in Guinea, 1953-1958,” in Women in African Colonial Histories, eds., Jean Allman, Susan 
Geiger, and Nakanyike Mussi, 282-304 (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2002). 
47 Women's Union, “Suggested Reforms for The E.N.A.,” 6/8/48, Ransome Kuti Papers. 
48 See, “Women Out of Egba Court: Suggestion Contrary To Custom and Constitution.  Hostile 
Demonstrations and Assemblies Are Banned: D.O. Reads Order,” Daily Times, September 22, 1948.  The 
colonial authorities were electing a handful of women into the newly constituted governing Council, the 
(ECC), in the late 40s, a right to which Funlayo Ransome-Kuti had fought for in the famous Abeokuta 
Women’s Movement (AWU). 
49 In his recent study of the politics and discourse centered around belonging and exclusion in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Stephen Jackson comments on how such vernaculars like the 
autochthony/allochthony duality draw energy from imprecise overlaps with other powerful pre-existing 
identity polarities at particular scales of identity and difference: local, provincial, national, and regional.  
He remarks that the slipperiness between different scales of meaning permits the speaker to leave open 
multiple interpretations and that this indefiniteness is a “paradoxical source of the discourse’s strength and 
weakness, suppleness and nervousness, its declarative mood and attendant paranoia.”  See Stephen Jackson, 
“Sons of Which Soil? The Language and Politics of Autochthony in Eastern D.R. Congo,” African Studies 
Review 49, no. 2 (Sept, 2006): 95. 
50 Homi K. Bhabha, ed., Nation and Narration, 294. 
51 “Community” and “nation” are sometimes used interchangeably and as appropriate in this work. 
52 Raymond William’s 1958 essay, “Culture is Ordinary,” is sensitive to questions of power inequality and 
marginalization of certain voices within the common culture.  See Raymond Williams, Resources of Hope: 
Culture, Democracy, Socialism (London: Verso, 1989), 3-18. 
53 Homi K. Bhabha, Nation and Narration.  The master-discourse in this study was the discourse that 
officialdom allowed space for while they tried to close off the space for the discourse that they did not want 
centered – the minority/supplementary discourse.  There were variations within and between these main 
trends and they sometimes existed in dialectical relationship to each other, as this study attempts to also 
reveal. 
54 Homi K. Bhabha, Nation and Narration, 305. 
55 Rodolphe Gasche, The Tain of the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection (Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 1986). 
56 Homi K. Bhabha, “DissemiNation: time, narrative, and the margins of the modern nation,” in Nation and 
Narration, 305. 
57 Ibid., 305-306. 
58 Ibid., 308. 
59 Ibid., 307. 
60 Ibid.   
61 Ibid., 306. 
62 Perceived social radicals were feared by colonial authorities as potential conduit pipe for the infiltration 
of communism into these West African colonies, both in the heyday of the Communist International and in 
the post World War II Cold War rivalry between the East and the West. 
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63 “Communist” was in a sense a label that British officialdom applied to any colonial or colonial 
organization that they did not like and this categorization was what made the diverse socially relevant 
interventions of colonials cohere.  This was demonstrated, for example, in the reaction of the Governor of 
the Gold Coast, Sir Gerald Creasy, to the 1948 Gold Coast crises, examined in chapter four.  Creasy 
immediately interpreted the crisis as a sort of communist conspiracy, while the causes of the crises were 
more deep-seated and multifaceted, as the Colonial Office would later be made to realize by the Report of 
the Watson Commission of Inquiry that was sent to investigate the outbreak of the crises. 
64 The end of empire in Africa has been a subject of debate among various schools of thought.  It has 
moved from the school of planned and guided devolution among revisionist historians such as Prosser 
Gifford and Roger Louis (1988), Curtis R. Nordman (1976), and R. D. Pearce (1982) who argued that the 
initiatives rested solely in British official hands, to the school of unplanned devolution such as Cell (1980) 
and to that which examined the relationship between events in the colonies, i.e., the weight of colonial 
pressures, and metropolitan policy making, such as the school of thought represented by Jane Bowden 
(1980).  For these schools, see, for example, Prosser Gifford and Wm. Roger Louis, eds., Decolonization 
and African Independence: The Transfer of Power, 1960-1980 (New Have: Yale University, 1988), Curtis 
R. Nordman, “Prelude to Decolonization in West Africa: The Development of British Colonial Policy, 
1938-1947,” unpublished doctoral dissertation, Oxford University, 1976, R. D. Pearce, The Turning Point 
in Africa: British Colonial Policy, 1938-1948 (London: Cass, 1982), John W. Cell, “On the Eve of 
Decolonization: The Colonial Office’s Plan for the Transfer of Power in Africa, 1947,” Journal of Imperial 
and Commonwealth History 8, no. 3 (May 1980): 250-256, and J. H. Bowden, “Development and Control 
in British Colonial Policy: Nigeria and the Gold Coast, 1935-48,” doctoral dissertation, University of 
Birmingham, England, 1980.  The debate has advanced further in more recent times towards the 
understanding of the end of empire in processual and dialectical terms in relation to internal processes in 
the colonies and in the metropolis and internationally.  See, for example, Fred Cooper, Decolonization and 
African Society : the Labor Question in French and British Africa.  
65 A few studies that have been carried out in regard to communism or leftwing movements and British 
imperialism have focused more on the politics of anti-colonialism by the left in British politics.  See, for 
example, Stephen Howe, Anticolonialism in British Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1993), and 
Partha Gupta, Imperialism and the British Labor Movement, 1814-1964 (New York: Holmes and Meier 
Publisher, 1975).  Hakim Adi’s study comes closer to an examination of communism and nationalism but is 
limited to the activities of West African students in Britain.  See, Hakim Adi, West Africans in Britain, 
1900-1960: Nationalism, Pan Africanism and Communism (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1998).  For a 
general account in relation to Pan-Africanism from an ideological viewpoint, see George Padmore. Pan-
Africanism or Communism (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1971).  A few other earlier works that 
touch on communist activities in limited forms in West Africa include Ayodele J. Langley, Pan Africanism 
and Nationalism in West Africa; a Study in Ideology and Social Classes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), 
and Immanuel Geis, The Pan African Movement (London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1974). 
66 I try to show that British officialdom’s anticommunist framework clearly imposed a grid of analysis on 
the broad spectrum of African politics and simplifies an otherwise complex phenomenon.   
67 This is fully discussed and detailed in chapters five and eight below. 
68 “[Gold Coast]: minute by A B Cohen on future policy towards political and constitutional evolution,” 11 
June 1951, CO 537/7181, [226], reprinted in Ronald Hyam (ed.), British Documents on the End of Empire. 
Series A, Vol. II: The Labour Government and the End of Empire 1945-1951, Part 3 (London: HMSO, 
1992), 74. 
69 Ibid.  It is also to be noted that the Gold Coast was the lynchpin of developments and changes in the 
British West African colonies 
70 “[West Africa]: memorandum by A B Cohen on Anglo-French relations: survey of constitutional 
progress in British territories,” [Extract], 20 Nov 1951, CO 537/7148, no 17, [228], reprinted in Ronald 
Hyam (ed.), British Documents on the End of Empire. Series A, Vol. II: The Labour Government and the 
End of Empire 1945-1951, Part 3 (London: HMSO, 1992), 77.  
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71 “Assessment of Anti-Communist Propaganda,” Accra, April 23, 1956, United Kingdom Information 
Office in the Gold Coast, Political Developments: Gold Coast, CO 554/1177, PRO.  The 1954 Reports had 
happily noted at that time the absence of any real localized theme in communist propaganda in the Gold 
Coast. 
72 See discussion of this in Roger Brubaker, Ethnicity without Groups. 
73 They have been so constituted. As Brubaker commented, ‘ethnic’ conflict is not always a matter of 
‘ethnic’ groups in conflict and the acts of framing and narrative encoding of it as such do not simply 
interpret the violence but constitute it as “ethnic,” or even “nationalist.”  Brubaker, Ethnicity without 
Groups. 
74 The term “nationalism” first appeared in a text written by Herder in 1774.  See Peter Alter, Nationalism 
(London: Edward Arnold, 1989), 7. 
75 The growth of cultural studies in recent times has served to reinstate the centrality of culture in nation-
forming and to link social and individual lives.      
76 Benedict Anderson’s work in 1983 is regarded to be emblematic text in marking this moment of 
transition in the literature of nationalism.  See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on 
the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983, rev. ed. 1991).   
77 Brubaker, Ethnicity without Groups, 4, 27. He regards cognitive perspectives as providing valuable 
resources for conceptualizing nation, ethnicity, race, sex, religion, etc., in a non-groupist manner.  He 
applies the same critique to the categories of race, sex, age, religion, ethnicity, etc.  
78 Ibid., 11-12.  By focusing on categories, Brubaker believes “ethnicity,” for example, could be envisioned 
without groups.   
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid., 11. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Kathleen Canning, “Class vs. Citizenship: Keywords in German Gender History,” Central European 
History 37, no. 2 (2004): 225-44.  See also, Kathleen Canning and Sonya O. Rose, “Introduction: Gender, 
Citizenship, and Subjectivity: Some Historical and Theoretical Considerations,” Gender & History 13, no. 
3 (2001): 227-41. 
83 See Geoff Eley and Jan Palmowski eds. Citizenship and National Identity in Twentieth-Century 
Germany, 7.  See also, Geoff Eley, “Making a Place in the Nation: Meanings of Citizenship in Wilhelmine 
Germany,” in Wilhelminism and its Legacies: German Modernities, Imperialism, and the Meanings of 
Reform, 1890-1930, eds., G. Eley and J. Retallack, 16-33 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003).  
84 The volatility and fluidity of ethnic identity are also noted by Martin Chanock in his book, Law Custom, 
and Social Order: The Colonial Experience in Zambia and Malawi (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1985), and by Thomas Spear and Richard Waller in, Thomas Spear and Richard Waller, eds., Being 
Maasai: Ethnicity and Identity in East Africa (London: James Currey, 1993).  On the other hand, Thandika 
Mkandawire believes that ethnic identity has been given a bad name by nationalists in conflating ethnic 
identity with tribalism. He commented that “nationalism denied ethnic identity and considered any political 
- or worse - economic claims based on these identities as diabolic as imperialism, if not worse.”  See 
Thandika Mkandawire, “African Intellectuals and Nationalism.” Lecture delivered in Australia, 2003, 2. 
85 As Brubaker has commented, “nations,” “ethnicity,” “race,” etc., provide better insights into the 
problems associated with nation-forming when conceptualized in relational, processual, dynamic, eventful, 
and disaggregate terms and not, for example, as collective individuals as they have tended to be in social 
science literature.  Rogers Brubaker, Ethnicity without Groups. 
86 In seeking to address a problematic consequence of the tendency to take groups for granted in the study 
of nationhood, ethnicity, and race, etc., Brubaker notes that the mere use of a term as a category of practice 
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does not disqualify it as a category of analysis.  What is problematic, he remarked, is not that a particular 
term is used but how it is used.  Rogers Brubaker, Ethnicity without Groups. 
87 The larger concept of “We are all Africans” is also in question.  See Ali A. Mazrui, Africanity Redefined. 
edit., Ricardo René Laremont ... [et al.]. 51 (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2002).  
88 Mazrui also noted that the concept of Africa itself is in part the tyranny of cartographers, etc.  Ibid. 
89 What may constrain such attempts for the present and future is the international context that also makes it 
difficult to sustain.  Also, there are potentials for the development of the “nation” in mutually-inclusive 
ways based on current borders of each state.  
90 The field of cultural studies has contributed to the understanding of how the nation is represented, how 
its origins and claims are narrated and how its aspirations are authorized. 
91 See Miroslav Hroch, Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985).   
92 Raymond Williams had earlier attested that “culture is ordinary, in every society and in every mind.”  He 
further stated that culture has two aspects: “the known meanings and directions, which its members are 
trained to; the new observations and meanings, which are offered and tested.”  See Raymond William’s 
essay, “Culture is Ordinary,” in Resources of Hope: Culture, Democracy, Socialism (London: Verso, 
1989), 4.   
93 Ibid., 3-18.   
94 Aspects of this are explored in chapter seven.  In the interwar and immediate post-World War II period, 
the theme of struggles of appropriation rather than anti-colonialism or ‘nationalism’ was a more appropriate 
descriptions of the conflicts of interests in these West African social formations  but the period witnessed 
the onset of the process within which other varieties of politics, including 'nationalist' politics, were made 
manifest.  It may be correct to observe that many of the interwar activities and movements were 
characteristic of societies in flux, analogous, though with very significant regional and local variations, to 
those that had arisen historically in situations of rapid social change.  These could be compared, in some 
ways, to a particular stage of industrializing societies which generated movements like syndicalism, 
anarchism, and even Marxism, in response to the attendant social dislocation.     
95 Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, eds., Becoming National: A Reader (Oxford: Oxford  University 
Press, 1996), 9. 
96 The study contends that there were different social issues and different positions taken on them.  It breaks 
down the socially relevant issues into basic issues of social life where contradiction  
97 Tradition was construed and misconstrued by all, i.e., colonial chiefs, local sub-chiefs, male fraternities, 
and even British officialdom itself. 
98 Geoff Eley and Jan Palmowski, eds., Citizenship and National Identity in Twentieth-Century Germany, 7. 
99 See, for example,  Ndabanigi Sithole, African Nationalism (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), and 
Boahen, Adu A. "Politics and Nationalism in West Africa," in Adu Boahen ed. General History of Africa, 
Africa Under Colonial Domination 1880-1935.  
100 A comparable weakness is revealed in earlier studies of this theme in other regional studies, including 
Western European studies.  A shared feature of these hitherto mainstream traditions of nationalist studies 
has been its overtly intellectual and political thrusts and its tendency to abstract from the social base.  For 
the early school located among political and intellectual historians of Western Europe and North America 
whose root goes far back to the eighteenth century German romanticist nationalist school, Herder and his 
school,  see Hans Kohn, The Age of Nationalism (New York: Harper, 1962) and The Idea of Nationalism, 
2nd ed. (New York: Collier-Macmillan, 1967), and, Carlton J. H. Hayes, "Nationalism," Encyclopedia of 
the Social Sciences, vol. II (New York: Macmillan, 1938), 240-49.    
101 Earlier mainstream studies of nationalism in Africa, originating within conventional paradigms and 
whose frame of analysis was influenced by the assumptions of the modernization school, had tended to 
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focus mainly on the phenomenon of politics and on the activities of African educated and commercial 
elites.  Their treatment of the movements of the period mainly as intellectual rather than as part of a 
complex social phenomenon had tended to reduce these to the politics of mobilization by educated African 
elites and to deny the examination of their subject as part of a process or system that is to be explained and 
analyzed.  
102 See, James S. Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1958).                              
103 See, for example, Richard Joseph, Radical Nationalism in Cameroun: Social Origins of the U.P.C. 
Rebellion (Oxford and New York: Clarendon Press), 1977, Tabitha Kanogo, Squatters and the Roots of 
Mau Mau (London: J. Currey, 1987), and Richard Sklar, Nigerian Political parties (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1963).  Thomas Hodgkin’s work also provided an early understanding of the 
rise of emergent social classes (forces) and new organizations.  See, Thomas Hodgkin, Nationalism in 
Colonial Africa (New York: New York University Press, 1975). 
104 James Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism. 
105 The enterprising intellectuals are the equivalent of the political entrepreneurs in this study. 
106 More recent literatures have emphasized the need to constitute nations discursively, through a process of 
imaginative ideological labor, i.e., the novelty of national culture, its manufactured or invented character, 
as opposed to its deep historical rootedness.  In the imaginative ideological labor involved in nation-
forming, Eley and Suny have noted, for example, the important role of the ‘enterprising intellectuals’ as 
catalyst in the case of nation-forming in Central Europe and Transcaucasia in nineteenth century.  See 
Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, eds., Becoming National: A Reader, 8. 
107 See, Thomas Hodgkin, Nationalism in Colonial Africa, and Adu A. Boahen, "Politics and Nationalism 
in West Africa." 
108 Thomas Hodgkin, Nationalism in Colonial Africa, 23.  Adu Boahen in his revisionist study also still 
interprets the events of the period from 1919 to 1935 in British West Africa, for example, as nationalist 
activities, regarding this period as that which saw African resistance to colonialism and nationalist activities 
in this region at its peak. Boahen, Adu A. Boahen, "Politics and Nationalism in West Africa," 624. 
109 It is premised on the notion that the idea of nationalism is predicated on a multiple complex of factors - 
cultural, social, linguistic, psychological, ideological, and others, on which the actual thrust of politics is 
based. 
110 John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 4. 
111 Peter Alter, Nationalism (London: Edward Arnold, 1989), 4. 
112 Brubaker points to the problematic consequence of taking groups for granted in the study of nationhood, 
ethnicity, races, etc., and would advocate the concept of groupness as a more valuable analytical tool in the 
study of such phenomena. Brubaker, Ethnicity without Groups. 
113 My works on the subject of nationalism since the 80s have represented attempts to move the 
understanding of the subject further by seeking to explore the phenomenon of nationalism in Africa within 
a reconstituted conceptual framework.  Other more recent works such as Fred Cooper’s examination of the 
labor question in decolonization in Africa and Lynn Schler’s examination of the Douala city in colonial 
Cameroons from a reconstituted methodological framework represent such new schools.  See, for example, 
Fred Cooper, Decolonization and African Society : The Labor Question in French and British Africa 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), and Lynn Schler, “History, the Nation-State, and 
Alternative Narratives: An Example from Colonial Douala,” African Studies Review 48, no. 1 (April 2005): 
89-108.  Schler examines the community of strangers in New Bell Douala, Cameroons in the interwar 
period in her attempt to offer an alternative to the nationalist narrative that had dominated the 
historiography of Cameroon till recent.  Commenting on the use of pidgin English among New Bell 
immigrants and as an important step in the evolution of a multiethnic collective in Cameroon, she stated 
that “the nation demarcated by pidgin bore little resemblance to the nation imagined by the Douala elite and 
recorded in their print culture.” Ibid., 101.  
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114 See, Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986). 
115 See Tom Nairn, The Breakup of Britain (London: Verso, 1981). 
116 Elie Kedourie, Nationalism (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1961). 
117 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford, England: Blackwell, 1983). 
118 Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of 
Nationality (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1953). 
119 Karl Deutsch failed in the 60s to transform the constraint of the Western rationalist epistemological 
framework which had similarly informed his analysis. 
120 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism  
(London-New York: Verso, 1983, repr. 1991).  Anderson’s work is discussed further below. 
121 See Jurgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category 
of Bourgeois Society, transl. by Thomas Burger (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1989). 
122 Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge, Mass: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992). 
123 Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, eds., Becoming National: A Reader. 
124 See, for example, Ify Amadiume,  Male Daughters, Female Husbands: Gender and Sex in an African 
Society (London: Zed Books, 1987), and, Oyeronke Oyewunmi, The Invention of Women: Making an 
African Sense of Western Gender Discourses (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), and 
“Conceptualizing Gender: Eurocentric Foundations of Feminist Concepts and the Challenge of African 
Epistemologies,” in CODESRIA, African Gender Scholarship: Concepts, Methodologies and Paradigms, 
Gender Series, 1, 2004, 1-8.  See also, Bibi Bakare-Yusuf, “Yorubas Don’t Do Gender: A Critical Review 
of Oyeronke Oyewunmi’s The Invention of Women: Making an African Sense of Western Gender 
Discourses,” in CODESRIA: African Gender Scholarship: Concepts, Methodologies and Paradigms.   
125 V. Y. Mudimbe, The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy, and the Order of Knowledge (London: 
James Curry, 1988). 
126 Ali A. Mazrui, Africanity Redefined, edit Ricardo René Laremont et al., (Trenton, NJ: Africa World 
Press, 2002). 
127 Ibid. Mudimbe searched for the epistemological foundation of an African discourse.  Earlier works 
dealing with this dilemma in African studies include, Chinweizu, Onwuchekwa. The West and the Rest of 
Us: White Predators, Black Slavers and the African Elite (New York: Vintage Books, 1975).    
128 As indicated above, the problem had been both methodological and epistemological and has been central 
to this author’s engagement with the problem of nationalism in Africa since the 80s. 
129 For some major works in this tradition see, Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), and Aristide Zolberg, Creating Political Order: the Party-
States of West Africa (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966). 
130 Irene Gendzier,  Managing Political Change: Social Scientists and the Third World (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1985).  Gendzier noted the congruence of Political Development theories with a normative 
view of domestic policy on one level and on the other with foreign policy.  A central tenet of modernization 
theory was the strengthening of the state vis-à-vis civil society so that it could successfully carry out the 
task of “modernization.”  From this perspective flowed the concern for the “orderly” transfer of colonial 
institutions to new elites, a dominant pre-occupation especially in the U.S.A. under the auspices of the 
Social Science Research Council's Committee on Comparative Politics 
131 A. Temu  and B. Swai, Historians and Africanist History: A Critique (London: Zed Press, 1981). 
132 Both the African “nationalist” (westernized) elite and the African nationalist historian had shared a 
common ideological origin in British late Victorian culture. 
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133 In British societies, the growth of industrial capitalism in the 19th and early 20th centuries had led to the 
creation of new social classes, viz., the middle class/bourgeoisie with strong links to state power and a new 
mass of the dispossessed - the working class – “alienated” from the means of production and state power.  
These processes were transforming the terrains of social struggle (class struggles) and led to the articulation 
of new ideologies of power between those classes seeking to retain and accumulate class privileges and 
those seeking to be inclusive in structures of power.  See, Gendzier, Managing Political Change. Colonial 
capital and colonial bureaucracy had similarly led to the emergence of new ‘classes’, i.e., what I have 
termed ‘social forces’ in my works, and a new public and the processes were similarly conflictual.  New 
levels of conflicts were added to prevailing ones in African societies.  Colonial capital and colonial 
administrative structures generated new resources around which people were mobilized.  New social 
groupings and relations of production were emerging within older but changing social groupings and 
patterns of relations, creating what has been identified in my works as the complex, contradictory and 
ambiguous processes in these places.  British official response to the emergence of a type of modern mass 
society in the colonies and the entry of the masses into colonial politics did not seem to involve any bold 
imagination; it was not ideologically dissimilar from that which informed their domestic policy, though 
with significant variations in the colonies.  In British West Africa, mainstream official policy took the form 
of a conservative adherence first to indigenous authorities/institutions in ways that constrained their 
hitherto democratic potentials; the attempted shift later in the late 30s to mid 40s to accommodate 
“modernizing” elements of the new public in structures of power, first in an ad hoc manner, and later as 
programmatic agenda from the end of the 40s was also democratically circumscribed as I tried to show later 
on in this study.  
134 See Irene Gendzier, Managing Political Change. 
135 Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1986).  He has observed that like Orientalism, or the discourse of the 
Orient, the discourse of Political Development and Modernization and its derivative discourse, colonial 
independence, were more particularly valuable as symbols of bourgeois middleclass/European power over 
the masses/colonial subjects than they were veridic discourse about political development/independence.  
For exploration of the concept of Orientalism, see Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1978). 
136 Raymond William, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society, 1780-1950 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1976). 
137 Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World. 
138 Ibid.  See also Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its fragments: Colonial and Post Colonial Histories 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), 3-13. 
139 Anderson’s revised work has attempted to address and resolve some of the challenges raised in his 
earlier work of the same title.  See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin 
and Spread of Nationalism, rev. ed.  
140 See, Partha Chatterjee, “Whose Imagined Community?,” in Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its 
fragments: Colonial and Post Colonial Histories, 3-13.  
141 Ibid., 39. 
142 Miroslav Hroch, Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1985). 
143 Ibid. 
144 Tom Nairn, The Breakup of Britain. 
145 Ibid., 348. 
146 Ade Ajayi has long noted that the colonial period or colonial intervention was one, albeit important, 
force of change in a long history of change and development in African societies.  See Jacob A. Ade Ajayi, 
“Colonialism: An Episode in African History,” in Colonialism in Africa Volume I, The History and Politics 
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of Colonialism, 1870-1960, eds., L. H. Gann and P. Duignan, 497-509 (London: Cambridge University 
Press, 1985). 
147 Aspects of these contradictory development and their effect on “group-forming” or “nation-forming” are 
explored a little further in chapter two and in subsequent relevant chapters. 
148 The latter would involve officialdom's endeavors to reshape their African empires in line with some 
conceived notion of “modernity.”  The imperial thrust of the last quarter of the 19th century in Africa by 
European Powers, especially by France and Britain, was underpinned by the philosophy of a civilizing 
mission which aimed at carrying the benefits of 'civilization' to the “backward” nations, the “Peoples 
without history.”  This view of the colonies and of the imperial mission by the West is epitomized in the 
Covenant of the old League of Nations which stipulated that “the well-being and development of people 
not yet ready to stand by themselves form the sacred trust of civilization.”  The problem with this 
conception of empire revolves around the notion of civilization itself - what is the objective criteria for its 
measurement, whose civilization and whose modernity?  It raises other issues and questions some of which 
have already been engaged with in post-modernist discourse and writings. See, for example, Partha 
Chatterjee, Partha, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse. 
149 These contradictions formed an important part of the sum of what Balandier had earlier tried to 
conceptualize as “the colonial situation.”  The “colonial situation” represents his attempt to capture 
conceptually the whole complex of social, political, economic and other array of phenomena that typified 
colonized societies.  See Georges Balandier, “The Colonial Situation: A Theoretical Approach,” in Social 
Change, ed. Wallerstein, Immanuel, 34-62 (New York: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1966). 
150 Newer works in African studies since the mid-90s have also started to fill certain gaps in the study of the 
nationalist phenomenon and/or of decolonization in Africa in their exploration of specific themes or 
localities 
151 I plan to further explore some of the themes raised in this study in my post-doctoral works. 
152 The partial marginalization of many of them in the colonial system gave a greater degree of autonomy 
and ability to formulate dissenting discourse.  But it was not altogether cost free.  In Northern Nigeria, for 
example, many Native Authorities’ clerks refrained from full or partial commitment to dissenting 
movements under NEPU because of assured loss of employment, physical beatings, arbitrary 
imprisonment, etc. from the Native Authorities to those who did.  See, NEPU files, Nigeria Archives, 
Kaduna.  Even worse, they were denied the opportunity to have a direct impact in the creation of the new 
independent African state. 
153 See Raymond William’s 1958 essay, “Culture is Ordinary,” in Resources of Hope: Culture, Democracy, 




154 Stephen Jackson reveals, for example, in his study of post-independence Democratic Republic of 
Congo, how in the vernacular use of ‘autochthony’ and ‘allochthony’ and in their duality the Hutus and 
Tutsis (who originated from Rwanda into the Kiev province) were increasingly constituted as strangers, 
referred to as ‘Kanyarwanda’ (Sons of Rwanda’) and lacking entitlements and rights in the Congo.  This 
has led to series of disturbances.  In Kivu province, for example, the ‘autochthon’ groups, such as the 
Hunde, Nyanga, and Nande in North Kivu feared that the Hutu (‘allochthons’) ‘infiltration threatens their 
demographic majority and constant conflicts and intercommunal violence arose over this in the 1960s and 
in 1992-93. 
155 Chinua Achebe brings a brilliant and humorous exposition from a literary and different perspective to 
Africans’ (Ibos) perceptions of the present in the past.  See, Chinua Achebe, Things Fall Apart (New York: 
Anchor Books, 1989). 
 313
                                                                                                                                                 
156 The British sought to maintain “order and good government” in the name of tradition, hoping colonials 
would obey their traditional rulers, hoping workers would desist from going on strike by listening to the 
restraining order of their 'chiefs' as they were believed to do in indigenous authority systems.  Terence 
Ranger provides insightful critique of how Europeans sought to make use of invented tradition to transform 
and modernize African thought systems and ways.  See Terence Ranger, “The Invention of Tradition in 
Colonial Africa” in The Invention of Tradition, 211-262, eds. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).  
157 Tradition as construed by all interested parties in colonial West Africa became in part a further source of 
contradictions.  The attempt by its would-be inventors to apply it in static terms also became a source of 
conflicts and part of the problem as tradition itself was not static in that pre-colonial structures and norms 
were themselves always in process of negotiation and renegotiation.  The people rose in opposition time 
and time again, as seen in many instances in the Sierra Leone hinterland and in the Gold Coast, for 
example, against the practices of their chiefs which they perceived as undemocratic and as having no legal 
sanction, be it under local African 'customary law' or western law.  For a good account of the operation of 
the judicial system in one colony see, Adewoye Omoniyi, The Judicial System in Southern Nigeria, 1854–
1954 (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1977).  In Nigeria, in the southern provinces for example, opposition 
to the perceived illegitimate and tyrannical rule of Oba Alake Ademola, the colonial chief, in Abeokuta was 
rife throughout his three-decade long rule from the 1920s, culminating in the renowned Abeokuta Women's 
Movement (AWU) led by Funlayo Ransome (later Anikulapo) Kuti in the post Word War II period. 
158 Studies have shown how colonial chiefs were applying tradition to legitimize their rule and practices and 
to stake their self-interested claims in the new order.  Under British administration, a process of role 
modification was occurring in the overall changes brought about in which access to roles was being 
provided on grounds other than ‘traditional’ ones while at the same time legitimacy was being conferred on 
these in the name of  tradition..  Chapters four and subsequent chapters explore the AWU movement. 
159 It was already coming under assault with the introduction of the new cash crop economy.  As far back as 
1903, the Bale of Ibadan was noted to be complaining that hundreds of young men had left Ibadan "without 
authority ... to proceed to the coast to better themselves." See Sara Berry, Cocoa, Custom and Socio-
Economic Change in Rural Western Nigeria (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975). 
160 The British had instituted this form of rule in many of these colonies early in other to rationalize 
colonial administration and to foster legitimacy.  They combined this with direct governance through 
Western-type Parliamentary institutions and which created further problems and discrepancies, i.e., 
mutually divergent forms of rule in one colony. 
161 David Apter, Ghana in Transition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972). 
162 Sara Berry in her study of cocoa producing regions of Western Nigeria succeeded in revealing how 
lineage structures were being strengthened.  See Sara Berry, Cocoa, Custom and Socio-Economic Change 
in Rural Western Nigeria.  Trade and commerce, missionary establishments and western education, among 
others, were all also contributory to the development of contradictions and to the promotion of tension in 
the emergent society under study. 
163 Earlier works of economic historians and anthropologists such as Claude Meillasoux and Henry 
Bernstein have shown how merchant capital penetrated pre-capitalist circuit of production and consumption 
without initially transforming the social relations of production.  They showed how the logic of capitalist 
production, that is, the appropriation and realization of surplus-value and the accumulation of capital, co-
existed with that of simple production, that which revolves around subsistence (Marx C. M. C. - 
Commodity-Money-Commodity) and that of merchant capital with that of productive capital.  See, for 
example, Claude Meillasoux, “The Social Organization of the Peasantry: The Economic Basis of Kinship,” 
Journal of Peasant Studies, no. 1 (1973-74), and Henry Bernstein, “Notes on Capital and Peasantry,” 
Review of African Political Economy, no. 10 (1977). See also Sara Berry’s work on Gold Coast cocoa 
farming, Sara Berry, Cocoa, Custom and Socio-Economic Change in Rural Western Nigeria. 
164 See Henry Bernstein, “Notes on Capital and Peasantry.”  Commodity relations were incorporated into 
the reproduction cycle of the peasant household.  By maintaining pre-capitalist organizations in this way 
for as long as possible capital was also able to cheaply reproduce the labor force.  Capital attempted to 
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regulate the conditions of pre-capitalist (peasant) production as well as exchange without undertaking its 
direct organization.  Except in few cases, the peasant household continued to produce use-value 
(agricultural and non-agricultural) for its direct consumption alongside with its production of commodities.  
165 The introduction of estate agriculture or mining industries were also slowly impacting social relations of 
production in the countryside but the penetration of capital there was quite sporadic and furthered the 
uneven and contradictory developments in these places.  
166 David Apter, Ghana in Transition. 
167 Thomas Hodgkin, Nationalism in Colonial Africa. 
168 Accompanying these new developments was also the beginning of a stratification system based on 
economic/”class” even while previously traditionally defined roles and criteria such as age still retained 
certain significance.  
169 The problem of definition is tied to the problem of the paradigm that is applied to the understanding of 
these social and economic types in Africa and in other such societies.  This has been a problem that 
scholars, theorists and philosophers of these other societies where capitalism was a later development have 
had to contend with over time.  Even Karl Marx could not escape the challenge of how to fit other modes of 
production and social systems into his grand schema, hence his concept of the Asiatic mode of production.  
The implication of these differences for successful world revolution was brought up by contending fellow 
leftwing theorists and activists like Rosa Luxemburgh, and the Russian and European Left.  Marx conceded 
the differences and a possible alternative route to capitalism and socialism with his notion of Asiatic mode 
of production.   
170 Sara Berry reveals in her study of African wealthy cocoa farmers and traders how much of their earnings 
are invested in providing western education for their children.  See  Sara Berry. Fathers Work for their 
Children. 
171 Scholars of the African rural hinterland, for example, have debated the use of the term peasantry to 
African farmers where in many cases land was not totally alienated, where farmers grew for the market as 
well as for subsistence, and where the social organization of production was still rooted significantly in the 
pre-capitalist structure of production (although this pattern was more rapidly changing in certain areas as in 
some areas of cocoa farming or estate agriculture). Hence, Lloyd Fallers applied the term “protopeasant,” 
Eric Wolf “rural cultivator,” Polly Hill “rural capitalist,” and J. Fitchin “commercial farmers',” for 
example.171  See Lloyd Fallers, "Are African Cultivators to be called 'Peasants?" Current Anthropology, II 
(1961), and “Equality, Modernity and Democracy in the New States,” in Old Societies and New States, ed. 
Clifford Geertz  (New York: The Free Press, 1963), Eric Wolf, Peasants, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 
1966), Polly Hill, Studies in Rural Capitalism in West Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1970), and J. Fitchin, “Peasantry as a Social Type,” in  Symposium: Patterns of Land Utilization and Other 
Papers, ed. Viola E. Garfield (Seattle: American Ethnological Society, 1961). Such debates have also been 
carried on for the African worker where workers' labor power had not been totally alienated and where 
workers were also farmers/peasants, for example.  V.L. Allen, for example, had observed much earlier in 
relation to the migrant labor phenomenon that the consequence of labor migration had been that the 
majority of wage laborers have also been peasant producers, see V.L. Allen, “The Meaning of the Working 
Class in Africa,” Journal of Modern African Studies 10, no. 2 (July, 1972): 169-189.  
172 The ideology of the age grading societies in modified forms provided an important instrument of 
mobilization among the young men.  For example, the traditional Asafo organization of young men in the 
Gold Coast continued to maintain its viability in this transformed context, asserting the claims and interests 
of their young and aspiring members against the encroachment of the colonial chiefs and new power 
holders on their own social and economic power base.  For an examination of the Asafo movement during 
this period, see, Simenson, Jarle. “Rural Mass Action in the Context of Anti-colonial Protest: The Asafo 
Movement of Akim Abuakwa, Ghana,” Conference Paper, African Studies Association of the United States 
and Canada, November, 1972. 
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173 Cooperatives such as salary earners cooperative, thrift and loan societies, cocoa sales societies and 
unions, etc., were being formed in many places, patterned initially in some ways along indigenous forms of 
cooperatives. In Nigeria, about 115 of such were recorded by 1940 
174 Thomas Hodgkin, Nationalism in Colonial Africa. 
175 For example, Hodgkin, Apter and others, have successfully detailed out these new organizational forms 
representing new interest groups and in fact went as far as mentioning how some were adapted from older 
forms but they failed to point to the conflicts in the values that sustained these and the implication of this 
conflict for colonials’ political practice.  See, Thomas Hodgkin, Nationalism in Colonial Africa, and 
Richard Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties: Power in an Emergent African Nation. 
176 Rhoda Howard noted in her study of the Gold Coast Cocoa crises of the 1930s that debt relationship 
provided the dynamic in stratifying the peasantry because private property in land was incomplete.  Rhoda 
Howard, “Formation and Stratification of the Peasantry in Colonial Ghana,” Journal of Peasant Studies 8, 
no. 1 (October 1980): 61-81. 
177 These movements are examined a little further below. 
178 The “nation” would be contested and conceived in similar terms in the post-World War II period.   
179 This is a vulgarized form of the English language. 
180 The multiplicity of wage earners’ location and their ambiguous characteristics could be and were indeed 
actualized in different directions.   
181 Many were, however, dependent on the wages of workers and were therefore also impacted by issues 
pertaining to workers’ wages, as well as to increased cost of living. 
182 See, for example, the account of this strike by Ibrahim Abdullah, “Rethinking the Freetown Crowd: The 
Moral Economy of the 1919 Strikes and Riot in Sierra Leone,” in CIAS/RCEA 28, no. 2 (1994). 
183 This presents a complex picture and points to the fact that any analysis of workers activism, particularly 
in context of the process that ended in decolonization, has to look as much beyond the hidden abode of 
production as within it. 
184 Ibrahim Abdullah, “Rethinking the Freetown Crowd: The Moral Economy of the 1919 Strikes and Riot 
in Sierra Leone,” and, “The Colonial State, Mining Capital and Wage Labor in Sierra Leone, 1884-1945: A 
Study in Class Formation and Action,” Doctoral dissertation, University of Toronto, 1990.  
185 They interacted freely in shared social setting and discussed prevailing economic and social conditions. 
Ibrahim Abdullah, “Rethinking the Freetown Crowd,” 211.  
186 This is because the activities of wage earners during this period indeed appear to reveal overt concerns 
with immediate occupational and economic issues.  These ranged from reaction to declining real incomes 
to protests against poor housing and labor conditions, particularly among mine workers, and to the general 
nature of their incorporation into the 'capitalist' mode of production.     
187 This was well ahead of official initiative in this endeavor.  It had first involved the adaptation, among 
manual workers, of organizations such as the workers' guilds or craft organizations which in the precolonial 
times had served to advance artisan workers' interest.  The colonial worker sought to convert these to serve 
new interests as the nature of work was becoming transformed in the emergent colonial capitalist order.  
188 Beyioku Papers, University of Ibadan Library, Nigeria.  
189 Workers were divided vertically in terms of their occupation, for example, into clerical and manual 
workers which were further subdivided into clerical assistant and executive officer and into skilled and 
semi-skilled and unskilled categories, respectively.  Horizontally, workers were divided in relation to age, 
sex and ethnic origins, for example.  In some cases, the horizontal and vertical lines of division coincided.  
In the Gold Coast, in the first two decades of the 20th century, especially when labor supply was relatively 
scarce, the unskilled and lowest paid workers in the mines and on the railway/harbor establishments also 
happened to be migrant workers from the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast, from neighboring French 
West Africa and from Northern Nigeria.  This potential division would become politically significant in the 
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postwar period.  It would influence the decision to participate or not participate in strike actions and social 
protest activities.  In many other cases, however, horizontal and vertical lines criss-crossed.  
190 Even among the radical fringe, certain inherent contradictions and other difficulties remained 
insurmountable even when these sought to forge workers into a cohesive force as revealed in the case of the 
labor left in Nigeria and the Gold Coast. 
191 Michael Imoudu led the 1945 strike in Nigeria for increased wages, and was popularly known as Labor 
Leader Number One.  He was deported on account of his participation in the strike as a “potential threat to 
public safety.”  See Wale Oyemakinde, “Michael Imoudu and the Emergence of Militant Trade Unionism 
in Nigeria, 1940-42,” Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria 7, no. 1 (December, 1974): 541-561.  
Other valuable references on Imoudu can be found in Robin Cohen, “Nigeria’s Labour Leader No.1. Notes 
for a Biographical Study of M. A. O. Imoudu,” Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria 5, no. 2 (June, 
1970): 303-308, Wogu Ananaba, The Trade Union Movement in Nigeria (Apapa, Lagos: Times Press 
Limited, 1969), and Richard Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1963).  In my interview with Michael Imoudu, conducted in Lagos, August 1990, he lamented what 
he perceived to be the demise of the labor movement in Nigeria.   
192 Author’s interview with Michael Imoudu, Lagos, Nigeria, 1991. 
193 Chapters three, seven and eight explore colonial officials’ fear of these categories of workers with a 
labor-socialist orientation. 
194 The Gold Coast Railway African Employees Union became one of the first unions to be accorded legal 
recognition under the 1941 Trade Union Ordinance and had since been the leader in militant trade 
unionism.  Their militancy and heightened consciousness partly explains their strategic roles in post-World 
War II Gold Coast politics, such as the January 1949 Positive Action.  For a well-written account of the 
Sekondi Takoradi workers, see, Richard Jeffries, Class, Power, and Ideology in Ghana: the Railwaymen of 
Sekondi Takoradi (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1978). 
195 See discussion of this aspect in chapter three and in relevant subsequent chapters. 
196 As Fred Cooper noted, it was in fact colonial officials who wanted to forge them into a working class in 
the 40s. Fred Cooper, Struggles for the City: Migrant Labor, Capital, and the State in Urban Africa 
(Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1983). 
197 The multiplicity of location among workers also produced its own tension, pulling in opposite directions 
and leaving uncertain what each worker or clusters of worker would do in any given situation; it could 
pattern their political behavior in quite complex and contradictory ways.  How this tension is resolved for 
any individual worker or group of workers was determined as much by factors external to the workplace as 
by those issuing from it.  For example, the geographical division among workers, in terms of their place of 
origin could become actualized to serve certain interests that may not necessarily be conducive to particular 
workers’ interests or to the creation of a multi-ethnic community.  
198 In 1961 the NCNC changed its name to National Convention of Nigerian Citizens. 
199 The Yorubas in the Western Region, Hausa-Fulanis in the Northern Region, and the Ibos in the Eastern 
Region comprised the three major nationality groupings in Nigeria with other minorities groups in each 
region.  The three regions have since been divided into over thirty states to better reflect the ‘nationality’ 
groupings in the country. 
200 Aspects of this are revealed in chapter six. 
201 Chapter five discusses this shift in Azikiwe’s and NCNC’s position on regionalism. 
202 A few and more ideologically-oriented Yoruba workers, like Kola Balogun, however, remained in the 
NCNC, perceiving it as a more popularly-based party. 
203 This practice is discussed more fully in chapter six. 
204 Where one form seemed dominant in a particular struggle, other forms were latent and may become 
centered in the same struggle at different moments, as participants perceived their interest 
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205 The struggles were fought at different levels.  At one level, it appeared that there were particular interest 
groups coalescing around clearly defined issues such as workers fighting for increased wages and better 
conditions of work, displaced chiefs fighting for restoration of old privileges and positions, and women 
fighting for free and fair access to the market and a say in the running of society.  At other significant 
levels, however, the conflicts of interests and struggles were more diffused 
206 This is revealed, for example, in the Gold Coast Cocoa Movements of the 1930s, and is explored below.   
207 While colonialism reinforced patriarchy in many ways, it had also, initially, provided means by which 
women were able to seek justice and obtain divorce through the courts.  The women took advantage of this 
provision to obtain divorce whenever they felt it was necessary, a provision deeply resented by men. 
208 “Petition to the Chief Commissioner, Southern Provinces, Enugu, through The Omo N'Oba N'Edo, 
Akenzua 11, Uku-Akpolokpolor, Benin City,” from representatives of the Benin Community, Benin City, 
January 22nd, 1936, Herbert Macauley Papers, University of Ibadan Library, Nigeria. 
209 Gold Coast Legislative Council Debates, 1930. 
210 The same internal divisions and conflicting interests are revealed in other social movements examined in 
this study, such as the Abeokuta Women’s Union movement examined in later chapters. 
211 “Petition of Councilors, Chiefs, and People of Benin City in the Protectorate of Nigeria, to His 
Excellency The Governor of Nigeria and President of the Legislative Council of Nigeria, & The Honorable 
Members of the Legislative Council of Nigeria,” 21st February, 1938, Benin City, 4, Herbert Macauley 
Papers. 
212 Ibid.  See more in-depth analysis of this movement below. 
213 See, for example, Sam Rhodie, “The Gold Coast Cocoa Hold-Up of 1930-31,” Transactions of the 
Historical Society of Ghana, 9 (1968): 109. 
214  See, Yao Twumasi, “Aspects of Politics in Ghana 1929-1939: a study in the relationships between 
discontent and the development of nationalism,” Doctoral dissertation, Oxford, 1971, and Sam Rhodie, 
“The Gold Coast Cocoa Hold-Up of 1930-31.”  
215 See “The Benin Water Rate Controversy,” in Herbert Macauley Papers. 
216 The NYM originated in Lagos among western educated Southerners and sought to democratize the base 
of government   The NYM’s politics was such that the power of indigenous power holders, including the 
colonial chiefs, would be highly reduced. 
217 The power base of the Oba was retained in the administrative changes while theirs was reduced. 
218 The Benin Movement is further explored below. 
219 For more detailed discussion of this uprising see, J. A. Atanda, “The Iseyin-Okeiho Rising of 1916: An 
example of Socio-Political Conflict in Colonial Nigeria,” Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria 4, no. 
4 (June 1969): 497-514. 
220 For a detailed and valuable account of this movement see, R.L. Stone, “Colonial Administration and 
Rural Politics in South-Central Ghana, 1919-1951,” Doctoral dissertation, University of Cambridge, 1974. 
221 Ibid.    
222 Ibid. 
223 Ibid.  He also expressed the fear that “unless the activities of the society are checked immediately the 
country will be thrown into helpless confusion before long.” 
224 Certain interests became displaced and others reinstated in ways some of the participants themselves did 
not expect as the struggle continued and changed over time. 
225 See, “Petition to His Excellency, The Governor of Nigeria through the Chief Secretary to the 
Government, Lagos, Nigeria, from Councilors, Chiefs and People of Benin City, Benin City,” 21st 
February, 1938. See also, “Editorial,” West African Pilot, January 11th, 1938, 4.  The levy was to subsidize 
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the cost of operating the new Benin water scheme which was completed by the government on July 16, 
1935.  This amount, however, happened to be twice the average amount levied elsewhere in Southern 
Nigeria but the authorities felt justified in doing this for purposes of reducing the large deficit in the Benin 
municipality budget.  Here, as in many other instances, the government failed to make its case known and 
to gain the support of the people who now felt that the proposed levy was onerous and unfair, thus 
incurring the disenchantment of the tax paying population.   
226 “Petition to the Chief Commissioner, Southern Provinces, Enugu, through The Omo N'Oba N'Edo, 
Akenzua 11, Uku-Akpolokpolor, Benin City, from representatives of the Benin Community, Benin City.” 
January 22nd, 1936, 3. 
227 Traditionally, as leader of the Eghaevbo n'ore chiefs, the Iyase always identified himself with the 
opposition where there were genuine grievances, a role he seemed repeated to play in this renewed context. 
228 Of the reported 250 signatories to the mammoth petition of 22 September 1937 representing all sections 
of the Benin City, there were 8 councilors, 13 titled chiefs, 1 warrant chief, 32 traders, 131 farmers, 
agriculturists or planters, 7 rubber contractors, 29 artisans, 1 washerman, 1 road overseer, 1 sawyer, 5 
tailors, 1 book-seller, 2 store keepers, 2 transport owners, 2 pensioners, 1 clerk, 1 domestic servant and 7 
unclassified signatories, Benin Prof. 929, Vol.1, p.40, cited in Philip A. Igbafe, “The Benin Water Rate 
Agitation 1937-1939: An Example of Social Conflict,”  Journal of Historical Society of Nigeria 4, no. 3 
(December, 1968): 360. 
229 “Petition to The Chief Commissioner, Southern Provinces,” 3. 
230 Ibid, 4. 
231 “Petition to His Excellency, The Governor of Nigeria, for and on behalf of the Benin Community by the 
Iyasere, Prime Minister, Chief Ojomo, Chief Oshodin and Chief Iyamu, the Obazuwa of Benin,” 21st 
February, 1938, Herbert Macauley Papers, 1. 
232 It is not clear, however, how the calculation was made to result in this amount which is much lower than 
6% reduction of the original amount.  It appears that there was a typographical error in the document and 
‘6%’ should have read ‘60%’ instead. 
233 “Petition to His Excellency, The Governor of Nigeria.” 
234 Ibid. 
235 This reorganization had involved the abolition of the District Head system in 1935, their erstwhile 
power base. 
236 Philip, A. Igbafe, “The Benin Water Rate Agitation 1937-1939: An Example of Social Conflict,” 60. 
237 The six members of the Intelligence Report Committee of the Benin Community comprised: 1. Y. O. 
Eke - President, literate, trader; 2. H. O. Uwaifo - Secretary, old student King's College, Lagos, ex-2nd 
class clerk; 3. E. E. Omere - Assistant Secretary, attended Benin City Government School, ex-2nd class 
clerk, trader and timber exporter; 4. H. O. Amadasu - literate, trader; 5. Jacob U. Egharevba - historian, 
author of A Short History of Benin; 6. Y. O. Okunzuwa -ex-student, Benin City government school, trader, 
cited in Igbafe, “The Benin Water Rate Agitation 1937-1939,” 364.  
238 This was in spite of the claims of H.O. Uwaifo, one of the members of the Committee, to the effect that 
the Intelligence Report received the support of “titled chiefs who are not councilors as well as the general 
people.”  Their recommendation was not well received either by the general body of the Benin Community 
which had selected them for this exercise.  See the report in Igbafe, “The Benin Water Rate Agitation 1937-
1939,” 365.   
239 “Petition by the Ekhaekpen Chiefs of Benin to the Oba,” 24.6.38, BP. 835, 50. 
240 Ibid. 
241 Cited in Igbafe, “The Benin Water Rate Agitation 1937-1939.”   
242 Ibid.  
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243 Chief Secretary's Office (CSO), Lagos, 26: 33603, p. 123., cited in Igbafe, “The Benin Water Rate 
Agitation 1937-1939,” 371 
244 Ibid.  
245 Ibid. 
246 Ibid. 
247 The changing nature of local politics is examined further in chapter six. 
248 See discussion of this in chapters five and eight. 
249 The struggles were tied to the way in which wealth was accumulated in the private sphere. 
250 Sam Rhodie comes closest in his analysis of the movement as ‘evidence of social conflict.’ Yao 
Twumasi’s account is also detailed and insightful and his and Rhoda Howard’s studies draw attention to the 
incipient class formation in this industry.  For some of these studies, see, Sam Rhodie, “The Gold Coast 
Cocoa Hold-up of 19930-31,” Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana, I0 (1968): 105-118, Yao 
Twumasi, “Aspects of Politics in Ghana 1929-1939: A study in the relationships between discontent and 
the development of nationalism,” Doctoral dissertation, Oxford University, 1971, and Rhoda Howard, 
“Formation and Stratification of the Peasantry in Colonial Ghana,” Journal of Peasant Studies 8, no. 1 
(October 1980): 61-81, and  Josephine Milburn, “The 1938 Gold Coast Cocoa Crisis: British Business and 
the Colonial Office,” African Historical Studies 3, no. 1 (1970): 57-74. 
251 Rich farmer, money lenders, rural cocoa brokers, rich peasants, and chiefs oftentimes all combined into 
one.  Howard rightly noted that ‘sometimes, broker, money lender and chiefs, were all the same person.’ 
Rhoda Howard, “Formation and Stratification of the Peasantry in Colonial Ghana,’ 75. 
252 These had before then engaged in speculation and had hoarded large stocks of cocoa produce as a result 
of previous rising prices in cocoa in the 1920s, and again between 1932, after the first Gold Coast Cocoa 
hold-up, and 1936.  Between 1936 and 1937, the price of Gold Coast cocoa was reported to have reached 
an all-time high. But the world demand for cocoa declined and sales and prices dropped very sharply 
during 1937.  The foreign companies involved in this trade, in their efforts to withstand this decline and to 
offset their losses, had joined together to form Cocoa Pools which was a form of monopsony.  Their action 
further compromised the ability of Africans engaged in this industry to survive the decline successfully.  In 
reaction to this, they organized against the big firms and government to stop the sale of cocoa from its 
source. 
253 Legislative Council Debates, Gold Coast, 19 June 1930, p.318.  Nana Ofori Atta, the colonial chief, 
would ask during question time in the Gold Coast Legislative Council whether the Director of Agriculture 
took any interest in regard to the manipulation of the cocoa markets in Europe and America and whether he 
had any scheme which might help the farmers in justifiable circumstances to escape undue exploitation.  
Legislative Council Debate, Gold Coast, 1932-33. 
254 The cocoa farming industry was the mainstay of the Gold Coast economy, apart from mining interests.  
For a good discussion of the development of this industry in the Gold Coast, see Sara Berry, Cocoa, 
Custom and Socio-Economic Change in Rural Western Nigeria, and Polly Hill, The Gold Coast Cocoa 
Farmer: A Preliminary Survey (London: Oxford University Press, 1956). 
255 Yao Twumasi, “Aspects of Politics in Ghana 1929-1939: A study in the relationships between 
discontent and the development of nationalism.” 
256 For a detailed and valuable account of the activities of the chiefs in these ways, see Twumasi, “Aspects 
of Politics in Ghana 1929-1939.” 
257 Sam Rhodie, “The Gold Coast Cocoa Hold-up of 19930-31.” 
258 Ibid., 105. 
259 The Vox Populi, 31 January, 1931, cited in Yao Twumasi, “Aspects of Politics in Ghana 1929-1939.” 
260  Ibid. 
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261 The potentials to find common identity in apparent common cause were actualized on many occasions 
especially from the 1930s onward.  On another occasion in the interwar period, in the early 30s in the Gold 
Coast, a united opposition was attempted to be built among some chiefs, educated elites, elders and the 
masses over government's proposal to introduce an income tax bill in 1931.  This was at a time of great 
economic distress and the proposals led to major disturbances in different places.   The opposition to it 
assumed a wide variety of forms, from urban tax riots in Cape Coast, Sekondi and Shama to 'constitutional' 
protests in Accra, Axim, Oda and Kumasi to messianic prophetic uprising of the Bensus and to the 
traditional Asafo disturbances in Native Authorities in Ashanti and the Cape Coast.  See, Yao Twumasi, 
“Aspects of Politics in Ghana 1929-1939.” 
262 This is explored a little further in chapter 6. 
263 Miroslav Hroch revealed this, for example, in his study of nationalist revival among the East European 
countries.  See, Miroslav Hroch, Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe. 
264 Ibid. 
265 See, for example, my earlier works and the application of the Hrochian concept of the socially-relevant 
conflicts of interest and the nationally-relevant conflicts of interests in Nike Adebiyi, “Radical Nationalism 
in British West Africa, 1945-56,” unpublished draft of doctoral dissertation, 1994@, and, “Deconstructing 
Nationalism: Towards a Social History of the Pre-independence Movements in British West Africa, 1900-
1945,’ Paper presented at the Council for the Development of Economic and Social Research in Africa 
(CODESRIA), Methodological Seminar on Social Movements, Social Transformation, and the Struggle for 
Democracy in Africa, Algiers, Algeria, July 18-20, 1990.  
266 This is explored more fully in chapter seven. 
267 I. T. A. Wallace-Johnson is examined in chapter three and later chapters. 
268 See chapter three for discussions of West African students in Britain and their links with leftwing 
organizations and individuals. 
269 See Hakim Adi, West Africans in Britain, 1900-1960: Nationalism, Pan Africanism and Communism 
(London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1998), for a good study of African and Black diasporas’ activism in Britain 
and for one of the few studies of communism in relation to Blacks in this period.  His account is useful but 
is limited to its examination in relation to Africans and Blacks in Britain.  
270 Ayodele J. Langley, Pan Africanism and Nationalism in West Africa: A Study in Ideology and Social 
Classes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), and Immanuel Geis, The Pan African Movement (London: 




271 Hakim Adi also noted that “anti-communism, whatever the reality, was a useful and powerful weapon to 
be used to label the real threat of anti-colonialism.”  See Hakim Adi, West Africans in Britain, 1900-1960: 
Nationalism, Pan Africanism and Communism, 134. 
272 Ibid. 
273 The Comintern (Communist International) was the Third International and was established in 1919 on 
the success of the 1917 Russian revolution.  Its official position, first spelled out by V. I. Lenin, was that 
the Third International was the direct and legitimate heir of the First International and that it had taken over 
all that was progressive in the Second International and given continuity to Marxist revolutionary 
movement.  For detailed study of the Revolutionary Internationals, see, for example, Milorad M. 
Drachkovitch, ed., The Revolutionary Internationals, 1864-1943 (California: Stanford University Press, 
1966). 
274 Chapter seven examines the socially relevant intervention of these colonials. 
275 Minute by A. Fiddian, June 2, 1932, CO 96/704/1932, PRO.  
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276 “Extremists” and “agitators” were sometimes synonymous with ‘communist’ in officialdom’s parlance. 
277 “From Sir Gerald Creasy to The Right Hon. Arthur Creech-Jones, M.P., Secretary of State for the 
Colonies,” Secret Telegram CO 537/3558/4220, 22nd March, 1948, PRO. 
278 Cummings-John and Ransome-Kuti’s discourses and movements are discussed in chapters four and 
seven. Their known early connections to the international leftwing movements, however limited or tenuous, 
might have served to facilitate the perception in official mind that these women were ‘communists.’  This 
perception was possibly fed further by the actual connection, albeit limited and weak, of their movements 
in the colonies at certain periods to certain communist-influenced international revolutionary movements.  
See further discussion of this in chapter seven. 
279 Other women activists like Mrs. Ekpo of Eastern Nigeria were ridiculed as ‘prostitutes,’ etc. 
280 Quoted in Hakim Adi, West Africans in Britain, 1900-1960: Nationalism, Pan Africanism and 
Communism. 
281 NEPU was formed in August 1950 as a breakaway radical organization from the more conservative 
Northern Peoples Association (NPA) composed of traditional elites.    
282 NEPU Papers, Nigeria Archives, Kaduna, 10. 
283 Ibid. 
284 See, for example, “Colonial Students: Political Significance,” CO 537/2574, PRO. 
285 Outside of WASU, there is no known significant current of radical thoughts or activism solely among 
overseas West African students. 
286 African trade unions were regarded as one of the most important channels of communist infiltration into 
the colonies.  For officialdom’s emphasis on workers as significant channels of communist infiltration into 
Africa, see for example, Robert D. Baum, “Trade Unionism and Communism in Africa,” in MSS 
Brit.Emp.s.365, Fabian Colonial Bureau, Africa, General, 1940-1962, Box 77, file 2, Rhodes House 
Library, Oxford, England.  Baum was Chief, Africana Branch, Division of Research for Near East, South 
Asia, and Africa, in the Department of State, Great Britain.  
287 Mentioned in “Minute of O. G. R. Williams to the Secretary of State on Parliamentary Questions and 
Significance,” 18.8.38, CO 267/666/32216/1938, PRO. 
288 CO 537/4312/14322/5, PRO. 
289 CO 537/7618/11246, PRO. 
290 CO 537/2637/14322, PRO. 
291 Some of the documents are cited as relevant in the following sections and in subsequent chapters.  
292 CO 537/2638/14322/2, PRO. 
293 CO 537/5263/14298, PRO. 
294 This is explored further in subsequent chapters. 
295 This was initially along old traditional forms. 
296 Report on the Census, 1921, 60, cited in Jon Kraus, “The Political Economy of Industrial Relations in 
Ghana,” in Industrial Relations in Africa, eds., Ukandi, G. Damachi, Seibel, H. Dieter and Lester 
Trachtman, 112 (London and Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1979). 
297 Ukandi, G. Damachi, Seibel, H. Dieter and Lester Trachtman eds. Industrial Relations in Africa, 3-4. 
298 Ibid. 
299 See V. I. Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism (New York: International Publishers, 
1939). 
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300See, Otto Huiswood Billings, “Report on the Negro Question,” International Press Correspondence 3, 2 
(1923): 14-16. 
301 For Lenin's work on the national issue see, V. I. Lenin, The Right of Nations to Self-Determination 
(Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1979).  Marx himself did not provide a theory of nationalism.  Marx and 
Engels were not committed to any abstract principle of freedom.  Their position on the national question 
was functional, dependent on the extent to which a particular nationalist movement furthered or detracted 
from the cause of world revolution.  Their support of the Polish national movement against 'feudal' Russia 
and their opposition to the national movements in Bohemia, Croatia and Serbia against the developed 
German nation was determined by this position.  
302 Within its theoretical schema, colonialism is presented as incorporating both the capitalist system of 
economic exploitation and the imperialist system of political and economic domination and exploitation.  
V. I. Lenin's Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism attempts the most systematic theoretical 
exposition of this theme.  Capitalism and imperialism, according to Lenin, manifest the ultimate and dying 
stages of a decadent system based on class and national exploitation, respectively.   
303 Although it was communist influenced in origin, the LAI embraced other anti-imperialist organizations 
which were not necessarily communist-oriented.  This at any rate reflected the Comintern's early policy of 
working with all anti-colonial forces everywhere.  The LAI was representative altogether of three major 
anti-colonial forces in the world, viz. communist, leftwing social democrats, and progressive liberal 
intellectuals and representatives of national movements in various other colonial territories.  These were 
united by a common aim of anti-imperialism and support for national movements in the colonies.  
304 Among the 173 delegates at the formation of the LAI in 1927 were Leopold Senghor and Jomo Kenyatta 
from colonial Africa: Senegal and Kenya.  Jomo Kenyatta who became recognized as a prominent leader of 
the Mau Mau movement and would later become the first president of independent Kenya was very closely 
associated with Communist Russia and the Comintern earlier on.  He was known to have taken courses of 
study in Russia and was reported at every significant meeting of the Comintern-front organizations for the 
colonial world, especially.  
305 WASU and its links with the LAI are discussed a liitle further below. 
306 The NWA was established in 1931 also in London.   
307 Colonial seamen were perceived by the Comintern and its affiliated organizations to be strategically 
placed as conduit pipes of communist infiltration into the colonies. 
308 The contemporary and important Pan African movement among Africans in the diaspora and African 
colonials which was founded in 1900 and reconstituted in the interwar period in 1919 around the same time 
as the Third International did not initially provide similar revolutionary stimulus for the timely political 
liberation of continental Africa under imperial rule until the infusion of leftwing communist revolutionary 
ideologies into it later.  Communism's focus on class was to later radicalize the race premise of Pan 
Africanism.  Garvey's economic nationalism which was influential earlier on was based on race and was, 
for example, bold in its conception but its attempt to replace White capitalism with Black capitalism still 
left Pan Africanism on a socially conservative premise.  For a valuable study of this movement, see 
Immanuel Geis. The Pan African Movement (London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1974).  See also George 
Padmore, ed.,  History of the Pan-African Congress (London: Hammersmith, 1947), for alternative account 
from a radical perspective.  
309 George Padmore later renounced his membership of the Communist Party and became an avowed Pan 
Africanist.  For some insight into the trajectory of his thoughts, see George Padmore, Pan-Africanism or 
Communism (New York, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1971).  See also DuBois’ comments on 
Padmore in W. E. B. DuBois, Africa in Battle Against Colonialism, Racialism, Imperialism (Chicago, 
Illinois: Afro-American Heritage Association, 1960).   
310 This came twenty years after the last (fourth) session of a Pan African Congress and it seemed to have 
resuscitated the movement at this time.  This move was largely the work of George Padmore who was also 
the moving spirit behind the 1945 Congress.  Its proceedings and resolutions which bore a strong Marxist-
Leninist tone were largely influenced by the Left in this organization and which Padmore symbolized.  See 
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Padmore's account of the proceedings in George Padmore, ed. History of the Pan-African Congress: 
Colonial and Coloured Unity, a Programme of Action (London: Hammersmith Bookshop, 1963).  For work 
on the same conference from a different perspective, see Imanuel Geis, The Pan African Movement.  Part of 
the Congress resolutions and rhetorics called on the workers of the colonies to be “in the forefront of the 
battle against imperialism” and for the intellectuals and professional classes to “awaken to their 
responsibilities,” suggesting a somewhat Marxist-Leninist position for waging a “class” war.  Aspects of 
the theoretical weaknesses of Marxism-Leninism in relation to these colonial social formations are 
discussed in chapter 7. 
311 These had gained direct and indirect exposure to communist revolutionary organizations and doctrines 
from the interwar period onward.   
312 Chapter seven explores the nature and impact of Marxism-Leninism on colonial social radicals and their 
discourse of the nation and notions of citizenship. 
313 See “F. G. Guggisberg to the Secretary of State,” Telegram, 5 December 1920, CO 96/617/1920, PRO, 
London.   
314 Ibid.  Colonial seamen were indeed becoming a conduit pipe for the infiltration of communist literature 
into the colonies.   
315 To note, these students were definitely not a monolithic group. 
316 This author’s father, Albert Adedeji Edun, son of the historic Secretary of Egba United Government in 
colonial Abeokuta, Adegboyega Edun, was also one of these overseas students in the period but he was not 
involved in African students’ political activism. 
317 Hakim Adi, West Africans in Britain, 1900-1960, 139, 11.  He also noted a high level of political activity 
among West African students in Edinburgh and London as early as the beginning of the 1900s, and 
commented that any critic of British colonialism and in defense of interests of Africans fell foul of the 
Colonial Office. . 
318 Quoted in Hakim Adi, West Africans in Britain, 151-152. 
319 CO 537/2573/11020/30 and CO 537/2573/11020/30/1. PRO. 
320 Ibid. 
321 See, for example, “Committee on Students in the United Kingdom, Proceedings, 1947-1948,” CO 
537/2573/11020/30/1, PRO. 
322 CO 537/2573/11020/30 & 30/1. 
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438 The interwar crises had been attenuated as a result of wartime exigencies, to continue in the post-World 
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439 Series of workers’ strikes, women protest movements, farmers’ protests, and other local disturbances, 
etc., had arisen, at the onset, as expressions of felt economic grievances, as some hitherto studies have 
indicated. 
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continuation.  See, “Petition of the Lagos Market Women Association to Sir Arthur Frederick Richards, 
Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria, through R. J. Hook, 
Commissioner of the Colony, Lagos, 15 January, 1945,” Herbert Macauley Papers, University of Ibadan 
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women at its onset.  But it would also embrace issues of grassroot concerns across the board as seen in its 
alliance with the SLPP.  See, LaRay Denzer, “Draft of Documents Related to the Sierra Leone Women's 
Movement.” Undated.   
443 The LMWA, for example, did not understand why government controls should continue beyond the 
cessation of the war as they had expected that the end of the war would bring economic relief from 
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Chief of the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria, through R. J. Hook, Commissioner of the Colony, Lagos, 
15 January, 1945,” Herbert Macauley Papers.  
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Egbaland, Oba Ademola, that were undermining their survival as traders.  The economic difficulties they 
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colonial chiefs, was continuing to use his public office to accumulate wealth in the private sectors.  The 
Alake was busily engaged in interpreting government regulations during and after the war years to his 
advantage in such ways that the economic restrictions there were felt to be unmitigating in its adverse 
effect, especially on women who made up the bulk of the traders.  They therefore sought redress, at the 
onset , of their economic grievances, particularly as it concerned the women traders.  They complained 
against the way they felt the Alake, combining the role of Sole Native Authority with that of Merchant-
King, was compounding the problem of trade and of their livelihood in this place.  The Women's Union 
Grievances presented to Mr. J. H. Blair, Resident Abeokuta Province, 31.5.48, 1, Ransome Kuti Paper.  
445 Ibid.  The Alake was accused, specifically, of monopolizing the trade in scarce resources in salt, 
clothings, indigo dye, rice and gari, the main articles of trade for the women and the main staples of the 
people's diet.  He was also accused of collecting illegal dues and tributes and of illegally seizing trading 
items, especially rice, from women traders and then reselling these at exorbitant price.  They wrote: 
Rice trade was carried on in his palace at 4/- (shillings) per Olodo 
measure when the rice price was fixed at 1/1d per Olodo measure, but 
no one must be seen to sell rice in town ... and most of his rice was 
seized from the women and nothing was paid to the poor people  
446 “Suggested Reforms for the E.N.A.,” Women’s Union, 6/8/48, Ransome Kuti Papers. 
447 See Funlayo Ransome Kuti, “Letter to the Editor,” West African Pilot, 25/10/48. 
448 John Akiley, “All Songs Sung During the Women’s Union Demonstration, 8/1247-15/9/48,” 1, 
Ransome Kuti Papers. 
449 The Ogbonis in precolonial society were the kingmakers with important constitutional powers. Their 
role began to be diminished at the onset of colonial administration in this and other places.  Token 
recognition of these bodies was made in the grant of some salaries to them but that had not carried 
commensurate political power that they had enjoyed before.  Even this token recognition and payment was 
being now denied to them under the present Alake Ademola in Egbaland.   
450 In fact, it was in context of the complex web of issues and interests that this movement soon embraced 
that the democratic ideals of the movement as conceived by its founders and the issues of equity for women 
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1945 General strike among Nigerian railway strikes and the 1949 Enugu riots among the colliery workers, 
the Zikists in Nigeria. Above all, many colonial social radicals are composed of laborites. 
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455 See Cheryl Johnson-Odim and Nina Emma Mba, For Women and the Nation: Funlayo Ransome-Kuti of 
Nigeria (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1977). 
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459 See, “Resolution of the 'The Ogbonis, Xstians and Mohammedans Mohammedans representatives at a 
meeting held at the Itoku Ogboni House on Wednesday the 7th day of July, 1948.” Ransome Kuti Papers. 
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462 Ibid., nos. 8 & 9. 
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before him.  Sara Berry observes in her study of a section of another Yoruba community in the cocoa 
growing region of Western Nigeria that the colonial chiefs exercised more power through the Native Courts 
than through their functions as colonial chiefs.  See Sara Berry, Fathers Work for Their Sons: 
Accumulation, Mobility, and Class Formation in an Extended Yoruba Community, 28.  See also Omoniyi 
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demands. 
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Nigeria (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 79. 
820  “Resolution of the Ibadan Progressive Union (Youth Group) on the Native Settlers’ Resolution on the 
Ibadan and District Native Authority (Alienation of Land to Strangers) Rules 1949,” printed, n.d., cited in 
Kenneth W. J. Post and George D. Jenkins, The Price of Liberty: Personality and Politics in Colonial 
Nigeria, 79. 
821 J. D. Y. Peel, Ijeshas and Nigerians: The Incorporation of a Yoruba Kingdom, 1890s-1970s, 186. 
822 It also presents a good example of the complex and contradictory nature of social struggles and 
discourses in these colonial formations and of how crisis in one sphere, in this case, chieftaincy crisis, 
precipitated crisis and change in other spheres.  It further reveals how the conflicts between competing 
power holders and aspirant power holders became reconstituted in nationality terms, i.e., in terms of the 
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Ibadan, a sub-nationality group of the Yoruba cultural group, versus non Ibadans, especially other Yoruba 
sub-nationality groups such as the Ijebus and the Egbas.   
823 Different issues and interests came to surround this conflict.  What started in Ibadan in 1949 as 
essentially a conflict between the old and the new nobility in the agitation against Agbaje, the Otun 
Balogun, one of important Ibadan chiefs, turned out to be more complex as it was soon joined by other 
causes and became expression of other antagonisms and issues, many of which were inherently mutually-
conflicting.  Like many social movements in different localities in this period, it also became a symbol of 
many forms of discontent in Ibadan and was quickly associated with the whole range of problems 
confronting Ibadan and the antagonisms surrounding the issue of local reforms, as well as with the politics 
of those seeking political power at the regional and national level. 
824 For an in-depth study and valuable account of this crisis, see Kenneth W. J. Post and George D. Jenkins, 
The Price of Liberty: Personality and Politics in Colonial Nigeria.  The basic information on this crisis 
derives from Post & Jenkins’ account. 
825 The Olubadan was the highest Native Authority post in Ibadan, the equivalent of the colonial chief.  
826 The Western-educated Africans had also started to take on chieftaincy titles at this time as means of 
increasing their power. 
827 Kenneth W. J.  Post and George D. Jenkins, The Price of Liberty: Personality and Politics in Colonial 
Nigeria. 
828 Ibid., 56.  
829 The anti-Agbaje forces included the reigning Olubadan, lesser chiefs, the Maiyegun League which was 
formed initially to protest government cutting of diseased cocoa trees, Muslim leaders, young men who had 
felt excluded by the wealthier native Ibadans from new opportunities, etc.  Other more personal and 
individual interests were also involved, as epitomized in the case of Adegoke Adelabu who got involved in 
the struggle primarily for the purpose of capturing the coveted proposed position of Administrative 
Secretary of the Ibadan local government which the colonial administration was putting forward at that 
time.  This was part of the administrative changes on-going in local government.  Adelabu joined the plot 
against Agbaje in December, 1949 by offering his skill in western literacy to help draft the petition that was 
filed to remove Agbaje from the ranks of the chiefs, hoping to be rewarded for his services with the post of 
Administrative Secretary, but failed in the end to get it.  Bello Abasi, the son of the previous Olubadan 
Aleshinloye, got involved with the new political society, the Ibadan Welfare Committee, primarily his 
organizational weapon against Agbaje, out of a personal grudge against Agbaje. 
830 Post and Jenkins, The Price of Liberty, 58. 
831 Ibid. 
832 Ibid. 
833 Governor of Nigeria to the Secretary of State, “Situation in Western Provinces,” 25 January 1950, CO 
537/5804, PRO. 
834 Ibid.  
835 Ibid. 
836 Ibid. 
837 Both the Alaperu and the Ologere partially admitted to the truth of the allegations brought against them.  
At the meeting of 18 December, 1949, the Obas were reprimanded by the delegates and agreed to the terms 
of settlement.  For the Alaperu, it included: decision by the Alaperu not to preside over the Iperu Native 
Court except in cases of appeals, the removal from his household the two wives the Alaperu had allegedly 
seduced from members of the Majeobaje, the release of the communal lands given to the Alaperu’s family, 
and Iperu court members to report to the Alaperu both on going to court and on their return. The terms for 
the Ologere were similar to those of the Alaperu with the addition that the Ologere should not settle 
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disputes by himself but in conjunction with his chiefs.  From the Governor Nigeria to the Secretary of 
State, “Situation in Western Provinces,” 25 January 1950. 
838 The Egbe was transformed into the Action Group (AG) political party in 1950. 
839 See chapter four for a discussion of the AWU’s conflict with the Alake. 
840 This is examined a little further below. 
841 Chief Oladoke Akintola was and remained a controversial and fascinating figure in the history of 
Nigeria.  He had been described in various ways as “razor-witted,” “uncompromisingly wily,” “complex, 
multifaceted, almost unfathomable politician,” etc.  He was born in 1910 at Ogbomosho in Oshun Division.  
In 1943, he became the editor of the Daily Service, then the official organ of the NYM.  In 1946, he went to 
England to study public administration and law.  He was active in the formation of the Action Group (AG) 
and in the agitation of Oshun Division for separation from the Ibadan divisional government.  Throughout 
the decade prior to Nigeria’s independence, he represented the AG at the national level of Nigeria’s 
government as Central Minister of Labor (1952-1953), Leader of the Opposition in the Federal House of 
Representatives (1954-1957), and Federal Minister of Commerce and Aviation in the national government 
of 1957-1959.  In 1953, he was chosen as Deputy Leader of the Action Group.  Akintola became Premier 
of the Western Region in the First Republic.  In 1962, a rift occurred between him and Awolowo, the leader 
of the AG party, causing a split in the party and led Akintola to form a new party, the Nigerian national 
Democratic Party (NNDP), in alliance with the ruling NPC party.    He was murdered in the military coup 
of January 15, 1966 that toppled Nigeria’s first Republic. 
842 The AG Universal Primary Education (UPE) program is examined a little further below. 
843 For a classic historical account, see, Samuel Johnson, The History of the Yorubas: from the Earliest 
Times to the Beginning of the British Protectorate. (London: Routledge and K. Paul, repr. 1969). 
844 For excellent accounts of the fratricidal internecine warfare and political realignments among the 
Yorubas in the 19th century, see J. F. Ade Ajayi and R. S. Smith, Yoruba Warfare in the 19th Century 
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1964), and S. A. Akintoye, Revolution and Power Politics in 
Yorubaland 1840-1893 (London: Longman, 1971). 
845 An example was the conflict between Ilesha and Ife, centered on the former’s resentment at its 
administrative subordination to Ife in the colonial state’s administrative rearrangements. 
846 See Richard L. Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties: Power in an Emergent African Nation. 
847 Ibid. 
848 Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Fears of Minorities and the Means of Allaying 
them.  Cmnd. 505, London, 1958. 
849 See Ahmed, Beita Yusuf, A Freedom Fighter: Annotated Memoirs of Mallam Illah Ringim (Sokoto, 
Nigeria: Sidi Umaru Press, 1978).  Ringim is discussed at length in chapter seven.  
850 The Uthman Dan Fodio jihad of the 19th century effectively put power in the hands of the invading 
aristocratic Fulanis of which Dan Fodio was one and who took over much of the region and ruled them as 
emirates.  It was on this structure that the Lugardian Indirect Rule system was superimposed with hardly 
much change of the power structure except for the native rulers to recognize the overall sovereignty of the 
British.  The inegalitarianism inscribed within the Fulani emirate system was left intact and survived in 
important forms to be reproduced in the NPC party which was composed mostly of members of the ruling 
Northern Native Authorities. 
851 See discussions of NEPU in chapters seven and eight. 
852 Roger Brubaker, Ethnicity without Groups.  
853 Ibid.  He also notes that such performative, group-making practices are not specific to ethnic 
entrepreneurs, but generic to political mobilization and representation. 
854 Report of the Kano Disturbances: 16th, 17th, 18th and 19th May, 1953, Nigerian National Archive.  The 
riot occurred as a result of the AG Party's attempt to canvass for electoral votes in this city.  NPC Party 
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officials were instrumental in manipulating the symbols of religion among the people against the Southern 
Parties.  
855 Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, eds., The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). 
856 Women were imagined as dependent, not sovereign, and as reproducers, the “mothers of the nation.” 
857 The Sardauna was believed to have been the direct descendant of Uthman Dan Fodi who led the Islamic 
jihad in the North of Nigeria in the 19th century and created the Sokoto Caliphate, Sokoto being the capital.  
Ahmadu Bello became the President-General of the NPC when it was launched as a full-fledged political 
organization in 1952.  In 1960, he became Premier of the North at Nigeria’s independence and was killed in 
the 1966 Nigerian military coup d’etat. 
858 “Oppositions, Republicanism, and Votes for Women,” West Africa, 1962. 
859 Sir Ahmadu Bello, My Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962). 
860 “Oppositions, Republicanism, and Votes for Women,” West Africa, 1962. 
861  Ibid. 
862 Ahmadu Bello, My Life.  The subordination and near total physical invisibility of women was at its most 
intense in the Sardauna’s Islamic Northern Nigeria’s social and political culture; the veil put on by Moslem 
women - and the purdah itself - are symbolic of this invisibility.   
863 See chapter five for examination of this report. 
864 See discussion of contrasting discourse of gender by women radicals in chapter seven.    
865 I recall repeated reference to this program in popular discourse during my teaching tenure at the 
University of Ibadan, Ibadan, now in Oyo State, Nigeria. 
866 For detailed and well-written account of the UPE program in Southern Nigeria, see, David B. 
Abernathy, The Political Dilemma of Popular Education: An African Case (Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press, 1969).  The basic information on the UPE program follows closely on Abernathy’s 
account. 
867 This was consequent to the victory of AG in the election that took place after the 1951 Macpherson 
Constitution was introduced.  Awolowo became the Premier of Western Region in October 1954. 
868 David B. Abernathy, The Political Dilemma of Popular Education: An African Case, 127.   
869 The AG also perceived its UPE program as very noteworthy and described it so in glowing terms.  The 
government’s commemorative brochure published to mark the occasion of the program when the first 
school year began in the West in January 1955 referred to it as “the beginning in this country of a social 
revolution” and quoted Awokoya’s earlier description of it as “a gilt-edged security against the hazards and 
difficulties of the coming years.” The seriousness and gravity with which the AG party leaders held this 
program is further reflected in the statement of the Minister of Education who regarded the proposals for 
educational development as “imperative and urgent,” to be “treated as a national emergency, second only to 
war,” and also to be moved with “the momentum of a revolution.”  And the AG did initially try to treat it as 
such.  Notwithstanding the relative increased resources of the Western Regional government and the 
sincere commitment of the AG party leaders to the program, the demands on the government’s financial 
and other resources when the program was put into operation proved more than any of the government was 
able to meet as projected and as planned.  The proposals of both parties had generated great interest among 
the populace in both regions, since all saw Western education on which the schools’ curriculum was based 
as the main avenue to status, wealth and power.  The turnout when the program first started in the West in 
January 1955 resulted in more pupils than projected.  As Abernathy records, the program had to be scaled 
down in course of time to make it administratively and financially feasible as reality set in.  The AG had to 
impose taxation in order to offset the cost of paying for the UPE program soon after.  This cost the AG 
politically, initially, as people were at first resistant to being taxed for this.  It cost the AG the loss of seats 
in the November 1954 elections to the Federal House of Representatives.  The NCNC exploited the AG’s 
 353
                                                                                                                                                 
unpopular tax in the Western Region to gain more seats in that region.  The AG recovered in the end as 
people became more understanding and receptive to paying the modest levy once they began to enjoy the 
results of government-financed primary education, giving the AG some degree of popularity which was 
reflected in its gains in the polls in the 1956 regional election.  Abernathy, The Political Dilemma of 
Popular Education: An African Case. 
870 The AG had a more principled commitment to this provision than the NCNC which could be seen to be 
playing politics by seeking to compete with the AG on this account, introducing the program in the East in 
1957, two years after the start of it in the West.  AG legislators and party executives, many of whom were 
Western-educated and many of whom were also educationists, had been giving attention to the issue of 
education even before the AG party was created and before they went into active politics.  In the late 1940s, 
an informal study group composed of these educators had met regularly at Ibadan to discuss what a 
Nigerian educational policy should be, should the British leave the country.  The AG’s 1951 policy paper 
on education and the 1952 Awokoya proposals emerged from the deliberations of this group.  The group 
included Chief T. T. Solaru, Canon E. O. Alayande, M. A. Ajasin, Canon S. A. Adeyefa, and S. O. 
Awokoya, all of whom became prominent in the AG and may be considered principal architects of the 
West’s educational policy in the early 1950’s.  Abernathy, The Political Dilemma of Popular Education: 
An African Case, 138. 
871 Obafemi Awolowo, Voice of Reason (Akure, Nigeria: Fagbamigbe Publishers, 1981), 163. 
872 Obafemi Awolowo, Action Group’s 14-Point Programme (Lagos: Amalgamated Press of Nigeria, 
1959), 3. 
873 Obafemi O. Awolowo, The People’s Republic (Ibadan, Nigeria: Oxford University Press, 1968), 311. 
874 Ibid. 
875 Obafemi Awolowo, Thoughts on Nigeria Constitution  (Ibadan, Nigeria: Oxford University Press: 
Ibadan, 1966), 112-113.  In 1976, Nigeria began Free Primary Education program nationally and included 
the goal of free education at all levels in her Constitution in 1979. 
876 UPN Directorate, U. P. N. Policy Papers, 6. 
877 The NCNC and the CPP which at their founding were more open to popular concerns did not prove to 
be different from other mainstream parties by this period. 
878 Some of the notable cases involve dissensions with the radical Zikists, and the controversies over the 
African Continental Bank (ACB) affair in which the colonial government indicted Azikiwe for 
mismanagement of the bank.  See chapter five for discussion of Azikiwe’s dissensions with the Zikists.  For 
the ACB controversies, see discussion in Richard Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties: Power in an Emergent 
African Nation, 143-189. 
879 As noted earlier in chapter five, Azikiwe already publicly indicated his acceptance of the federalist 
constitution for Nigeria before his party even met to discuss and approve a change of position towards the 
federalist constitution for Nigeria and to formally accept it. 
880 Richard Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties: Power in an Emergent African Nation.  
881 The views of those disenchanted with their political party and with the party president and who resigned 
from them may not be altogether disinterested. 
882 Abernathy attributed his resignation to the fact that he was not expected to be put forward as the 
Minister for Education in the next election, as well as to his unfulfilled desire to have his stamp on the UPE 
program of which he was more or less the main intellectual architect.  David B. Abernathy, The Political 
Dilemma of Popular Education: An African Case. 
883 Awokoya, for example, who was from the same Ijebu-Yoruba sub-group as Awolowo, was hoping to 
draw political support from the same constituency as Awolowo with whom he was in disagreement. 
884 The AG did lose out in a few cases for taking such steps.  In Abeokuta, the AG supported the return of 
the Alake without addressing the issues that had led to his deposition.   
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885 Reports on the Political Situation in the Oyo Province in Western Region, Nigeria, 6 Nov. 1953, CO 
554/373, PRO. 
886 Awolowo, the AG leader was, however, cautious as to the boundaries of the conflicts with the Alafin.  
He did not want to see the total demise of the Alafin, as a Yoruba Oba, because of how it would affect the 
support AG was already gaining among some Yoruba chiefs.  As he did with these pro-AG Yoruba chiefs, 
Awolowo only wanted to go as far as capturing the base of power of these chiefs, and thus their 
constituencies, but not to destroy them and the symbol of chieftaincy – much like the colonial authority 
also tried to use the colonial chiefs!  Awolowo knew he could not afford to lose the support of the other 
Obas and preferred to see the Alafin “knocked down” instead and set up again on terms to suit the AG.  
The tension between the extreme group led by Bode Thomas and the rest of the party on account of this 
crisis was already threatening the unity of the party and there were signs that the Obas in the AG party were 
becoming increasingly restless about toeing the party line on account of the AG/Bode Thomas struggle 
with the Alafin of Oyo, a fellow Oba.  Four of the Obas, the Oba of Benin, the Olubadan of Ibadan, the 
Alake of Abeokuta, and the Oba Adele of Lagos, were said to be showing signs of rebellion. See Extracts, 
“Situation in Western Provinces,” 13th September – 14 October, 1953 and “Reports on the Political 
Situation in the Oyo Province in Western Region, Nigeria, 6 Nov. 1953,” CO 554/373, PRO. 
887 W. J. M. Mackenzie, and Kenneth Robinson, eds., Five Elections in Africa (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1960). 
888 It led to the “struggle for the second independence.”     
889 Officialdom’s “rush” to relinquish empire is discussed in chapter eight, the concluding chapter. 
890 See his lengthy report in “Minority Reports,” Political Developments of Nigeria, 1950, CO 537/5786, 
PRO. 
891 Ibid. 
892 Mokwugo Okoye, A Letter to Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe: a Dissent Remembered (Enugu, Nigeria: Fourth 




893 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 7. 
894 Pobee Biney was a socialist-oriented labor leader and activist in the Gold Coast. 
895 Anthony Woode was also a socialist-oriented labor leader and activist in the Gold Coast. 
896 Nduka Eze was one of the four initiators of the Zikist Movement in Lagos in 1946.  The Zikist 
Movement and aspects of Eze’s career as a trade union leader and political activist are discussed a little 
further below and in chapter eight. 
897 Raji Abdallah was an Igbirra from the Middle Belt area of the country.  In 1945, he formed the African 
Anti-Colour Bar Movement (ABM) with Osita Agwuna.  In 1947, he merged the ABM with the Zikist 
Movement for a broader national front and became president of the Zikist Movement the same year.   
898 Mokwugo Okoye was the General Secretary of the Zikist Movement.  He was convicted of sedition for 
having revolutionary pamphlets in his possession and was sentenced to 33 months in prison. West African 
Pilot, March 7th, 1950.  He was released in 1953 and returned to the NCNC Youth Association.  In 1955, 
he was expelled from the NCNC, readmitted in 1956 and became the Secretary-General of the Youth 
Association as well as a member of the National Executive Committee (NEC).  Okoye was author of 
several pamphlets which espoused revolutionary socialism and freedom.  See his memoir, Mokwugo 
Okoye, Storms on the Niger (Enugu, Nigeria: Eastern Nigeria Printing Corporation, 1967). 
899 Osita C. Agwuna was in the civil service at Kano, Northern Nigeria and formed the African Anti-Color 
Bar Movement with Raji Abdallah in 1945.  In 1947, he became Vice President of the Zikist Movement.  
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He became General Secretary of the short-lived CPP of Nigeria (chapter eight touches on the CPP of 
Nigeria), and later became NCNC member of the Federal House of Representatives for Awka Division. 
900 Michael Imoudu was a trade unionist from Auchi, Nigeria and President of the Railway Workers’ Union 
in Nigeria and rose to fame as “Nigerian Labor Leader No. 1” when he led the 1945 General Strike of 
railway workers in Lagos.  He was deported by the colonial government from Lagos to his hometown of 
Auchi on account of his participation in the strike as a “potential threat to public safety.”  Imoudu was one 
of those involved in the NCNC pan-Nigeria tour in opposition to the 1946 Richard’s Constitution.  In 1948, 
he was appointed by Azikiwe into the NCNC Cabinet along with Nduka Eze and F. O. Coker.  He also 
became the president of the leftwing-oriented Nigerian Federation of Labor (NNFL) and the Nigerian 
Labor Congress which was also under leftist leadership.  For some useful works on Michael Imoudu, see, 
for example, Wale Oyemakinde, “Michael Imoudu and the Emergence of Militant Trade Unionism in 
Nigeria, 1940-42,” Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria 7, no. 1 (December, 1974): 541-561.  Other 
valuable references on Imoudu include. Robin Cohen, “Nigeria’s Labour Leader No.1. Notes for a 
Biographical Study of M. A. O. Imoudu,” Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria 5, no. 2 (June, 1970): 
303-308, Wogu Ananaba, The Trade Union Movement in Nigeria (Apapa, Lagos: Times Press Limited, 
1969), and Richard Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1963).  In my interview with Michael Imoudu, conducted in Lagos, August 1990, he lamented what he 
perceived to be the demise of the labor movement in Nigeria.   
901 Hajiyya Sawaba Gambo was born in 1933.  Her mother was from Nupe, Nigeria and her father was from 
the Gold Coast.  Author’s interview with Sawaba, August 11, 1990, Zaria, Nigeria. 
902 Ringim was a poet, social analyst, political activist, orator, and a freedom fighter who lived and 
practiced chiefly as a Koranic scholar.  See his biographical accounts also in Ahmed, Beita Yusuf, A 
Freedom Fighter: Annotated Memoirs of Mallam Illah Ringim (Sokoto, Nigeria: Sidi Umaru Press, 1978) 
903 Mallam Lawan Dambazair was a versatile poet and legal adviser to NEPU in Northern Nigeria. 
904 Muda Spikin Darma was born in 1920.  He was publicity secretary of the Northern Peoples’ Congress 
from which he and the other NEPU militants subsequently broke off.  He led the dissenting body within the 
Congress before the break.  He was a trader as well as a poet and lived in Kano but traveled around the 
Northern cities giving lectures on the subject of unity in Nigeria.  NEPU Papers, Nigeria Archive.  
905 The “class” component of radical discourse is critiqued in later sections of this chapter. 
906 These include the heritage of earlier millennium and indigenous Christian revolt movements in the 
colonies. 
907 It could be deemed somewhat that Marxism-Leninism provided for colonials exposed to Western 
education, mostly products of mission schools and Christian churches, the equivalent of a Christian 
theology of revolution to that of the Islamic Jihad (Holy War).  Liberation theology in the second half of 
the twentieth century in places such as South Africa and in many Latin American states and elsewhere was 
partly rooted in Marxism.   
908 In the ideal sense, their vision of social change approximates to the Trotskyist socialist concept of the 
permanent revolution (the Leninist “double revolution”), involving the simultaneous resolution of social 
and political issues in one political action.  Though not in any way Trotskyist or communist, colonial 
radicals sought to effect social change at a time of political change, when the changes being proposed in the 
new constitutions at the turn of the 50s seemed to promise such changes. 
909 Colonial Office Secret Document, CO 537/5807, PRO.  See discussion of this shift in chapter five.  As 
also revealed in chapter five, Azikiwe and others like him had similarly been making strategic shifts and 
reinventing themselves as partners worth working with. 
910 This was the view expressed to the Secretary of State by a member of the Gold Coast mines’ interest 
groups, using the familiar imperialist’s label and with which the SOS was in agreement.  See, 
Memorandum for the Secretary of State, Enclosure 4, Private and Personal, in “Gold Coast Representatives 
against Constitutional Advancement,” 1951-52, 13, CO 554/252, PRO. 
 356
                                                                                                                                                 
911 It was, however, precisely because these changes were perceived by the social radicals to circumscribe 
desired grassroot and democratic changes across the board that made them insistent on pursuing their goals 
of social change. 
912 As examined in chapter five, the new constitutional provisions allowed Nkrumah to become elected into 
the Gold Coast Legislative and Executive Councils and Azikiwe headed the Eastern Region of Nigeria as 
Premier. 
913 See further discussion and documentation of Nkrumah’s and Azikiwe’s statements and actions to this 
effect below and in chapter eight. 
914 Wallace-Johnson had been able to enter the Sierra Leone legislature where he carried on his radical 
critique after the 1951 election in Sierra Leone, first as a National Council (NC) party representative and 
subsequently as an Independent member for Wilberforce and York Electoral District, Freetown after 
quitting the NC in 1952, and then as a United Sierra Leone Progressive Party (UPP) representative until 
after the 1957 election when he quit the UPP.  Part of the social radicals’ predisposition towards resorting 
to extra-institutional means of protest was also because of the exclusion of many of them from these 
representative institutions.  See discussion of this in later sections. 
915 This was at the 1949/50 Nigerian General Conference for the review of the 1946 Richard’s constitution 
and in anticipation of the proposed Macpherson constitution which was passed into law in 1951.  See 
chapter five for a discussion of some of the objections recorded in his minority report. 
916 The Zikists and the Zikists movement are discussed below and in chapter eight. 
917 Mokwugo Okoye, Storms on the Niger, 142. 
918 Ibid. 
919 These colonial radicals lacked thorough grasp of Marxism-Leninism as a revolutionary theoretical 
schema or blueprint as well as of its weaknesses and limitations. 
920 West Africa, August 25, 1962, 935.  The “new doctrine” was in reference to Marxism-Leninism.  The 
“new facts” relate to their ability to subsequently see and understand the structural context of imperial rule, 
etc., and its drawbacks. 
921 Ibid.  Ex-servicemen were also among the militant rank and file of the CPP in the Gold Coast and were 
at the forefront of the 1948 Gold Coast disturbances. 
922 In general, colonialism led to women’s diminished status and roles and undermined what had been 
strong women’s political and economic status in many pre-colonial African societies.  As studies have 
shown, erstwhile strong women’s political organizations, deriving in part from the dual sex system, were 
undermined during colonialism.  See, for example, Bolanle Awe, ed., Nigerian Women in Historical 
Perspective (Ibadan, Nigeria: Sankore Publishers, 1992), and K. Okonjo, “The Dual Sex Political System in 
Operation: Igbo Women and Community Politics in Midwestern Nigeria,” in Women in Africa: Studies in 
Social and Economic Change, eds., N. J. Hafkin and E. G. Bay, 45–58 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 1976).  
923 As studies have shown, colonial rule actively excluded women from political power and deepened their 
social and economic subordination to male elders and patriarchal kinship groups.  The colonial state, 
especially in the first half of the twentieth century, was antagonistic towards African women’s diverse 
interests and relied on women for reproductive and agricultural production and as cheap source of labor.  
Exclusionary measures were enacted such as exclusive property rights to men in order to ensure women’s 
labor in the home and on the land.  
924 The removal of marriage restrictions by the colonial courts was leading to increased adultery, divorce, 
and fluid marriage practices that undermined the position of traditional power holders and became part of 
the crises in local African society.  The colonial state and African patriarchs would collude to control 
women’s burgeoning autonomy through a series of legal enactments, such as new marriage laws and travel 
restrictions, that curtailed women’s activities in various spheres.  Walsh and Scully remark that the 
collusion between the colonial state and elder men meant that both local and national forms were 
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patriarchal.  See Denise Walsh and Pamela Scully, “Altering Politics, Contesting Gender,” Journal of 
Southern African Studies 32, no. 1 (March 2006): 4.  Women radicals sought to change gender norms and 
dismantle the axis of patriarchy which was reinforced in the collusion between the colonial state (white 
male colonial officials), and African cultural producers and political entrepreneurs, i.e., African chiefly and 
liberal, Western-educated men.  This undermined the otherwise limited emancipatory aspects of 
colonialism on African women.   
925 This was extensively used, for example, in the 1929 Aba Women’s War and in the Abeokuta Women’s 
Movement.  The AWU women in their protest demonstrations against the Alake and their March on the 
Alake’s palace in 1947 sang songs worded in terms of female’s genital organs.  For the Aba Women’s War, 
see for example, Misty, L. Bastian, “Vultures of the Marketplace: Southeastern Nigerian Women and 
Discourses of the Ogu Umunwaanyi (Women’s War) of 1929,” in Jean Allman, Susan Geiger, and 
Nakanyike Musisi, edits., Women in African Colonial Histories (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2002).   
926 See John Akileye, “All Songs Sung During the Women Union’s Demonstration, from 8/12/47 to 
15/9/48,” 5, in The March (Oro Ritual) on Alake’s Palace, Ransome Kuti Papers. 
927 It was applied in socially emancipatory ways among women radicals. 
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1083 The discourse in the Colonial Office in 1943 regarding proposed plans for devolution of power in these 
colonies is revealing of the way in which all the parties were still thinking in terms of an indefinite time 
period, in relative measures.  O .G. R. Williams, head of the West African section in the Colonial Office, in 
response to a criticism by the Governor of Sierra Leone, Hubert Stevenson, in 1943 regarding Williams’ 
proposed time scale for devolution of power as too short, somehow cynically remarked that, “As the plan in 
this memorandum contemplated possibly a good may generations for its evolution, I can only suppose that 
Sir Hubert Stevenson is thinking rather in centuries.  I dare say he is right!”  See Minutes by O. G. R. 
Williams, 4.9.43, CO 554/132/33727, PRO.  Williams’ plan, partly influenced by Lord Hailey’s views, 
involved five stages and some of the proposals were partly reflected in the constitutional reviews and 
changes of late 1940s/early 1950s.  He had called for the formulation of Regional Councils from among the 
Native Authorities (NA), the modernization of the NA by the introduction of younger and better educated 
Africans, and for local men to be introduced in greater numbers into the upper echelons of the colonial 
service.  Stage four called for African unofficial majorities to be introduced in the Legislative Councils 
while stage five, ‘towards self government’, contained no proposals whatever, except of course to perceive 
self government in terms of an indefinite future.  See CO 554/132/33727, PRO, for the discussion paper. 
1084 Ibid.  The document was meant to help provide some policy guidelines in preparation for the planned 
visit of the Secretary of State, Oliver Stanley, to West Africa later on in 1943. 
1085 The Trusteeship concept is well defined by Lord Lugard.  See Sir Frederick Lugard, The Dual Mandate 
in British Tropical Africa (Edinburgh, London: W. Blackwood & Sons, 1922).  See also, Molly Mortimer, 
The Trusteeship in Practice; a Report to the Fabian Colonial Bureau (London: Fabian Publication: 
London, 1951). 
1086 For descriptive use of the term, see, Eric Wolf, Europe and the People without History (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1982). 
1087 Rita Hinden, “Partnership and What it Means,” 1946, CO 554/132/33727. 
1088 This statement was attributed to Mr. W. L. S. Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of Britain from 26 
October, 1951-5 April, 1955. 
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1089 In France, it also included Thorez, the French Communist leader.  This was somewhat in 
contradistinction to the Third International’s advocacy of self-determination of subjugated societies.  
Perhaps the French imperial notion of their colonies as extension of metropolitan France served to 
rationalize that position.  That position could also be tied to the communist school of thought that believed 
in the full development of productive forces in such subjugated and ‘backward’ societies through such 
phase of imperial domination by more developed nations. 
1090 Nigerian Legislative Council Debates, March 5, 1945.   
1091 Ibid.  When the Constitution was enacted in 1946, the NCNC pushed for constitutional reforms to 
secure ‘greater participation in the management of their own affairs’ and went on a tour of the nation to 
enlighten the citizens as to the limitations of the new constitution and to push for more changes, to include 
a program of positive action.  This was followed with an NCNC delegation to the United Kingdom in 
pursuit of the same objective. Nnamdi Azikiwe, Zik: The Development of Political Parties, 13. 
1092 The concept of Trusteeship that had guided British interests in these colonies had become outmoded 
and was replaced during World War II with the concept of ‘Partnership’ whose meaning was changed from 
increased African participation in development and welfare to the idea of the inter-dependence of the UK 
and colonial economic units.  This change in terminology to the idea of complementarity of trade was an 
attempt to rationalize United Kingdom’s (UK) colonial empires’ exemption from the multilateral aims of 
international policy provisions in the draft I. T. O. Charter, as Bowden posited.  For a valuable study and 
in-depth discussion of the changing British colonial power’s notions of Partnership, and of the rationale 
behind these changing concepts, see Jane Bowden, “Development and Control in British Colonial Policy: 
Nigeria and the Gold Coast, 1935 – 48,” Doctoral dissertation, University of Birmingham, 1980. 
1093 This idea of the “inter-dependence of the UK and colonial economic unit” and of “special relationship” 
between UK and its colonies was forcefully argued by Sir Stafford Cripps, Minister of Economic Affairs, 
in his speech to the African Governors Conference on the twin theme of complementarity and mutual 
benefit.  He stated that:   
The economies of Western Europe and tropical Africa are so closely 
interlocked in mutual trade … that their problems of overseas balance 
are essentially one … The further development of African resources is 
of the same crucial importance to the rehabilitation and strengthening 
of Western Europe as the restoration of European productive power is 
to the future progress and prosperity of Africa.  
Quoted in Jane Bowden, “Development and Control in British Colonial Policy: Nigeria and the Gold Coast, 
1935-48,” 362.  In reality, what was advocated, as Bowden noted, was a short term solution to the UK’s 
financial problems that artificially reinforced the pre-war complementary pattern of colonial trade, a trend 
which went against all war-time statements of the promotion of balanced growth in the Colonial Empire.    
1094 See, for example, Nike Adebiyi, “Radical Nationalism and the Politics of Anticolonialism in British 
West Africa, 1940-1960,’ 1989, and ‘Radical Nationalism in British West Africa, 1945-60,’ 1994@.  
1095 The crisis at the level of the colonial state had also involved major contradictions of British imperial 
rule as well as the crisis of policy.  
1096 See also chapters four and five for the development of this theme. 
1097 “[Gold Coast and Nigeria]: letter from Sir T Lloyd to Governor Sir J Macpherson explaining Gold 
Coast policy,” 25 Mar 1953, CO 554/254, no 29, [270], reprinted in David Goldsworthy (ed.), British 
Documents on the End of Empire.  Series A, Vol. III, The Conservative Government and the End of Empire 
1951-1957, Part 2 (London: HMSO, 1994), 193.  Lloyd was recalling the comment of the Secretary of State 
to Nkrumah to Governor Macpherson. 
1098 Nkrumah and the regimes that followed him in the Gold Coast, as well as post-independence 
governments in Nigeria and Sierra Leone had indeed had to confront and continue to confront the crises of 
nationhood in these places.  As of 2008, however, some of the new African states appear to be better placed 
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to fairly successfully confront some of these challenges, after phases of civil wars, military coups, etc., 
especially in Nigeria and Ghana (Gold Coast). 
1099 Lower-ranking and middle-level colonial officials in the colonies had to be persuaded to follow the 
wind of change blowing from the Colonial Office in this regard. 
1100 “[Gold Coast and Nigeria]: letter from Governor Sir J Macpherson to Sir T Lloyd on the impact of 
Gold Coast policy on Nigeria, 8 Jan 1952,” CO 967/173, [262], reprinted in David Goldsworthy (ed.), 
British Documents on the End of Empire.  Series A, Vol. III, The Conservative Government and the End of 
Empire 1951-1957, Part 2 (London: HMSO, 1994), 179-182. 
1101 Mr. J. Griffiths became Secretary of State for the Colonies under the Labor Government for a brief 
period after Arthur Creech-Jones left the post, from 28 February 1950 till 27 October, 1951 when the Tory 
came into power and was succeeded by Mr. O. Lyttelton. 
1102 “[Gold Coast and Nigeria]: letter from Governor Sir J Macpherson to Sir T Lloyd on the impact of 
Gold Coast policy on Nigeria, 8 Jan 1952,” 179.  These concessions included the agreement to allow 
Nkrumah change his title from Leader of Government Business to Prime Minister, the removal of the ex-
officio members of the Gold Coast Executive, and possible liquidation of all District Officers over a period 
of five years.  Arden-Clarke had stopped in Nigeria and met with Governor Macpherson on his way to 
London to discuss these agreements and the future of the Gold Coast with H. M. G.  It was at this brief 
airport meeting that Macpherson learnt of the discussions that had taken place between Nkrumah and 
Griffiths many months back as well as of Creech-Jones’ readiness during his tenure to allow further 
political advance to Nkrumah.  Macpherson also expressed profound shock at not being told previously of 
these conversations that had taken place between Creech-Jones and Nkrumah. 




1107 Ibid., 181. 
1108 “[Gold Coast and Nigeria]: inward telegram no 337 from Governor Sir J Macpherson to Sir T Lloyd, 
explaining the effects of Gold Coast policy on Nigeria, 16 Mar 1953,” CO 554/254, no 20, [269], reprinted 
in David Goldsworthy (ed.), British Documents on the End of Empire.  Series A, Vol. III: The Conservative 
Government and the End of Empire 1951-1957, Part 2 (London: HMSO, 1994), 191.  Macpherson would 
prefer that the demands of Nkrumah and the other CPP leaders in government be not met and would 
recommend the use of force should riots and disturbances ensue in the Gold Coast as a result of this refusal.   
1109 “[Gold Coast constitution]: minutes by Sir C Jeffries and Mr. Lyttelton, 9 Feb 1953,” CO 554/254, 
[267], reprinted in David Goldsworthy (ed.), British Documents on the End of Empire.  Series A, Vol. III: 
The Conservative Government and the End of Empire 1951-1957, Part 2 (London: HMSO, 1994), 189.  He 
would resign himself to taking things as they were and to considering what best could be done in the 
circumstance in the Gold Coast.  
1110 “[Gold Coast and Nigeria]: letter from Sir T Lloyd to Governor Sir J Macpherson explaining Gold 
Coast Policy, 25 Mar 1953,” CO 554/254, no 29, [270], reprinted in David Goldsworthy (ed.), British 
Documents on the End of Empire. Series A, Vol. III: The Conservative Government and the End of Empire 
1951-1957, Part 2 (London: HMSO, 1994), 193. This was also in response to Macpherson’s earlier 
expressed  inclination towards officialdom’s possible use of force to quell any disturbances that might 
break out in the Gold Coast as a result of failure to continue to grant rapid concessions there. 
1111 “Constitutional developments in the Gold Coast and Nigeria: Cabinet memorandum by Mr. Lyttelton,” 
13 May 1953, CAB 129/61, C(53)154, [271]. reprinted in David Goldsworthy (ed.), British Documents on 
the End of Empire.  Series A, Vol. III: The Conservative Government and the End of Empire 1951–1957, 
Part 2 (London: HMSO, 1994), 194. 
1112 Minute by A. J. Dawe 27.9.39, CO 554/122/33632, PRO. 
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1113 “[Gold Coast constitution]: address by Mr. Griffiths to Colonial Group of the Royal Empire Society, 1 
May 1951,” CO 96/820/2, no 39, [225], reprinted in Ronald Hyam (ed.), British Documents on the End of 
Empire. Series A, Vol. II: The Labour Government and the End of Empire 1945-1951, Part 3 (London: 
HMSO, 1992), 69.  Griffiths was not opposed to change in principle, but to what he perceived to be rapid 
and indiscriminate pace of change in the Gold Coast and the rest of the West African colonies.  
1114 Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Disturbances in the Gold Coast, 1948. 
1115 See Irene Gendzier, Managing Political Change: Social Scientists and the Third World. 
1116 Economic development was being planned at the same time as there continued to be a lag in political 
development leading to, i.e., political stasis. 
1117 Joseph Engwenyu, in his study of labor and politics in the Gold Coast, 1947-1950, also affirm that up to 
1948 and beyond, the intention of the colonial state was to reform Indirect Rule, i.e., improve the conduct 
of empire and not hasten its end.  See Joseph Engwenyu, “Labour and Politics in Ghana: The Militant 
Phase 1947-1950,’ 18. 
1118 Jane Bowden, “Development and Control in British Colonial Policy: Nigeria and the Gold Coast, 1935-
48,” 187. 
1119 Ibid. 
1120 For example, in Governor Macpherson’s 8th January, 1952 letter to Sir T Lloyd which reiterated some 
of the underlying tenets of British imperial position and argued against hurried political changes and 
devolution of power in the Gold Coast, he advocated self-government for the colonies, in his case Nigeria, 
at the time when “the then Governor of Nigeria would be in a position to report to the Secretary of State 
that public opinion throughout Nigeria was so overwhelmingly pro-good government and pro-British 
ideals, institutions and practices, that he could safely advocate complete self-government.”  See “[Gold 
Coast and Nigeria]: letter from Governor Sir J Macpherson to Sir T Lloyd on the impact of Gold Coast 
policy on Nigeria, 8 Jan 1952,” BDEE, 181. 
1121 Self-government was being asked for by both the ‘moderates’ in the legislatures and by those outside 
the institutions of power.  The latter, perceived to be asking for it by force were also perceived to be 
irresponsible and pro-communist.  
1122 See, for example, John Michael Lee, Colonial Development and Good Government (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1967). 
1123 See, Curtis R. Nordman, “Prelude to Decolonization in West Africa: The Development of British 
Colonial Policy, 1938 – 1947,” unpublished doctoral dissertation, Oxford University, 1976, John Michael 
Lee, Colonial Development and Good Government (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), and R. D. Pearce, The 
Turning Point in Africa: British Colonial Policy, 1938 –1948 (London: Cass, 1982). 
1124 J. H. Bowden, “Development and Control in British Colonial Policy: Nigeria and the Gold Coast, 1935-
48.” 
1125 John W. Cell, “On the Eve of Decolonization: The Colonial Office’s Plan for the Transfer of Power in 
Africa, 1947,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 8, no. 3 (May 1980): 250-256. 
1126 Ibid. 
1127 The crises at the level of local African society were, as revealed in preceding chapters, at an important 
level, crises of social change - crises engendered by competition among colonials for access to power and 
resources and to the means by which they were controlled; crises of democracy, etc. 
1128 Arthur Richards, later Lord Milverton, the Governor of Nigeria under whom the 1946 Nigerian 
Constitution was passed and who it was named after, remarked in his later reminiscences of how no 
instruction was given to him regarding his future responsibility when he was appointed governor of the 
various territories to which he was assigned at different times.  He remarked that he was given only 
geographic information, and nothing about policy, nor was he consulted for advice on any subject after he 
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retired from his tour of duty in these different British colonies.  See A. F. Milverton, “Tape recording and 
transcripts of an interview with A. H. M. Kirk-Greene,” MSS Brit. Emp.s.368, Rhodes House Oxford. 
1129 Perham’s view at the Consultative meeting between colonial officials and prominent university scholars 
at Carleton Hotel on October 6, 1939, which was called in officialdom’s attempt to deal with one level of 
contradiction in British colonial policy in regard to two mutually divergent forms of rule in one territory: 
local authority rule (Indirect Rule) and Central government along Western Parliamentary system 
(Legislative Councils), gained popular acceptance among the academicians but remained in the minority.  
Margery Perham had favored the Native Authority structure as solution to the problem of native rule.  
Colonial officials were opposed to her views and preferred to see Indirect Rule as a means to an end, 
preferring Reginald Coupland’s more liberal view that suggested constitutional advance along 
parliamentary lines for the colonies, even though they continued to straddle both paths.  CO 847/17/47135, 
PRO. 
1130 See chapter three for earlier discussions of officialdom’s perceptions of labor in the colonies. 
1131 See, for example, Jon Kraus, “The Political Economy of Industrial Relations in Ghana.” 
1132 See, Ukandi G. Damachie, Dieter H. Seibel, and Lester Trachtman, eds., Industrial Relations in Africa, 
7. 
1133  See, Irene Gendzier, Managing Political Change: Social Scientists and the Third World. 
1134 David Marr, Vietnamese Anticolonialism, 1885-1925 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971).  
1135 See chapters three and seven for further discussion. 
1136 See LaRay Denzer, “I. T. A. Wallace-Johnson and the West African Youth League: A Case Study in 
West African Nationalism.” 
1137 CO 267/666/32216/1938, PRO.  See chapter three for discussion of Wallace-Johnson and officialdom’s 
attitudes towards him. 
1138 Given official hostility against her, it is even surprising that she managed to get into the ECC interim 
council.  Perhaps to not allow her would have created more volatile situations at the time, given her popular 
base of support.  On the other hand, it is also possible that colonial officials had hoped that the opportunity 
to enter into such governing institution would serve to moderate her, in hope of gaining further power, as 
was happening with her other known fellow 'radicals’ of the 40s like Nkrumah and Azikiwe.   
1139 See chapter four for aspects of discussion of these abuses and organized protests against him. 
1140 See, for example, “Letter from Funmi Ransome Kuti to Mr. Griffith,” 13.12.50, Ransome Kuti Papers. 
1141 Daily Service, March 2, 1948. 
1142 See, His Honor and Chief Commissioner Western Provinces, Mr. T. Hoskyns-Abrahall, C. M. G., 
Address to the Chief and People of Egbaland in Council Hall, titled “Chief Commissioner Speaks On Egba 
Women’s Agitation,” in the Daily Times, Tuesday 27th April 1948.  The same language would be used to 
describe members of NEPU and their activism in the North of Nigeria in the 50s. 
1143 This was facilitated by the exploitation of cleavages within organized opposition bodies, such as among 
the Ogboni fraternity, by both the colonial administration and the Egbe Omo Oduduwa (EOO) who both 
wanted the Alake back.  See document titled “Resolution passed by the Ogboni and people of Egbaland on 
the unauthorized visit of a few Ogbonis to Ademola the Ex-Alake at Osogbo and against his return to 
Abeokuta, etc.,” Ake Ogboni House, Ake, Abeokuta, 1/6/50, Ransome Kuti Papers.  It also documents 
EOO’s beginning involvement through its influential newspaper, the Nigerian Tribune.   EOO was just 
coming into its own at that time in what would become a formidable political grouping of the Yorubas. 
1144 See “Egba Alake’s Section Who Are the Paramount Owners of Oba Alake Still Oppose Ademola’s 
Return.” signed by F. Ransome Kuti, Women’s Union Abeokuta, undated memo, additional enclosure in 
“Letter from Funmi Ransome Kuti to Mr. Griffith,” 13.12.50, Ransome Kuti Papers. 
1145 Ibid. 
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1146 Ibid.  Questions regarding the Alake’s return were raised at a short notice of this meeting in which a 
considerable number of members were absent; the total number of members was 95.  Voting was 
understood to be 29 in favor of his return, 14 in favor of his return on certain conditions and 19 against his 
return.     
1147 See Governor of Nigeria to the Secretary of State, Memo, “Ex-Alake of Abeokuta,” 6 October 1950.  
1148 “Egba Alake’s Section Who Are the Paramount Owners of Oba Alake Still Oppose Ademola’s Return,” 
signed by F. Ransome Kuti, Women’s Union Abeokuta, Ransome Kuti Papers.  
1149 As younger western-educated Africans were gaining power at the central and regional levels of 
government, the chiefs in local authorities still retained their position but their powers were being gradually 
undermined by new African political parties composed of these new forces.  
1150 “Amendment of the Gold Coast constitution: Cabinet memorandum by Mr. Lyttelton, 9 Feb 1952,” 
CAB 129/49, C(52)28, [265], reprinted in David Goldsworthy (ed.), British Documents on the End of 
Empire.  Series A, Vol. III: The Conservative Government and the End of Empire 1951-1957, Part 2 
(London: HMSO, 1994), 187. 
1151 Ibid. 
1152 Ibid. 
1153 Ibid., 185.  Lyttelton added, lamely, that “though there were economic and social discontents also,” but 
the economic and social discontents were as much at the very root of the crisis as the political.   
1154 In the outbreak of the 1948 crisis, the chiefs - the unofficial members of the Gold Coast Legislative 
Council, as well as Native Authority chiefs – showed themselves to be solidly behind the government.  
They publicly decried what they considered “this disorderliness and open defiance of law and order,” as 
“totally unconstitutional and inconsistent with our own principles of justice and right.” “We solemnly 
reaffirm our loyalty to his Majesty and pledge our homage and unstinted support to our government,’ 
reiterated Nana Tsibu Darku, O.B.E., a senior official and member of the Legislative Council of the Gold 
Coast Colony and Ashanti.  Their support of the colonial government and vehemence against Nkrumah and 
the CPP was even stronger after the January 1950 General Strike and the CPP Positive Action in the Gold 
Coast.  “The activities of grasshopper leaders in the C.P.P. must be checked,” Nana-Tsibu Darku voiced out 
again.  See, Nana Tsibu Darku, 1X O.B.E., and the Ga Native Authority, “Riots in the Gold Coast,” 
Dispatch No. 587 of March 5th, 1948, from the American Embassy, London, in U. S. A National Archives, 
Washington 848N. 00/3-548 cited in Joseph Engwenyu, “The Gold Coast Riots of 1948,” Part I undated 
Occasional Paper, 21.  Others, like the Asantehene, Osei A. Prempeh II, had expressed similar sentiments 
in a letter sent to His Excellency, the Governor, through the Chief Commissioner of Ashanti.  The 
government’s response to the T.U.C. strike and the Positive Action and to the telegram sent by Nkrumah to 
the Secretary of State dated 12th January, 1950 was to emphasize the rule of law and to regard as illegal the 
demand for immediate self-government and Dominion Status by the CPP, including its insistence on the 
right of government employees to go on strike to safeguard their interests.  The Native Authorities and the 
UGCC members stood behind the government and the state of emergency declared.  In the emergency 
Legislative Council meeting of January 19th, 1950, they poured scorn on the TUC and CPP leaders.  See, 
Joseph Engwenyu, ‘The Working Class and the Politics of Constitutional Independence: “The “Positive 
Action” and the General Strike of 1950 in the Gold Coast,’ 18-19.  Engwenyu noted that Nana Tsibu Darku 
was also taking the opportunity to answer some of the previous CPP charges against the chiefs to the effect 
that the chiefs were no longer representatives of the people but government mouthpieces, that they were 
“sitting” on gazettes instead of stools, and that to cope with the changing tide of nationalism the chiefs 
might have to “run” so fast as to forget their sandals behind in an attempt to catch-up!  The African 
National Times, Vol. III, No. 18, Saturday January 21st, 1950, quoted in Joseph Engwenyu, Joseph, ‘The 
Working Class and the Politics of Constitutional Independence.’ 
1155 Ibid., 21. 
1156 The interests of the UGCC educated Africans and the chiefs brought them together as much as it 
separated them especially in this period in the colony. 
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1157 See Joseph Engwenyu, “The Working Class and the Politics of Constitutional Independence: The 
“Positive Action” and the General Strike of 1950 in the Gold Coast.’ 
1158 See chapter four for discussion of this provision. 
1159 D. J. R. Scott, “The Sierra Leone Election, May 1957,” in W. J. M. Mackenzie, and Kenneth Robinson, 
Five Elections in Africa (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960), 176. 
1160 Kono Mannda, Koidu Town, 2, no. 5, December 1, 1958, 1. 
1161 Daily Mail, Freetown, September 5, 1958, 3 
1162 See detailed discussion of NEPU in chapter seven.  
1163 The Secretary of State, Mr. Lyttelton, had expressed this view in 1953, consonant with how the British 
had viewed the Northern emirate system from the consolidation of empire and the establishment of the 
Indirect Rule system in this place.  By contrast, Lyttelton characterized the Yorubas and the Ibos of the 
South, the two remaining of the three major ethnic groups in Nigeria, as “Pagan or Christian, with higher 
education and lower manners … somewhat intoxicated with nationalism, though loyal to the British 
connection at least so long as it suits them’!  See “The Nigerian constitution: Cabinet memorandum by Mr. 
Lyttelton,” 17 August 1953, PREM 11/1367, C(53)235, [274], reprinted in David Goldsworthy (ed.), 
British Documents on the End of Empire.  Series A, Vol. III: The Conservative Government and the End of 
Empire 1951-1957, Part 2 (London: HMSO, 1994), 200. 
1164 “NEPU,” Extract from N. R. Political Intelligence Summary, October 1951, NEPU Papers. 
1165 Ibid. Its danger to officials as expressed here lies very much in its program of social change which 
challenged and undermined the status quo which they wanted to leave largely in place!  
1166 Ibid. 
1167 “NEPU,” Extract from Kano Intelligence Summary, 20.6.51, NEPU Papers. 
1168 The regulation permitted every Native Authority, typically an emir, to 'nominate' a number of persons 
equal to 10% of the final electoral college who were then “injected” into the college.  These nominees 
included the choice of the emir and various pressures operated to induce the members of the final electoral 
colleges to vote for them.  See chapter five for more details of this provision.  
1169 See chapter seven for more in-depth exploration of these colonial critics. 
1170 By 1951, the new Sierra Leone Constitution was the only constitution in British West Africa to retain 
an unofficial majority (eleven out of twenty-one) in the legislature.  See, D. J. R. Scott, “The Sierra Leone 
Election, May 1957,” 175-176. 
1171 Some of his critiques are also mentioned in chapters five and seven. 
1172 I. T. A. Wallace Johnson, MP Sierra Leone Legislative Council and Organizing Secretary of the West 






1177 As noted earlier, Siaka Stevens was hand-picked in 1945 by the colonial labor official, Mr. Edgar 
Parry, to replace Wallace-Johnson as the Sierra Leone trade union leader in order to undermine Johnson’s 
influence among labor and the grassroot.  Siaka Stevens was regarded by officialdom to be the ’ideal’ 
moderate African leader that they sought to work with in the colonies. 
1178 Wallace-Johnson, Member for Wilberforce and York Electoral District, Sierra Leone Legislative 
Council Debates, October 1, 1956. 
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1188 See, “Northern Political Body Pleads for Cooperation & Rights of Representation,” extract from 
Comet, 30/9/50, in NEPU Papers. 
1189 Ibid. 
1190 See chapter six for discussion of aspects of this. 
1191 The 1946 Richard’s Constitution in Nigeria enacted before it and which was introduced 23 years after 
the last one - the Clifford Constitution - was highly criticized by vocal African opinion as being inadequate 
at the time.  The Constitution was still tied to the authoritarian system of Indirect Rule based on elections 
from the undemocratic organs of local authority, the Native Administration.  Other major aspects of this 
constitution were also criticized as unacceptable, such as the NCNC’s objection to the division of the 
country into regions.   
1192 “[Nigeria]: dispatch from Mr. Griffiths to Sir J. Macpherson on constitutional review, 15 July 1950,” 
CO 537/5787, no 52, [223], reprinted in Ronald Hyam (ed.), British Documents on the End of Empire. 
Series A, Vol. II: The Labour Government and the End of Empire 1945-1951, Part 3 (London: HMSO, 
1992), 64.  Griffiths in this instance was more or less preaching to the converted because Macpherson was 
similarly aversed to frequent constitutional changes although Griffiths was stating this to him as a matter of 
general principles and personal preference. 
1193 “Gold Coast constitution: Cabinet memorandum by Mr. Creech Jones, 8 Oct 1949,” CAB 129/36/2, 
CP(49)199, [217], reprinted in Ronald Hyam (ed.), British Documents on the End of Empire. Series A, Vol. 
II: The Labour Government and the End of Empire 1945-1951, Part 3 (London: HMSO, 1992), 49. 
1194 Ibid.   
1195 Ibid. 
1196 Daily Echo, 19th April 1948, quoted in Joseph Engwenyu, ‘Labour and Politics in Ghana: The 
Militant Phase 1947-1950,’ 29.  See further discussion in chapter four. 
1197 He became leader of Government Business after the landslide victory of the CPP in the 1951 election 
that followed the new constitution adopted in the Gold Coast in 1950.   
1198 Kwame Nkrumah. The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah (New York: International Publishers, 
1957), 87. 
1199 CO 537/7181, no 5, 12 May 1951 in “[Gold Coast]: minute by A B Cohen on future policy towards 
political and constitutional evolution,” 11 June 1951, CO 537/7181, [226], reprinted in Ronald Hyam (ed.), 
British Documents on the End of Empire. Series A, Vol. II: The Labour Government and the End of Empire 
1945-1951, Part 3 (London: HMSO, 1992), 73.  Arden-Clarke did not, however, believe that Griffiths and 
Cohen should be too forthcoming or give any impression to Nkrumah that further concessions could be 
easily or readily granted. 
1200 Ibid.  In this particular instance, in regard to one of Nkrumah’s demands, the SOS, Griffiths, did not 
feel it was a big deal granting Nkrumah the changed title of Prime Minister as they felt the change would 
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be more or less nominal, without much change in power or functions, while they stood to derive more 
capital from conceding this to him. 
1201 Ibid.  
1202 Ibid.  
1203 The meeting was held at the Colonial Office on 13th June, 1951.  Arden-Clarke, the Governor of the 
Gold Coast was present at both while Cohen attended one of them.  “[Gold Coast]: minute by A B Cohen 
on future policy towards political and constitutional evolution,” 11 June 1951, CO 537/7181, [226], 
reprinted in Ronald Hyam (ed.), British Documents on the End of Empire. Series A, Vol. II: The Labour 
Government and the End of Empire 1945-1951, Part 3 (London: HMSO, 1992), 73-74.  Nkrumah was not 
unmindful of the wishes of rank and file CPP followership for more constitutional change and grant of 
early self-government.  He also perhaps wanted to gain as much concessions from the Labor government 
before the impending advent of perhaps a less sympathetic Conservative government in Britain. 
1204 Ibid., 73. 
1205 Ibid., 74. 
1206 Ibid. 
1207 Political Intelligence Notes, 1949, CO 537/7233, PRO, London. 
1208 However, the NLC soon terminated its affiliation with the Communist-controlled WFTU in 
September 1951, realizing the futility of this.  Ananaba recorded that from then until the emergence of a 
new central labor organization in 1953, the Congress was a façade existing only on letter-heads and on the 
pages of certain newspapers.  Wogu Ananaba, The Trade Union Movement in Nigeria (Benin, Nigeria: 
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